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Hostage and crisis negotiators are police officers who have been trained to respond to 
and resolve hostage and crisis incidents.  They are often required to respond to highly-
pressurised and emotive incidents that may last for protracted periods of time and are likely to 
encounter situations whereby their actions could play a role in whether individuals live or die.  
The first aim of the current thesis was to identify whether negotiators in the United Kingdom 
(UK) possess certain traits or characteristics that serve to enable them to perform their role 
effectively and differentiate them from the wider police population.  The first phase of the 
research involved a quantitative cross-sectional comparison of a sample of hostage and crisis 
negotiators (n = 117) with a sample of non-negotiator police officers (n = 118) from 21 UK 
forces and a sample of students (n = 203) utilising a psychometric test battery measuring five 
constructs previously identified within the literature as playing a role in success within 
occupational settings: Personality, Coping Style, Cognitive Emotion Regulation, Decision-
Making Style and Emotional Intelligence.  The findings refuted the existence of a “unique 
hostage and crisis negotiator profile” but confirmed the existence of a unique “police officer 
profile” by demonstrating significant differences between both police samples and the student 
sample in relation to all constructs measured.  These findings are discussed with reference to the 
implications for the selection, training and CPD of UK negotiators.  
 
Hostage and crisis negotiation is one of many options available to police incident 
commanders and is well-established as an effective means of resolving hostage and crisis 
incidents.  Whilst there is a plethora of published literature relating to the entity of hostage and 
crisis negotiation, the majority of this literature has been developed within the United States of 
America (USA), on the basis of USA negotiator deployments and experiences.  The second aim, 
therefore, was to provide an insight into the discipline of negotiation in the UK by conducting a 
constructivist grounded theory analysis of the experiences of negotiators as derived from semi-
structured interviews with 15 negotiators from nine UK police forces.  The findings allowed for 
the development of five grounded theoretical micro-models: a) The Nature and Characteristics 
of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation, b) The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey, c) 
The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation, d) The 
UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience, and e) The Self-Perceived Successful UK 
Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile.  These micro-models are discussed with reference to 
their implications for hostage and crisis negotiation policy and practice in a UK-centric context. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Thesis Rationale 
 Hostage and crisis negotiation (HCNn) as an entity has existed as a specific police tool 
since the 1980s, with the United States of America (USA) pioneering the development of HCNn 
teams within police departments (Fuselier 1981a).  Since the implementation of the “negotiate 
first policy” (Bolz 1979), it has evolved and become more advanced and widespread 
internationally, with the majority of police forces/departments having at least some officers 
trained to act as hostage and crisis negotiators (HCNs).  There has been a plethora of research 
studies that have established the discipline as a credible police tool; with some going so far as to 
purport that HCNn “has come to be known as one of law enforcement’s most effective tools” 
(Regini 2002: 1).  The majority of these studies have been conducted in the USA, and most 
models were developed utilising US-based case studies/data and HCNs.  To date, and to the 
author’s knowledge, there has been no published empirical research that has identified how 
HCNs in the United Kingdom (UK) operate, or what works in relation to the styles, strategies 
and techniques utilised.  The rationale for the current research was, therefore, to shine a light on 
negotiation from a UK-centric perspective, as perceived by the experts themselves – current 
operationally active HCNs. 
 Whilst the current research was driven firstly by a need to document/describe/validate 
the current UK HCNn approach as a result of this narrative being lacking within the current 
literature base, it was also informed by the potential for UK HCNn to differ from HCNn carried 
out in other countries as a result of cultural differences that are likely to play a part in 
communication/language/negotiation style.  Work by Giebels and Taylor (2010), for example, 
identified cultural differences that influenced the process of negotiation by analysing 25 audio-
recorded HCNn situations that took part in the Netherlands or Belgium.  They found that 
subjects from low-context cultures (i.e. individualistic Western societies) reciprocated rational 
arguments from a HCN more quickly; whereas subjects from high-context cultures (i.e. 
collectivistic non-Western societies) tended to reciprocate intimidation strategies more quickly, 
suggesting that culture plays a role within HNCn incidents and more specifically, within the 
way HCN arguments/use of social influence/strategy are perceived by subjects from different 
cultural backgrounds.  Giebels and Taylor (2010) suggest that these findings can be explained 
by cultural norms in relation to handling conflict, with intimidation (i.e. confrontation and 
assertiveness), for example, being perceived as a more appropriate way of handling conflict 
within low-context cultures (Fu and Yukl 2000).  These findings provide a rationale to study 
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HNCn from different cultural perspectives, to identify whether HCNn as an entity differs in 
accordance with the country/culture in which it is situated.  The current research, therefore, 
provides an insight into the way HCNn is conducted within the UK and may, therefore, provide 
a starting point for further/future comparison with HCNn carried out within other individualist 
or collectivist cultures to help provide a deeper understanding of the role of culture within 
HCNn.          
 Furthermore, there has also been a lack of empirical research identifying the 
characteristics and traits of HCNs (particularly within the UK), or whether HCNs differ from 
their non-negotiator colleagues in relation to socio-psychological constructs.  HCNn is a role 
that involves dealing with incredibly stressful/volatile and emotive situations, sometimes for 
protracted periods of time, and as such, it would seem prudent to suggest that certain individuals 
are more suited to the role than others, when considering their psychological make-up.  As such, 
the current research aimed to empirically address the question of whether HCNs possess a 
certain set of traits/characteristics that differentiate them from the rest of the police population.  
These findings have potential implications in terms of the recruitment and selection of future 
trainee HCNs.    
 
1.2. Context for the Selection of Hostage and Crisis Negotiators 
(HCNs) 
 
Whilst exact selection processes will vary slightly from police department to 
department within the USA, there are a number of established protocols/procedures for selecting 
new/trainee HCNs.  The National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA) and FBI Crisis 
Negotiation Unit (CNU) recommended guidelines and policies for selecting HCNn team 
members (established in 2001), for example, suggest that consideration should be given to 
identifying officers that display the following competencies: they are volunteering for the role; 
they have a high level of self-control; they have a good ability to remain calm under stress; they 
demonstrate excellent interpersonal communication skills; they have a calm and confident 
demeanour; they are a good listener and interviewer; and they work well in a team concept 
(NCNA & FBI CNU n.d.).  In a similar vein, the Canadian Police College stipulates the 
following selection criteria for trainee crisis negotiators: officers should be strong team players; 
have at least five years of operational police experience; possess above-average interviewing, 
communication and listening skills; and be able to perform under high levels of stress for long 
periods of time (Canadian Police College 2016).  When selecting candidates who are suitable to 
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attend this training course, the Ontario Provincial Police, for example, assess candidates on the 
basis of behavioural competencies alone, including: commitment to organisational learning; 
communicating effectively; flexibility; impact and influence; learning from experience; problem 
solving; self-control; and team work (Ontario Provincial Police 2006).   
There is also a fairly well-established selection model for trainee HCNs in the USA, as 
directed by McMains and Mullins (2014), which directs law enforcement agencies to follow a 
sequence of steps when selecting new HCNs.  These steps include: 1) Advertisement of a HCN 
team vacancy that informs officers of the role requirements; 2) Officers should apply via an 
interest sheet/application which includes biographical/work data, details why they are interested 
in the position and provides evidence of their communication ability; 3) Officers should be 
subjected to a structured interview with the team leader, whereby they are rated/graded on the 
following aspects: the candidate’s willingness to work unusual hours, be on call, views on 
teamwork and communication ability (amongst others); 4) Candidates should take part in a 
structured HCN team interview, whereby the team members have a chance to assess the 
candidate in relation to aspects such as: communication skills, adaptability, ability to think on 
one’s feet, temperament, ability to cope with a variety of situations, team working skills/ability, 
ability to deal with stress and team fit (amongst others); 5) Use of a telephone role play scenario 
whereby the candidate is scored by team members on their performance in responding to a 
scripted/standardised crisis intervention situation (such as a barricaded suicidal subject).  
Optional additional steps include incorporation of a physical fitness/agility test (used by some 
departments) (Hogewood 2005) and utilisation of psychological testing/evaluation, as a means 
of assessing candidates’ abilities to deal with stress, anger management, stability of personality, 
ability to solve problems creatively, ability to take orders and not be in charge, and frustration 
intolerance (McMains and Mullins 2014).     
It is clear that there is some national guidance from a USA perspective1 when selecting 
new HCN trainees, however, a similar tangible UK policy/set of guidance is lacking.  Kennett’s 
(2003) work identified limitations associated with the multi-faceted approach adopted by UK 
police forces when selecting HCNs, and it would appear that this issue has still not been 
addressed.  Whilst ostensibly, UK forces follow a similar approach to that described above, 
current mandate dictates that individual territorial forces utilise their own selection procedures 
and this will vary in accordance with force HR policies and hostage negotiator coordinator 
(HCN) force/regional lead directives.  An exemplar force recruitment method requires 
candidates to apply utilising a paper-based application form by demonstrating evidence to 
                                                          
1 There are likely to be other international police/law enforcement policies that govern the selection of 
HCNs, however, this information is not always publically available due to the security concerns within 
the policing arena. 
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support the following Policing Professional Framework (PPF) qualities: 1) Decision making; 2) 
Leadership – Leading People; 3) Professionalism; 4) Public service; and 5) Working with others 
(Anonymised at request of force 2016) but specific policies regarding the next steps within the 
selection process do not appear to be officially documented/publically available.  Without 
access to each of the 43 specific individual UK force policies, it is impossible to state whether 
all forces assess against the same criteria at the initial application stage, or whether all forces 
utilise the same selection model in terms of the interview/assessment process.  As such, the 
Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey Model discussed in Chapter 7 attempts to bridge this gap 
by describing the current selection processes for HCNs in the UK, as identified within the 
interview data obtained as part of the qualitative phase of the research.  It is worth noting here 
that the final (and most pertinent) stage of the selection process constitutes successful 
completion of the regional or national HCN training course, which some applicants may fail to 
achieve.             
 
1.3. Thesis Structure and Chapter Outline 
 Chapters 2 and 3 present the findings from two literature reviews and provide the 
theoretical grounding and rationale for the empirical research which is discussed in the 
subsequent chapters.  Chapter 4 describes the method utilised to conduct the empirical research 
and provides a theoretical underpinning for the choice of methodology in relation to both the 
quantitative and qualitative phases of the research.  Chapters 5 and 6 present the quantitative 
findings assessing and comparing the traits and characteristics of UK HCNs with non-negotiator 
trained police officers and a student sample utilising a psychometric test battery.  Chapter 5 
focuses on the findings in relation to three of the psychological constructs measured 
(Personality, Coping Style and Cognitive Emotion Regulation), whereas Chapter 6 focuses on 
the findings in relation to the remaining constructs: General Decision-Making Style and 
Emotional Intelligence.   
Chapters 7-10 present the findings from the qualitative phase of the research, a 
grounded theory analysis of data collected via semi-structured interviews with 15 HCNs from 
nine territorial police forces across the UK.  Five qualitative theoretical micro-models were 
developed: a) The Nature and Characteristics of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation, b) The UK 
Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey, c) The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model 
of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation, d) The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience, and e) 
The Self-Perceived Successful UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile.  These micro-models 
are discussed with reference to their implications for enhancing our understanding of HCNn.  
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Chapter 11 presents a discussion and evaluation of the findings with an emphasis on 
their significance, and recommendations in terms of policy and practice for HCNn in the UK.  
The thesis concludes by drawing together conclusions formed as a result of the two phases of 
research which provide a multi-perspective insight into the phenomenon of HCNn.       
 
1.4. Terminology 
The following abbreviations are used throughout the thesis: 
 
 HCN: hostage and crisis negotiator 
 HCNs: hostage and crisis negotiators 
 HCNn: hostage and crisis negotiation 
 HNC: hostage negotiator coordinator 
 
In addition to this, the term “subject” is utilised to refer to either a “hostage-taker” or 
“individual-in-crisis”, depending on the context of the hostage or crisis situation being referred 





Chapter 2: Modern-Day Hostage (Crisis) 
Negotiation: The Evolution of an Art Form 
Within the Policing Arena 
This chapter presents a review of the literature in relation to the evolution of HCNn as a 
police tool/discipline.  The aim is to provide a contextual backdrop in terms of how HCNn 
developed as an entity and to provide an insight into the existing models of HCNn.  The extant 
literature is utilised to identify gaps within the literature base and to generate a rationale for the 
current study.  This review was published in the journal of Aggression and Violent Behavior in 
2010.  This chapter includes the pre-print version of the manuscript and the reference list has 
been embedded within the overall reference list section of the thesis. 
 
Grubb, A. (2010) ‘Modern-Day Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation: The Evolution of an Art Form  




2.1.1. The Evolution of Modern Day Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation 
 The concept of hostage negotiation is shrouded in a wealth of misperception.  Hostage 
incidents are as old as recorded time and the evolution of hostage negotiation as both a criminal 
and socially acceptable act (e.g., in times of war) can be plotted throughout the ages.  The 
earliest recorded incidents can be traced back to biblical times in the book of Genesis 14: 12-16 
with the abduction, and subsequent rescue, of Abraham’s nephew Lot by the armies of four 
kings.  Abraham’s use of 318 men to rescue his nephew is the first recorded account of the use 
of force to resolve a hostage incident (Soskis and Van Zandt 1986).  Similarly, there are 
multiple accounts of Israelites and their enemies taking each other captive as spoils of war, to 
deplete the resources of opposing enemies and to attempt to convert potential enemies to the 
cause (McMains and Mullins 1996).  Helen of Troy’s abduction and the kidnapping of Julius 
Cesar for ransom in 51BC are also historically relevant events involving hostage scenarios.   
In post-biblical times, pirates of many nationalities have used hostages to obtain money 
or goods from third parties who valued the lives of those being held captive.  This form of 
hostage-taking by pirates preceded the instrumental use of innocent captives by modern 
terrorists for social, political, or religious goals.  During the middle ages, hostages were taken 
by European nations to enforce the compliance of enemy nationals during the war.  This 
conceptualisation of hostage-taking links to the origin of the word “hostage” which is derived 
from the Latin hostis meaning “guest”.  This derivation demonstrates the highly frequent 
political and military use of hostages in the past, whereby political authorities or generals would 
legally agree to hand over one or usually several hostages in the custody of the other side, as 
guarantee of good faith in the observance of obligations.  In the early 20th century, hostage-
taking for this purpose continued, with hostages being taken by one nation to coerce another.  In 
1942, for example, Germany took two million French hostages after the division of France in 
order to ensure compliance of the French people.  From this conceptualisation of the hostage-
taking incident, responses to such events have developed and evolved into what is now known 
as hostage or crisis negotiation.   
 The impetus for the development of modern hostage negotiation is debatable; however, 
one particular incident is cited by many law enforcement professionals as providing the driving 
force for the development of techniques to de-escalate crisis situations often involving hostages.  
This incident is commonly referred to as the “Munich Massacre” that occurred at the 1972 
Olympic Games.  During this incident, a group of Palestinian terrorists invaded an Olympic 
dormitory and seized 11 Israeli athletes as hostages.  The incident was dealt with via force; and 
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once the terrorists political demands had been refused, the Munich police resorted to firepower, 
resulting in the death of 22 people: 1 policeman, 10 terrorists and all 11 of the hostages.  This 
tragedy highlighted the distinct lack of protocol or procedure to deal with crisis situations in a 
controlled way and result in limited death/harm to hostages.  In the wake of this tragedy, 
international law enforcement agencies began to criticise the lack of effective crisis 
management techniques for hostage situations and began to explore new techniques which 
could be employed within such situations (Soskis and Van Zandt 1986).  Since then, several 
models of negotiation have been developed for use in hostage situations, based primarily on 
problem-solving approaches to response, management, and resolution of these incidents (Fisher, 
Ury and Patton 1991, Lanceley 1999, McMains and Mullins 2001 and Webster 1998 cited in 
Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005).       
 In response to these tragic incidents, police agencies in the USA began implementing a 
“negotiate first” policy in dealing with both hostage-taking situations and perpetrators 
barricaded without hostages (Bolz 1979).  This policy led to the development of specialised 
hostage negotiation teams that include a designated negotiator, tactical assault team (TAC), 
command structure, and support personnel (Fuselier 1981a) with the primary aim of resolution 
and guiding principle being to minimise and eliminate the loss of life (McMains and Mullins 
2001).   
 
2.1.2. Types of Hostage Situation 
 Hostage negotiation as an entity evolved from the tragic result of the Munich Massacre 
in 1972 which has come to be known as an example of a ‘traditional hostage-taking incident’, 
however, research shows that hostage negotiation may be utilised within a variety of different 
scenarios and contexts.  Literature which has examined the type of scenario which involves the 
deployment of negotiators has identified that while every situation has unique aspects, there are 
some general types of hostage situation that police typically encounter (Boltz, Dudonis, and 
Schultz 1996, McMains and Mullins 1996, Rogan 1997 and Russell and Biegel 1990).  These 
data have been used to create classification systems or typologies of crisis event situations.  
Various authors have created different typologies or classification systems; an early system 
devised by Hassell (1975), for example, established that hostage-takers fell into one of four 
basic categories including a) emotionally disturbed, b) criminal trapped in the commission of 
crime, c) prisoner in a revolt situation, and d) politically motivated; with the ratios of each 
subtype varying internationally in accordance with more common types of crime.  
More recently, Call (1996, 2003) has devised a more complex classification system 
based on hostage-taker typology.  He states that there are six major types of hostage-taker: the 
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emotionally disturbed, political extremist, religious fanatics, criminals, prisoner inmates and a 
combination of two or more of the above.  Call goes further by identifying multiple subtypes 
under these typologies.  For example, under the emotionally disturbed category there are seven 
subtypes: brain damaged, elderly/senile, depressed, paranoid, schizophrenic, substance abuser 
and personal/family disputes (Fuselier 1988, Gist and Perry 1985, Kennedy and Dyer 1992, 
Pearce 1977 and Strentz 1986).  Similarly, the political extremist can be further sub-divided into 
subtypes.  Knutson (1980), for example, makes reference to the reluctant captor and the 
deliberate hostage-taker and suggests the former to be dreamers and philosophers whose violent 
act was part of an attempt to right a wrong and who indicated that they were unwilling to kill 
their hostages, whereas the latter, on the other hand is described as more instrumental in the act 
and is perfectly willing to kill his or her captives to obtain their perceived goal.  The religious 
fanatic can also be further subdivided, dependent on the particular cult/religion's internal mores 
and values (Cooper 1981).  Further subcategories also exist amongst the criminal and prison 
inmate typologies, with Call (2003) making particular reference to the subtype of criminal 
psychopath. 
 In addition to the development of typologies, research has identified a variety of 
common characteristics exhibited within crisis/hostage situations within the USA.  This 
research has enabled a picture of the "common hostage situation" to be constructed, providing 
hostage negotiators with a model which conceptualises the characteristics of the hostage 
situation, including details relating to the hostage-taker's motivation, behaviour, and the 
resolution of the incident.  Head (1990), for example, analysed 3330 incidents of domestic 
hostage-taking that occurred between 1973 and 1982 and created a database entitled Hostage 
Event Analytic Database (HEAD).  Head identified ten common characteristics associated with 
domestic hostage-taking which included: 
 
1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the criminal or prison inmate typology (52%). 
2. The second largest typology of perpetrators were the political extremist/religious fanatic 
(21%) followed by the emotionally disturbed (18%). 
3. The majority of perpetrators were young (25% below age 30), white (61%), male (80%) 
and acted alone. 
4. The usual number of victims captured was one (47%) or two (15%). 
5. The most common location for the crisis event was a form of transportation (35%) 
followed by a home (20%). 
6. The most common motivation for the perpetrator's actions was political/publicity (33%) 
followed by money (23%). 
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7. The most common weapon used was a firearm (31%). 
8. The most common event duration was one day or less (53%). 
9. The majority of incidents were non-lethal (87%).  However, hostages were more at risk 
for injury than the hostage-taker. 
10. The majority of incidents were negotiated (64%). 
 
Similar research conducted at a later date by Feldman (2001) in Kentucky looked at 120 
hostage/barricade incidents, and identified seven characteristic factors: 
 
1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the personal/family dispute typology (31%). 
2. The second largest typology of perpetrators was criminal (26%) followed by the 
emotionally disturbed (19%). 
3. The majority of perpetrators were young (below age 30), male and acted alone. 
4. The most common motivation for the perpetrator's actions was an interpersonal dispute 
complicated by an underlying psychiatric disorder as well as alcohol or drug use. 
5. The most common weapon used was a firearm (75%). 
6. The majority of incidents ended in injury or death to either some of the hostages or to 
the perpetrator (88%). 
7. The majority of incidents were negotiated, but negotiations were successful in less than 
40% of the time. 
 These findings illustrate the vast disparity in the characteristics of hostage/crisis 
incidents and suggest that although similarities exist, there is no one “typical hostage scenario”.  
This concept is also echoed within the literature focusing on classification systems and 
typologies of hostage situations, whereby systems and typologies are vast and disparate, with 
little convergence in terms of an established and agreed upon classification system.  It is clear 
that the classification system is dependent upon the type and source of data which are used to 
devise it, i.e. crisis situations will vary from state to state and country to country, so it is likely 
that situations will arise that cannot be neatly slotted into one of the typologies.  The nature of 
“crisis” situations dictates that no two scenarios will be exactly the same; therefore, the database 
of encountered crisis situations is ever expanding.  As such, typologies and classification 
systems should be interpreted with caution, and negotiators must be careful not to respond to the 
situation as a specific type of crisis incident, as opposed to a unique crisis scenario which may 
develop in any number of possible permutations.     
 Interestingly, despite the terminology used to describe the phenomenon, hostage 
negotiation does not always involve hostages.  While early research focused on what is referred 
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to as the “first generation of negotiations” whereby negotiators were typically responding to 
terrorist hostage situations with political or religious motivations, the “second generation of 
negotiations”, marked by the early 1980s demonstrated a clear shift in the types of incidents of 
greatest concern to the law enforcement agencies which involved emotionally disturbed 
individuals and trapped criminals.  Gist and Perry (1985), for example, found that the majority 
incidents which involved negotiators being called out were those including domestic, barricaded 
and suicidal incidents.  Research conducted by McMains (1988a cited in Vecchi, Van Hasselt 
and Romano 2005) reflected this shift by revealing that less than 18% of the incidents dealt with 
by negotiation over a five year period in 15 of the largest U.S. cities actually involved hostages.  
In line with this, Hatcher et al. (1998) noted a change in the type of typical scenario with 
negotiators working more with emotionally disturbed individuals, trapped criminals and 
domestic incidents and less with terrorists and prisoners.  Contrary to public misconception, 
negotiators are often being faced by people in the midst of an escalated personal crisis, as this 
quote from Noesner and Webster (1997: 13) demonstrates: 
  
“The majority of critical incidents to which law enforcement responds involve subjects 
who are motivated primarily by emotional needs...[and] these incidents may involve 
jilted lovers, disgruntled employees, or students, mood-disordered or psychotic 
subjects, suicidal individuals, or individuals, who, for whatever reason, believe that 
they or their beliefs have been threatened or demeaned by society”.  
 
This demonstrates the varied and diverse nature of the role of the negotiator and provides an 
explanation for the change in terminology from “hostage negotiation” to “crisis negotiation” 
(McMains and Mullins 1996) which is now commonly accepted amongst the negotiation 
literature.  
 
2.1.3. The Role of Mental Health in Crisis Situations  
 A key theme running throughout the literature highlights the increasingly common 
occurrence of crisis incidents involving individuals suffering from mental health problems.  
Individuals with mental health problems are disproportionately represented within those 
identified as hostage-takers.  For example, an early analysis of 245 hostage-taking incidents 
reported to the FBI by USA law enforcement agencies from 1976 to 1983 revealed that 145 of 
these incidents (59%) were attributed to individuals who were apparently suffering from a 
mental health disorder or who were experiencing emotional turmoil arising from personal 
problems or emotional disputes (Strentz 1985 cited in Soskis and Van Zandt 1986).  Similarly, 
Miron and Goldstein (1979) found that the majority of people who take hostages suffer from 
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some form of psychopathology, with hostage-takers typically falling into four diagnostic 
categories: paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar disorder (depressed type), antisocial personality 
and “inadequate personality” (Borum and Strentz 1992).  The exact prevalence of mentally 
disturbed individuals committing hostage-taking incidents still remains unclear with research 
reporting varied prevalence rates.  Research focusing specifically on the prevalence of 
emotionally disturbed individuals as perpetrators varies from 52% (Fuselier 1981a and Strentz 
1987) to 88% (Butler, Leitenberg, and Fuselier 1993) with variability perhaps attributable to the 
size of the agency and multiple definitions of “emotionally or mentally disturbed”.  It should be 
noted, that this correlation between hostage-taking incidents and the prevalence of mental health 
problems cannot be directly translated into a causal link.  Specifically, while a high proportion 
of those involved in hostage incidents may be more likely to suffer from mental health problems 
or emotional difficulties, this does not mean that a high proportion of those suffering from 
mental health problems are likely to take hostages.   
 Historically, both psychologists and psychiatrists have been used to contribute to the 
development of negotiation techniques.  In the 1970s, Psychiatrist Mulder (1976 cited in 
Hatcher et al. 1998) acted as a consultant to The Hague in the Netherlands and Scott (1976 cited 
in Hatcher et al. 1998) adopted a similar role in the UK, advising Scotland Yard.  A number of 
psychologists also contributed to this field throughout the 70s and 80s (Bell et al. 1989, Miron 
and Goldstein 1979 and Stratton 1978).  The role of mental health professionals as advisors 
within crisis incidents is, therefore, not a new one.  However, the utilisation of such mental 
health professionals has developed in line with the increasingly prevalent role of mental health 
within such incidents.  The existence of psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers within 
an advisory capacity is well established within hostage negotiation protocol in many parts of the 
USA. Researchers estimate that between 30% and 58% of agencies with a crisis/hostage 
negotiation team utilise a mental health consultant in some fashion and 88% of these tend to be 
psychologists as opposed to other mental health professionals (Butler, Leitenberg and Fuselier 
1993, Delprinho and Bahn 1988 and Fuselier 1988).  Utilisation of such advisors is also in 
existence within the UK, although on a much smaller scale.  This acceptance of the usefulness 
of psychological knowledge/input within hostage negotiation teams is a demonstration and 
public acknowledgement of the role of mental health within crisis situations.  Although the 
efficacy of mental health consultation within crisis/hostage situations has not been researched 
extensively, research conducted by Butler, Leitenberg and Fuselier (1993) found that the use of 
a mental health consultant to assess the perpetrator resulted in fewer hostage incidents leading to 
the serious injury or death of a hostage, more negotiated surrenders, and fewer incidents in 
which the SWAT team had to enter to arrest the suspect.  Similar support for the use of mental 
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health professionals is also exhibited anecdotally by many of the major city police departments 
in the USA, including the Los Angeles, New York City, San Antonio, San Francisco, and 
Houston Police Departments, who report highly effective outcomes from their crisis/hostage 
negotiation teams with deaths to hostages and hostage-takers extremely rare (McMains 1988b).     
The role of mental health within crisis situations is echoed by the terminology of 
“crisis” itself.  And research indicates that mental health is likely to play a role in at least a 
proportion of the hostage or crisis incidents that negotiators are involved with for some time to 
come.  This concept is resonated in line with the rising prevalence of mental health problems 
within society today, with recent research demonstrating a 46.6% lifetime prevalence rate of 
DSM-IV classified disorders - a figure which is higher than in previous cohorts (Kessler et al. 
2005).  These findings implicate and highlight the need for continued involvement of mental 
health professionals as advisors within the negotiation arena for the foreseeable future. 
  
2.1.4. Negotiation Strategy 
 Crisis negotiation has come to be known as “one of law enforcement's most effective 
tools” and this statement is consistently supported by the successful resolution of tens of 
thousands of hostage, barricade, attempted suicide, and kidnapping cases throughout the world 
(Regini 2002: 1).  Such a contention is also supported by data from the Hostage Barricade 
database System (HOBAS) established by the Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) of the FBI.  
HOBAS serves as a database on hostage/crisis incidents through the systematic collection of 
cases (post incident) from law enforcement agencies across the USA.  An analysis of HOBAS 
data from 2002-2003 indicated that approximately 82% of reported incidents were resolved 
without death or injury to the subject or the victim (Flood 2003).  Similarly, a considerable 
number of case studies and anecdotal reports further attest to the efficacy of crisis negotiation 
(see McMains and Mullins 2001 and Rogan, Hammer and Van Zandt 1997).  However, despite 
this excellent success rate, the rapidly increasing phenomenon of hostage-taking continues to 
challenge law enforcement professionals worldwide (Call 1996, McMains and Mullins 2001 
and Romano 1998).  For this reason, it is essential to establish what makes a negotiator 
effective, and what strategies are effective within such situations, so as to improve the success 
rate of negotiations and minimise the loss of life for both hostages and hostage-takers.    
The art of crisis negotiation has been described by some as a “complex verbal dance 
between the negotiator and the subject” (Kelln and McMurtry 2007: 30).  Crisis negotiation 
exists on a spectrum of infinite situational variables, with scenarios and ‘key players’ shifting 
over time with each contextual change.  Some situations involve hostages, while others do not.  
Some subjects are suicidal, some are homicidal, and in some cases the subject may display both 
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types of behaviour.  Some incidents involve weapons or explosives, whereas others are deemed 
unmanageable by the barricade location or pragmatic logistics associated with the scenario.  
Given the infinite range of possible situations that may be encountered by hostage (crisis) 
negotiators internationally, it is unrealistic to think that specific strategies for each situation can 
be learned by the negotiator.  Instead, what is required is a flexible working model of 
negotiation that can be adapted to each individual scenario, providing the best possible outcome 
for the crisis situation.  In essence, a good working model of crisis negotiation must be flexible 
enough that it applies to virtually any situation regardless of the context, subject state-of-mind, 
or other constraints (Kelln and McMurtry 2007).    
 Although every hostage/crisis incident is different, and involves an infinite number of 
variables, research conducted by a number of researchers has managed to establish a basic 
consensual protocol for handling hostage crises at a macro level, as a result of training and 
experience (Call 2003, Greenstone 1995, 2005, Lanceley 1999, McMains 2002, 2003, McMains 
and Mullins 1996, 2002, Miller 2005, 2006, Noesner 1999, Noesner and Dolan 1992, Noesner 
and Webster 1997, Slatkin 1996, 2005 and Wind 1995).  The basic elements of this protocol 
include: 
 
 Isolate and contain the hostage-taker and secure the perimeter to keep the hostage-
taker in and unauthorised persons out. 
 Provide for scene control.  This may involve mobilising medical service, controlling 
the local traffic, dealing with the media, and keeping the surrounding community 
sufficiently informed to protect their safety. 
 Establish some form of communication with the hostage-taker, such as line phone, cell 
phone, bullhorn - even digital pager or email - as soon as possible. 
 Employ socialised/pseudo-therapeutic communication strategies, such as rapport 
building and active listening. 
 Respond appropriately to demands and deadlines, with the overriding goal being the 
safety of the hostages. 
 Structure the surrender ritual and resolution of the crisis carefully and know when to 
employ a tactical response, if absolutely necessary. 
 Utilise operational and stress debriefing techniques on hostages, hostage-takers, and 
crisis team members as appropriate. 
 
This protocol provides an overall blueprint for managing the situation from both a tactical and 
negotiator perspective.  Similarly, research has addressed the negotiation procedure on a more 
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micro level by exploring the strategies that have been used and have been found to be successful 
within the negotiation procedure.  As a result of this, these strategies have been adopted by law 
enforcement professionals within their roles as negotiators with the aim of reducing/minimising 
the loss of life during such crisis situations.  Many of these strategies have been born out of 
models of crisis negotiation.  Some of the key models of negotiation are outlined below.   
 
2.2. Models of Negotiation 
2.2.1. Principled Negotiation 
 One of the earliest models of negotiation was proposed by Fisher and Ury (1981) and 
expanded upon by Fisher, Ury, and Patton in 1991.  Principled negotiation focuses on what is 
referred to as an “interest-based” approach to conflict resolution.  The model advocates four 
fundamental principles of negotiation: 1) separate the person from the problem, 2) focus on 
mutual interests instead of individual positions, 3) generate options for mutual gain, and 4) 
insist on using objective criteria to judge the effectiveness of the agreement.  The initial 
principle works on the basis that people tend to become personally involved with the problem 
and therefore will often interpret outsiders’ responses as personal attacks.  The second principle 
works on the basis that good agreements focus on the parties' interests, rather than their 
positions.  When individuals are focused on defining a problem in terms of positions, there will 
inevitably be one party who will “lose” the dispute.  In contrast to this, when a problem is 
defined in terms of the parties' individual underlying interests it is often possible to find a 
solution which satisfies both parties' interests.  The third principle focuses on the generation of 
options and is based on the concept that generation of options that will mutually benefit both 
parties will result in eventual successful resolution of the conflict.   
The final principle relates to the importance of using objective criteria to judge the 
effectiveness of the agreement.  This principle is particularly salient when parties' interests are 
directly opposed.  In such situations, Fisher and Ury's (1981) model proposes that individuals 
should develop objective criteria which is appropriate for the situation and should use this 
criteria to govern agreements and resolution of the conflict.  Examples of such criteria include 
scientific findings, professional standards, or legal precedent and adherence to such criteria 
helps to preserve the relationship between the parties, an aspect which is vital when negotiating 
crisis situations.  This early model of negotiation was seen to be influential and provided 
negotiators with a framework for the utilisation of problem-solving techniques to respond to, 
manage and resolve crisis incidents.  Although this model provided a useful tool for early 
negotiators, it has been critiqued for its lack of applicability to many crisis situations due to the 
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prerequisite for both parties involved to be functioning in a rational cognitive state.  Many of the 
principles outlined by Fisher and Ury (1981) simply could not be implemented with an 
individual who was suffering from a severe mental illness or emotional conflict, as they would 
be unable to go through the processes outlined in a rational manner.   
 
2.2.2. The "Getting Past No" Model of Negotiation 
 Ury (1991) built upon previous work within the conflict resolution arena by developing 
a five-step model for people engaged in difficult negotiations and applied this to a variety of 
settings, including that of hostage negotiation.  The first step is entitled “Don't React - Go to the 
Balcony” and Ury describes this stage as a shift from the negotiator as a participant in the 
process to an observer in the negotiation process.  Ury utilises the analogy of the negotiator 
acting as a third party standing on a balcony watching actors perform a play on a stage, rather 
than being part of the play themselves.  The negotiator needs to avoid any form of anger, 
confrontation and emotion, and this can be achieved by shifting the dynamics of the negotiator 
from participant to observer.  The second step is entitled “Stepping to Their Side” and refers to 
the requirement for the negotiator to paint the hostage-taker in the light of an ally rather than an 
opponent.  By making the subject a partner in the process and making them perceive that they 
are working together to form a resolution, this is more likely to result in successful peaceful 
resolution of the crisis situation.  Echoing the recurring theme running throughout many of the 
crisis negotiation models, this step can be achieved by utilising active listening skills, such as 
mirroring, paraphrasing, emotional labelling and summarising.   
The third step is entitled “Change the Game” and refers to the concept of reframing 
subject demands so as to avoid rejecting the hostage-taker’s demands which is likely to result in 
resistance.  This step can be achieved by utilising open-ended questions which force the subject 
to think about possible solutions and alternatives, deflecting attacks from the subject and 
reframing problems to reveal future solutions.  The fourth stage of Ury's model is entitled 
“Build a Golden Bridge” and this essentially relates to the negotiator's attempt to make it easy 
for the subject to say “yes” instead of “no”.  The negotiator has to make the hostage-taker a 
willing partner in the negotiating process by involving them in the decision-making process.  If 
the negotiator attempts to force compliance, this is likely to result in resistance and continuation 
of unrealistic demands.  Consequently, the aim is for the negotiator to help generate ideas from 
the subject to help them feel part of the process and encourage collaboration.  It has also been 
suggested that in getting the hostage-taker to say yes, this has a mutually beneficial effect, as it 
benefits the negotiation process by encouraging successful resolution, but it also helps the 
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subject to save face - an element which plays a role in the successful resolution of crisis 
incidents (Mullins 2002).   
The final stage in the model is entitled “Make it Hard to Say No” which expands upon 
the fourth stage by not only increasing the subject's desire to say “yes”, but also making it 
harder for the subject to say “no”, thereby increasing the chances of successful resolution of the 
incident.  This model provides a toolbox of techniques to utilise within crisis situations, but 
again, relies on some element of cognitive rational processing on behalf of both parties, an 
aspect which is often lacking within the hostage-taker mentality.  In line with the recurring 
theme of emotionally disturbed or mentally disordered individuals involved in crisis incidents, it 
is likely that these individuals will require a different negotiation approach, which is less 
systematic or hierarchical and more crisis-intervention based.  Once cognitions and 
rationalisation have been restored somewhat, more cognitively based problem solving 
techniques, such as those discussed above can be employed.     
  
2.2.3. The Crisis Bargaining Model 
Donohue et al. (1991) utilise a different model to describe strategies used by 
negotiators.  Their model focuses on the type of bargaining that parties involved in the 
negotiation utilise and identifies and distinguishes between crisis (distributive) and normative 
(integrative) bargaining.  The model incorporates the notion of both relationship (expressive) 
and substantive (material) issues being addressed with differing levels of preference at different 
stages throughout the negotiation process.  The model works on the basis that the initial stages 
of negotiation tend to focus on relational issues, such as power, role, trust and status between 
police and hostage-takers.  Once these issues become resolved, more attention or weight gets 
placed on substantive issues to resolve the problem.  In essence, crisis bargaining is about 
relationships and normative bargaining is more focused on resolving material issues.  Donohue 
et al. (1991) apply this model to hostage negotiation strategies by trying to move hostage-takers 
away from crisis bargaining and towards normative bargaining in order to resolve the crisis 
situation.  Ideally, negotiation should progress in a step-wise manner from crisis to normative 
bargaining; however, Donohue and Roberto (1996) note that this is not always the case.  
Hammer and Rogan (1997) make a similar distinction in their communication-based negotiation 
model whereby they identify instrumental, relational, and identity issues within a negotiation, 
and specify the need for negotiators to steer hostage-takers away from crisis (i.e., relational and 
identity) bargaining modes (where relational and identity issues are prevalent) to normative 
bargaining modes (where instrumental needs are paramount), which is more likely to result in 
successful resolution of the crisis situation.  Donohue et al.'s (1991) model focuses less on 
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specific techniques and more on adapting the style of negotiation to the appropriate needs of the 
perpetrator (i.e., by focusing on crisis or normative bargaining, respectively).  
 
2.2.4. The S.A.F.E. Model of Crisis Negotiation 
 The S.A.F.E. model was developed by Hammer and Rogan (1997) and forms a key part 
of many negotiator toolboxes today.  The model was devised on the basis of a combination of 
behavioural science research and insights of numerous operationally active crisis negotiators.  
The model creates a specific framework for de-escalating and resolving crisis situations by 
incorporating a variety of effective strategies within a communication plan to influence the 
behaviour of the subject (e.g., hostage-taker, suicidal individual) in a positive manner.  The 
S.A.F.E. framework assesses and tracks what the authors refer to as four key “triggers” for de-
escalating crisis situations.  The authors propose that by assessing and monitoring these triggers, 
negotiators can adopt the appropriate strategy to respond to the situation which is more likely to 
result in a positive resolution.  The four triggers are described as: “Substantive Demands”, 
“Attunement”, “Face” and “Emotion” with each functioning as a predominant ‘frame’ within 
which the subject and negotiator communicatively interact as a crisis incident unfolds.   
The initial frame makes reference to Substantive Demands whereby the instrumental 
interests and needs expressed by the parties are identified.  The S.A.F.E. model indicates that 
when the subject is in a substantive demands frame, the negotiator’s goal is to bargain or 
problem-solve with the subject to achieve a peaceful surrender.  The second frame - Attunement, 
refers to the relational trust which has been established between the subject and the negotiator.  
The S.A.F.E. model states that the negotiator’s goal in this frame is to engage in cooperative 
behaviour to build trust and liking (without compromising safety or security concerns).  This 
frame is akin to rapport building within the therapeutic relationship.  The third frame - Face, 
refers to the projected self-image of the subject and the model proposes that the negotiator’s 
goal in this frame is to validate the face needs of the subject in order to promote face-honouring 
and de-escalation of the situation.  The final frame - Emotional Distress refers to intense, 
negative emotions that compromise an individual's ability to cope with the stress of a crisis 
situation.  The goal of the negotiator in this frame is to help subjects cope with their emotional 
distress in a way that permits them to re-assess the situation and then influence the subject 
towards a cooperative resolution. 
 The focus of the S.A.F.E. model refers to appropriate identification of the subject's 
current dominant S.A.F.E. frame, appropriate matching of communication style to the S.A.F.E. 
frame of the subject, and then utilisation of strategies in order to effectively facilitate resolution 
of the needs expressed by each frame or shift to another S.A.F.E. frame in order to de-escalate 
36 
 
the situation.  Rogan and Hammer (1997) propose that the S.A.F.E. model offers a 
comprehensive approach for assessing, evaluating and developing effective response strategies 
to subject's behaviour in crisis incidents.  They propose that the model should be incorporated 
into the toolbox utilised by crisis negotiation teams (Hammer 1997). 
  
2.2.5. The Behavioral Influence Stairway Model 
One of the most recent models of crisis negotiation is that of the Behavioral Influence 
Stairway Model (BISM) developed by Vecchi (2007 cited in Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 
2008).  The BISM is a model of behaviour change grounded in the principles of active listening 
that was adapted from a model developed by the FBI/CNU (Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 
2005).  The BISM highlights the importance of the relationship –building process involving the 
negotiator and the subject in order to achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis situation 
(Noesner and Webster 1997).  This relationship has been found to be a key element for the 
successful resolution of both barricaded and crisis situations (Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 
2005).  The BISM shares parallel concepts with models of Motivational Interviewing, with 
emphasis being placed on the utilisation of skills such as empathy, rapport and active listening 
in order to facilitate behaviour change.  In line with this, the BISM consists of four elements: 1) 
active listening skills, 2) empathy, 3) rapport, and 4) behavioural influence.  Progression from 
stage 1 to stage 4 occurs by utilising these skills (underpinned by active listening throughout) 
with the aim of building a relationship with the subject in order to facilitate behaviour change.  
The key element of active listening has been shown to facilitate behaviour change and crisis 
resolution (Lanceley 1999 and Noesner and Webster 1997) and hence justifies this 
underpinning.  Research indicates that as this process is utilised effectively, the probability of 
positive behaviour change increases, thus becoming a building block towards the successful 
resolution of the crisis situation (Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005).   This statement is 
supported via anecdotal evidence whereby the heuristic value of the BISM has been 
documented in the resolution of a wide range of highly volatile crisis situations (Flood 2003); as 
such it demonstrates the applicability and efficacy of the BISM within the negotiation arena. 
 
2.2.6. The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Communications 
 The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Negotiation was devised by Taylor (2002), who 
highlighted the complex nature of negotiation focusing on levels of interaction, motivational 
emphases, and behaviour intensity within negotiations.  The model was compiled by utilising 
qualitative data from nine resolved cases of hostage negotiation in the USA with results of 
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analysis via nonmetric multidimensional scaling solution revealing clear empirical support for 
the cylindrical nature of communication behaviour (Taylor 2002).  The model proposes there to 
be three general levels of interaction behaviour during negotiations ranging from avoidance, to 
distributive, to integrative, a concept which is analogous to the crisis vs. normative bargaining 
conceptualisation proposed by Donohue et al. (1991) and Donohue and Roberto (1996).  
Taylor's model proposes that negotiators aim to move subjects through these levels 
progressively in order to move subjects away from non-active participation (avoidant) 
interaction through to a degree of cooperation which may be based on self-interest (distributive) 
through to eventual normative and cooperative communication (integrative) that will result in 
reconciliation of the parties' respective divergent interests.  Secondly, the model proposes the 
existence of three different motivational emphases within negotiation behaviour, and classifies 
these as Instrumental, Relational, and Identity themes.  The first theme refers to behaviour 
which is linked to the subject's instrumental needs which can be described as tangible 
commodities or wants.  The second theme refers to behaviour which is linked to the relationship 
or affiliation between the negotiator and the subject; and the third theme refers to the 
negotiating parties' concern for self-preservation or “face” (Goffman 1967).  
Finally, the model proposes the existence of a third variable within negotiations, which 
Taylor refers to the intensity of negotiation behaviour.  This concept relates to the degree to 
which intense behaviours are utilised within negotiations, with research indicating that a 
speaker's attitude towards a concept deviates more from neutrality with more frequent use of 
obscure metaphors, profanity, and dramatic changes in intonation (Bowers 1963, Donohue 1981 
and Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton 1999).   Similar research has shown that the use of such 
intense behaviours has a detrimental effect on negotiation, increasing the tendency for conflict 
and for negotiation break-down (Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton 1999).  The strength of 
Taylor's model lies in its conceptualisation of negotiation behaviour as inter-related 
communication components, rather than discrete, mutually exclusive categories.  As such, the 
cylindrical model avoids the criticism of early, static style-based frameworks for negotiation as 
it enables both researchers and negotiators to consider the changing pattern of communication 
behaviour across the whole negotiation process (Taylor 2002).  Taylor's model provides a 
detailed micro-level analysis of crisis behaviour and provides a unique insight into the multi-
dimensional existence of negotiation behaviour.      
 
2.2.7. Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEPS) Model  
 Kelln and McMurtry (2007) have recently devised the Structured Tactical Engagement 
Process Model.  The model provides a framework for both understanding and influencing a 
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barricaded subject's behaviour in order to reach a peaceful resolution by utilising principles 
from the Transtheoretical Stages of Change Model (Prochaska and DiClemente 1986).  Kelln 
and McMurtry propose that in line with any form of behaviour, a crisis situation has to go 
through four stages in order to reach successful resolution.  The stages consist of 
Precontemplation (Step 0), Contemplation (Step 1), Preparation (Step 2) and Action (Step 3), 
with the final stage resulting in behavioural change that results in successful and peaceful 
resolution.  The authors propose that a variety of skills/techniques can be utilised in order to 
help guide subjects through these four stages.  The initial stage of any negotiation is 
characterised by the Precontemplation stage, whereby the subject is unwilling to acknowledge 
that the situation or their behaviour needs to change.  The subject tends to be uncooperative and 
unrealistic at this point in the negotiation and it is the role of the negotiator to steer the subject 
away from this stage and into a Contemplative stage whereby they can begin to contemplate a 
change in behaviour or situation.   
Research has implicated the role of rapport in facilitating behaviour change (Miller and 
Rollnick 2002) and application of this finding to the negotiation procedure indicates the benefit 
of the formation of a connection between the subject and the negotiator.  As this connection 
grows, the individual is less likely to be defensive and more open to suggestion (Kelln and 
McMurtry 2007) and behaviour change becomes more likely.  Once rapport has been 
established and the subject has moved from Step 0 to Step 1, the subject is likely to be realising 
that their behaviour and the current situation needs to change, but they are not quite sure how to 
go about implementing this.  It is, therefore, the negotiator’s job at this stage to gently affirm the 
need for a peaceful resolution while increasing the subject's confidence to move into Step 2.  
Once the subject is committed to working with the negotiator and his/her confidence has 
increased, the subject moves to the penultimate phase of Step 2 - Preparation.  At step 2, the 
subject has identified that there is a problem and that their behaviour needs to change, and they 
are beginning to consider and possibly commit to a resolution. During Step 2, the negotiator's 
role becomes more proactive and directive with the key role being problem-solving in order to 
develop an appropriate exit strategy.  The negotiator must then try to maintain a degree of 
motivation and confidence in the subject in order for them to progress to the final Step - Action.  
During the final stage, the subject should be carrying out the agreed-upon plan for peaceful 
resolution of the situation.  It is vital that the negotiator remains supportive and directive 
throughout the final step, until resolution has been achieved.   
 The STEPS model incorporates many of the concepts of the transtheoretical model of 
change (Prochaska and DiClemente 1986) and motivational interviewing in order to facilitate 
and encourage behaviour change in an individual.  There are parallels between the use of such 
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techniques in counselling, whereby active listening skills will be utilised in order to establish 
rapport and positive therapeutic relationships with clients (Evans et al. 1989 and Hersen and 
Van Hasselt 1998) which, in turn, increases the likelihood of behaviour change. 
 
2.3. Negotiation Models: Synopsis and Comparison 
 This chapter reviews/describes a range of different models of negotiation, with some 
having originally been developed out of the general negotiation (i.e. business negotiation) arena 
and others having been developed for more specific utilisation within the hostage/crisis 
negotiation arena.  The principled negotiation model (i.e. the Harvard approach) (Fisher and Ury 
1981) and the “getting past no” model of negotiation (Ury 1991) were not developed 
specifically for utilisation within hostage and crisis negotiation, but instead utilise 
principles/techniques that are broad enough to be applied to almost any type of conflict.  As 
such, their principles (whilst developed for people engaged in difficult negotiations) have been 
applied to hostage and crisis negotiation settings.  These models have stepped away from the 
traditional positioning negotiation approaches by placing more emphasis on parties’ interests 
(i.e. an interest-based approach), as opposed to a position- based approach which focuses on the 
status of each party in terms of winning/losing the negotiation.  In doing so, principled 
negotiation tries to reframe the negotiation process so that both parties win, and both parties 
interests’ are fulfilled, as opposed to one party being the “winner” and the other, the “loser”.  
These initial models differ from the more traditional models of HCNn discussed later in the 
paper, as they have a more normative (i.e. integrative) focus, whereby there is an expectation 
that the subject will be able to engage in problem-solving in a calm and rational manner (which 
is often not the case when someone is experiencing a state of conflict or crisis).  The latter 
models (i.e. the crisis bargaining model (Donohue et al. 1991); the S.A.F.E. model (Hammer 
and Rogan 1997); the BISM (Vecchi 2007 cited in Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 2008); the 
cylindrical model (Taylor 2002); and the STEPS model (Kelln and McMurtry 2007)) appear to 
have been developed with a contextual backdrop of the behavioural and emotional context of 
crisis/hostage scenarios and as such tend to identify the need to address crisis (i.e. distributive) 
needs prior/in addition to addressing normative (i.e. integrative) needs.   
The majority of these models suggest that crisis (i.e. typically relational) issues need to 
be addressed first, prior to attempting to deal with substantive needs/specific demands, 
suggesting that forming a relationship between the negotiator and subject is a precursor to being 
able to deal with more substantive issues/engage in rational problem-solving.  The latter models, 
whilst focusing more on relational issues, also tend to identify the emotional arousal and 
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conflict/crisis state that subjects are likely to be experiencing and address these issues as 
important in successfully resolving the incident.  The BISM, for example, identifies the 
importance of active listening in terms of subjects being given space to talk about their current 
situation and what has led them to this crisis point; the S.A.F.E. model (Hammer and Rogan 
1997) identifies “emotion” as it’s last frame within the model and highlights the importance of 
the negotiator helping subjects to cope with emotional distress that may be blocking rational 
thought in relation to their situation; the crisis bargaining model (Donohue et al. 1991) 
differentiates between the need for negotiators to address both crisis (distributive) and 
normative (integrative) needs, with crisis bargaining often taking precedence; the cylindrical 
model (Taylor 2002) equally identifies the need for subjects to progress through from 
distributive to integrative behaviour whereby initial dialogue/interaction tends to focus on 
subject self-interest and latter dialogue focusing on more cooperative (integrative) 
communication; and lastly, the STEPS model (Kelln and McMurty 2007) also focuses on 
building a relationship between the subject and negotiator as a tool to move subjects through 
from pre-contemplation to action in relation to behaviour change, further emphasising the 
importance of relational issues within the hostage and crisis negotiation setting.  Broadly 
speaking, the latter models tend to take a more pseudo-therapeutic approach to hostage and 
crisis negotiation, with the emphasis being on crisis intervention, de-escalating emotion and 
building relationships between the two parties, whereas the first two models tend to take a more 
pragmatic and business-orientated approach that may not necessarily meet the emotionally-
driven and multi-faceted situational context presented by hostage or crisis incidents. 
 
2.4. Conclusion & Future Directions 
 It is clear from the variety of models which have been devised to account for effective 
negotiation strategies that there is no singular theoretical blueprint which can be adhered to in 
order to achieve successful resolution of crisis situations.  This toolbox or library of negotiation 
strategies and techniques has been built up via a combination of operationally successful 
negotiations and academic research and provide a set of resources which negotiators can refer to 
and adopt within their roles.  It seems prudent to suggest that a combination of strategies or 
techniques may be useful depending on the circumstances of the crisis situation.   
 It is also important to note that the models discussed above relate specifically to the 
culture/society in which they were devised and as such may not be directly applicable cross-
culturally.  The majority of the research on crisis negotiation has been conducted in the USA 
and has particular relevance to countries which adhere to the right to bear arms.  As a result, 
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research within cultures and countries which do not bear arms may reveal interesting 
comparisons in terms of strategies and techniques which tend to be effective.  Of particular 
interest is police hostage negotiation in the UK, an aspect which has not been investigated to 
date.  An analysis of hostage negotiation within the UK would enable a model of negotiation to 
be devised providing a forum for cross-cultural comparison with USA-based models of crisis 
negotiation. 
 Finally, analysis of the literature focusing on crisis negotiation has identified a common 
theme linked to effectiveness/success of negotiations.  This theme has tended to focus on the 
techniques and strategies employed by the negotiators during the crisis.  An aspect which has 
not been explored in such detail is that of the characteristics, traits and skills which may 
enhance a negotiator’s ability to perform effectively within their role.  In line with this, it is 
proposed that certain fixed and malleable traits, such as personality, coping style, decision-
making style, emotion regulation and emotional intelligence, may play a role in the ability of 
individuals to successfully perform and cope with their role.  Future research in this direction 
would have implications for both the selection and training of operationally active negotiators 
and may yield a tool to help select appropriate individuals for the role, identify specific training 
needs, and enhance operational skills in order to increase the successful resolution of hostage 




Chapter 3: Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation: The 
Potential Role of Negotiator Personality, 
Decision-Making Style, Coping Style and 
Emotional Intelligence on Negotiator Success 
This chapter presents a theoretical review of the literature in relation to a number of 
specific psychological constructs that may play a role within HCN performance/success.  This 
review is used to generate a specific rationale for the quantitative phase of the research by 
assessing four specific constructs that have been linked to success within a variety of different 
occupational roles.  This review was published in the International Journal of Emergency 
Mental Health in 2012.  This chapter includes the pre-print version of the manuscript and the 
reference list has been embedded within the overall reference section of the thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Method 
This chapter describes the rationale for the study along with the aims, objectives and 
research questions that were identified from the literature reviews presented in the previous two 
chapters.  The epistemological, ontological and methodological justification for the choice of 
methodology is then described, followed by a discussion of the design and procedure adopted.  
 
4.1. Rationale for the Study 
Whilst reviewing the literature, a variety of gaps were identified in relation to our 
understanding of HCNn as an entity, including understanding what makes someone an effective 
HCN and empirically documenting/understanding the phenomenon within the UK.  Firstly, for 
example, whilst there is a wealth of literature focusing on the concept of a ‘police personality’ 
(Black 2000, Chibnall and Detrick 2003, Detrick and Chibnall, 2002, 2006, Lau et al. 2006 and 
Varela et al. 2004), there is limited published research that applies this concept to police officers 
who work specifically as HCNs.  The current research, therefore aimed to identify whether the 
concept of a ‘HCN profile’ exists amongst UK-based negotiators by identifying whether they 
possess traits and characteristics that are unique to them as a group.   
Secondly, the review of the literature identified a dearth of published literature in 
relation to the experiences of HCNs, and to the author’s knowledge, there is no published 
research that focuses directly on the experiences of negotiators within the UK.  This 
extrapolated further to a lack of understanding in relation to the procedural and operational 
underpinnings of the discipline of HCNn, with a specific emphasis on the procedures and 
processes employed by UK police forces/constabularies to recruit, select, train and support their 
negotiators.  Hence, the following aims, objectives and research questions were developed. 
 
4.2. Aims and Objectives  
Three main aims were identified.  The first was to compare HCNs with police officers 
(non-negotiator trained) and students in order to identify the traits, characteristics and skills that 
were required and found in UK HCNs.  The second was to investigate the processes involved in 
the recruitment, selection, training and support of HCNs in UK-based police forces nationally.  
The third aim was to provide an insight into UK HCNn by exploring the experiences of 
operationally active negotiators from a number of rural and urban/metropolitan police forces.   
In addition to these aims, a number of specific objectives were developed: 
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1. To assess the traits, characteristics and skills required and utilised by UK HCNs, 
looking specifically at: 
a. Personality 
b. Coping Style 
c. Cognitive Emotion Regulation 
d. Decision-Making Style 
e. Emotional Intelligence. 
2. To establish whether UK HCNs possess a unique “HCN” profile. 
3. To provide a description of: 
a. The HCN recruitment and selection process 
b. The training and CPD of HCNs 
c. The skills required and utilised during the negotiation process 
d. The process of decision-making throughout the negotiation 
e. The support structures and coping strategies utilised by HCNs following 
involvement in crisis situations. 
4. To produce a model of the overall processes involved in the 
recruitment/selection/training and operational support of UK HCNs. 
5. To develop a model of UK HCNn by providing an insight into the experiences of police 
HCNs. 
6. To make recommendations for changes in policy/practice in relation to the selection, 
training and support of operationally active HCNs in the UK. 
 
4.3. Hypotheses for Quantitative Research Phase  
A number of hypotheses were developed on the basis of the extant literature.  Please 
refer to Chapter 5 (5.2.) and Chapter 6 (6.3.) for details of the specific hypotheses tested within 
the quantitative research phase2.  
 
4.4. Research Questions for Qualitative Research Phase   
Broadly, the qualitative research phase aimed to generate of theory of HCNn based on 
the experiences of operationally active UK HCNs.  More specifically, this phase of the research 
aimed to address the following research questions: 
                                                          
2 Please note that the results from the quantitative phase of the research have been written up in the form 
of empirical papers and, as such, the relevant chapters are referred to in order to avoid duplication of the 
narrative in the method chapter. 
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1. How do you become a HCN and what type of processes are in place for the recruitment, 
selection and training of HCNs? 
2. What is it like to be a HCN? 
3. What types of experiences do HCNs have and how does this impact on their identity? 
4. What types of incident do HCNs get deployed to and what are the characteristics of 
such incidents? 
5. How do HCNs operate when deployed to hostage/crisis incidents? 
6. How do HCNs successfully resolve hostage/crisis incidents? 
7. Do HCNs experience stress and what systems are in place to support operationally 
active HCNs? 
    
4.5. Mixed Methodology Research Paradigm 
The aforementioned aims, objectives and research questions could have been addressed 
utilising a number of different quantitative and qualitative research paradigms.  In my opinion, 
the initial aim (i.e. identification of the characteristics/traits possessed by HCNs) lent itself more 
intuitively to a quantitative cross-sectional comparative method utilising psychometrics to 
measure the constructs identified as salient by the review of the literature; however, this aspect 
could also have been explored in a different manner by asking negotiators to identify the 
characteristics and attributes that they feel were important for individuals to be successful 
negotiators utilising a questionnaire format.  By utilising a cross-sectional comparison of 
negotiators with non-negotiator trained police officers, I felt that this would allow for a more 
valid identification of any observed differences between the two police samples, i.e. one which 
was grounded in statistical rigour. 
Similarly, the second and third aims could have been addressed by utilising a number of 
different methodological paradigms.  Some of the specific research questions (i.e. RQ5 and 
RQ6), for example, would have been most effectively addressed utilising recorded live 
negotiation scenario data/transcripts, however, at the time of the data collection, I was unable to 
gain approval to access such data from the National Negotiator Group (NNG)3.  These research 
questions were still addressed utilising a semi-structured interview paradigm that allowed the 
other objectives and research questions to equally be addressed.  The approach adopted, in my 
opinion, allowed for a broader analysis of the HCNn discipline and overall process to be 
performed, as it allowed for the development of a model that encompassed the entire, wider 
                                                          
3 The NNG “is a national network of negotiators who share best practice and are able to provide mutual 
support in seeking to bring incidents to a successful conclusion.  The group is responsible for exercising 
strategic oversight of police negotiation” (ACPO and NPIA 2011). 
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negotiation process (i.e. from deployment to debrief), as opposed to focussing solely on the 
aspect of dialogue/negotiation that occurs between the subject and HCN.  I felt that the research 
questions identified as a whole, therefore, lent themselves more intuitively and appropriately to 
a qualitative research paradigm, whereby the theory and conclusions drawn would be deduced 
on the basis of the experiences of the HCNs themselves.  In light of these considerations, the 
study utilised a combination of both quantitative and qualitative data analysis in order to 
provide a diverse analytical perspective of HCNn within the UK.   
 
4.5.1. Justification for Mixed-Methodological Approach   
Quantitative analysis adheres to the positivist philosophical paradigm as opposed to the 
interpretive paradigm adopted by qualitative research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003).  
The positivist paradigm states that the social world exists externally and is objectively 
determined and, therefore, its properties can be measured objectively; whereas the interpretive 
paradigm states that the world and reality are socially constructed and influenced by people 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 1991).  Interpretivists, therefore, are concerned with 
subjective, qualitative phenomena that are context-rich and aim to understand what is happening 
in the totality of each situation (Godfrey and Hill 1985 and Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
2003).  Inductive processes are typically used in order to generate theory within the qualitative 
paradigm; whereas quantitative methods primarily utilise deductive processes in order to test 
pre-specified concepts, constructs and hypotheses (Liouka 2007).  Although historical 
conceptualisations have constructed quantitative and qualitative methods as opposing and 
polarised views, they are commonly used in conjunction with one another in order to provide 
complementary contributions to research studies.  The two paradigms can be used separately or 
together in accordance with their abilities to provide the best answer to the research question 
(Van Maanen 1979); the latter being the approach adopted within the current study. 
Whilst quantitative and qualitative analyses have their own sets of advantages and 
disadvantages, a mixed-methodological approach that combines the two can often enhance the 
quality of the findings pertaining to a set of research questions.  Quantitative analysis benefits 
from the validity and reliability of its findings, whereby validated psychometric measures 
should produce valid and consistent results; whereas qualitative techniques and interpretations 
enable researchers to provide a deeper understanding of a specific phenomenon.  By utilising a 
combination of the two methodological approaches, the current study provides an insight into 
the phenomenon of HCNn from two differing perspectives, thereby enhancing the overall 
contribution of this body of work to our understanding of HCNn as a multi-dimensional entity. 
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For the purposes of the current research, quantitative analyses were used in order to 
empirically compare HCNs with police officers and students on a number of different 
constructs.  A deductive analytical approach was adopted in order to test a number of 
hypotheses that were generated on the basis of pre-existing literature within the field of police 
and occupational psychology.  Psychometric tests were utilised in order to identify a profile for 
each sample with reference to these constructs and in order to quantifiably compare such 
profiles, numerical or statistical procedures needed to be applied.  Parametric statistics provide 
us with a way of validly identifying whether individuals or a group of individuals are 
significantly different from each other on a number of scales, measures or constructs and, as 
such, parametric statistics were utilised in order to empirically test the generated hypotheses.   
In addition to identifying whether HCNs were a unique or homogenous group (with 
respect to a number of specific psychological constructs), a qualitative approach was also 
adopted in order to provide an insight into UK HCNn and the experiences of individuals who 
resolve hostage and/or crisis situations.  This aspect of the research required an inductive 
approach, whereby theory could be generated about a phenomenon that can only be explained 
by the experiences of those who are involved, in line with the Sine Qua Non concept advocated 
by the qualitative research movement (Bryman 1984).                
 
4.5.1.1. Justification for the use of a quantitative statistical approach and 
psychometric tests utilised.   
The positivist paradigm asserts that scientific knowledge must be free of metaphysics in 
order to provide a credible and rational contribution to knowledge.  Proponents of this paradigm 
state that such a contribution must, therefore, rely on pure observation that is unbiased by the 
interests, values, purposes and psychological schemata of the individuals who seek such 
knowledge (Howe 1988).  The initial stage of this research adopted a positivist deductive 
approach in order to identify data and test hypotheses on a purely observable basis, whereby the 
traits, skills and characteristics of police HCNs were identified by comparison with police 
officers (non-negotiator trained) and students.  The utilisation of quantitative data collection and 
analyses enabled objective and direct comparisons to be made between the three samples in 
order to provide a credible and quantifiable analysis of the characteristics possessed by UK 
HCNs. 
Self-report questionnaires/psychometric tests have been utilised to measure 
psychological constructs for many years; with the use of objective self-reports being prevalent 
in most areas of the social sciences, including personality assessment (Schwarz 1999).  
Research consistently demonstrates that self-report measures are the most frequently utilised 
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method when it comes to measuring personality (Kagan 2007, Robins, Tracey and Sherman 
2007 and Vazire 2006), leading some researchers to suggest that “the questionnaire is central to 
measuring constructs” (McDonald 2008: 76).  Not only are self-report based assessments 
deemed to be an accurate measure of personality, they are perceived by some as being the most 
valid/accurate measure of personality due to the fact that the information is “coming directly 
from the horse’s mouth” (McDonald 2008: 77) and no one else has access to/is more aware of 
the information in relation to these aspects than oneself (Paulhus and Vazire 2007).  Other 
advantages of the self-report method include practicality, ease of interpretation, causal force, 
and richness of information (Lucas and Baird 2007 and Swann, Chang-Schneider and McClarty 
2007).  If self-report scales are constructed well, there is a suggestion that they can predict a 
variety of outcomes with both ease and efficiency (Paulhus and Vazire 2007), two aspects that 
were further factored into the decision-making process in relation to the choice of methodology 
for phase one of the study.  As such, and in light of the amount of data that needed to be 
collected, self-report psychometrics were deemed to be the most efficient and accurate method 
of measuring the identified psychological constructs.   
The review of the literature identified five salient constructs that could potentially 
discriminate HCNs from non-negotiator trained officers: personality, coping style, cognitive 
emotion regulation, decision-making style and emotional intelligence, each of which could be 
measured by a number of different validated/pre-existing measures.  Suitable validated 
measures for each construct were identified from the literature, considering the following 
variables: levels of reliability and validity, number of scale items4 and financial costs.  The 
following measures were initially identified on the basis of these criteria: 
 
 Personality: The Occupational Personality Questionnaire 32 (OPQ32; Bartram et al. 
2006) 
 Coping Style: The Coping Skills Test-Revised (CST-R; Jerabek 2001) 
 Cognitive Emotion Regulation: The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
(CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002) 
 The General Decision-Making Style Questionnaire (GDMS; Scott and Bruce 1995) 
 The Genos Emotional Intelligence Inventory (EII; Gignac 2008)     
 
                                                          
4 This aspect was considered in relation to the length of time required to complete the psychometric test 
battery in order to minimise potential boredom/fatigue effects. 
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The aforementioned measures all demonstrated good psychometric properties in 
relation to reliability and validity5 and were either free or available to the researcher at a viable 
cost6.  Soon after ethical approval had been granted for the project, the test publishers of the 
OPQ32 raised a concern in relation to the use of the measure by an individual who had not 
completed the Level B in Occupational Testing7 training (despite the fact that my Director of 
Studies was qualified to this level).  As such, a decision was made to change the personality 
measure to the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue and Kentle 1991).  The BFI was freely 
available, demonstrated good levels of reliability and validity and was deemed to be adequate 
for the purposes of the current study.  This change resulted in the loss of an impression 
management scale (that was built into the OPQ32) and, as such, the Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus 1988) was incorporated to measure and control for social 
desirability within the samples.   
 
4.5.1.2. Justification for the use of Grounded Theory.   
The choice of methodology for any piece of research is dependent on the research 
problem or question being investigated and the best methodological fit (Bryman 1989 and 
Patton 1990).  A number of qualitative analytical approaches could have been adopted to 
address the aforementioned research questions, including Discourse Analysis (DA) and 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).  DA was considered to be too restricted in 
terms of depth of analysis as it refers to the language utilised by participants, as opposed to the 
meaning attached to that language (Giles 2002).  IPA was considered to be less appropriate as 
the aspect being explored has never been investigated and required the adoption of an inductive 
methodology and generation of new theory grounded in the data.  Grounded Theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1965, 1967) was, therefore, selected as the method of analysis on the basis of the need 
to generate new theory from data that has not previously been explored.  In line with 
exploratory research, Grounded Theory also allowed for the reformulation and evolution of the 
research question during the course of the research (Glaser and Strauss 1967), enabling an 
iterative theory generation process to be achieved.   
                                                          
5 Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.5.3.) and Chapter 6 (6.4.3.) for reliability and validity data for the measures 
finally selected.   
6 The CST-R and EII were purchased by the researcher from the test publishers and paid for by the School 
of Psychological, Social and Behavioural Sciences via means of an internal funding request.  All other 
psychometric tests were freely available. 
7 The researcher had completed the Level A in Occupational Testing at this stage and original discussions 




Grounded theory is a methodology that seeks to construct theory about issues of 
importance in peoples’ lives (Glaser 1978, Glaser and Strauss 1967 and Strauss and Corbin 
1998) and is referred to as an inductive methodology for gathering, synthesising, analysing and 
conceptualising data (Charmaz 2001).  Engaging in grounded theory generation requires the 
researcher to address a set of common characteristics: theoretical sensitivity, theoretical 
sampling, treatment of the literature, constant comparative methods, coding, the meaning of 
verification, identifying the core category, memoing and diagramming, and the measure of rigor 
(McCann and Clark 2003).  The methodology involves a hierarchical coding system whereby 
three forms of coding are employed: open, axial and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin 
1998).  Essentially, open coding refers to the process of generating initial concepts from the 
data, axial coding to the development and linking of concepts into conceptual families, and 
selective coding to the formalising of these relationships into theoretical frameworks (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998).  A different coding system refers to a similar distinction of coding including 
open, theoretical and constant comparative coding (Glaser 1992).  Within this model, open 
coding is the initial step of theoretical analysis, where codes are developed from the data.  This 
form of coding ends when a core category is located.  Theoretical codes are described as 
“conceptual connectors” that develop relationships between categories and their properties 
(Glaser 1992: 38).  And finally constant comparative coding describes the method of constant 
comparison that imbues both open and theoretical coding (Glaser 1992).  Regardless of the 
adopted coding system, the process is dynamic and multi-layered, whereby data is collected and 
then analysed and then more data is collected and then analysed in order to pursue emerging 
themes from the first wave of analysis (Wasserman, Clair and Wilson 2009).  This process is 
repeated until saturation of the data has been completed and there is no new conceptual 
information emerging from the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  Saturation of the data can be 
reached with a combination of adapted questioning and theoretical sampling of new respondents 
in order to explore the conceptual issues raised in previous interviews, in line with the concept 
of allowing data collection and analysis to “blur and intertwine continually” (Glaser and Strauss 
1967: 43).        
The adoption of grounded theory in the current study enabled the researcher to build up 
a picture of a phenomenon that has never been academically explored within the UK.  
Qualitative analysis enabled a detailed description and model of the processes involved in 
HCNn to be established, along with provision of an insight into the experiences of operationally 
active police HCNs.  This choice of methodology enabled the researcher to adopt the Sine Qua 
Non approach advocated by the qualitative movement (Bryman 1984), whereby HCNn has been 
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explored through the eyes of the actors involved and thus provided a rich and detailed 
explorative account of this social phenomenon.      
 
4.5.1.3. Epistemological and ontological positioning/stance.   
Constructivist grounded theory resides in the interpretivist stance whereby priority is 
placed “on the phenomena of study and sees both data and analysis as created from shared 
experiences and relationships with participants” (Charmaz 2006: 130).  In line with the concept 
of the importance of developing a relationship between the HCN and subject within HCNn, I 
felt that development of the relationship between myself and the interviewee played a salient 
role in the theory generation by allowing the interviewee to feel at ease and to encourage 
disclosure, thereby leading to the development of a richer data set.  As such, I adopted a 
constructivist grounded theory approach whereby I felt that the interaction between myself and 
the interviewee was as much a part of the development of theory as the data itself.  The 
interpretivist epistemological stance adopted recognises that not only is the data a representation 
of the interviewees’ interpretation of their realities and experiences, but equally acknowledges 
the fact that the grounded theory is derived on the basis of the theorist/researcher’s 
interpretation of the data as it stands (Bryant 2002 and Charmaz 2000, 2002).   
As an academic, researcher and someone who lectures on the topic, I arrived at the 
qualitative phase of the study with a fairly good level of knowledge and understanding in 
relation to HCNn.  As such, it would have been impossible to completely disregard this 
knowledge/information when developing the grounded theory; instead, in line with the 
constructivist approach, this knowledge was utilised to guide my interpretation of the data and 
the meaning that it held for the interviewees.  The data, was therefore, not considered in terms 
of a metaphorical vacuum, and instead was constructed iteratively as a result of the interaction 
between myself as the researcher, and the interviewees; a process that developed throughout the 
interviews, with interpretations of previous interview data being cross-referenced/validity 
checked within later interviews.  I believe that this knowledge/understanding also 
allowed/guided me to ask further additional, appropriate (unscripted) questions as a means of 
delving deeper into the experiences and realities of the interviewees, thereby enhancing the 
overall richness of the data obtained and ergo the quality of the grounded theory developed.  As 
such, I conceptualised myself as part of the research situation, with an awareness of the fact that 
my positions, privileges, perspectives and interactions would affect the overall theory developed 
(Charmaz 2000, 2006 and Clarke 2005, 2006) and enhance it, as opposed to the requirement for 
researchers to act as tabula rasa, as dictated by the objectivist or positivist stance (Charmaz 
2008).   
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Throughout the qualitative research phase, I adopted a reflexive stance towards the 
research process and the overall grounded theory product and recognise that the analysis was 
contextually situated in time, place, culture and situation (Charmaz 2006).  For example, I 
identified both during the interview and coding processes, that the three interviewees who were 
soon due to retire from the force (as a result of Regulation A198) may have been coming from a 
different situational and emotional position when discussing their experiences when compared 
to those interviewees who still had a significant length of service left.  HCNs that were being 
“forced to retire” may have felt some animosity towards the force as a result of this and, as such, 
may have been more honest/forthright within their interviews due to the fact that they were 
leaving.  The researcher feels that this is likely to have enhanced the honesty and “reality” of the 
data obtained, as opposed to biasing it per se.  Nevertheless, the potential emotional bias (and 
perhaps greater openness to discuss certain matters) was borne in mind throughout the analysis 
and reflected upon as part of the theory generation process (with caution, for example, being 
exercised when attempting to extrapolate certain findings pertaining to these specific 
interviewees to the entire sample, as opposed to removing their data from the dataset).  In 
summary, as a constructivist grounded theorist, I believe that the theory generated was co-
constructed on the basis of a combination of my interpretation of the data and resultant 
construction of categories and the interviewees’ interpretation of their own socially constructed 
realities in relation to their roles as HCNs.           
 
4.6. Design 
The research utilised a mixed-methodology design combining both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis.  Phase one of the research involved a cross-sectional survey design 
whereby data gathered via questionnaire format in the form of a psychometric test battery were 
compared across three samples (HCNs, police officers and students).  The psychometric test 
battery consisted of five pre-existing scales measuring the following constructs: Personality, 
Coping Style, Cognitive Emotion Regulation, Decision-Making Style, and Emotional 
Intelligence.  The data from this stage of the study was analysed using a variety of parametric 
statistics including analyses of variance, discriminant function analysis and t-test comparisons 
with norm group data.  Phase two of the research involved a qualitative grounded theory design 
                                                          
8 “Regulation A19 of the Police Pensions Regulations 1987 provides for the compulsory retirement of a 
police officer, (up to and including the rank of Chief Superintendent), on the grounds of efficiency of the 
Force, where the officer has accrued full pension entitlement.  This will typically be after 30 years’ 
service, but may be prior to this where an officer has transferred benefits from a previous pension scheme.  
It also applies to those on the 30+ and 30++ schemes” (Bedfordshire Police 2012: 3).  This Regulation 
resulted in police officers with > 30 years’ service being forced to take retirement regardless of whether 
they wanted to retire at this point in time. 
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which consisted of the qualitative analysis of data gathered during 15 semi-structured interviews 
with a sub-sample of the HCNs who took part in phase one of the research.  The data obtained 
from the interviews were analysed using the process of Grounded Theory, whereby categories 
of meaning were progressively identified, refined and integrated using initial and focused 
coding in order to develop a theory that is grounded in the data (Charmaz 2006). 
 
4.7. Recruitment of Participants 
4.7.1. Quantitative Research Phase 
4.7.1.1. HCN sample.   
Opportunity sampling was utilised to recruit the HCN sample.  All 43 UK territorial 
police forces (plus the Garda Siochana (Police Force of Ireland), Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI) and the Scottish police forces) were offered the opportunity to take part via letter 
or email9 to the Regional or Force Lead Hostage Negotiator Coordinator (HNC) (please see 
Appendix 3).  A total of 54 police forces were invited (see Table 4.1 in Appendix 4) with 21 
police forces agreeing to take part (38.9%).   
 
Once Regional or Force Lead HNCs had agreed to take part in the research, the data 
was collected in a variety of formats.  For the majority of forces, Lead HNCs were sent a set of 
paper-based test batteries to disseminate to individual HCNs at one of their quarterly meetings.  
HCNs were asked to complete the questionnaires either during the meeting or during their own 
time and were then asked to send the questionnaires back to the researcher in the freepost 
envelopes provided.  The researcher also attended quarterly meetings for four of the forces in 
order to promote the research and request participation and questionnaires were completed by 
HCNs during these meetings.  All participants were made aware of the voluntary nature of the 
research and self-selected whether to take part or not. 
 
4.7.1.2. Police officer sample.   
The majority of police officers were recruited using snowball sampling, whereby each 
HCN who agreed to take part in the research was asked to disseminate a second questionnaire to 
                                                          
9 The request included a detailed description of the following in the form of a letter and short PowerPoint 
presentation: 1) The aims and objectives of the study, 2) The proposed methodology and analysis, 3) The 
process for obtaining ethical approval for the study, 4) Confirmation of the anonymity of forces and 




a non-negotiator police officer colleague for him/her to complete and return to the researcher in 
the freepost envelope provided.  Each HCN was provided with instructions in relation to this 
next step via a debrief sheet/letter (see Appendix 5/6).  Additional police officers were also 
recruited from a single force (the researcher’s previous employer) via the opportunity sampling 
of ex-colleagues. 
 
4.7.2. Qualitative Research Phase   
All participants who took part in the first phase of the research (apart from HCNs from 
one force who requested to only be involved in the first phase) and completed the psychometric 
tests were offered the opportunity to take part in the second phase of the research, which 
consisted of a semi-structured interview about their role as a HCN.  Participants were asked to 
state whether they would be willing to take part in an interview and to provide an email address 
in order for the researcher to be able to contact them.  Purposive sampling was used to recruit 
the HCN sample in order to locate participants that were most relevant for the progress of data 
collection and development of theory (Morse 2007).  A form of maximum variation sampling 
was utilised (Patton 1990) with the intention of catching a wide range of perspectives across the 
negotiator experience and identifying information-rich cases.  This process involved identifying 
potential participants based on stratifying the data in order to provide data from a variety of 
HCNs with different perspectives and experiences (as advocated by Cohen and Crabtree 2006).  
The researcher therefore identified 15 participants that represented heterogeneity in relation to: 
type of force (i.e. metropolitan and rural), gender, current role, current rank and length of 
experience as a HCN.         
 
4.8. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
4.8.1. Quantitative Research Phase 
4.8.1.1. HCN sample.   
Male or female police officers of any rank who had successfully completed the regional 
or national HCNn training course and were operational negotiators were eligible to take part in 
the research.  The majority of participants were ranked at Sergeant level or above (due to most 
force policies stating that officers must be of at least Sergeant/Inspector rank to apply for HCN 
status).  Please refer to Table 4.2 for details of the rank ratios of the HCN sample. 
 
4.8.1.2. Police officer sample.   
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Male or female police officers of any rank were invited to take part in the research.  The 
only exclusion criterion for this sample was that officers were not eligible if they were currently 
working as HCNs. 
 
Table 4.2.  Number and Percentage of Ranks Represented in Each of the Police Samples 
 HCN Sample Police Officer Sample 
Rank N Percentage (%) N Percentage (%) 
Police Constable (PC) 5 4.3 64 54.2 
Sergeant 48 41.0 28 23.7 
Inspector 43 36.8 17 14.4 
Chief Inspector 17 14.5 3 2.5 
Superintendent 3 2.6 3 2.5 
Chief Superintendent 1 0.9 0 0.0 
Not Stated 0 0.0 3 2.5 
Total n 117 100 118 100 
Note: The modal rank represented for the HCN Sample is Sergeant and the modal rank 
represented for the Police Officer sample is Police Constable.  
   
4.8.1.3. Student sample. 
Male and female undergraduate and postgraduate students studying a variety of courses 
at Coventry University were eligible to take part in the research. 
 
4.8.2. Qualitative Research Phase   
All HCNs who took part in phase one of the research (apart from the negotiators from 
one force who requested to only be involved with the quantitative phase) were given the 
opportunity to take part in the qualitative research phase.  Only those participants who specified 
that they would be happy to be interviewed were invited to take part in the semi-structured 
interview. 
 
4.9. Ethical Considerations 
The study was devised and executed in line with Coventry University’s Ethics 
Regulations/Code, the British Psychological Society's Code of Ethics and Conduct (The British 
Psychological Society 2009), and the Code of Human Research Ethics (The British 
Psychological Society 2014).  An ethics proposal was submitted to the University Ethics 
Committee 22nd October 2009 and ethical approval was granted on 29th October 2009 (please 
refer to Appendix 7).  The following relevant ethical issues were managed in accordance with 
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the guidance provided by the aforementioned codes: Informed Consent; Deception; Debriefing; 
Withdrawal from Investigation; Confidentiality; Protection of Participants; Protection of the 
Researcher (please refer to Appendix 8 for a full description). 
 
4.10. Participants 
4.10.1. Quantitative Research Phase 
Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.3.2.) for socio-demographic and occupational details of the 
participants involved in the quantitative phase of the research10.  Please see Table 4.2 and Table 
4.3 for further information. 
 
Table 4.3.  Number and Percentage of HCNs and Police Officers Represented from Each Police 
Force 
 HCN Sample Police Officer Sample 
Force N Percentage (%) N Percentage (%) 
1 0 0.0 23 19.5 
2 5 4.3 3 2.5 
3 11 9.4 5 4.2 
4 5 4.3 4 3.4 
5 10 8.5 3 2.5 
6 2 1.7 6 5.1 
7 14 12.0 18 15.3 
8 3 2.6 0 0.0 
9 5 4.3 5 4.2 
10 5 4.3 4 3.4 
11 12 10.3 2 1.7 
12 1 0.9 2 1.7 
13 5 4.3 5 4.2 
14 4 3.4 2 1.7 
15 6 5.1 2 1.7 
16 10 8.5 13 11.0 
17 1 0.9 2 1.7 
18 5 4.3 3 2.5 
19 1 0.9 0 0.0 
20 0 0.0 1 0.8 
21 5 4.3 4 3.4 
22 4 3.4 4 3.4 
23 2 1.7 3 2.5 
Total n 117 49.8 118 50.2 
 
4.10.2. Qualitative Research Phase 
                                                          
10 The total number of participants was dictated by power analyses run using the G*Power software.  
Please refer to Appendix 9 for details of the power analyses run to determine an adequate sample size 




4.10.2.1. The HCN interview sample.  
The interview sample consisted of 15 male and female HCNs from nine of the police 
forces with a range of demographic and occupational characteristics as outlined in Table 4.4. 
4.11. Measures 
4.11.1. Quantitative Research Phase 
4.11.1.1. Psychometric test battery11.   
Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.3.3.) and Chapter 6 (6.4.3.) for details of the psychometric 
test battery12. 
 
4.11.2. Qualitative Research Phase 
4.11.2.1. Semi-structured interview schedule.   
On the basis of the literature reviews, a semi-structured interview schedule was devised 
by the researcher as a means of addressing the research questions.  The interview schedule (see 
Appendix 10) focused on the following aspects/themes: 
 
1. The recruitment and selection process for HCNs (example questions: “Can you tell me 
how you came to become a negotiator?”; “What did the selection process involve?”). 
2. The training and continuing professional development of HCNs (example questions: 
“What training did you receive once you had been selected?”; “Do you have any 
continuing professional development/on-going training as a negotiator?”). 
3. The operational experiences of HCNs (example questions: “Can you describe the first 
incident that you were involved in as a negotiator?”; “Can you describe the most 
recent incident that you have been involved in?”). 
4. The process of decision-making throughout the HCNn (example question: “What are 
the decision-making processes involved in negotiating crisis incidents?”; “Do you 
naturally tend to use one process more than others?”). 
5. The strategies, styles and techniques used by HCNs to resolve incidents (example 
questions: “Are there any specific strategies, styles or techniques that you use when you 
                                                          
11 The questionnaires within the test battery were counterbalanced in order to avoid demand 
characteristics such as practice/fatigue effects.  
12 Please note that the pre-validated measures have not been included within the appendices due to 
copyright issues, however, the researcher can make confidential copies available to the examiners upon 
request.   
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Table 4.4.  Table Depicting the Demographic and Occupational Characteristics of Interviewees13 
Participant 
Reference 
























A Male 45 1 Rural Uniform Supt Territorial Policing 
(Commander) 
284 156 89 Yes Regional R, N, RC 
B Male 54 2 Rural Uniform CI Local Policing & 
Partnerships Deputy 
Commander 
356 195 200 Yes No N, RC 
C Female 43 2 Rural CID DS DS Integrated 
Offender Management 
Team 
261 96 100+ No No R, N. RC 
D Male 52 3 Rural Uniform I Service 
Delivery/Support 
360 63 100 No No R, N, RC 
E Male 43 3 Rural CID DCI Territorial Policing 
Unit 
222 114 200 Yes No R, N, RC* 
F Male 47 4 Met Uniform I Audit & Inspection, 
Strategic Development 
Department 
354 111 40 – 50 No No R, N, RC 
G Male 48 4 Met Uniform CI Head of Training 
Delivery 
338 123 100+ Yes No N, RC 
H Female 41 5 Rural CID DS Southern Intelligence 
Manager 
274 50 40 – 50 Yes Force N, RC 
I Male 46 5 Rural Uniform CI Operations Cadre 330 84 100 Yes Force R, N, RC* 
J Female 46 6 Rural Uniform S Change Management 
Team 
303 110 50 – 60 No No R, N, RC 
K Male 44 2 Rural CID DI Major Crime Unit 195 111 200 Yes Regional 
(Red Centre) 
R, N, RC 
L Male 42 7 Rural CID DCI Local Investigations 263 54 15 No No R, N, RC 
M Female 49 8 Rural CID DS Investigative Training 344 24 8 No No R 
N Female 42 8 Rural Uniform I Critical Incident 
Manager 
261 34 20 No No R, RC 
O Female 47 9 Met CID DS Supervision of 
Regional Asset 
Recovery Team 
316 36 20+ No Regional R 
Note. Rank: Supt = Superintendent; DCI = Detective Chief Inspector; CI = Chief Inspector; DI = Detective Inspector; I = Inspector; DS = Detective Sergeant; S = Sergeant. Training: R 
= Regional Training; N = National Training; RC = Red Centre Training.  All participants were White British or White European.  *Also trained as a Gold Negotiator Advisor.
                                                          
13 This information was gathered via the use of a demographic questionnaire (please refer to Appendix 11). 
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are negotiating?”; “If so, what do you feel is the most effective strategy, style or 
technique?”). 
6. The skills required and utilised during the HCNn procedure (example questions: “What 
skills do you think you use whilst dealing with crisis situations?”; “What skills do you 
think are important to be an effective negotiator?”). 
7. The support structures and coping strategies utilised by HCNs following involvement in 
hostage/crisis situations (example questions: “Do you feel that you are supported 
sufficiently in your role by the police?”; “What sort of help & support is available to 
you (both in theory and realistically)?”). 
 
4.12. Procedure 
4.12.1. Quantitative Research Phase   
Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.3.4.) and Chapter 6 (6.4.4.) for details of the procedure 
utilised within the quantitative phase of the research. 
 
4.12.2. Qualitative Research Phase  
Selected participants were contacted via email to arrange a convenient time and venue 
for the interview.  Convenient times were arranged with all HCNs who agreed to take part and 
all interviews were carried out at the HCN’s place of work (i.e. police station) in an interview or 
meeting room.  All interviewees were fully debriefed at the end of the interview (please refer to 
Appendix 12 for a copy of the debrief sheet).  The interviews took place between August 2011 
and June 2012 and lasted between 45-130 minutes; with a mean interview length of 87 minutes 
(i.e. 1 hour and 27 minutes) (please refer to Table 4.5 for details of the interviews).  The 
interviews resulted in a total of 1,301 minutes (i.e. 21.7 hours) of data. 
 
4.13. Data Preparation 
4.13.1. Quantitative Research Phase 
4.13.1.1. Screening and cleaning the data.   
The data obtained from the psychometric test batteries were inputted into the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software.  Questionnaires with more than 20 missing 
values (n = 10) were excluded from the research.  Once all the data had been inputted, data were 
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then screened using the “Frequencies” and “Descriptives” functions to identify any errors.  
Identified typing errors were cross-referenced with the raw data on the test battery and were 
amended accordingly.  
 
















A 1 Male 45 24.08.11 100 41 
B 2 Male 54 19.12.11/06.02.1114 121 (59 + 62) 72 
C 2 Female 43 06.02.11 89 36 
D 3 Male 52 21.03.12 45 17 
E 3 Male 43 21.03.1215 63 (21 + 42) 22 
F 4 Male 47 11.04.12 102 38 
G 4 Male 48 11.04.12 130 84 
H 5 Female 41 16.04.12 117 113 
I 5 Male 46 16.04.12 69 28 
J 6 Female 46 18.04.12 83 33 
K 2 Male 44 25.04.12 77 37 
L 7 Male 42 15.05.12 80 26 
M 8 Female 49 14.06.12 52 24 
N 8 Female 42 14.06.12 58 47 
O 9 Female 47 27.06.12 115 54 
 
4.13.1.1.1. Dealing with missing values.   
Missing values for each of the measures were dealt with in the following way.  In cases 
with two or less missing values, the missing values were replaced with the mean value for the 
scale for each participant (i.e. a new variable was computed that provided an average score by 
adding the score for each participant on each item and dividing the sum by the number of items 
in the measure; for example, for the CERQ, the scores for the participant on CERQ items 1–36 
were summed and divided by 36).  For cases with more than two missing values, the values 
were not replaced and were excluded from the analysis.  Please refer to Tables 4.6–4.11 in 
Appendix 13 for details of the excluded cases for each measure. 
 
4.13.1.1.2. Dealing with outliers and checking parametric assumptions.  
A number of descriptive statistics were calculated using the explore function in SPSS, 
to screen the data for any outliers and to check whether the data met the assumptions for 
parametric statistical tests, i.e. to check for univariate and multivariate normality of distribution, 
                                                          
14 Interview conducted in two parts on two separate dates due to operational commitments of interviewee. 
15 Interview conducted in two parts on same date due to interviewee being on call and having to take a 
call during the interview. 
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univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and 
multicollinearity (please refer to Tables 4.12–4.16 in Appendix 14 for inter-correlation 
matrices). 
There were a number of sub-scales where the data were not normally distributed and, 
therefore, the assumption of normality was violated.  These sub-scales are indicated by a 
Kolmorogov-Smirnov statistic or significance value of p < .05 as detailed in Tables 4.6–4.11 in 
Appendix 13.  The only sub-scales that met the assumption for normality demonstrating 
significance values of p > .05 were: CERQ Adaptive Strategies; Total BIDR; BIDR Self-
Deceptive Positivity; BIDR Impression Management and Total EII.  In light of this violation, 
transformations were unsuccessfully performed on the data in an attempt to improve the 
normality of distribution scores, and therefore, the data was retained and analysed in its original 
format. 
A number of outliers were also identified for the majority of the sub-scales.  In order to 
decide whether cases needed to be retained or removed from the dataset, the mean and 5% 
trimmed mean for each sub-scale was compared.  All of the mean and 5% trimmed mean figures 
were fairly similar with the majority of differences being < .70.  This indicated that the outliers 
were unlikely to be having a strong influence on the mean and as such all cases were retained in 
the dataset.  Please see details of existing outliers in Tables 4.6–4.11 in Appendix 13.    
The majority of the aforementioned parametric assumptions were met and in instances 
where assumptions were violated, such violations were considered to be successfully 
counteracted by the large sample size (N = 438), the number of participants in each cell 
exceeding 30 and the robust nature of the MANOVA test (see Field 2009 and Pallant 2007). 
 
4.13.2. Qualitative Research Phase  
The interviews were orthographically (i.e. verbatim) transcribed16 by an external 
transcription company (Way With Words) who provide a secure and confidential transcription 
service17.  The transcripts were emailed to each interviewee for verification and sanitisation (if 
necessary).  Specific redactions were made within three of the transcripts to remove 
confidential/sensitive information and to protect the identity of the interviewee.  The transcripts 
                                                          
16 This consisted of a word-for-word account of all verbal utterances including both words and non-
semantic sounds - such as ‘erm’, ‘er’, ‘uhuh’, ‘mm’ and ‘mm-hm’ (Braun and Clarke 2013: 163).  Names 
and other identifying language/discourse were edited out within the thesis using square brackets and 
replaced with the terms “anonymous” or “anonymous place” in order to protect interviewee identity and 
maintain anonymity.    
17 See: http://waywithwords.net/transcription-services-faq/#Security & Confidentiality - transcription 
services faq for more details.  
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were amended in line with interviewee requested amendments/redactions and were then printed 
as hard copy and coded/analysed as described below. 
   
4.14. Data Analysis 
4.14.1. Quantitative Research Phase   
Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.4.) and Chapter 6 (6.5.) for details of the data analysis 
conducted for the quantitative research phase.  
 
4.14.2. Qualitative Research Phase 
4.14.2.1. Data coding. 
The interview data was coded manually (i.e. by hand) in line with a grounded theory 
constructivist framework that sympathetically aligns with exploration of this type of data.  A 
method of constant comparison was applied throughout the coding process, whereby 
phenomena, concepts and cases were iteratively compared in order to identify common and 
recurring themes throughout the data set (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  Broadly speaking, a 
combination of initial and focused coding paradigms were utilised in order to synthesise and 
provide meaning to the data (Charmaz 2006).  Initial coding involved a line-by-line coding 
process that enabled each word, line or segment of data to be provided with a name/phrase that 
synopsised the meaning associated with this section of narrative text (Charmaz 2006).  Please 
refer to Appendix 15 for an example of the line-by-line coding completed.  A vast number of 
initial codes were produced that were further reduced and refined within the focused coding 
phase, whereby the most frequently appearing initial codes were identified as a means of 
sorting, synthesising, integrating and organising the data (Charmaz 2006).  As such, coding of 
the data represented the process by which data were broken down, conceptualised and 
reintegrated in order to depict and demonstrate theory associated with the phenomenon under 
investigation (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  This process is also referred to as codifying the data, a 
process that permits data to be “segregated, grouped, regrouped and relinked in order to 
consolidate meaning and explanation” (Grbich 2007: 21). 
 
4.14.2.1.1. Initial coding.   
Open coding was completed on the entire set of transcripts in chronological order.  This 
form of coding was completing using highlighters and handwritten comments within the 
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margins of the transcripts (see Appendix 15 for an example of the open coding performed on 
Transcript A).  Using the constant comparative method (Glaser and Strauss 1967), and 
comparing the data across the transcripts, the identified concepts were then further refined into 
broad level tentative categories that could be used to provide meaning to the data.  This constant 
comparison involved identification of similarities and differences both within and across 
interview transcripts as a means of making analytic distinctions (Charmaz 2006) and thereby 
identifying concepts and categories that were relevant to overall theory generation.   
The process of memo-writing/development of theoretical memoranda was utilised 
throughout the coding process in order to identify striking observations and thoughts relevant to 
the development of the overall theory (Flick 2009).  Memos can be used to conceptualise the 
data in narrative form (as suggested by Lempert 2007) and can include references to the 
literature and the use of diagrams for linking, structuring and conceptualising concepts (Flick 
2009).  Memos were utilised as a form of both reflexivity (i.e. for the researcher to ask 
questions of the data) and to produce diagrammatic representation of categories in the form of 
clustering and mind maps.  Clustering represents a non-linear, visual technique to help you to 
understand and organise your data (Rico 1983) and enabled me to produce a number of tentative 
and editable maps of my data as depicted by the hierarchical structure of the inter-connecting 
categories and sub-categories (Charmaz 2006).  Clustering was completed using the Simple 
Mind18 software application and initially completed on an iPad and further refined using 
Microsoft word.  This consisted of creating spider diagrams/mind maps that depicted potential 
groupings of concepts and possible relationships between concepts and categories (please refer 
to Appendix 16–18 for examples).  Open coding was performed in parallel with the clustering 
techniques described above in order to identify similar concepts that could be grouped together 
to form categories (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  This process, therefore, resulted in a list of 320 
concepts and tentative categories attached directly to the text that were then subjected to focused 
coding whereby more directed, selective and conceptual categories were generated (Glaser 
1978). 
  
4.14.2.1.2. Focused coding.   
Focused coding was performed in a handwritten format using a colour-coding technique 
(similar to the colour-coding method described by Stottok, Bergaus and Gorra (2011) but using 
a manual as opposed to electronic format) whereby initial broad categories were further refined 
into 20 primary, 54 secondary, 89 tertiary and 23 quaternary categories (please refer to Table 
                                                          
18 Please refer to: http://www.simpleapps.eu/simplemind/desktop for more information about the Simple 
Mind software application. 
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4.22 in Appendix 19 for details of the refinement of categories for each micro-model).  
Coloured Post-it note labels were utilised to group concepts and meanings into categories that 
were further refined using the constant comparative technique described above (please refer to 
Appendix 15 for a coded transcript example).  Refinement of the categories was achieved by 
identifying the most significant and/or frequently occurring concepts and selection of the 
categories that made the most analytic sense to categorising and synopsising the data (Charmaz 
2006).  An example of focused coding can be seen by presentation of concepts and categories 
from the HCN Journey Model described in Chapter 7.  Initial open coding revealed 14 concepts 
that could be identified as motivations or reasons for being a negotiator (see Table 4.26 in 
Appendix 20).  When these concepts were analysed more deeply, they could be further refined 
into four tertiary categories (a desire to help people; vicarious pseudo-altruism; negotiation as 
an opportunity to be “down the coalface” and self-aggrandisement/ego-boosting).  These 
tertiary categories were then further refined into two secondary categories (i.e. those which were 
conceptualised as internally-orientated motivations and those that were externally-orientated 
motivations).  These two categories, when taken as a whole, were then further refined into the 
primary category of “reasons for entering into (and remaining within) the negotiator world”.  In 
line with Saldana’s (2009) suggestion, once I felt happy with the initial categorisation of the 
codes, they were transferred into an electronic file/data analysis matrix whereby further 
refinement was performed in the form of axial coding.   
As a researcher immersing myself in the data as per the requirements of a constructivist 
grounded theory study, I felt the need to “touch the data” as suggested by Graue and Walsh 
(1998), by coding the printed transcripts manually, as this permitted a more tangible 
understanding of the codes and categories and their inter-connecting relationships, as opposed to 
working solely with the data electronically.  The focused coding process was deemed to be 
complete once the cross-comparative process performed across the interview transcripts 
demonstrated pseudo-saturation of data and no further concepts or categories were identified.  
“Pseudo-saturation” of data for the purposes of this thesis is referred to, as in line with Strauss 
and Corbin’s (1998: 136) premise, I believe that the phenomenon under investigation represents 
an entity whereby the data obtained is both rich and thick, and as such, it is my belief that if I 
were to continue to examine the data, there would always be the potential for “the new to 
emerge”.  Having said this, I feel that in relation to the specific models developed, the data was 
saturated to the point at which any new concepts/categories discovered would not add anything 
significant to the overall theory/model that had been developed and as such, data collection was 
ceased after the fifteenth interview (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 136).  It is also worth noting that 
the theory generated/reported within the current thesis represents part of the theory generated as 
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a result of the data coding, as further theory/model development was beyond the remit of this 
particular thesis, thereby further validating my explanation of the data as having been “pseudo-
saturated”.  This restriction in terms of what can be feasibly achieved within a PhD thesis is also 
a well-documented constraint of doctoral research, as identified/acknowledged by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998: 292), who note that “sometimes the researcher has no choice and must settle for a 
theoretical scheme that is less developed than desired”.      
 
4.14.2.1.3. Axial coding.   
Axial coding was utilised as a means of refining the categories specifically into primary, 
secondary, tertiary and quaternary subordinate categories and identifying how these categories 
relate to one another in a hierarchical sense.  This process enabled the data that had been 
deconstructed as a result of the initial/open coding process to be reassembled in a manner that 
provides coherence and meaning to the emerging analysis and theory (Charmaz 2006).  Axial 
coding was utilised to elaborate each category and conceptual maps/diagrams were used to help 
integrate categories and sub-categories and to produce substantive theory (as suggested by 
Clarke 2003, 2005) in relation to HCNn.  Axial coding was utilised as suggested by Charmaz 
(2006), as a means of developing subcategories and identifying potential links between them, as 
opposed to the more stringent and prescriptive method encouraged by Strauss and Corbin 
(1990).  Axial coding in the latter sense has been criticised for making grounded theory 
cumbersome (Robrecht 1995) and is not always considered to be necessary for the development 
of a robust grounded theory (Charmaz 2006).  Axial coding was therefore performed as a 
reflective process whereby links between categories and sub-categories were identified in order 
to make meaning of the data and to ‘metaphorically’ build the models utilised to conceptualise 
and depict the theory being developed.  A particular example of this coding process can be seen 
in the linking of four of the secondary categories represented in the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural 
model described in Chapter 8.  Within the model, the first category (information/intelligence 
gathering) informs the second category (risk/threat assessment), and the second category 
(risk/threat assessment) then informs the third category (scene control/sterilisation and 
management) (i.e. information/intelligence gathered is used to assess potential risk posed to all 
parties within the scenario, and this level of risk is then used to inform the scene control process 
and the negotiator cell setup in terms of negotiator positioning etc.).  This relationship between 
categories is represented visually via the use of two downward-facing vertical arrows 
connecting the three secondary categories within the conceptual map of the model (see Figure 
8.1).  Please refer to Tables 4.23–4.27 in Appendix 20–24 for a copy of the data analysis 
matrices/coding tables utilised to refine the categories hierarchically.    
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4.14.2.1.4. Theory generation.   
Data analysis resulted in the development of five grounded theoretical micro-models 
that can be used to depict and portray five specific aspects in relation to HCNn within the UK: 
1) The nature and extent of HCNn19, 2) The HCN journey, 3) The HCN experience, 4) The 
HCNn procedure and 5) The successful HCN profile; as discussed in Chapters 7-10. 
 
4.14.2.1.5. Methodological rigour.   
Throughout the coding and analysis process, a number of strategies were employed as a 
means of enhancing the methodological rigour of the qualitative theory and models generated.  
This included the following: 
 
 The development of an early familiarity with the culture of the organisation (i.e. police 
service) and specific discipline being investigated (i.e. HCNn) (Shenton 2004).  As an ex-
member of police staff, I was already familiar with the police culture and many of the 
processes/procedures utilised.  In addition, during the initial phases of the research, I made 
significant efforts to understand the way HCNn works in the UK by obtaining relevant 
ACPO policy documents and speaking to a member of my supervisory team, who was a 
police HCN/HNC for many years.  I also spent time at the beginning of each interview 
building a rapport with each interviewee as a means of enhancing disclosure and ergo the 
richness and credibility of the data obtained; a tactic which is proposed by Shenton (2004) 
as a means of helping to ensure honesty in informants when contributing data.  
 Engaging with other researchers to reduce research bias (Slevin and Sines 2000) and 
frequent debriefing sessions between the researcher and his/her superiors (Shenton 2004); 
this included iterative discussions with three members of my supervisory team in relation to 
the validity of the coding of the data and the development of the categories and theoretical 
models.  This process enabled me to utilise others as a “sounding board” and ergo test the 
validity of my interpretations and theory development. 
 Respondent validation (Long and Johnson 2000) and member checks (Guba and Lincoln 
1989 and Shenton 2004); this included providing all interviewees with an opportunity to 
firstly validate/comment on the interview transcript and secondly with an opportunity to 
confirm whether the final categories and models created adequately reflected the 
phenomenon being investigated. 
                                                          
19 Please refer to Appendix 25 for a discussion of this model. 
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 Peer scrutiny of the research project (Shenton 2004); opportunities for peer scrutiny by 
colleagues, peers and academics were encouraged throughout completion of the research 
which included scrutiny of written chapters by members of the supervisory team (and 
internal subject experts) at annual Progress Review Panels20 and presentation of findings at 
internal and external conferences which enabled me to refine methods and strengthen 
arguments in relation to comments made and conclusions drawn.     
 
4.14.2.1.6. Researcher reflexivity statement.   
In addition to the methods described above, I feel that it is important for me to 
contextualise my own journey within this doctoral research, as a means of helping to validate 
the findings and provide context for the reader in terms of the evolution of this thesis.  My 
interest in negotiation was catalysed by a negative experience that I encountered many years 
ago, at the very beginning of my career within Psychology.  Whilst working as a Nursing 
Assistant on an acute ward within a low secure psychiatric hospital, I was confined in a room by 
a floridly psychotic male patient (albeit for a short period of time).  During the five or so 
minutes that I was prevented from leaving the room by this patient and due to me not being 
provided with a personal attack alarm on this particular day due to “resourcing issues”, I 
realised that the only weapon I had at my disposal was my voice.  I started to think, “what can I 
say to this individual that will make them stop what they are doing and allow me to leave?”  In 
this scenario, mainly due to the psychosis the patient was experiencing, dialogue was not 
sufficient and force was utilised to resolve the situation, with several staff members forcing the 
door open in time for me to be able to exit the room.  Luckily, I was not injured as a result of 
this encounter, however, the experience made me reflect upon whether there was a way of 
resolving such situations utilising “words as weapons”, as opposed to having to resort to the use 
of force.  A couple of years after this, whilst working for a police force, I met several officers 
who were trained as HCNs and learned that there were, in fact, individuals who utilised 
dialogue in this way to resolve incidents involving hostages or individuals-in-crisis.  
Discussions with these officers about their role piqued my interest and catalysed the research 
that you see before you today.  This experience is likely to have played a role in my own 
interpretation of the data by providing one of the only personal reference points that I have in 
relation to the concept of HCNn.  However, albeit an experience that was initially a negative 
one, I believe that this experience failed to colour my view of negotiation in a negative light and 
                                                          
20 Progress Review Panels are “mini” viva voce examinations that need to be completed and passed by 




instead, instilled a drive in me to understand academically and empirically, how negotiators can 
be successful in these types of scenarios and it is this theoretical backdrop that has been utilised 





Chapter 5: Quantitative Phase Results Chapter 
1: Personality Traits and Coping Styles in UK 
Police Officers.  Do Negotiators differ from 
their Non-Negotiator Colleagues?  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the findings from the quantitative phase of the 
research in relation to three of the constructs measured: Personality, Coping Style and Cognitive 
Emotion Regulation.  This paper was published in Psychology, Crime and Law in 2015 and this 
chapter includes the pre-published version of the manuscript.  The references from this paper 
are embedded into the references section of this thesis. 
 
Grubb, A. Brown, S., and Hall, P. (2015) ‘Personality Traits and Coping Style in UK Police  
Officers.  Do Negotiators Differ from their Non-Negotiator Colleagues?’ Psychology, 





5.1.1. Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the United Kingdom (UK) 
UK HCNs are police officers who have been trained to perform this specialist function.  
The negotiator role differs from other specialist roles, such as dog handling, criminal 
investigation and firearms, as it does not constitute an officer’s main operational function; 
rather, the role operates on an on-call basis, performed alongside day-to-day duties.  Entry 
requirements for the role differ across police forces but generally officers must be of sergeant 
rank or higher (or inspector rank or higher in some metropolitan forces).  Officers who 
successfully apply for the role complete a one-week regional training course followed by a two-
week national course to equip them with the skills to respond to both crisis and hostage 
situations.  Negotiators are considered to be beneficial within the following incidents: suicide 
intervention; missing persons; political protest; people in crisis; supporting incident 
commanders in firearms operations; offences of kidnap and/or extortion; criminal sieges and 
terrorist hostage incidents (ACPO and NPIA 2011).  This helps to exemplify the diverse nature 
of situations that hostage crisis negotiators are likely to encounter within the UK.  However, it is 
worth noting that anecdotal evidence proffered by negotiators themselves (Grubb, Brown, Hall 
and Bowen 2016), suggests that the majority of incidents that they respond to relate to 
individuals experiencing some form of personal, emotional or psychological crisis, as opposed 
to the latter, more sensationalist categories above.  This suggestion is also reinforced by 
individual territorial force policies which reaffirm the fact that “not all types of incidents 
involve the taking of hostages but all are life threatening or display the potential for significant 
harm/damage to the community, a person or commercial enterprise” (West Mercia Police 2009: 
2). 
It is difficult to provide a clear and accurate picture of the nature and prevalence of 
HCNn in the UK due to the territorial nature of police forces and the lack of a centralised 
database which collates national data in relation to HCN deployments.  Whilst individual forces 
will record negotiator deployments, the exact nature of this recording will vary from force to 
force in terms of detail and content, making it difficult to directly compare such data.  Similarly, 
the number and frequency of deployments will vary from force to force and will be dependent 
on factors such as size of geographical force area and whether the force is metropolitan or rural.  
To provide some context, data provided by one metropolitan police force in the UK indicates 
that negotiators were deployed/utilised on 93 occasions in 2013.  The most common incident 
type involved suicide intervention (74%), followed by ‘other’ incidents (9%), criminal incidents 
(9%) and domestic incidents (8%) (Source Anonymised at Request of Force 2013).  Scottish 
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data provided by Alexander (2011) provides an insight into the prevalence of HCNn in 
Scotland, with Alexander reporting 315 deployments across all Scottish police forces over a 
three year period between 2005-2008.  Official police recorded data can also provide an 
indication in terms of the number of kidnapping incidents that occur per annum within the UK 
on a national level (i.e. there were 1727 offences of kidnapping recorded by the police in 
2013/2014) (Office for National Statistics 2014), however, negotiators may not have been 
involved in responding to all of these incidents and as such, it is difficult to ascertain a clear and 
coherent picture of the exact nature and prevalence of HCNn in the UK.     
The selection processes for police officers have been subject to research that has 
informed the selection criteria utilised by law enforcement agencies internationally.  The 
measurement of personality traits has typically dominated the research and the existence of the 
‘police personality’ is well established empirically (Abrahamsen and Strype 2010, Lefkowitz 
1975 and Twersky-Glasner 2005).  However, there is a lack of research relating to the 
competencies and characteristics that are important for performance within specialist roles, 
including that of HCNn.  The identification of which could be used to inform recruitment and 
selection processes, and ergo facilitate selection of appropriate candidates for these roles.  It 
remains to be established, for example, whether certain personality traits in police officers result 
in them being more effective as negotiators.  In many instances, negotiators can play a 
significant role in whether an individual lives or dies and as such, there is a need for a better 
understanding of the competencies and characteristics that are inherent in effective negotiation. 
    
5.1.2. The Police Personality 
Research within police populations has demonstrated the importance of personality 
traits as significant predictors of police performance (Black 2000, Chibnall and Detrick 2003, 
Detrick and Chibnall 2002, Detrick and Chibnall 2006, Lau et al. 2006 and Varela et al. 2004), 
with higher levels of Conscientiousness and lower levels of Neuroticism being identified as the 
most significant predictors of police population membership and performance (Abrahamsen and 
Strype 2010, Barrick and Mount 1991, Barrick, Mount and Judge 2001, Cortina et al. 1992, 
Detrick and Chibnall 2006 and Mount and Barrick 1995).  Conscientiousness is thought to 
reflect dependability, whereby individuals tend to be careful, thorough, responsible, organised 
and planful (Botwin and Buss 1989 and John 1989).  When extrapolating these findings to the 
context of police work, individuals displaying such traits would logically appear to be well 
suited to a role which involves taking responsibility for protecting the public and goal-orientated 
tasks in relation to enforcement of the law.  Neuroticism tends to reflect negative emotionality 
and nervousness whereby individuals demonstrating lower N scores tend to be more 
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emotionally stable, calm and not easily upset (John, Naumann and Soto 2008) than those with 
higher N scores.  When considering the interpersonal conflict that inevitably arises as a result of 
police work, it is likely that those who are able to react calmly in the ‘heat of the moment’ and 
respond in a more emotionally stable way after experiencing a potentially traumatic event are 
more likely to cope with the pressure associated with police work and perform more effectively 
within their role.  Abrahamsen and Strype (2010) confirmed the importance of both 
Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability within a Norwegian police sample, and also 
identified the role of Agreeableness.  Agreeableness characteristics such as being good-natured, 
cooperative and trustful may be linked to conflict resolution skills within policing (John, 
Naumann and Soto 2008) and therefore beneficial in de-escalating crisis situations.         
 
5.1.3. The Role of Personality and Socio-Psychological Constructs in Hostage 
Negotiation 
Researchers investigating negotiator characteristics have tended to take one of two 
stances: identifying the characteristics of operational negotiators; or asking negotiators to 
describe the characteristics that they perceive are important for effective negotiators.  The 
studies that have been conducted are outlined in Table 5.1 in Appendix 26.  Much of the 
research has been conducted in the USA with a potential lack of cross-cultural validity or 
applicability to other contexts.  The studies are varied in terms of the variables measured, type 
of measurement tools/methods and samples utilised, such that it is difficult to compare findings 
or attempt to synthesise a single list of qualities/characteristics that HCNs possess. In three 
studies (e.g. Allen, Fraser and Inwald 1991, Gelbart 1979 and Gettys and Elam 1988), 
psychometric profiles of negotiators were produced using the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI) and/or the California Personality Inventory (CPI), but 
comparison or control samples of non-negotiator officers were not included, so it cannot be 
determined whether the characteristics are unique to negotiators.  Other researchers (e.g. 
McMains and Mullins 2010, Regini 2002 and Slatkin 2010) relied upon discussions with, or 
observations of, the crisis negotiation teams.  However, the lists of characteristics generated do 
not appear to have been empirically validated and it is unclear exactly how these attributes were 
measured.  Self-report studies in which negotiators were asked to identify the characteristics of 
effective negotiators by selecting characteristics from a standardised list of adjectives (e.g. San 
Jose 1995, 2004 cited in Strentz 2012) lack credibility due to the fact that they only provide 
insight into the perceived characteristics of effective negotiators and do not necessarily depict 
the actual characteristics.  The findings from the studies are far from generalisable as a result of 
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sampling limitations, including limited sample sizes and differences in the levels and lengths of 
operational experience of negotiators in different studies.       
 
5.1.4. The Role of Coping Style in Police Settings 
Coping is referred to as the conscious use of cognitive or behavioural strategies to 
reduce perceived stress (Lazarus and Folkman 1991).  The way in which individuals cope with 
stressful events can broadly be dichotomised into adaptive and maladaptive coping styles.  The 
most commonly discussed conceptualisation of these styles describes coping strategies as either 
problem-focused or emotion-focused (Folkman 1984).  Problem-focused coping refers to 
responses that are geared towards directly altering or resolving the stressful situation, while 
emotion-focused coping refers to efforts to manage and regulate one’s emotional reactions to 
the stressful situation (Folkman et al. 1986).  In general, problem-focused coping strategies are 
considered to be more functional than emotion-focused coping strategies (Billings and Moos 
1984, Hart, Wearing and Headey 1995 and Thoits 1995), because they focus on actively 
addressing the problem (Masel, Terry and Gribble 1996), as opposed to dealing with the 
emotions associated with the problem.   
The ability to cope with stress has been highlighted as a significant factor within police 
settings, with poor coping skills significantly predicting stress experienced in police work 
(Anshel 2000 and Beehr, Johnson and Nieva 1995).  Law enforcement has been recognised as 
one of the most stressful occupations worldwide (Dantzer 1987 and Loo 1984) and the use of 
maladaptive coping strategies in police work has been found to lead to chronic, long term stress 
(Hurrel 1995 and Nordlicht 1979); increased rates of heart disease, stomach disorders, divorce, 
alcohol/drug abuse, suicide (Lord, Gray and Pond 1991 and Rogers 1976); job burnout and 
leaving the profession (Burke and Deszca 1986 and Malloy and Mays 1984).  The use of coping 
strategies by police officers has been empirically investigated by a number of researchers 
(Anshel 2000, Anshel, Robertson and Caputi 1997, Biggam, Power and MacDonald 1997, 
Bishop et al. 2001, Burke 1994, Fain and McCormick 1988, Haarr and Morash 1999, Kirkcaldy, 
Cooper and Ruffalo 1995 and Leonard and Alison 1999) showing that police officers utilise 
maladaptive coping strategies (Burke 1993, Dietrich and Smith 1984, Evans et al. 1993, Graf 
1986, McCafferty, F. McCafferty, E. and McCafferty, M. 1992, Richmond et al. 1998 and 
Violanti, Marshall and Howe 1985) to deal with occupational stress.  Strategies include 
aloofness, alcoholism, authoritarianism, cynicism, depersonalisation, emotional detachment and 
suspiciousness (Bonifacio 1991, Davidson and Veno 1980, Kroes 1985, Niederhoffer 1967 and 
Violanti and Marshall 1983); with one of the most consistently reported maladaptive coping 
strategies being the use of alcohol and/or drugs (Burke 1993, Dietrich and Smith 1984 and 
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Richmond et al. 1998). The findings from these studies conducted across different cultures are 
inconsistent.  The reasons behind this are unclear but suggest that cultural components play a 
role.  It may be the case, for example, that some strategies are less acceptable within certain 
cultures (i.e., the use of alcohol) and, therefore, are used less.  The implications of maladaptive 
coping are far from benign, with those who utilise such coping mechanisms being far more 
likely to suffer from health problems than those utilising more adaptive forms of coping (Burke 
1993).            
Research focused on direct comparisons of problem and emotion-focused coping has 
identified more frequent use of problem-focused coping within police samples (Bishop et al. 
2001 and Evans et al. 1993).  Other research indicates that both strategies are used (Alexander 
and Walker 1994, Beehr, Johnson and Nieva 1995, Fain and McCormick 1988 and Larsson, 
Kempe and Starrin 1988), with Larsson, Kempe and Starrin (1988) revealing problem-focused 
coping in 100% of the situations and emotion-focused coping in 97% of the scenarios officers 
were asked to evaluate.  Whilst these findings provide an insight into police officer coping, they 
have often been identified using police samples in isolation so it is difficult to assess whether 
these strategies are unique to police officers.  Moreover, there is no published research to date 
that investigates coping strategies utilised by specific divisions within the police (i.e. HCNs) 
who may be exposed to intense and potentially emotionally traumatic incidents that may extend 
over fairly protracted periods of time.  Identification of the cognitive and behavioural coping 
mechanisms utilised by negotiators would have a number of implications for police selection 
processes, probationary officer training and on-going operational policing.  Identification of 
applicants who have a tendency to utilise less adaptive strategies could be used to inform 
selection of probationary officers, or provide an opportunity for additional resilience training to 
be implemented prior to completing their probationary period.  Equally, operational officers 
frequently exposed to traumatic or emotionally challenging scenarios (as a result of a specific 
police role, for example), could be provided with bespoke dedicated training packages designed 
to enhance their utilisation of adaptive cognitive and behavioural coping strategies in an attempt 
to prevent potential problems associated with maladaptive coping in police settings.   
 
5.1.5. Gender, Personality and Coping Style 
Limited research has focused on direct comparisons of personality attributes of male 
and female police officers; however, research that has been conducted outside of police settings 
has found that gender impacts upon personality (Costa, Terracciano and McCrae 2001 and 
Feingold 1994).  Amongst other trait differences, women tend to possess higher levels of 
neuroticism and agreeableness, whereas men tend to score more highly on assertiveness and 
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openness (Costa, Terracciano and McCrae 2001).  With reference to coping style and stress 
responses, generic occupational empirical studies indicate that there are significant differences 
in the coping skills of male and female employees (Barnett, Biener and Baruch 1987), with 
females tending to utilise more emotion-focused coping strategies and males more problem-
focused strategies (Billings and Moos 1981 and Stone and Neale 1984).  This finding also 
extrapolates to police settings, with female officers coping with stress differently compared to 
male officers (Brown and Campbell 1990, Haarr and Morash 1999 and Pendergrass and Ostrove 
1984).  There is, however, a paucity of research in which direct gender comparisons of coping 
styles and strategies are made, and gender in relation to HCNn has not been examined.          
 
5.2. Rationale, Aims and Hypotheses 
 To date, there is limited literature which examines negotiator characteristics when 
placed in a comparative context of the wider police population.  In addition to this, research 
which analyses the potential impact of gender on HCN characteristics is also lacking.  The aim 
of the current study, therefore, was to compare UK police HCNs with police officers and 
students on three constructs (personality, coping style and cognitive emotion regulation) that 
may influence the way individuals negotiate and/or cope with high levels of stress, whilst also 
taking account of gender.  It was proposed that police negotiators would display a unique and 
consistent ‘HCN profile’, distinct from the profiles of non-negotiator trained police officers and 
non-officers, that enables them to perform and cope under highly stressful situations, and that 
there would be gender differences observed across the sample.  The constructs were selected on 
the basis of empirical evidence linking them to occupational performance within police settings, 
or commonsensical application of the constructs to performance within highly stressful 
occupations and roles (Grubb and Brown 2012).  A student comparison group was employed to 
establish differences between police and non-police populations.  Whilst the authors 
acknowledge that a sample of students may not fully represent the general population, this type 
of sample is frequently utilised within social science research.  Comparisons with norm group 
data (where available) for the tests employed were also carried out. 
 Despite this not being a focus of the current research, the authors acknowledge the 
interactive play between personality and coping style and the notion that certain personality 
traits are more conducive to the utilisation of adaptive and functional coping styles.  For a full 
discussion of the literature relating to the relationship between personality and coping style and 
a theoretical analysis of how this may play a role within HCNn environments, please refer to 
(Grubb and Brown 2012).   
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 The following hypotheses were generated on the basis of the extant literature:  
 
1a) HCNs will score significantly more highly on Extraversion and Conscientiousness than 
police officers and students;  
1b) HCNs will score significantly lower on Neuroticism than police officers and students;  
1c) There will be a statistically significant difference between the Agreeableness and Openness 
scale scores exhibited by HCNs, police officers and students;  
1d) Female participants will score significantly more highly on the Neuroticism and 
Agreeableness scales than male participants; 
1e) Male participants will score significantly more highly on the Openness subscale than female 
participants; 
2a) HCNs will display significantly higher levels of problem-focused coping and significantly 
lower levels of emotion-focused coping than police officers and students;  
2b) HCNs will use maladaptive coping strategies (i.e. ‘Hang Ups’) significantly less frequently 
than police officers and students; 
2c) Female participants will score significantly more highly on emotion-focused coping 
strategies than male participants;  
3a) HCNs will use adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies significantly more 
frequently than police officers and students;  
3b) HCNs will use maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies significantly less 
frequently than police officers and students;  
3c) Female participants will score significantly more highly on the use of maladaptive cognitive 




A cross-sectional survey design was utilised, whereby data were collected in the form of 
a psychometric test battery.  The independent variables consisted of group membership with 
three levels (HCN, Police Officer and Student) and gender with two levels (male and female).  
The battery consisted of four pre-validated scales measuring the following dependent variables: 





The HCN Sample consisted of 117 (77% Male; 23% Female) police HCNs from 21 
UK-based police forces with a mean age of 43 years (SD = 6.1) and an age range of 29–61.  
Most of the participants were White British (n = 115; 98%), one participant (1%) was Other 
White and one participant (1%) was Pakistani.  Participants lengths of service within the police 
ranged from 30–400 months, with a mean of 244 months (SD = 76.7) and their lengths of 
service as negotiators ranged from 0–192 months, with a mean of 64 months (SD = 45.5).  The 
number of incidents dealt with as a negotiator ranged from 0–300 incidents, with a mean of 43 
incidents (SD = 52.0).    
The Police Officer Sample consisted of 118 (63% Male; 37% Female) police officers 
from 21 UK police forces with a mean age of 41 years (SD = 7.5) and an age range of 21–57 
years.  All 118 (100%) of the participants were White British.  Participants’ lengths of service 
within the police ranged from 28–480 months, with a mean of 182 months (SD = 92.6). 
The Student Sample consisted of 203 (45% Male; 55% Female) undergraduate and 
postgraduate students from Coventry University with a mean age of 22 years (SD = 5.9) and an 
age range of 18–50 years.  The majority of the participants were White British (n = 124; 61%) 
and the remainder of the sample consisted of students from a variety of different ethnicities: 
Other White (n = 18; 9%); Indian (n = 19; 9%); Pakistani (n = 12; 6%); Bangladeshi (n = 1; 
1%); Other Asian (n = 1; 1%); Black African (n = 14; 7%), Other Black (n = 3; 2%), Chinese (n 
= 1; 1%); and Other Ethnicity (n = 10; 5%).  The majority of students were studying psychology 
at undergraduate level (n = 107; 53%) or postgraduate level (n = 18; 9%), with the remainder 
studying a variety of courses across the Health and Life Sciences, Engineering and Business 
Faculties.     
 
5.3.3. Measures 
The Demographic Questionnaire21 contained questions relating to personal 
characteristics and work history within the police force, including: age, gender, nationality, 
ethnicity, force, rank, length of service as an officer, length of service as a negotiator and 
number of incidents dealt with as a negotiator. 
The Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue and Kentle 1991) was used to measure 
personality and consists of 44 items measuring each of the big five personality dimensions.  
Personality theory stipulates that personality can be defined on the basis of five broad factors: 
Extraversion (talkative, assertive, active, energetic, outgoing), Agreeableness (sympathetic, 
kind, appreciative, affectionate, soft-hearted), Conscientiousness (organised, thorough, planful, 
                                                          




efficient, responsible), Openness (wide interests, imaginative, intelligent, original, insightful) 
and Neuroticism (tense, anxious, nervous, moody, worrying) (John 1990).  The items on the BFI 
consist of short phrases or statements that describe certain ways of behaving (e.g. I am someone 
who is talkative).  Respondents are required to assess the degree to which they agree with each 
statement with the items being scored on a 5 point Likert scale where 1 = disagree strongly and 
5 = agree strongly.  The BFI scales have excellent psychometric properties, demonstrating 
substantial internal consistency, retest reliability, clear factor structure, and impressive 
convergent and discriminant validity with other longer Big Five measures (Benet-Martinez and 
John 1998 and John and Srivastava 1999).  The Cronbach’s alpha scores for each of the 
subscales using the current dataset also demonstrated good levels of internal consistency (please 
refer to Table 5.2 for subscale alpha coefficients).      
The Coping Skills Test - Revised (CST-R; Jerabek 2001) was used to measure coping 
style and consists of a 45-item questionnaire that is answered on a Likert-based scale ranging 
from Almost Never to Most of the Time. The questionnaire consists of an overall coping scale 
and three subscales: Problem-Focused Coping, Emotion-Focused Coping and Hang-Ups.   High 
scores on the overall coping scale indicate an ability to cope well with problems and utilisation 
of more effective coping strategies rather than ineffective ones.  A high score on each of the 
three subscales indicate that participants tend to utilise problem-focused strategies (Problem 
Solving, Information Seeking and Negotiation), emotion-focused strategies (Social Support, 
Positive Cognitive Restructuring, Emotional Regulation and Distraction) or hang-
ups/maladaptive strategies (Rumination, Avoidance, Helplessness, Social Withdrawal and 
Opposition), respectively, when coping with stress.  The CST-R has high internal consistency 
with a Cronbach’s alpha score of .94 (PsychTests AIM Inc. 2009) (please refer to Table 5.3 for 
subscale alpha coefficients for the current dataset).         
The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij and 
Spinhoven 2002) was used to measure cognitive coping style and emotion regulation.  The 
CERQ is a 36-item multidimensional questionnaire constructed in order to identify the cognitive 
coping strategies someone uses after having experienced negative events or situations. The 
CERQ specifically differentiates between behavioural and cognitive forms of emotion 
regulation and refers exclusively to an individual’s thoughts after having experienced a negative 
event as opposed to their actions.    The nine subscales demonstrate good internal consistency 
with Cronbach’s alpha scores ranging from .68-.86 (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002).  
Items are scored on a Likert-based scale ranging from 1 = Almost Never to 5 = Almost Always 
and a score is obtained for each of the nine subscales (self-blame, acceptance, rumination, 
positive refocusing, refocus on planning, positive reappraisal, putting into perspective, 
95 
 
catastrophising and other blame) indicating the degree to which an individual engages in each 
specific cognitive emotion regulation strategy.  For the purposes of this research, in addition to 
the nine subscales, the cognitive emotion regulation strategies have been combined into two 
larger subscales indicating the use of Adaptive (acceptance, rumination, positive refocusing, 
positive reappraisal and putting into perspective) and Maladaptive (self-blame, rumination, 
catastrophising and other blame) Cognitive Emotion Regulation Styles.  The Cronbach’s alpha 
scores for the sample utilised within this research demonstrated good levels of internal 
consistency (please refer to Table 5.4 for subscale alpha coefficients).      
The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus 1988) consists of 
40 items that are scored on a Likert scale of 1 = Not True to 7 = Very True.  Respondents are 
asked to rate the items according to their level of agreement with the item and one point is 
added for each extreme response of 6 or 7.  The BIDR is used to measure two constructs: Self-
Deceptive Positivity (the tendency to give self-reports that are believed but have a positivity 
bias) and Impression Management (deliberate self-presentation to an audience).  The scores 
from items 1-20 (with even items reversed) are summed to create a Self-Deceptive Positivity 
scale score; the scores from items 21-40 (with odd items reversed) are summed to create an 
Impression Management scale score and all items are summed (with appropriate scores 
reversed) to create an overall social desirability score.  The BIDR has good levels of internal 
consistency: .83 for the total measure; .68-.80 for the Self-Deceptive Positivity scale and .75-.86 
for the Impression Management scale (Paulhus 1988) and the Cronbach’s alpha obtained for the 
current sample was .81 (.71 for the Self-Deceptive Positivity subscale; .79 for the Impression 
Management subscale), so the scale was deemed to be reliable.  The BIDR was used to screen 
for socially desirable responding whereby a cut-off point of greater than 30 (n = 2) was used to 
exclude responses from the analysis. 
 
5.3.4. Procedure 
Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the University Research Ethics 
Committee prior to data collection.  Permission to take part in the research was provided by the 
Assistant Chief Constable or lead HNC for each police force.  Lead HNCs for each force were 
provided with a set of questionnaires that were disseminated to negotiators to complete either at 
one of their quarterly meetings or within their own time.  Each HCN was provided with a 
second questionnaire to disseminate to a non-negotiator police officer colleague to complete.  
Student participants were recruited mainly via a research participation scheme whereby 
psychology students are allocated research credits for taking part in research studies.  Additional 
non-psychology students were recruited from other faculties within the University to enhance 
96 
 
the number of male participants in the student sample.  All participants were provided with a 
participant information sheet detailing the nature and aims of the research and were asked to 
provide written consent prior to completing the test battery.  Participants were provided with a 
debrief sheet at the end of the questionnaire that included the researchers’ details should they 
require any further information or wish to withdraw their data from the study.  Scales were 
completed in paper format and returned to the researcher in a freepost envelope.   
  
5.4. Results 
Statistical analyses were conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) software.  Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were used to assess the internal consistency of 
the scales utilised (Clark and Watson 1995).  Descriptive statistics, Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA), Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA)22 and T-Tests were used to 




 A three (group: HCN, police officer and student) by two (gender: male and female) way 
between groups MANOVA was performed to investigate the influence of group membership 
and gender on the big five personality trait scores.  Five dependent variables were used: 
Extraversion (E), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), Openness (O) and Neuroticism 
(N).  There was a statistically significant difference between the three groups on the combined 
dependent variables (F (10, 858) = 15.43, p < .001; V = 0.31, partial ŋ2 = .15).  This effect was 
large and accounts for 15% of the variance observed.  Univariate analyses of each dependent 
variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .01, revealed significant differences for four 
of the five variables (E, A, C and N).   Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that both HCNs and police officers scored significantly higher than students on E, A 
and C and significantly lower than students on N, however, there were no statistically 
significant differences observed between any of the mean subscale scores for negotiators and 
                                                          
22 DFA was chosen in lieu of logistic regression for the current study.  Whilst logistic regression is often 
cited as being a more suitable test when assumptions of normality are violated, such violations are not 
considered to be ‘fatal’ and the resultant significance tests are still considered to be reliable/trustworthy 
(Hill and Lewicki 2006 :161).  There is also some evidence to suggest that linear DFA still frequently 
achieves good performance even when the assumptions of normality are violated (Duda, Hart and Stork 
2001), thereby further justifying the utilisation of DFA in this case. 
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police officers (please refer to Table 5.2 for means, standard deviations, F values and effect 
sizes).  On this basis, the first three hypotheses have been rejected.  Fifteen triangulation t-tests 
were conducted to compare the norm data mean subscale scores with those of the three samples.  
The findings revealed that the mean scale scores obtained for HCNs and police officers on all 
five constructs (E, A, C, N and O) were significantly different (p < .01) to the norm data mean 
scores providing further evidence for the differences observed above.  In addition to this, only 
one of the five subscale scores (N) was found to be significantly different when comparing the 
norm data and student sample means, suggesting that the student sample provides a fairly 
representative comparison sample (please refer to Table 5.2 for t-test values).    
The MANOVA was followed up with DFA that revealed a significant discriminant 
function variate utilising E, A, C, N and O as predictor variables (canonical R2 = 0.31; Ʌ = 0.68, 
x2 (10) = 162.00, p < .001).  The discriminant function plot depicted in Figure 5.1 demonstrates 
that the function successfully discriminates the student sample from the two police samples 
(combined) with N (r = 0.63) and C (r = -0.60) contributing most significantly to group 
separation/discrimination.  In this case, relatively higher levels of N and relatively lower levels 
of C predict membership of the student sample as opposed to the police samples.  Overall, the 
discriminant function successfully predicted outcome in 55% of cases, with accurate predictions 
being made for 48% of HCNs, 20% of police officers and 79% of students.  These prediction 
rates demonstrate a higher ‘hit-ratio’ than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e. 33%) in all 
but one of the predicted groups (the police officer sample). 
Gender also had a significant impact on the combined dependent variable of personality 
(F (5, 428) = 9.33, p < .001; V = 0.10, partial ŋ2 = .10).  This effect was large and accounts for 
10% of the variance observed.  Univariate analysis of each dependent variable, using a 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .01 revealed significant differences for three of the five 
variables (E, C and N).  Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that females 
scored significantly higher on E, C and N than males (please refer to Table 5.2 for means, 
standard deviations, F values and effect sizes), thereby providing some support for Hypothesis 
1d but leading to rejection of Hypothesis 1e.  Follow up DFA revealed a significant 
discriminant function utilising E, A, C, N and O as predictor variables (Ʌ = 0.85, x2 (5) = 69.55, 
p < .001) and revealed that N (r = 1.10) and E (r = 0.50) were the best predictors of gender in 
this case, with female participants more likely to possess higher levels of both traits than male 
participants.  Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome for 66% of 
cases, representing a hit rate higher than would be predicted by chance alone (33%).   
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(n = 255) 
Females 
(n = 183) 
Univariate ANOVA 
(Gender) 
 α M M SD t (116) M SD t (117) M SD t (202) F (2, 432) ŋ2 M SD M SD F (1, 432) ŋ2 
E .84 3.18 3.69 0.70 7.95** 3.68 0.75 7.40** 3.37 0.76 3.58 12.79* .06M 3.50 0.75 3.60 0.77 7.85* .02S 
A .76 3.65 4.07 0.54 8.45** 4.06 0.62 7.76** 3.74 0.60 2.16 17.07* .07M 3.90 0.62 3.93 0.58 2.45 .01S 
C .84 3.55 4.25 0.55 13.59** 4.16 0.68 12.30** 3.55 0.69 -0.06 64.81* .23L 3.89 0.68 3.90 0.72 9.88* .02S 
N .86 3.04 2.00 0.63 -17.93** 2.20 0.76 -12.15** 2.90 0.81 -2.47** 52.51* .20L 2.27 0.76 2.79 0.89 7.71* .02S 
O .73 3.98 3.63 0.52 -7.27** 3.55 0.57 -7.85** 3.47 0.58 -12.38 1.16 .01S 3.60 0.57 3.44 0.56 4.07 .01S 
Note. E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; C = Conscientiousness; N = Neuroticism and O = Openness.  Possible scores for each subscale ranged from 
a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5.  Italicised font = Most significant predictors of group membership as specified by DFA.  Bold Font = Most 
significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA.  Superscript text = Effect Size (S = Small; M = Medium; L = Large).  Adjusted probability level 
(Bonferroni) for ANOVA = .05 / 5 = .01.  Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for T-Test = .05 / 15 = .003.  ŋ2 = Partial eta Squared.  *Statistically 
significant at the p < .01 level.  **Statistically significant at the p < .003 level.  ^Norm data obtained from Srivastava et al. (2003). 
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There was no statistically significant interaction between group membership and gender (F (10, 
858) = 1.75, p = .066, V = 0.04; partial ŋ2 = .02) suggesting that the effect of group membership 
on personality traits is independent of gender and vice versa. 
 
Figure 5.1.  Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant 
functions utilising the BFI subscales as predictor variables. 
 
5.4.2. General Coping Style 
A three (group: HCN, police officer and student) by two (gender: male and female) way 
between groups MANOVA was performed to investigate the influence of group membership 
and gender on Coping Style.  Dependent variables used within the analysis and descriptive 
statistics can be seen in Table 5.3.  There was a statistically significant difference between the 
three groups on the combined dependent variable of coping style (F (32, 836) = 5.93, p < .001; 
V = 0.37, partial ŋ2 = .19).  This effect was large and accounts for 19% of the variance observed.  
Univariate analysis of each dependent variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .003, 
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showed significant differences for 15 of the variables.  Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey 
HSD test indicated that both HCNs and police officers scored significantly lower than students 
on:  Rumination, Avoidance, Helplessness, Social Withdrawal, Opposition, Hang-Ups and 
Maladaptive Coping Strategies; and significantly higher than students on: Overall Coping 
Skills, Problem Solving, Negotiation, Positive Cognitive Restructuring, Emotional Regulation, 
Problem-Focused Coping, Emotion-Focused Coping, and Adaptive Coping Strategies.  For the 
Distraction subscale, police officers alone scored significantly lower than students.  There were 
no statistically significant differences observed between any of the mean subscale scores for 
negotiators and police officers (please refer to Table 5.3 for means, standard deviations, F 
values and effect sizes).  On this basis, Hypotheses 2a and 2b have been rejected.  Triangulation 
t-tests were conducted to compare the norm data mean subscale scores with those of the three 
samples.  The findings revealed that the mean scale scores obtained for HCNs and police 
officers on the majority of the constructs (12 out of 16 for negotiators; 14 out of 16 for police 
officers) were significantly different (p < .001) to the norm data mean scores providing further 
evidence for the differences observed above.  Only one of the 16 student subscale mean scores 
(Helplessness) was significantly different from the norm data means, suggesting that the student 
sample provides a fairly representative comparison sample (please refer to Table 5.3 for t-test 
values). 
The MANOVA was followed up with DFA and revealed a significant discriminant 
function variate utilising the variables identified in italicised text in Table 5.3 (canonical R2 = 
0.61; Ʌ = 0.62, x2 (26) = 207.21, p < .001).  The discriminant function plot depicted in Figure 
5.2 demonstrates that the function successfully discriminates the student sample from the two 
police samples (combined) with Problem-Focused Coping (r = -1.26), Information Seeking (r = 
0.75), Rumination (r = 0.59) and Avoidance (r = 0.54) contributing most significantly to group 
separation/discrimination.  In this case, relatively higher levels of Information Seeking, 
Rumination and Avoidance and relatively lower levels of Problem-Focused Coping predict 
membership of the student sample as opposed to the police samples.  Overall, the discriminant 
function successfully predicted outcome in 60% of cases, with accurate predictions being made 
for 54% of HCNs, 46% of police officers and 71% of students.  These prediction rates therefore 
demonstrate a higher ‘hit-ratio’ than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e. 33%). 
 Gender also had a significant impact on the combined dependent variable of coping 
style (F (16, 417) = 2.67, p = .001; V = 0.09, partial ŋ2 = .09).  This effect was moderate and 
accounts for 9% of the variance observed.  Univariate analysis of each dependent variable, using 
a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .003 revealed only significant differences for the 
Information Seeking and Social Support variables (F (1, 438) = 9.66, p = .002, partial ŋ2 = .02; 
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F (1, 438) = 27.72, p < .001, partial ŋ2 = .06).  Inspection of the mean scores indicated that 
females scored significantly higher than males on measures of Information Seeking and Social 
Support, however, no significant differences were observed for emotion-focused strategies 
thereby leading to rejection of Hypothesis 2c (please refer to Table 5.3 for means, standard 
deviations, F values and effect sizes). 
Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function utilising the italicised 
variables in Table 5.3 (Ʌ = 0.85, x2 (12) = 71.42, p < .001) and revealed that Problem-Focused 
Coping (r = -1.59), Overall Coping Skills (r = 0.97), Problem Solving (r = 0.77) and Social 
Support (r = 0.75) were the best predictors of gender in this case, with male participants more 
likely to display higher levels of Overall Coping Skills and female participants more likely to 
display higher levels of Problem-Focused Coping, Problem Solving and Social Support.  
Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome for 67% of cases, representing 
a ‘hit ratio’ higher than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e. 50%).  There was no 
statistically significant interaction between group membership and gender (F (32, 836) = 0.95, p 
= .549, V = 0.07; partial ŋ2 = .04) suggesting that the effect of group membership on coping 
style is independent of gender and vice versa. 
Figure 5.2.  Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant 
functions utilising the CST-Revised subscales as predictor variables.  
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Table 5.3.  Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, Univariate ANOVA and T-Test Results for Scores on the CST-Revised across the Groups and Genders 
Dependent Variable Cronbach 
Alpha 
Norm Group 
(N = 8998)^ 
HCNs 














(n = 255) 
Females 
(n = 183) 
Univariate 
ANOVA (Gender) 
 α M M SD t (116) M SD t (117) M SD t (202) F 
(2, 432) 
ŋ2 M SD M SD F 
(1, 432) 
ŋ2 
Problem Solving .85 62.96 74.92 14.29 9.05** 73.81 15.30 7.71** 67.04 17.32 3.36 12.95* .06M 70.55 15.72 71.55 17.34 4.90 .01S 
Information Seeking .74 56.84 52.70 17.20 -2.60 55.25 18.32 -.941 56.68 18.20 -.125 0.93 .00S 52.45 18.05 59.11 17.26 9.66* .02S 
Negotiation~ .64 62.48 76.14 10.67 13.85** 74.37 11.40 11.34** 64.09 14.98 1.53 36.68* .15L 71.82 12.22 67.65 16.19 0.04 .00S 
Social Support .74 49.58 47.90 15.52 -1.17 48.73 16.92 -0.55 50.76 16.01 1.04 0.02 .00S 45.77 16.16 54.57 14.82 27.72* .06M 
PC Restructuring¬ .86 63.00 76.21 13.10 10.90** 75.25 14.38 9.25** 65.96 17.75 2.38 20.42* .09M 71.87 15.60 70.27 17.55 0.92 .00S 
Emotional Regulation .65 56.85 60.84 15.80 2.73 62.69 15.85 4.01** 53.95 16.01 -2.58 13.79* .06M 59.01 16.38 56.94 16.38 0.12 .00S 
Distraction~ .67 58.76 62.57 13.04 3.16 63.95 15.12 3.73** 58.14 15.93 -0.55 7.19* .03S 61.72 15.01 59.73 15.38 0.17 .00S 
Rumination .87 50.78 30.16 16.19 -13.78** 31.88 16.49 -12.45** 52.75 19.08 1.47 70.59* .25L 37.19 19.41 46.54 21.27 2.50 .01S 
Avoidance .73 33.93 18.03 9.91 -17.34** 19.15 11.33 -14.16** 36.97 18.97 2.28 71.71* .25L 24.57 15.88 30.65 19.32 0.23 .00S 
Helplessness .72 36.59 15.15 12.32 -18.83** 16.49 11.92 -18.32** 31.45 16.69 -3.92** 46.83* .18L 19.99 15.20 27.35 19.19 2.57 .01S 
Social Withdrawal .76 39.97 27.18 12.12 -11.42** 27.43 12.79 -10.65** 36.30 18.35 -2.85 19.53* .08M 31.84 14.89 30.96 17.64 4.17 .01S 
Opposition~ .86 38.98 25.50 13.77 -10.59** 25.08 14.95 -10.10** 38.84 18.67 -0.11 32.35* .13L 29.33 17.03 34.70 18.43 0.60 .00S 
Problem Focused Coping .89 60.77 67.90 11.29 6.83** 67.85 12.28 6.26** 62.60 13.55 1.92 11.32* .05M 64.94 12.48 66.10 13.43 5.39 .01S 
Emotion Focused Coping .88 57.08 61.83 10.19 5.04** 62.62 11.55 5.21** 57.15 10.95 0.09 14.84* .06M 59.54 11.18 60.34 11.21 6.40 .02S 
Hang Ups .93 39.83 23.15 9.88 -18.27** 24.00 10.07 -17.07** 39.24 14.89 -0.57 75.53 .08M 28.53 13.07 34.05 16.25 0.49 .00S 
Adaptive Coping Skills~ .80§ N/A 64.47 9.59 N/A 64.87 11.08 N/A 59.52 10.95 N/A 15.73* .07M 61.88 10.78 62.83 11.13 7.15 .02S 
Maladaptive Coping 
Skills~ 
.88§ N/A 23.21 9.85 N/A 24.01 10.13 N/A 39.26 14.90 N/A 75.44* .26L 28.58 13.09 34.04 16.26 0.43 .00S 
Overall Coping Skills .94 59.20 69.58 8.17 13.75** 69.52 9.52 11.78** 60.01 10.98 1.06 49.86* .19L 65.85 10.21 64.13 11.90 1.77 .00S 
Note. Italicised type = Most significant predictors of group membership as specified by DFA.  Boldface type = Most significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA.  ~ = variables that 
were not included within the DFA.  Superscript text = Effect Size (S = Small; M = Medium; L = Large).  Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for ANOVAs = .05/18 = .003.  Adjusted 
probability level (Bonferroni) for T-Tests = .05/48 = .001.  ŋ2 = Partial eta Squared.  N/A = Norm data not available for these subscales as they were created by the researcher.  ¬ = Positive 
Cognitive Restructuring.  Cronbach’s alpha data provided by PsychTests who retained the raw data, apart from those marked with a § which are based on the current dataset.  ^Norm group 
data taken from PsychTests AIM Inc. (2009).  * Statistically significant at the p < .003 level.  **Statistically significant at the p < .001 level.   
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5.4.3. Cognitive Emotion Regulation Style 
A three (group: HCN, police officer and student) by two (gender: male and female) way 
between groups MANOVA was performed to investigate the influence of group membership 
and gender on Cognitive Emotion Regulation Style.  Dependent variables used within the 
analysis and descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 5.4.  There was a statistically significant 
difference between the three groups on the combined dependent variable of cognitive emotion 
regulation style (F (18, 840) = 8.21, p < .001; V = 0.30, partial ŋ2 = .15).  This effect was large, 
accounting for 15% of the variance observed.  Univariate analysis of each dependent variable, 
using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005, found significant differences for six of the 
variables.  Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that both HCNs and police 
officers scored significantly lower than students on:  Self-Blame, Acceptance, Rumination, 
Catastrophising and Maladaptive Cognitive Emotion Regulation Strategies; whereas HCNs 
alone scored significantly higher than students on the Positive Reappraisal subscale.  There 
were no statistically significant differences observed between any of the mean subscale scores 
for negotiators and police officers (please refer to Table 5.4 for means, standard deviations, F 
values and effect sizes).  On this basis, Hypotheses 3a and 3b have been rejected.  Triangulation 
t-tests were conducted to compare the norm data mean subscale scores with those of the three 
samples.  The findings revealed that the mean scale scores obtained for HCNs and police 
officers on the majority of the constructs (five out of nine) were significantly different (p < 
.002) to the norm data mean scores providing further evidence for the differences observed 
above.  However, eight out of nine of the student subscale mean scores were also significantly 
different from the norm data means, suggesting that the students also utilise cognitive emotion 
regulation strategies differently to those participants on which the norm data is based (N = 611) 
(please refer to Table 5.4 for t-test values).     
Follow-up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function variate utilising all 
variables apart from those marked with a ~ in Table 5.4 (Canonical R2 = 0.54; Ʌ = 0.67, x2 (8) = 
24.52, p = .002).  The discriminant function plot depicted in Figure 5.3 demonstrates that the 
function successfully discriminates the student sample from the two police samples (combined) 
with Rumination (r = 0.42), Catastrophising (r = 0.37) and Self-Blame (r = 0.35) contributing 
most significantly to group separation/discrimination.  These variables were positively 
correlated with the discriminant function value, therefore relatively higher scores on each of 
these variables predict membership of the student sample, as opposed to the police samples.  
Overall, the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome in 58% of cases, with 




Table 5.4.  Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, Univariate ANOVA and T-Test Results for Scores on the CERQ across the Groups and Genders 
 




(N = 611)^ 
HCNs 














(n = 255) 
Females 
(n = 183) 
Univariate ANOVA 
(Gender) 
 α M M SD t (116) M SD t (117) M SD t (202) F 
(2, 427) 
ŋ2 M SD M SD F 
(1, 427) 
ŋ2 
Self-Blame .73 8.29 8.17 2.01 -0.64 8.29 1.97 -0.01 10.53 3.20 10.05** 35.28* .14L 8.86 2.65 9.87 3.02 1.55 .00S 
Acceptance .71 10.66 11.83 3.37 3.75** 11.11 3.11 1.57 13.10 3.21 10.72** 15.52* .07M 12.21 3.27 12.22 3.42 1.26 .00S 
Rumination .75 10.15 9.44 3.14 -2.46 9.27 2.91 -3.28** 12.46 3.49 9.09** 42.07* .17L 10.19 3.31 11.59 3.83 2.62 .01S 
Positive Refocusing .82 9.75 9.45 3.38 -0.95 10.39 3.57 1.95 10.29 3.42 2.08 1.12 .01S 9.95 3.38 10.29 3.57 0.65 .00S 
Refocus on Planning .77 12.84 14.18 3.02 4.80** 14.14 3.14 4.51** 13.70 3.41 3.64** 1.73 .01S 14.01 3.12 13.87 3.40 0.44 .00S 
Positive Reappraisal .79 12.16 15.52 3.01 12.07** 14.31 3.38 6.91** 13.87 3.54 6.84** 6.40* .03S 14.60 3.42 14.21 3.43 0.12 .00S 
Putting into Perspective .79 11.46 14.06 3.64 7.72** 14.12 3.37 8.58** 13.44 3.63 7.77** 1.19 .01S 14.05 3.48 13.43 3.67 1.46 .00S 
Catastrophising .74§ 6.15 5.92 2.03 -1.21 6.29 2.27 0.66 8.64 3.32 10.60** 42.15* .17L 6.95 2.72 7.71 3.36 0.01 .00S 
Other-Blame .79 6.37 8.03 2.45 7.31** 8.06 2.19 8.40** 8.54 2.99 10.38** 3.76 .02S 8.53 2.65 7.91 2.63 9.09* .02S 
Adaptive CER Strategies~ .70 N/A 13.01 2.16 N/A 12.81 2.26 N/A 12.88 2.41 N/A 0.18 .00S 12.96 2.26 12.81 2.36 0.03 .00S 
Maladaptive CER 
Strategies~ 
.70 N/A 7.89 1.65 N/A 7.98 1.53 N/A 10.04 2.30 N/A 57.47* .21L 8.63 2.03 9.27 2.39 0.00 .00S 
 
Note.  Possible scores on each subscale ranged from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 20.  Italicised type = Most significant predictors of group membership as 
specified by DFA.  Boldface type = Most significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA.  ~ Variables not included within the DFA.  Superscript text = Effect 
Size (S = Small; M = Medium; L = Large).  Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for ANOVA = .05/11 = .005.  Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for T-Test = 
.05/27 = .002.  § The original Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Catastrophising Subscale was .69.  In order to enhance the reliability of this scale, item 8 on the 
questionnaire was removed and the internal consistency of the subscale increased to a satisfactory level of .74.  ŋ2 = Partial eta Squared.  *Statistically significant at the 




These prediction rates therefore demonstrate a higher ‘hit-ratio’ than would be predicted by 
chance alone (i.e. 33%).  
 
Figure 5.3.  Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant 
functions utilising the CERQ subscales as predictor variables. 
Gender also had a significant impact on the combined dependent variable of cognitive 
emotion regulation style (F (9, 419) = 2.21, p = .02; V = 0.05, partial ŋ2 = .05).  This effect was 
moderate and accounts for 5% of the variance observed.  Univariate analysis of each dependent 
variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005, only revealed a significant difference 
for the Other Blame variable (F (1, 427) = 9.09, p = .003, partial ŋ2 = .02).  Inspection of the 
mean scores indicated that females scored significantly lower on measures of Other Blame than 
males, thereby leading to rejection of Hypothesis 3c (please refer to Table 5.4 for means, 
standard deviations, F values and effect sizes).  Follow up DFA revealed a significant 
discriminant function (Ʌ = 0.97, χ2 (9) = 37.56, p < .001) and revealed that Other Blame (r = –
0.64), and Rumination (r = 0.50) were the best predictors of gender in this case, with male 
participants more likely to display higher levels Other Blame and female participants more 
likely to display higher levels of Rumination. Overall, the discriminant function successfully 
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predicted outcome for 58% of cases, representing only a slightly higher ‘hit ratio’ than would be 
predicted by chance alone (i.e. 50%). There was no statistically significant interaction between 
group membership and gender (F (18, 840) = 1.45, p = .101, V = 0.06, partial ŋ2 = .03) 
suggesting that the effect of group membership on cognitive emotion regulation style is 
independent of gender and vice versa. 
 
5.5. Discussion 
The findings of this study provide evidence for the existence of a ‘police profile’ by 
revealing statistically significant differences between both of the police samples (HCNs and 
police officers) and the student sample.  The study revealed a relatively greater level of 
extraversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness and a relatively lower level of neuroticism 
within both police samples compared to the student sample.  The empirical literature relating to 
police personality, whereby police officers have typically demonstrated higher levels of 
conscientiousness and agreeableness and lower levels of neuroticism than the general 
population (Abrahamsen and Strype 2010) has, therefore, been supported.  DFA revealed that 
higher levels of extraversion and lower levels of neuroticism were in fact the best predictors of 
police sample membership, further reinforcing the importance of such traits within law 
enforcement settings.  
The data, however, fail to support the predicted existence of a unique ‘HCN profile’ as 
negotiators did not demonstrate significantly different personality traits or cognitive/ 
behavioural coping styles when compared to their non-negotiator counterparts.  Although it 
could be hypothesised that HCNs would be a more extraverted and gregarious group of 
individuals due to their role as ‘professional persuaders’ and their requirement to interact with 
people for sometimes prolonged and protracted periods of time, the findings from this study 
suggest that this is not necessarily the case.   
The results are reassuring with regards to police selection within the UK, when 
considered in line with the research indicating that higher levels of conscientiousness and 
extraversion and lower levels of neuroticism are the most significant predictors of police 
population membership and performance (Barrick and Mount 1991, Barrick, Mount and Judge 
2001, Black 2000, Cortina et al. 1992 and Detrick and Chibnall 2006).  It can also be argued 
that police officers (as a generic group) possess the appropriate personality characteristics to 
perform specialist roles, such as HCNn, and that the ‘police personality profile’ serves as an 
appropriate grounding on which to develop specific skills for officers to become trained as 
negotiators.  Many of the day-to-day situations that are encountered by operational police 
officers involve basic conflict management and resolution skills and it is therefore likely that the 
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police personality characteristics in combination with police training equip the majority of 
officers to deal with such situations.   
With reference to coping style, the findings provide a reassuring and positive outlook.  
Despite much of the existing research literature suggesting that police officers are frequent users 
of dysfunctional or maladaptive coping strategies, the current findings indicate that this is not 
representative of UK-based police officers (or at least those sampled within the current 
research).  In line with the findings relating to personality, although no significant differences 
were observed between HCNs and police officers, both police samples demonstrated significant 
differences in their use of both adaptive and maladaptive coping strategies when compared with 
the student sample.  Police samples used adaptive coping strategies significantly more and 
maladaptive coping strategies significantly less than students.  Police officers and negotiators 
also used all of the individual maladaptive cognitive and behavioural coping strategies far less 
than students.  Such strategies included cognitive coping strategies such as Rumination, and 
Helplessness, and behavioural strategies such as Avoidance, Social Withdrawal and Opposition.  
With regards to the adaptive strategies, the police samples used Problem Solving, Negotiation, 
Positive Cognitive Restructuring and Emotional Regulation to a far greater extent than students.  
Interestingly, both HCNs and police officers scored more highly on Problem-Focused and 
Emotion-Focused coping than the students; however, the DFA indicated that the use of 
Problem-Focused Coping was in fact the best predictor of the police sample membership, 
thereby highlighting the importance of this style of coping within police work.  Despite the fact 
that this finding is in contrast to that which was predicted, it is worth noting that emotion 
focused coping can also be considered to be adaptive, and that both styles of coping have in fact 
been observed within police populations (Alexander and Walker 1994, Beehr, Johnson and 
Nieva 1995, Fain and McCormick 1988 and Larsson, Kempe and Starrin 1988).  These findings 
suggest that UK police officers are employing appropriate coping strategies to deal with the 
stresses associated with their role, which is vital when considered in the context of the pre-
established positive correlational relationships between poor coping skills and stress, burnout 
and physical/psychological problems (Hurrel 1995, Lord, Gray and Pond 1991, Nordlicht 1979 
and Rogers 1976).   
The CST-Revised is designed to explore coping style from both a cognitive and 
behavioural context, whereas the CERQ includes a number of cognitive coping strategies used 
to regulate emotions when experiencing a stressful event.  The current findings indicate that UK 
police officers use fewer maladaptive cognitive strategies to regulate their emotions and cope 
with stress, suggesting that they are adept at avoiding those strategies that are negative and 
dysfunctional.  However, the data failed to demonstrate uniqueness with regards to HCNs 
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specifically.  Interestingly, despite the difference observed with reference to maladaptive 
cognitive coping strategies, there is limited indication that police officers use adaptive cognitive 
emotion regulation strategies to a greater extent than students.  Specifically, police officers 
employed Self-Blame, Acceptance, Rumination and Catastrophising significantly less than 
students and HCNs alone utilised Positive Reappraisal significantly more than students.  While 
these findings are suggestive of appropriate non-utilisation of the more dysfunctional coping 
strategies, they also highlight a potential training need for officers to utilise more adaptive and 
functional methods of cognitive coping when trying to regulate emotions in response to stressful 
events.  The only strategy that appeared to discriminate the HCNs from the other two samples 
was Positive Reappraisal, which negotiators appear to use far more frequently.  This variable 
was also the most discriminating variable when differentiating between group membership, 
indicating the importance of Positive Reappraisal as a cognitive coping tool within the 
negotiator repertoire.  Therefore, it would appear that the ability to positively reappraise or 
reframe a situation is a beneficial tool for negotiators to help the person in crisis/hostage-taker 
see the situation in a different light and also for negotiators to deal with the stress that is often 
associated with negotiation by focusing on the positive aspects of the situation as opposed to the 
negative.  This finding is particularly relevant to negotiator stress when considered in line with 
the research that indicates that Positive Reappraisal has been demonstrated to act as a protective 
factor against psychopathology (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002).  The results are also 
reassuring regarding the potential for police officers generally to experience different forms of 
psychopathology, as research demonstrates that maladaptive forms of cognitive coping 
(particularly Rumination, Catastrophising and Self-Blame) are positively correlated with certain 
forms of psychopathology (particularly depression, anxiety and suicidality).  Research 
demonstrates that the use of adaptive cognitive coping strategies can act as a protective factor 
against such symptomology (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002) and therefore, there is 
obvious scope to enhance the use of adaptive cognitive coping strategies within both HCNs and 
police officers as a result of dedicated training packages.  Research indicates that such strategies 
can in fact be learned and unlearned (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002), suggesting 
potential for the development of bespoke cognitive coping strategy training within UK-based 
police forces in order to reduce the potential likelihood of negative psychological impact within 
their staff.   
The findings relating to gender were fairly limited in scope in terms of application to 
police settings, and HCNn selection and practices specifically.  Gender differences were 
observed for personality, with females demonstrating higher levels of extraversion, 
conscientiousness and neuroticism than males, a finding which is supportive of previous 
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research (Schmitt et al. 2008).  This finding is interesting, when considered in line with the 
police personality literature, and suggests that females may in fact possess higher quantities of 
two of the personality traits that are correlated with performance in police settings (E and C) and 
therefore, provides ratifying evidence for the increased number of female officers who are now 
working within law enforcement, compared to a decade ago.  Women, however, still, only 
constitute 27% of the total police strength/workforce within England and Wales (Home Office 
2012), and these findings implicate the potential for this percentage to increase.  Women also 
reported higher levels of social support and information seeking indicating more frequent 
utilisation of certain adaptive general coping strategies than males.  They also demonstrated 
lower levels of blaming others, suggesting that they utilise certain maladaptive cognitive 
emotion regulation strategies less frequently than men.  Although significant differences were 
observed for male and female participants across the whole sample, there were no significant 
interactions observed between gender and group membership.  This indicates that male and 
female participants from within each of the three groups were similar in terms of personality, 
coping style and cognitive emotion regulation and suggests that gender is not necessarily a 
variable that mediates the effect of group membership on the dependent variables in this study.          
The current study has provided an insight into the traits and characteristics possessed by 
UK police HCNs; however, it is not without limitations.  While the sample size (N = 438) is 
fairly acceptable for a study of this kind, its main limitation relates to the use of the student 
sample as a control/comparison sample. This resulted in comparison between three groups with 
a considerable difference in mean age, which is likely to have reduced the validity of the 
findings to some extent.  The student population is also considered to be a fairly homogeneous 
group which is likely to have a higher level of intelligence and socio-economic status than the 
general population and therefore may not provide a perfect sample to act as a comparison group 
for police officers who generally recruit without degree level education.  In order to try and 
account for this limitation, the mean scores for both the HCN and police officer samples on each 
of the variables tested was compared with norm group data (where available) using t-tests.  The 
majority of the findings indicated that the police officer (combined) sample subscale means 
were significantly different to the norm group data means, thereby reinforcing the uniqueness of 
the ‘police profile’ observed.  In addition, the majority of the student subscale means (with the 
exception of the CERQ subscales) were also statistically similar to the norm data means, 
thereby reinforcing the validity of the student sample as a comparison/control sample in this 
study.  Nevertheless, in order to fully account for this limitation, future research could draw 
upon a general population sample that is more comparable in terms of age, level of education 
and socio-economic status to the police samples in order to further validate the current findings.   
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A further sampling limitation includes different proportions of rank representation 
across the two samples, with the negotiator sample demonstrating a relatively higher rank 
profile than the police officer sample.  However, even when controlling for the effect of rank 
using MANCOVA, no significant differences were observed between the HCN and police 
officer samples on any of the dependent variables, thereby suggesting that rank is not 
confounding the current findings.  Nevertheless, this limitation could be avoided in future 
research by ensuring that participants are matched in terms of rank across the two police 
samples, thereby reducing the potential impact of rank as a confounding variable.  It is also 
worth noting that while a fairly large sample of HCNs (n = 117) from approximately 50% of the 
territorial forces in the UK were included in the current study, this figure represents only a 
proportion of the total HCN population (~800) and the findings would therefore be validated 
further by replicating the study with a larger number of negotiators and police officers from 
more forces within the UK and internationally.  Work in this domain has already begun, with 
Young (2016) having completed a partial replication of the current study using a sample of 
HCNs from the USA.     
This research provides one of the first insights into the traits and characteristics of 
police HCNs within the UK.  While the findings fail to provide evidence to support the notion 
of a unique HCN personality or profile, they add weight to the pre-established concept of a 
police personality.  They suggest that police officers possess personality traits and coping styles 
that are unique and distinct from the general population and it is proposed that these 
characteristics serve to help them perform effectively within their police roles.  The study also 
highlights potential individual police officer training needs that could be identified and 
developed in order to reduce possible negative impact on the psychological wellbeing and 
functioning of operational police officers.  The findings, therefore, provide support for the 
development of a bespoke cognitive coping style training package which is designed to enhance 
effective utilisation of adaptive cognitive coping strategies and minimise the use of maladaptive 





Chapter 6: Quantitative Phase Results Chapter 
2: Exploring Decision-Making Style and 
Emotional Intelligence in UK Police Hostage 
and Crisis Negotiators 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the findings from the quantitative phase of the 
research in relation to the remaining two constructs measured: General Decision-Making Style 
and Emotional Intelligence.  At the time of writing, this paper is currently under review by the 
Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology.  The references for this chapter are embedded in 
the references section of this thesis. 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Police HCNs may encounter an infinite number of varying situations during the 
performance of their role, which may range from dealing with an individual-in-crisis to 
negotiating with someone who has taken a person, or persons hostage.  There is accumulating 
evidence to suggest that negotiation is an effective police tool (McMains and Mullins 2001 and 
Regini 2002) and that the use of negotiation can result in an increased likelihood of successful 
peaceful resolution of both hostage and crisis incidents (Flood 2003).  However, there is little 
published empirical research in relation to the skills and characteristics required by HCNs in 
order to perform within this specific and often complex role.  HCNs need to be able to respond 
effectively and efficiently within a variety of stressful and often highly emotive environments 
and it is likely that a number of constructs/characteristics help to mitigate the stress experienced 
by HCNs during such situations.  This research explores whether decision-making style and 
emotional intelligence are important aspects within the HCN profile and aims to identify 
whether these constructs differentiate HCNs from their non-negotiator police officer 
counterparts and a non-police sample of students.   
In addition to this, the current study incorporates the variable of gender, in order to 
explore whether profiles differ between male and female negotiators, police officers and 
students in terms of these constructs.  Whilst the number of female police officers (and HCNs) 
has increased over the past five to ten years, there are still fewer serving female police officers 
within UK police forces.  Data indicates that females represented 27.9% of police officers 
across the 43 UK police forces in 2014 (Home Office 2014).  In light of the ‘softer skills’ that 
have been anecdotally identified as vital for successful negotiation (i.e. ability to demonstrate 
empathy, actively listen and develop rapport), the authors suggest that females may, therefore, 
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represent ideal candidates for the role of HCN.  As such, the current study attempts to identify 
whether there are differences between the profiles of male and female HCNs (and police 
officers) in terms of their decision-making style and levels of emotional intelligence as this 
information has implications for the recruitment and selection of new HCNs.   
The current study is being conducted in the absence of published research which 
identifies the characteristics and competencies of police HCNs and the findings, therefore, have 
implications for both the selection and training of HCNs and police officers.  The successful 
identification of an effective ‘HCN profile’ would enable police forces to perform targeted 
recruitment for trainee HCNs and enhance the selection of appropriate candidates to complete 
training as HCNs.    
   
6.2. Review of the Literature 
6.2.1. Decision-making style   
Scott and Bruce (1995: 820) described decision-making style as ‘the learned, habitual 
response pattern exhibited by individuals when confronted with decision situations’, suggesting 
that decision-making style is not a personality trait, but a habit-based propensity to react in a 
certain way.  The premise is that when encountered with a stressful situation, individuals are 
likely to respond in a fairly consistent habitual manner when deciding how to react to the 
situation, but that the style of decision-making adopted may also be context-dependent.  Scott 
and Bruce (1995) developed a classification system for individual decision-making style that 
consists of five distinct styles that are not mutually exclusive (see also Thunholm 2004).  
Individuals tend to utilise more than one style and consistently display a primary and secondary 
decision-making style (Driver, Brosseau and Hunsaker 1990).  The five styles are described as 
1) Rational: whereby logical and structured approaches to decision-making are employed (e.g., 
‘My decision-making requires careful thought’).  Rational decision-makers assess the long-term 
effects of their decisions and have a strong fact-based orientation to decision-making.  2) 
Intuitive: whereby individuals rely upon hunches, feelings and impressions when making 
decisions (e.g., ‘I generally make decisions that feel right to me’).  Intuitive decisions are made 
relatively quickly, with limited information, and are often changed if the intuition was in error.  
3) Dependent: which relies upon the direction and support of others (e.g., ‘I use the advice of 
other people in making important decisions’).  A dependent style of decision-making is 
characterised by the use of advice and support from others in making decisions.  4) Avoidant: 
whereby decision-making tends to be postponed or avoided (e.g., ‘I postpone decision-making 
whenever possible’).  The avoidant style is characterised by delay and denial, the opposite of 
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decisiveness.  5) Spontaneous: exemplified by impulsive and ‘spur of the moment’ decisions 
(e.g., ‘I often make decisions on the spur of the moment’).  The spontaneous style is 
characterised by a strong sense of immediacy and an interest in getting through the decision-
making process as quickly as possible.   
The style of decision-making adopted by individuals is likely to contribute to 
performance/success within any occupational role and researchers have identified that certain 
decision-making styles are more effective than others (Anderson 2000, Nutt 1990, Russ, 
McNeilly and Comer 2001 and Sadler-Smith 2004).  For example, rational decision-making 
styles have been found to be positively correlated, and avoidant styles negatively correlated, 
with assessments of managerial performance (Russ, McNeilly and Comer 2001).  Other 
researchers have linked the intuitive decision-making style to performance within business 
settings (Anderson 2000 and Sadler-Smith 2004).  However, although decision-making ability 
has been demonstrated to constitute a vital skill within the business and managerial context 
(Barnard 1938, Simon 1947, 1960, Taylor 1965 and Ivancevich, Szilagyi and Wallace 1977), 
there is very limited research that has been conducted to assess this construct within law 
enforcement or emergency services personnel.  In light of the ‘high stakes’ scenarios that HCNs 
typically encounter, it seems prudent to suggest that decision-making style is likely to play a 
role in performance within such settings (i.e. a negotiator who is dealing with a hostage 
situation that may be bound by time-specific deadlines is unlikely to perform well if they 
display a primarily avoidant decision-making style).     
The limited research which has been conducted focusing on the role of decision-making 
style within such personnel has tended to be linked to the physiological stress response.  
Research by Thunholme (2008) conducted with Swedish army officers indicates that individuals 
who utilise certain decision-making styles are more likely to respond negatively to stress and 
exhibit higher stress responses in certain situations, particularly those involving military or 
operational decision-making.  Thunholme found that the avoidant decision-making style 
correlated significantly with higher levels of cortisol release during test sessions, indicating that 
individuals utilising this style experienced a higher level of negative stress when asked to make 
decisions under test conditions.  This finding has implications for individuals working within 
highly stressful situations, as it implies that certain decision-making styles may be related to 
more effective coping.  To date, there is no empirical research that explores decision-making 
styles among police officer populations and as such, it is unclear whether decision-making style 
is a construct which bears relevance to policing, or more specifically whether it plays a role in 
specialist police activities, such as that of HCNn. 
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6.2.2. Emotional intelligence   
Salovey and Mayer (1990: 189) define Emotional Intelligence (EI) as ‘the ability to 
monitor one’s own and others’ emotions, to discriminate among them and to use the information 
to guide one’s thinking and actions’, whereas, Bar-On (1997: 16) defines EI as ‘an array of non-
cognitive capabilities, competencies and skills that influence one’s ability to succeed in coping 
with environmental demands and pressures’.  There are a number of different models of EI;  
probably the most widely accepted model is that of Salovey and Mayer (1990) who divided EI 
into four dimensions and proposed that these dimensions exist sequentially (Mayer et al. 2001).  
These four dimensions can be summarised as: The perception of emotion, the integration and 
assimilation of emotion, knowledge about emotions and management of emotions (George 2000 
and Mayer, Salovey and Caruso 1999).  The first stage refers to the accuracy with which a 
person can identify emotions in themselves and others; the second refers to the process whereby 
an individual uses or assimilates emotions to facilitate thought (i.e., the use of emotions to guide 
thinking); the third refers to an individual’s understanding of how his/her emotions change; and 
the final stage refers to the management of one’s own mood and emotions along with the 
emotions of others.  The construct of EI has been suggested to play a vital but multifaceted role 
in aspects of life including work, health and happiness and research indicates that individuals 
who are higher in EI, tend to be more successful in their careers, have higher levels of general 
life satisfaction and are healthier (Grewal and Salovey 2005).  It is clear, therefore, that EI is a 
salient construct within the human psyche and one that contributes positively to individual 
success and satisfaction in a number of domains.  
There is a vast amount of psychological research focused specifically on the role of EI 
in occupational settings, with respect to both work-place performance/success and academic 
performance (Nowicki and Duke 1992, Shoda, Mischel and Peake 1990 and Van Rooy and 
Viswesvaran 2004).  Some researchers have even gone so far as to suggest that EI is a more 
important predictor of work-place performance/success than IQ (Bar-On 1997, Goleman 1995 
and Dulewicz, Higgs and Slaski 2003); and EI has been consistently and empirically linked to 
both occupational performance and success (Carmeli and Josman 2006, Christiansen, Janovics 
and Siers 2010, Cote and Miners 2006, Goleman 1995, Lam and Kirby 2002, Law, Wong and 
Song 2004, Semadar, Robins and Ferris 2006 and Sy, Tram and O’Hara 2006).      
EI has also been conceptualised as a protective factor in terms of resilience to negative 
life events and is thought to buffer the effects of aversive events on mental health (Ciarrochi, 
Forgas and Mayer 2001).  A relationship between EI and resilience has been demonstrated, with 
Armstrong, Galligan and Critchley’s (2011) findings demonstrating that high scores on all four 
dimensions of EI successfully predict higher levels of resilience in a general population sample 
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of 414 participants from across the world (including the USA, Australia, the UK and Canada).  
Emotionally intelligent behaviour has been suggested to be particularly adaptive when 
individuals are confronted by stressful situations (Armstrong, Galligan and Critchley 2011) and 
Salovey et al. (1999: 161) have proposed that individuals with higher levels of EI cope better 
with the emotional demands of stressful encounters as a result of their abilities to ‘accurately 
perceive and appraise their emotions, know how and when to express their feelings, and 
effectively regulate their mood states’.     
Research also indicates that EI may influence the performance of individuals within 
specific occupational roles (Bar-On et al. 2000).  Bar-On et al. (2000) investigated the 
differences in EI between two distinct occupational groups in Germany, both of which suffered 
high levels of occupational stress: Police officers and paraprofessional personnel in mental 
health and child care professions.  They found that police officers scored significantly higher 
than either of the care worker practitioner groups on most of the primary measures of EI, 
suggesting that the abilities of police officers to be emotionally more aware of themselves and 
of others makes them more adaptable to stressful events and equips them with more 
efficient/effective coping strategies.  Due to the stress that is likely to be experienced by 
negotiators when dealing with hostage or crisis situations, it seems prudent to suggest that high 
levels of EI would not only serve to facilitate their negotiating skills, but also to enhance their 
resilience and protect them from the adverse effects of the stresses experienced as a result of 
negotiation deployments.     
It is clear that EI contributes positively to individual success within a variety of settings, 
however, research has also implicated the role of EI within team/group performance (Jordan and 
Lawrence 2009, Jordan and Troth 2004, Quoidbach and Hansenne 2009 and Stough, Saklofske 
and Parker 2009).  This suggests that the ability to identify and regulate your own and others’ 
emotions is a skill that works to positively enhance the performance of a number of individuals 
within a team.  This also has implications for HCNs who exist as part of a cadre and typically 
work within a team format (i.e. the negotiator cell).  The ability, therefore, to effectively manage 
the emotions of the parties involved (including that of the hostage-taker/individual in crisis and 
secondary negotiator) is consequently proposed to constitute a vital part of HCNn and highlights 
the potential importance of the EI construct within such settings. 
Although there is a plethora of research studies where the role of EI in a number of 
occupational settings has been investigated, the empirical research focused on police settings is 
limited.  However, the idea of EI as a contributing factor within police organisations is gaining 
momentum, and those researchers that have measured EI within police officers have 
demonstrated positive findings that promote the benefits of EI within law enforcement settings 
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(Afolabi, Awosola and Omole 2010, Al Ali, Garner and Magadley 2012, Aremu and Tejumola 
2008 and Lev 2005).  Al Ali, Garner and Magadley (2012), Afolabi, Awosola and Omole 
(2010) and Lev (2005), for example, all found a positive correlation between EI and police 
officer performance within their samples of police officers in the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria 
and Israel, respectively.  Furthermore, there is strong evidence to indicate that EI is particularly 
beneficial within occupations that involve regular interpersonal contact with people, particularly 
where such contacts are the basis for effectiveness (Caruso, Bienn and Kornacki 2006).  This 
criteria is congruent with the majority of police officer roles, particularly that of HCNs, who 
spend the vast majority of their time communicating and interacting with hostage-takers or 
individuals-in-crisis.   
In addition to the small cluster of studies that support a link between EI and police 
performance, there are a number of specific facets of EI that would appear logically to be 
associated with, and particularly pertinent to, the role of HCNn.  The first relates to the concepts 
of appraisal and expression of emotion, which are described by Mayer and Salovey (1997) as 
the ability to recognise emotion in other people’s facial and postural expressions and the ability 
to recognise honest and dishonest expressions of emotions.  These abilities are particularly 
relevant to the HCNn situation, as the ability to accurately detect an individual’s emotional state 
is vital for consistent communication (Al Ali, Garner and Magadley 2012) and therefore, the 
negotiator’s ability to draw upon these skills may facilitate the negotiation process and enhance 
the likelihood of a successful and peaceful resolution.  The concept of empathy also falls within 
this facet of EI and relates to the ability to demonstrate an awareness of other people’s feelings, 
concerns and needs (Gardner 2005).  Empathy is considered to be one of the main underpinning 
processes within the HCNn context and it is specified as a key component within the 
Behavioural Change Stairway Model developed by the Crisis Negotiation Unit of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (CNU/FBI) (BCSM; Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005) and the 
adapted version of the BCSM, the Behavioural Influence Stairway Model (BISM: Van Hasselt, 
Romano and Vecchi 2008, Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005 and Vecchi 2007 cited in 
Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 2008) utilised by negotiators worldwide.  The ability to 
display empathy in this context forms a key component of active listening that is used to help 
create a relationship between the HCN and individual-in-crisis or hostage-taker.  This process 
has parallels with the therapeutic alliance observed within the psychotherapeutic context (Grubb 
2010) and is thought to play a vital role within the successful resolution of negotiation incidents.  
The second facet of EI that would appear to be particularly relevant to HCNn is that of emotion 
regulation.  Cherniss (2000) demonstrated that enhancement of EI skills within police officers, 
as a result of training to effectively manage emotions, has positive outcomes in terms of helping 
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regulate individual’s reactions and those of others, particularly in conflict, dangerous and 
difficult situations.   
To date, there is no specific published academic research that focuses on the role of EI 
within HCNn; however, the construct has been implicated within the more generic negotiation 
literature (Barry, Fulmer and Van Kleef 2004, Fulmer and Barry 2004 and Thompson, Nadler 
and Kim 1999) and has more recently been applied to the concept of international negotiation 
(see Caruso 2015) and negotiation/mediation of legal disputes (see Kelly and Kaminskiene 
2016).  Fulmer and Barry (2004), for example, suggested that the benefits from EI in other 
occupational and academic contexts are likely to extrapolate to negotiation contexts by 
providing greater sensitivity to emotional cues, minimising the negative effects of emotion on 
decision-making and facilitating the implementation of emotion-based tactics in negotiation.  
They proposed that EI is a vital concept within the negotiation process as emotional expression 
is a pervasive tool within human communication.  Researchers have identified that aspects of 
EI, such as negotiator’s emotional expression (verbal or non-verbal) assist in providing 
important informational cues that help to propel the negotiation through its various phases 
(initiation, influence, problem solving and conclusion) (Morris and Keltner 2000).  Caruso 
(2015) suggests that emotionally intelligent negotiators are more likely to: 1) demonstrate 
accurate self- and other-awareness of emotions, 2) connect emotionally with others and match 
the mood to the task, 3) utilise excellent emotion vocabulary and conduct accurate affective 
forecasting, and 4) stay focused and calm and keep other parties calm.  On the basis of 
extrapolation of these findings, it is therefore prudent to suggest that EI is an important element 
within HCNn, due to the nature of the highly emotive situations that typically require the 
expertise of police negotiators and the need for negotiators to manage both their own and 
others’ emotions effectively.   
 
6.2.3. Gender, decision-making style and emotional intelligence   
 Gender differences have been observed within the broad decision-making literature, 
particularly with reference to risk-taking behaviour (Dwyer, Gilkeson and List 2002, Powell and 
Ansic 1997 and Turner and McClure 2003); and in this context, men tend to demonstrate higher 
levels of risk-taking than women, a trend confirmed by Byrnes, Miller and Schafer’s (1999) 
meta-analysis.  There is, however, limited research that focuses specifically on gender 
differences in decision-making style.  Some researchers have implicated the role of intuition 
within decision-making gender differences, with findings suggesting that women are more 
intuitive then men (Agor 1986, Pacini and Epstein 1999 and Parikh, Neubauer and Lank 1994).  
Lieberman (2000), for example, found that female decision-makers more efficiently access 
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intuition than men, as a result of superior encoding and decoding skills that are partly thought to 
be due to higher levels of oestrogen. 
The literature associated with EI and gender is somewhat contradictory and is likely to 
be influenced by the use of different constructs/tools to measure EI and cross-cultural 
variability.  There is strong empirical support for women possessing higher levels of EI 
compared to men (Day and Carroll 2004, Mayer, Caruso and Salovey 1999, Schutte et al. 1998 
and Van Rooy and Viswesvaran 2003 cited in Van Rooy, Alonso and Viswesvaran 2005); 
however, other researchers have found the opposite (Bindu and Thomas 2006) or no significant 
differences (Bar-On 1997 and Petrides and Furnham 2000).  Published research which explores 
the potential existence of such differences within police populations is lacking, and as such, the 
current study aims to identify whether gender differences in decision-making style and EI 
extrapolate to police settings and to HCNs, specifically.   
 
6.3. Aims, Objectives and Hypotheses 
The main aim of the current study is to compare police HCNs with non-negotiator 
trained police officers and a non-police sample of students to identify the decision-making 
styles and levels of EI demonstrated by police HCNs in the UK.  This will help to establish 
whether negotiators utilise certain types of decision-making style to a greater extent or display 
higher levels of EI than the comparative groups.  Research evidence implicates the importance 
of EI within police work and extrapolation of this evidence suggests that EI is a vital skill for 
HCNs, with particular reference to the elements of appraisal/expression of emotion and 
regulation of other people’s emotions.  The authors therefore propose that the abilities to 
identify and modulate both their own and other people’s emotions are skills that are vital to de-
escalating hostage and crisis situations.  It is predicted that HCNs possess higher levels of EI 
than the general population on this basis.  Similarly, decision-making style has been linked to 
performance within a number of occupational roles and a lower stress response in certain 
environmental conditions.  The authors therefore propose that certain types of decision-making 
style may serve to be more beneficial for those deployed as HCNs by enabling them to cope 
more effectively with role-related stress.  A further aim is to establish whether there are 
differences between male and female decision-making styles and levels of EI within the HCN, 
police officer and student samples.  This latter analysis will provide insight into potential gender 
differences within police populations which may have implications for police officer selection, 
training and performance.  The following hypotheses have been generated on the basis of the 




1a) HCNs will employ rational decision-making styles significantly more frequently than police 
officers and students;  
1b) HCNs will employ intuitive decision-making styles significantly more frequently than 
police officers and students;  
1c) HCNs will employ avoidant decision-making styles significantly less frequently than police 
officers and students;   
2a) HCNs will score significantly higher on measures of EI than police officers and students; 
2b) Police officers will score significantly higher on measures of EI than students;   
2c) HCNs will score significantly higher than both police officers and students on measures of 
EI that specifically involve the identification and regulation of other people's emotions (i.e., the 
Emotional Awareness of Others (EAO) EI subscale and the Emotional Management of Others 
(EMO) EI subscale);   
3a) There will be a significant difference between male and female HCN decision-making style 
scores;   
3b) There will be a significant difference between male and female police officer decision-
making style scores;   
3c) There will be a significant difference between male and female student decision-making 
style scores;   
4a) There will be a significant difference between male and female HCN EI scores;   
4b) There will be a significant difference between male and female police officer EI scores;   




The current study utilised a cross-sectional survey design whereby data were collected 
in the form of a psychometric test battery.  The battery consisted of six pre-validated scales 
measuring the following constructs: a) Personality, b) Coping Style, c) Cognitive Emotion 
Regulation, d) Decision-Making Style, e) Emotional Intelligence and f) Social Desirability.  
Constructs d and e were considered as dependent variables within the current paper23 and the 
independent variables were group membership with three levels (HCN, Police Officer and 
Student) and gender with two levels (male and female).   
 
                                                          





The HCN Sample consisted of 117 (77% Male; 23% Female) negotiators from 21 UK 
police forces with a mean age of 43 years (SD = 6.1) and an age range of 29 - 61.  The vast 
majority of participants (n = 115; 98%) were White British, 1 (1%) participant was Other White 
and 1 (1%) was Pakistani.  Participants’ lengths of service within the police ranged from 30 to 
400 months, with a mean of 244 months (SD = 76.7) and their lengths of service as negotiators 
ranged from 0 to 192 months, with a mean of 64 months (SD = 45.5).  The number of incidents 
dealt with as a negotiator ranged from 0 to 300, with a mean of 43 (SD = 52.0).    
The Police Officer Sample consisted of 118 (63% Male; 37% Female) officers from 21 
UK police forces with a mean age of 41 years (SD = 7.5) and an age range of 21 – 57 years.  All 
118 (100%) participants were White British.  Participants’ lengths of service within the police 
ranged from 28 to 480 months, with a mean of 182 months (SD = 92.6). 
The Student Sample consisted of 203 (45% Male; 55% Female) undergraduate and 
postgraduate students from Coventry University, with a mean age of 22 years (SD = 5.9) and an 
age range of 18 – 50 years.  The majority of participants were White British (n = 124; 61%) and 
the remainder of the sample consisted of students from a variety of different ethnicities: Other 
White (n = 18; 9%); Indian (n = 19; 9%); Pakistani (n = 12; 6%); Bangladeshi (n = 1; 1%); 
Other Asian (n = 1; 1%); Black African (n = 14; 7%), Other Black (n = 3; 2%), Chinese (n = 1; 
1%); Other Ethnicity (n = 10; 5%). 
 
6.4.3. Measures 
6.4.3.1. Demographic Questionnaire24.   
Participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire that was sample specific and 
contained questions relating to personal characteristics, work history within the police or course 
of study.  Demographic questions included: age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, course and year 
of study, force, rank, length of service as an officer, length of service as a negotiator and 
number of incidents dealt with as a negotiator. 
 
6.4.3.2. The General Decision-Making Style Questionnaire (GDMS). 
The GDMS (Scott and Bruce 1995) is used to classify individuals as having one of five 
independent decision-making styles: rational (logical and structured approaches to decision-
                                                          




making); avoidant (postponing or avoiding making decisions); intuitive (reliance upon hunches, 
feelings and impressions); dependent (reliance upon the direction and support of others); or 
spontaneous (impulsive and prone to making ‘snap’ or ‘spur of the moment’ decisions).  It 
consists of 25 items, scored on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = Strongly 
Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree, with five items identified for each decision-making style.  Each 
decision-making style can obtain a maximum of 25 and a minimum of 0 and the highest score 
from each of the subscales is used to classify participants in terms of their decision-making 
style.  E.g., If a participant scores 25 on the avoidant subscale they will be classified as an 
avoidant decision-maker.  Examples of items relevant to each decision-making style include: ‘I 
postpone decision-making whenever possible’ (Avoidant); ‘I use the advice of other people in 
making important decisions’ (Dependent); ‘When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts’ 
(Intuitive); ‘I make decisions in a logical and systematic way’ (Rational); and ‘I generally make 
snap decisions’ (Spontaneous). The scales of the GDMS have been shown to be reliable with 
military officers, students, engineers and technicians, with reported Cronbach’s alphas ranging 
from: .77-.85 for the Rational Scale; .78-.84 for the Intuitive Scale; .62-.86 for the Dependent 
Scale; .84-0.94 for the Avoidant Scale and .83-.87 for the Spontaneous Scale (Loo 2000 and 
Scott and Bruce 1995).  The Cronbach’s alphas obtained for the current sample ranged from 
.70-.90 (please refer to Table 6.1 for specific subscale alphas), thereby demonstrating an 
adequate level of internal consistency. 
 
6.4.3.3. The Genos Emotional Intelligence Inventory - Full Version (EII). 
The EII (Gignac 2008) consists of 70 items designed to measure the frequency with 
which an individual displays emotionally intelligent behaviours across seven dimensions. The 
items are scored on a five-point Likert scale, from 1 = Almost Never to 5 = Almost Always.  The 
inventory provides scores that are representations of the relative frequency with which an 
individual engages in emotionally intelligent behaviours.  The EII provides a Total Emotional 
Intelligence (Total EI) score, along with seven EI sub-scale scores that measure the 
demonstration of EI skills across the following seven different dimensions: Emotional Self-
Awareness (ESA); Emotional Expression (EE); Emotional Awareness of Others (EAO); 
Emotional Reasoning (ER); Emotional Self-Management (ESM); Emotional Management of 
Others (EMO); and Emotional Self-Control (ESC).  The Total EI score is based on an equally 
weighted composite of the seven Genos EI dimensions defined above. The Total EI score 
therefore represents the frequency with which an individual engages in a diverse variety of 
emotionally intelligent behaviours relevant to the identification of emotions (relating to both 
self and others), reasoning with emotions, and the general management of emotions (self, 
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others, and emotional control).  The Genos EII demonstrates a high level of internal consistency 
with the overall EII scale displaying a Cronbach’s alpha score of >.90 across a variety of 
nationalities (including American, Asian, Australian, Indian, and South African) (Gignac 2008).  
The subscale scores are also associated with respectable levels of internal consistency with 
alpha scores ranging from .71-.85 (Gignac 2008).  The Cronbach’s alphas obtained for the 
current sample ranged from .71-.83 (please refer to Table 6.2 for specific subscale alphas), 
thereby demonstrating an adequate level of internal consistency.   
 
6.4.3.4. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). 
The BIDR (Paulhus 1988) consists of 40 items that are scored on a Likert scale of 1 = 
Not True to 7 = Very True.  Respondents are asked to rate the items according to their level of 
agreement with the item and one point is added for each extreme response of 6 or 7.  The BIDR 
is used to measure two constructs: Self-Deceptive Positivity (the tendency to give self-reports 
that are believed but have a positivity bias) and Impression Management (deliberate self-
presentation to an audience).  The scores from items 1-20 (with even items reversed) are 
summed to create a self-deceptive positivity scale score; the scores from items 21-40 (with odd 
items reversed) are summed to create an impression management scale score and all items are 
summed (with appropriate scores reversed) to create an overall social desirability score.  The 
BIDR reports good levels of internal consistency: .83 for the total measure; .68-.80 for the self-
deceptive positivity scale and .75-.86 for the impression management scale (Paulhus 1988) and 
the Cronbach’s alpha obtained for the current sample was .81 (.71 for the self-deceptive 
positivity subscale; .79 for the impression management subscale), demonstrating an adequate 
level of internal consistency.  The BIDR was used to screen for socially desirable responding 
whereby a cut-off point of >30 (n = 2) was used to exclude responses from the analysis.          
  
6.4.4. Procedure 
 Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the Coventry University Research 
Ethics Committee.  Permission to take part in the research was provided by the Assistant Chief 
Constable (ACC) or Force Lead HCNn Coordinator (HCNC) for each police force.  All 
participants were provided with a participant information sheet which provided details of the 
research and were asked to sign a consent form prior to taking part.  HCNCs for each force were 
provided with a set of questionnaires that were disseminated to negotiators to complete either at 
one of their quarterly meetings or within their own time.  Each negotiator was provided with a 
second questionnaire to disseminate to a non-negotiator police officer colleague to complete.  
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Student participants were recruited mainly via a research participation scheme whereby 
psychology students are allocated research credits for taking part in research studies.  Additional 
non-psychology students were recruited from other faculties within the University to enhance 
the number of male participants in the student sample.  All questionnaires were completed in 
paper format and all participants were provided with a debrief sheet at the end of the 
questionnaire which included information on how to withdraw their data from the study.   
 
6.5. Results 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS.  Descriptive statistics, multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA), discriminant function analysis (DFA)25 and t-tests were used 
to analyse the data.  The data were screened and parametric assumptions were tested prior to 
analysis taking place.  Any violated assumptions were considered to be successfully 
counteracted by the large sample size (N = 438), the number of participants in each cell 
exceeding 30 and the robust nature of the MANOVA test (see Field 2009 and Pallant 2007).  
Effect sizes were calculated using the guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988: 22) and are 
indicated by the terms small, medium or large in brackets after the partial eta squared figure (ŋ2) 
and the superscript letters “S”, “M” and “L” in the tables.  
 
6.5.1. Decision-Making Style 
6.5.1.1. Effect of group membership.   
To investigate the influence of group membership and gender on decision-making style, 
a three (group: HCN, police office and student) by two (gender: male and female) way between 
groups MANOVA was performed using the five decision-making style subscales as dependent 
variables (please refer to Table 6.1 for means, standard deviations, F values and effect sizes).  A 
main effect of group was observed on the combined dependent variables, F (10, 858) = 9.62, p = 
.000; V = 0.20; partial ŋ2 = .10 (large) indicating a significant difference between the decision-
making style subscale scores obtained for each group.  Univariate ANOVAs (using a Bonferroni 
                                                          
25 DFA was chosen in lieu of logistic regression for the current study.  Whilst logistic regression is often 
cited as being a more suitable test when assumptions of normality are violated, such violations are not 
considered to be ‘fatal’ and the resultant significance tests are still considered to be reliable/trustworthy 
(Hill and Lewicki 2006 :161).  There is also some evidence to suggest that linear DFA still frequently 
achieves good performance even when the assumptions of normality are violated (Duda, Hart and Stork 
2001), thereby further justifying the utilisation of DFA in this case. 
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adjusted alpha level of p < .01) revealed significant differences for the Dependent, Spontaneous 
and Avoidant decision-making styles when considering the separate dependent variables.  
Separate post hoc analyses (Tukey HSD) revealed that both HCNs and police officers scored 
significantly lower than students on Dependent and Avoidant decision-making and police 
officers scored significantly lower than students on Spontaneous decision-making.  No 
statistically significant differences were observed between HCNs and police officers on any of 
the subscales, thereby leading to rejection of Hypotheses 1a and 1b.   
Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function variate utilising the five 
decision-making style subscales as predictor variables (canonical R2 = 0.45; Λ = 0.80, χ2 (10) = 
98.74, p < .001).  The function explains 98.4% of the variance with Avoidant (r = 0.85) and 
Dependent (r = 0.36) decision-making styles contributing most significantly to group 
separation/discrimination (please refer to Figure 6.1 for the Discriminant Function Plot).  In this 
case, higher levels of both Avoidant and Dependent decision-making styles predict membership 
of the student sample.  Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome for 
51% of cases, with accurate predictions being made for 34% of HCNs, 19% of police officers 
and 79% of students.  These prediction rates demonstrate a higher ‘hit-ratio’ than would be 
predicted by chance alone (i.e., 33 %) in all but one of the predicted groups (police officers).   
 
6.5.1.2. Effect of gender.   
A significant main effect of gender was observed on the combined dependent variables, 
F (5, 428) = 7.29, p = .000; V = 0.08; ŋ2 = .08 (medium) (please refer to Table 6.1 for means, 
standard deviations and p values) with univariate ANOVAs (using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
level of p < .01) revealing significant differences between male and female participants on the 
Spontaneous decision-making style alone, with females scoring significantly lower on the 
Spontaneous decision-making subscale than males.  Follow up DFA using the five sub-scales of 
the GDMS as the predictor variables revealed a single significant discriminant function (Λ = 
0.89, χ2 (5) = 49.39, p = < .001). 
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(n = 255) 
Females  




 α M M SD t (116) M SD t (117) M SD t (202) F 
(2, 432) 
ŋ2 M SD M SD F  
(1, 432) 
ŋ2 
Intuitive .77 3.62 3.51 0.66 -1.72 3.54 0.67 -1.29 3.63 0.67 0.14 0.38 .00S 3.50 0.42 3.66 0.58 5.21 .01S 
Rational .70 3.50 3.91 0.43 10.48** 3.91 0.50 8.88** 3.88 0.65 8.33** 0.24 .00S 3.91 0.04 3.87 0.05 0.48 .00S 
Dependent .73 3.48 3.09 0.61 -7.01** 3.15 0.68 -5.36** 3.51 0.73 0.60 13.99* .06M 3.17 0.04 3.33 0.06 4.56 .01S 
Spontaneous .78 2.89 2.64 0.64 -4.30** 2.56 0.68 -5.27** 2.79 0.83 -1.67 5.66* .03S 2.76 0.05 2.55 0.06 7.13* .02S 
Avoidant .90 2.54 1.77 0.61 -13.61** 1.86 0.67 -11.13** 2.55 1.02 0.15 40.74* .16L 2.07 0.05 2.00 0.07 0.64 .00S 
Note.  Possible scores for each subscale ranged from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5.  Italicised font = Most significant predictors of group membership as 
specified by DFA.  Bold Font = Most significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA.  Superscript text = Effect Size (S = Small; M = Medium; L = Large).  
Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for ANOVAs = .05 / 5 = .01.  Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for t-Tests - .05 / 15 = .003.  *Statistically significant at 





Figure 6.1.  Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant 
functions utilising the GDMS subscales as predictor variables.  
 
Correlations between predictor variables and the discriminant function suggested that 
Spontaneous and Intuitive decision-making styles were the best predictors of gender in this case, 
with female participants more likely than males to display higher levels of Intuitive decision-
making and male participants more likely than females to display higher levels of Spontaneous 
decision-making.  Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome for 64% of 
cases, with accurate predictions being made for 65% of male participants and 62% of female 
participants.  These prediction rates represent ‘hit-rates’ that are higher than would be predicted 
by chance alone (i.e., 50%).  There was no statistically significant interaction between group 
membership and gender, F (10, 858) = 1.71, p = .359, V = 0.03; partial ŋ2 = .01 (small), which 
indicates that the effect of group membership on decision-making style is independent of gender 




6.5.2. Emotional Intelligence 
6.5.2.1. Effect of group membership.   
To investigate the influence of group membership on EI, a three (group: HCN, police 
office and student) by two (gender: male and female) way between groups MANOVA was 
performed utilising the eight EII subscales as dependent variables.  A statistically significant 
difference was observed between the three groups on the combined dependent variables, F (14, 
824) = 8.39, p = .000; V = 0.25; partial ŋ2 = .13 (large) (please refer to Table 6.2 for details of 
means, standard deviations, F values and effect sizes).  Separate univariate ANOVAs (using a 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of p < .006) revealed significant differences for all eight 
variables.  Separate post hoc analyses (Tukey HSD) revealed that both police samples scored 
significantly higher than students on all measures of EI, thereby providing support for 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  No statistically significant differences were observed between any of the 
mean sub-scale scores for negotiators and police officers, thereby leading to the rejection of 
Hypothesis 2c.   
Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function variate utilising seven of 
the EII subscales as predictor variables (Overall Emotional Intelligence was removed from the 
analysis due to exceeding the minimum tolerance level for the analysis) and significantly 
discriminated the three groups/samples (canonical R2 = 0.25; Λ = 0.74, χ2 (14) = 128.65, p < 
.001).  The function explains 93.0% of the variance and successfully discriminates the student 
sample from the two police samples (combined), with Emotional Management of Others (r = 
0.14), Emotional Reasoning (r = 0.12) and Emotional Self-Management (r = -0.08) contributing 
most significantly to group separation/discrimination (please see Figure 6.2 for the Discriminant 
Function Plot).  High scores on each of these variables therefore predict membership of one of 
the two police samples.  Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted 59% of cases, 
with accurate predictions being made for 58% of HCNs, 22% of police officers and 83% of 
students.  These prediction rates demonstrate a higher ‘hit-ratio’ than would be predicted by 
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(n = 203) 
t-Test  
(norm*S) 
Univariate ANOVA  
(Group) 
Males  
(n = 255) 
Females  
(n = 183) 
Univariate ANOVA  
(Gender) 
 α M M SD t (116) M SD t (117) M SD t (202) F 
(2, 417) 
ŋ2 M SD M SD F 
(1, 417) 
ŋ2 
ESA .77 41.94 41.56 4.07 -1.02 41.38 3.92 -1.32 38.19 5.19 -10.26** 29.16* .12L 39.79 4.83 40.29 4.98 7.84* .02S 
EE .78 39.53 40.24 4.01 1.91 39.28 4.82 -0.34 35.86 5.17 -10.03** 37.26* .15L 37.81 5.29 38.30 4.98 9.66* .02S 
EAO .82 40.22 41.38 3.89 3.21 39.74 4.15 -1.18 37.04 5.22 -8.87** 31.77* .13L 38.85 5.11 39.17 4.72 6.39 .02S 
ER .73 39.29 39.29 4.16 0.00 37.34 4.37 -4.81** 34.24 4.49 -16.06** 42.09* .17L 36.71 5.08 36.16 4.53 0.84 .00S 
ESM .71 38.36 38.44 3.85 0.21 37.82 4.29 -1.11 35.36 4.68 -9.14** 19.09* .08M 37.08 4.78 36.61 4.23 0.37 .00S 
EMO .83 40.29 42.02 3.95 4.74** 40.47 4.22 0.73 36.67 5.15 -10.16** 51.46* .20L 39.16 5.38 39.23 4.82 6.05 .01S 
ESC .72 39.51 40.26 3.86 2.16 39.42 4.20 0.08 36.78 5.23 -7.28** 18.84* .08M 38.78 4.85 38.03 4.85 0.06 .00S 
OEI .83 279.13 283.18 22.16 1.98 275.45 24.30 -1.63 268.01 28.81 -12.01** 48.49* .19L 268.17 29.80 267.79 27.41 4.72 .01S 
 
Note.  ESA = Emotional Self Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-
Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self Control; OEI = Overall Emotional Intelligence.  Minimum and maximum scores 
unavailable as scale scores were provided by test publisher and scoring algorithm is not publicly available. Italicised variables represent the most significant predictors 
of group membership as specified by DFA.  Boldface type represents the most significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA.  Superscript text = Effect Size (S = 
Small; M = Medium; L = Large).  Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for ANOVAs = .05 / 8 = .006.  Adjusted probability level for t-Tests = .05 / 24 = .002.  ŋ2 = 




Figure 6.2.  Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant 
functions utilising the EII subscales as predictor variables. 
 
6.5.2.2. Effect of gender.   
A significant main effect of gender was observed on the combined dependent variables, 
F (7, 411) = 3.17, p = .003; V = 0.05; partial ŋ2 = .05 (medium) (please refer to Table 6.2 for 
means, standard deviations, F values and effect sizes) with separate univariate ANOVAs (using 
a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of p < .006) revealing significant differences for two of the 
eight variables (Emotional Self Awareness and Emotional Expression).  Females scored 
significantly higher on measures of Emotional Self Awareness and Emotional Expression than 
males.  Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function utilising seven of the 
variables (Overall Emotional Intelligence was not included – see above) as predictor variables 
(Λ = 0.96, χ2 (7) = 17.19, p = .016) and revealed that Emotional Expression and Emotional 
Reasoning were the best predictors of gender in this case, with female participants more likely 
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than males to display higher levels of Emotional Expression and male participants more likely 
than females to display higher levels of Emotional Reasoning.  Overall the discriminant 
function successfully predicted outcome for 59% of cases, with accurate predictions being made 
for 60% of male participants and 58% of female participants.  These prediction rates represent 
‘hit-rates’ that are higher than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e., 50%).  No statistically 
significant interaction between group membership and gender, F (14, 824) = 1.19, p = .280, V = 
0.04; partial ŋ2 = .02 (small), was observed which indicates that the effect of group membership 
on emotional intelligence is independent of gender and vice versa.  On this basis, Hypotheses 
4a, 4b and 4c have been rejected.  
 
6.5.2.3. Comparisons with norm group data. 
One way independent sample t-tests (utilising appropriate Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
levels) were performed in order to compare the norm data means with those obtained from the 
three samples in order to triangulate the findings (please see Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for t-test and 
significance values).  The findings revealed that the police sample means were significantly 
different to the norm data means in four of the five GDMS subscales and that the student sample 
means were remarkably similar to those provided by the norm dataset (significant differences 
were observed between student and norm data mean scores on one of the five subscales).  This 
suggests that the police samples do in fact differ from the general population in regards to their 
decision-making styles and this further supports the differences observed within this study.  The 
findings also support the assertion that the student sample provides a fairly representative 
comparison group when comparing decision-making style in light of the similar subscale scores 
obtained on the GDMS.  With regards to EI, however, the t-tests revealed a lack of significant 
differences between the mean scores obtained for the majority of the EII subscales and those 
reported for the norm dataset (one out of eight for both police officer samples) and significant 
differences between all of the student mean subscale scores and the norm dataset scores.  This 
suggests that while statistically significant differences were observed between the police 
samples and students in this case, the findings are limited to some extent by the fact that these 
differences were not reflected/corroborated by comparisons with the norm data utilised to 
validate the scale.      
 
6.6. Discussion 
The results demonstrate firstly that HCNs and police officers utilise different decision-
making styles to students and secondly that they employ emotionally intelligent behaviours 
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more frequently than students.  As such, they provide substantial evidence to suggest that police 
officers are a fairly distinct and homogeneous group from the general population.  However, the 
findings have failed to discriminate HCNs from non-negotiator trained officers and therefore, do 
not support the concept of a unique ‘HCN profile’.  The results of the current study, therefore, 
suggest that HCNs possess similar traits and characteristics to the wider police population when 
considering decision-making style and EI.   
The findings relating to decision-making indicate that all three groups utilise the 
rational decision-making style as their primary style and the intuitive decision-making style as 
their secondary style, suggesting that these two styles are the most commonly utilised styles of 
decision-making (a finding corroborated by the norm data provided by Spicer and Sadler-Smith 
2005).  This finding is reassuring as it indicates that all three groups tend to utilise those 
decision-making styles that are positively correlated with performance in academic and 
occupational settings (i.e., rational and intuitive styles) (Anderson 2000, Russ, McNeilly and 
Comer 2001 and Sadler-Smith 2004).  Despite the lack of observed significant differences 
between HCNs and police officers on their utilisation of the five decision-making styles; there 
were, however, differences between both police samples and the student sample that clearly 
differentiate the groups and provide evidence of a unique ‘police officer profile’.  Both police 
samples report utilising the dependent and avoidant decision-making styles to a significantly 
lesser degree than students, thereby suggesting that police officers are much more independent, 
and reactive/decisive when making decisions.  These findings are commonsensical when 
applied to police settings, as despite the rank structure, police officers often attend incidents that 
require immediate action and they do not have time to wait for someone else to make decisions 
for them.  There is no doubt that operational policing is a role that requires non-avoidant and 
reactive decision-making, in order to apprehend perpetrators and protect victims of crime, so 
these findings appear logical in this sense.   
The relatively lower utilisation of the avoidant decision-making style by both police 
samples is perhaps the most interesting finding, when considered in combination with the 
previous literature relating to decision-making styles and the physiological management of 
stress.  Thunholme’s (2008) findings demonstrated the negative effects of avoidant decision-
making within military officers, whereby those utilising avoidant styles were more likely to 
respond negatively to stress and experience higher stress responses (as measured by increased 
release of cortisol).  It is therefore reassuring that police officers within the UK are utilising 
decision-making styles that are less positively correlated with negative stress responses and 
cortisol release.  The lack of significant differences between negotiator and non-negotiator 
officers, in terms of avoidant decision-making style is of particular interest, however, when 
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considering the nature of the HCN role.  Avoidant behaviour or decision-making in this context 
is likely to result in potentially fatal consequences and therefore needs to be circumvented by 
individuals in the HCN role.  The findings suggest that decision-making style could be targeted 
as a training need to enhance the utilisation of more effective decision-making styles and to 
further reduce the likelihood of avoidant decision-making within HCNs.  Decisiveness (i.e., the 
opposite of avoidance) has also previously been identified as a key characteristic within 
American HCNs (Allen, Fraser and Inwald 1991), which indicates the importance of decisive 
decision-making within the negotiation role and provides further support for training or 
enhancement work focusing on decision-making style and processes within UK-based police 
negotiator teams.   
The second important finding relates to that of the spontaneous decision-making style, 
whereby there was only a significant difference between the police officer and student samples.  
The findings indicate that police officers utilise the spontaneous decision-making style to a 
lesser extent than students but that this trend does not apply to HCNs specifically, who appear to 
utilise this style to the same extent as police officers and students.  Police officers are perhaps 
less likely to utilise spontaneous styles of decision-making as a result of the extensive training 
they receive regarding responding to incidents.  As a result of the types of incident that officers 
are deployed to and the risks associated, it is likely that a methodical form of decision-making is 
utilised based on their training and experience, as opposed to a spontaneous or ad hoc style.  
However, if this is the case, it is unclear why this finding does not extrapolate to HCNs, who 
also receive the same initial police officer training.  The lack of a significantly lower negotiator 
score on the utilisation of spontaneous decision-making can potentially be explained by 
considering the role, context and nature of HCNn; negotiators are frequently confronted by 
situations that sometimes involve spontaneous decision-making and they must be able to adapt 
their negotiation strategies quickly and often with little time to prepare.  This is often a direct 
result of the emotionally charged and potentially dangerous situations that negotiators are often 
required to respond to, and it could be argued that spontaneous decision-making links to 
intellectual/mental agility, which anecdotally has also been suggested to play a role within 
HCNn.  Spontaneous decision-making in this context could therefore be framed as a positive, 
rather than a negative attribute as it enables the decision maker to ‘think on their feet’, a concept 
that is important within the resolution of hostage/crisis incidents which are likely to have an 
infinite number of possible outcome variations and scenario trajectories.  This assertion would 
benefit from further empirical exploration to identify whether spontaneity in this context may 
serve to benefit police HCNs.   
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The findings relating to EI indicate that both police samples possess a significantly 
higher level of EI than students.  This finding confirms previous research findings where higher 
levels of EI in police officers as compared to other occupational groups has been found (Bar-On 
et al. 2000).  Within the current research, both police samples demonstrated significantly higher 
scores on the overall measure of EI and the seven sub-scale measures of EI, suggesting that the 
increased level of EI is a consistent one across the different facets of EI.  This finding is again 
reassuring when considered in line with the research indicating a positive correlation between 
EI and police performance, in a number of cross-cultural settings (Afolabi, Awosola and Omole 
2010, Al Ali, Garner and Magadley 2012 and Lev 2005); and the potential influence of EI on 
resilience and protection from the negative effects of stress (Armstrong, Galligan and Critchley 
2011 and Salovey et al. 1999).  Although the findings are reassuring with regards to 
confirmation that police officers within the UK demonstrate the use of self-reported emotionally 
intelligent behaviours at work to a greater extent than students, there is no evidence to suggest 
that HCNs are more adept at utilising emotionally intelligent behaviours than police officers 
generally.  In addition to this, the negotiator sample did not demonstrate higher levels of EI 
specifically relating to the awareness and management of other people’s emotions, as originally 
predicted.  This finding is particularly surprising and suggests that EI enhancement, particularly 
within the facets mentioned above, is a potential area of development and training for police 
HCNs, who often deal with individuals-in-crisis or emotional turmoil and, as such, need to be 
adept at identifying and managing such emotions.   
Although the findings suggest that the police population possess higher levels of EI and 
suggest that EI is an important component within police work, it is difficult to identify whether 
EI is a construct that is enhanced as a result of police training and operational experience, or 
whether it is an existing construct that attracts individuals to the role of police work in the first 
place.  Within the UK, EI is not currently utilised as a selection criterion; however, research 
indicates that the construct is important and predicts performance within police settings 
(Afolabi, Awosola and Omole 2010, Al Ali, Garner and Magadley 2012 and Lev 2005).  There 
is potential, therefore, for the development of EI-based psychometric testing to be incorporated 
within UK police selection procedures, if further research were conducted to confirm/establish 
the role of EI within police populations and to support predictive validity of a specific EI 
measure which could be utilised in this format.   
EI enhancement/training for police officers is used within the USA and is accepted as a 
core component within policing (Saville 2006) and findings indicate that such training has 
positive benefits within a number of contexts (Cherniss and Goleman 2001, Ricca 2003, Sala 
2001, 2006 and Slaski and Cartwright 2003).  Chapman and Clarke (2002), for example, found 
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that EI training resulted in lower levels of reported stress by officers and Ricca’s (2003) study 
concluded that EI awareness training significantly reduced police officer burnout.  In addition to 
this, findings from a study by Sala (2001) (not using a police population) suggest that EI 
training improved self-confidence, conflict management, communication and conscientiousness, 
factors that intuitively would be beneficial within HCNn contexts.  These findings, therefore 
suggest that there is potential for similar application of EI training within police contexts in the 
UK.   
There are a number of possible explanations for the lack of differences observed 
between the two police samples.  On a macro level, it is important to consider that police 
officers who are trained to be HCNs tend to perform this role in addition to their day-to-day role 
within the police force.  This means that HCNs in the UK may not, in fact, spend a significant 
amount of time acting as operational negotiators.  Further research is therefore warranted to 
explore whether individuals who work ‘full time’ as negotiators within law enforcement 
agencies (i.e., the FBI) represent a more unique group characteristically than their non-
negotiator counterparts.  More specifically, it could be suggested that police officers (in a 
number of different roles) are constantly encountering crisis situations and having to utilise 
emotionally intelligent behaviours in order to resolve conflict and effectively manage the public.  
Police officers as a population, therefore, are trained to deal with pressurised situations and in 
how to deal with conflict and as such are likely to possess a certain level of EI in order to 
effectively analyse and respond to an infinite number of potential crisis/conflict situations.  It 
could be proposed, therefore, that the majority of police officers demonstrate a higher level of 
EI than the general population (and students in the case of the current study) and that this 
baseline acts as a starting point, on which specific negotiation training can build.  With 
reference to decision-making style, it could be argued that police officers utilise a typical style 
of decision-making that is functional for police work on a variety of levels (i.e., lower levels of 
dependent and avoidant decision-making) and do not need to adapt this when negotiating.  It is, 
of course, impossible to decipher whether such decision-making styles are present prior to 
individuals joining the police, or whether they are adopted as a result of training and operational 
police work.  This is an argument which is also debated heavily within the police personality 
literature.   
The findings in relation to gender suggest that whilst generic gender differences exist in 
relation to certain decision-making styles and domains of EI, these differences fail to extrapolate 
when looking at each sample in isolation.  No significant interaction effects were observed 
between group and gender suggesting that male and female decision-making style and EI scores 
were not significantly different for HCNs, police officers or students.  These findings imply that 
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both male and female police officers display similar traits and profiles in terms of decision-
making style and EI and that in particular, no significant differences exist between the profiles 
of male and female officers currently working as HCNs.  It is, however, important to note that 
caution should be taken when interpreting gender differences due to the unequal numbers of 
males and females within the HCN and police officer samples.   
The current study benefits from the inclusion of a control/comparison group as it 
enabled the researchers to obtain an understanding of HCN/police officer characteristics within 
the wider context of a non-police population.  Despite the fairly robust sample size (N = 438), 
the findings are limited to some extent by the nature of the comparison sample.  Although 
students are frequently utilised within social psychological research, they represent a fairly 
homogenous group as they typically represent a much smaller age range and higher mean level 
of socio-economic status than the general population.  In addition to this, there was a disparity 
in the mean age and ethnic background of the two police samples and the student sample, which 
may have influenced the findings.  In particular, the police samples were disproportionately 
White British in ethnicity, and as such, comparisons between two ethnically homogenous 
samples and a more ethnically heterogeneous sample may have therefore introduced some form 
of bias.  Such bias could potentially be avoided by conducting follow-up research utilising a 
matched-pairs design across all three samples in future.  The choice of sampling strategy may 
also limit the findings to some extent, as the snowball sampling method adopted (whereby 
HCNs were asked to locate a non-negotiator colleague to complete the psychometric test 
battery) was not random and as such, may not have provided a truly representative ‘control 
group’ of police officers for comparison.   
These limitations are further compounded, to some extent, by the results of the 
independent t-tests conducted with the norm data means.  Although the GDMS results 
corroborate the differences observed between the police samples and students, comparisons 
using the EII norm data means failed to replicate this finding – which suggests that the police 
samples demonstrate a similar level of EI as the general public population utilised to validate 
the EII.  Comparisons between the police officer groups and the student sample would, 
therefore, have been enhanced by the utilisation of a more representative control group and 
further research would benefit from the utilisation of a general population sample with a more 
similar mean age, ethnic background, education and socio-economic status to that of the police 
samples.  In addition to this, it is difficult to directly compare current findings to those of 
previous research, as previously published studies have either not incorporated a comparison 
group/sample or have utilised different psychometrics to measure the constructs in question.  
There are, of course, numerous different tools that have been developed to assess decision-
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making and EI and it is therefore often difficult to directly compare findings across studies 
utilising different methodologies and data collection tools.   
Despite these limitations, the research benefits from a fairly large and robust sample 
size and from the range of officers (i.e. in terms of rank, role and length of service) included 
within the study.  Many researchers investigating police practice tend to utilise participants from 
a single geographical force or region, whereas the current study has included both negotiators 
and officers from 21 forces within the UK, which equates to a representation of approximately 
50% of the forces throughout the country.  This breadth of coverage helps to provide a more 
generalisable picture of both HCNs and police officers in the UK and applies to both small/large 
and rural/metropolitan forces and constabularies.  Future/follow-up research which adopts an 
even greater proportion of the total HCNn population within the UK (~800) as a comparative 
group/sample may also provide a greater insight into these two police populations and a more 
robust conclusion in relation to whether differences do exist in relation to their decision-making 
style and levels of EI.  
In light of the current findings, it is equally prudent to suggest that future research 
would benefit from a cross-cultural application, in order to establish whether the findings are 
unique to a UK HCN context.  Partial replication of the current study (Young 2016) has also 
recently been conducted within the USA with this intention in mind, to establish whether USA 
HCNs present as a unique and homogenous group within the police population or exhibit 
different decision-making styles to their non-negotiator counterparts.  One final salient point of 
note is to highlight that whilst the findings may suggest that differences exist in relation to the 
police officer samples (in comparison to the student sample), it remains to be established 
whether these differences directly translate into improved performance.  Future research, 
therefore needs to explore the potential link between certain decision-making styles/higher 
levels of EI and police performance in order to provide a potential model that could be utilised 
for police recruitment in the UK.      
 
6.7. Conclusion 
The findings from the current study suggest the need to reject the predicted existence of 
a unique ‘HCN profile’ but provide evidence to support the notion of a distinct ‘police officer 
profile’.  The findings indicate that police officers tend to utilise less dependent, spontaneous 
and avoidant decision-making styles and demonstrate significantly more emotionally intelligent 
behaviours than students.  Whilst the current findings indicate a lack of support for the use of 
psychometric testing of certain constructs within the selection process for HCNs specifically, 
there is potential for the incorporation of specific psychometric testing within the selection of 
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trainee police officers within the UK if further research is conducted to empirically validate 
such a procedure.  Further research is also needed to explore the exact role of decision-making 
style and EI within the negotiation process and to establish/verify the effectiveness of training to 





Addendum to Chapter 5 and 6: Superficial 
Analysis of Correlations between Construct 
Variables for the HCN and Police Officer 
Samples 
 
Tables 4.17 – 4.21 in Appendix 14 provide a synopsis of the correlations between all 
variables within the dataset as applied to the HCN and police officer samples in 
isolation/separately.  Initial analysis of the correlation matrices suggest that there are differences 
between the two samples in relation to the specific combinations/constellations of variables as 
displayed by each sample, as discussed below.  These differences may serve to differentiate the 
two samples in a way that was not achieved by direct comparison on individual constructs and 
this is an aspect that will be explored further by the author within follow-up research. 
 
6.8. Correlations between personality traits and cognitive emotion 
regulation strategies 
Whilst both samples utilise similar strategies to regulate their emotions, there are 
differing relationships between the five personality traits and the utilisation of certain emotion 
regulation strategies.  When deciphering the different inter-correlations between the two 
samples, the key observable difference appears to be that there are a greater number of 
significant correlations between the personality traits of police officers and adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies than within the HCN sample.  E, A and C, for example, are all significantly 
positively correlated with the use of Positive Reappraisal in both samples, however, police 
officers displaying the same traits, are more likely to utilise a number of adaptive coping 
mechanisms (including Positive Reappraisal, Refocus on Planning and Putting into 
Perspective), suggesting that police officers displaying these traits are more likely to draw upon 
a broader range of coping mechanisms, than HCNs displaying these traits.  N was significantly 
positively linked to maladaptive coping strategies in both samples (including Self-Blame, 
Rumination and Catastrophising), however, N was also significantly negatively correlated with 
Positive Reappraisal, Refocus on Planning and Putting into Perspective within the police 
officer sample alone, thereby suggesting that those police officers low in N are more likely to 
utilise adaptive emotion regulation strategies.  O was also significantly positively correlated 
with Positive Refocusing, Positive Reappraisal, Refocus on Planning and Putting into 
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Perspective, within the police officer sample, thereby suggesting that police officers scoring 
high on E, A, C and O and low on N are more likely to utilise a range of positive and adaptive 
strategies to regulate their emotions, whereas there is limited evidence of this occurring within 
the HCN sample.  Correlations between variables within the police officer sample were also 
more likely to be stronger in nature than those within the HCN sample suggesting more 
substantial relationships between personality traits and coping strategies within the former 
sample (see Table 4.17). 
 
6.9. Correlations between personality traits and coping style 
strategies 
The most obvious differences in profile between the two samples (see Table 4.18) relate 
to the greater number of significant correlations between personality domains and coping 
strategies within the police officer sample; with E, A and C, for example, being significantly 
positively associated Overall Coping Skills, along with a number of individual adaptive coping 
strategies (e.g. Problem Solving, Negotiation and Positive Cognitive Restructuring).  Whilst the 
relationship between the N domain and coping portrays a similar picture across both samples 
(with N being typically positively associated with maladaptive coping strategies and negatively 
associated with adaptive coping strategies), the police sample demonstrated a greater number of 
significant negative relationships between N and adaptive coping strategies overall, suggesting 
that police officers scoring relatively lower in this domain are more likely to utilise a broader 
range of adaptive coping mechanisms in order to regulate emotions and deal with stress.  The 
findings also indicate a weaker relationship between personality domains and the utilisation of 
maladaptive coping strategies within the HCN sample, with far fewer significant negative 
correlations observed in relation to these strategies (i.e. five significant medium correlations 
observed for HCNs versus 15 significant medium/large correlations observed for police 
officers).   
 
6.10. Correlations between personality traits and decision-making 
styles 
For the HCN sample, E was significantly positively associated with Intuitive and 
Spontaneous decision-making and significantly negatively associated with Avoidant decision-
making; whereas for the police officer sample, E was only found to be significantly negatively 
correlated with Avoidant decision-making.  A was found to be significantly negatively 
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associated with both Spontaneous and Avoidant decision-making for the police officer sample, 
however this was not observed in the HCN sample.  A similar pattern was observed in relation 
to C, with both HCNs and police officers demonstrating significant positive correlations with 
Rational decision-making and significant negative correlations with Spontaneous and Avoidant 
decision-making.  N was not found to correlate significantly with any of the decision-making 
styles in the HCN sample, however it was found to be significantly positively associated with 
Spontaneous and Avoidant decision-making and significantly negatively associated with 
Rational decision-making in the police officer sample.  Differences were also observed in 
relation to O, whereby HCNs displayed significant positive associations with Intuitive and 
Rational decision-making, however, no such associations were observed within the police 
officer sample, suggesting that the two samples may be differentiated by a combination of their 
personality traits and their decision-making styles.  Please refer to Table 4.19 for details of the 
correlations.   
 
6.11. Correlations between cognitive emotion regulation strategies and 
emotional intelligence 
All EII subscales were significantly positively correlated with Positive Reappraisal in 
both HCNs and police officers (see Table 4.20).  All EII subscales (apart from Emotional Self 
Control) were significantly positively correlated with Refocus on Planning in HCNs and all EII 
subscales (apart from Emotional Self-Awareness and Emotional Awareness of Others) were 
significantly positively correlated with Refocus on Planning in the police officer sample.  Police 
officers also demonstrated a correlation between certain EII subscales and the utilisation of 
additional specific adaptive emotion regulation strategies (such as Putting into Perspective and 
Positive Refocusing).  All EII subscales (apart from Emotional Self Awareness and Emotional 
Self Control) were significantly positively correlated with Putting into Perspective and Positive 
Refocusing was significantly positively correlated with Emotional Expression, Emotional Self-
Management and Overall Emotional Intelligence in the police officer sample.  EII subscales 
were also significantly negatively correlated with a number of maladaptive emotion regulation 
strategies, however, differences in these correlations can be observed across the two samples.  
The use of Self-Blame as a coping strategy was significantly negatively correlated with 
Emotional Awareness of Others, Emotional Self-Management and Overall Emotional 
Intelligence; Rumination was significantly negatively correlated with Emotional Self-
Management and Catastrophising was significantly negatively correlated with Emotional Self 
Awareness within the HCN sample.  Whereas in the police officer sample, Catastrophising was 
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also significantly negatively associated with Emotional Awareness of Others, Emotional Self-
Management and Emotional Self-Control.  Lastly, Self-Blame was significantly negatively 
associated with most EII subscales (apart from Emotional Reasoning, Emotional Management 
of Others and Emotional Self Control) in the police officer sample.  The strongest correlations 
across both groups relate to the Positive Reappraisal strategy and suggest that police officers 
who possess higher levels of EI are more likely to utilise this strategy to regulate emotions 
(regardless of whether they are trained as HCNs or not).      
 
6.12. Correlations between coping style strategies and decision-
making styles 
The correlation coefficients are similar across both samples, with the most significant 
relationships being observed between the Avoidant decision-making style and coping strategies 
(see Table 4.21).  Avoidant decision-making appears to be significantly negatively correlated 
with all forms of adaptive coping strategy and significantly positively associated with all forms 
of maladaptive coping strategy within the police officer sample.  The same trend is observed 
within the HCN sample, however, no significant correlations are observed for Social Support, 
Emotional Regulation, Distraction or Rumination.  Intuitive decision-making is significantly 
positively correlated with Social Support, Avoidance and Opposition in the HCN sample, 
suggesting that Intuitive decision-making in this sample alone is linked to use of both adaptive 
and maladaptive coping strategies.  A similar pattern of relationship is observed across both 
samples in relation to Rational decision-making, whereby this style is associated with both 
Overall Coping Skills and a number of individual adaptive coping strategies (e.g. Problem-
Focused Coping and Problem Solving).  Spontaneous decision-making is also differentially 
correlated across the two groups, with police officers demonstrating a significant positive 
association with three of the maladaptive coping strategies (Hang Ups, Rumination and 
Opposition) and a significant negative association with Overall Coping Skills, Problem Focused 
Coping, Problem Solving and Emotional Regulation; whereas HCNs only demonstrated a 







Introduction to Qualitative Phase Results 
The following four chapters present the findings from the qualitative phase of the 
research whereby semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 HCNs from nine UK 
police forces.  Chapters 7-10 synopsise and describe four of the five theoretical micro-models 
that were developed as a result of the grounded theory analysis conducted (please refer to 
Appendix 25 for a discussion relating to the “Nature and Extent of UK Hostage and Crisis 
Negotiation” model).  Chapter 7 discusses the first of these micro-models: “The Hostage and 
Crisis Negotiator Journey” which provides a narrative of the UK HCN journey from the initial 
selection process and HCN training through to the operational support of HCNs during/after 
deployment.  Chapter 8 describes the second micro-model: “The Hostage and Crisis Negotiator 
Experience” which provides a synopsis of what it is like to be a HCN along with identification 
of the positives, negatives and ambivalences associated with HCNn in the UK.  Chapter 9 
presents the third micro-model developed: “The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Model of Hostage 
and Crisis Negotiation”, which provides a theoretical blueprint of the processes and protocols 
that HCNs follow when successfully resolving hostage/crisis incidents in the UK.  Lastly, 
Chapter 10 describes the fourth micro-model: “The Self-Perceived Successful Hostage and 
Crisis Negotiator Profile” which presents a model that can be used to depict the characteristics, 
attributes and skills that police officers need to possess in order to be successful HCNs.  These 
models are discussed sequentially in line with reference to how the findings can be situated 
within the current HCNn literature base and their potential implications for HCNn policy and 




Chapter 7: Qualitative Phase Results Chapter 3: 
The Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey 
Model 
This chapter outlines the grounded theory identified as the “hostage and crisis 
negotiator journey” in which the processes involved in the selection, training and operational 
deployment of UK HCNs are detailed.  A conceptual model was developed on the basis of the 
categories that emerged from the transcript data and includes 5 primary, 12 secondary and 32 
tertiary categories (please refer to Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1).  The negotiator journey could be 
clearly divided into five main primary categories: ‘Why? Reasons for entering into (and 
remaining within) the negotiator world’; ‘Who and how? The negotiator profile and selection’; 
‘Negotiator training’; ‘Operational negotiator roles’; and, ‘Negotiator welfare and support’.  
One further final category was identified as a resultant category: ‘Confidence enhancement as a 
result of increased negotiator deployment’.  Each of these categories will be discussed 
sequentially below.  
 
Why? Reasons for Entering into (and Remaining within) the Negotiator World 
 A variety of motivations were identified by negotiators as catalysts for entering into, or 
motivations for remaining within, the ‘negotiator world’.  A total of ten different motivations 
were identified, with four categories being corroborated most frequently within the sample.  
Two of these motivations were identified as externally-orientated and two were identified as 
self-orientated, thereby creating the secondary categories of ‘Externally-orientated motivations’ 
and ‘Internally-orientated motivations’.   
 
Externally-orientated motivations.  Two tertiary categories were identified within the 
externally-orientated motivations category and these consisted of: ‘Desire to help people’ and 
‘Vicarious pseudo-altruism’26.   
 
 Desire to help people.  The most frequently cited motivation for becoming a negotiator 
was identified as a desire to help people in crisis: “…I think it is genuinely to… kind of try and 
help people… (H:F:5:50); protect the public, save lives and make a difference: “Why do I do it?  
                                                          
26 Whilst this tertiary category contains elements of internal motivations, the external motivations were 
perceived as being the primary motivator (with the personal reward acting as a secondary consequence of 
their negotiator role) thereby justifying its presence within the externally-orientated motivations category, 
as opposed to the internally-orientated motivations category. 
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Table 7.1.  Table Depicting the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Categories within the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey Model 
Primary Categories Secondary Categories Tertiary Categories 
Why? Reasons for entering into (and remaining within) the negotiator world Externally-orientated motivations Desire to help people 
  Vicarious pseudo-altruism  
 Internally-orientated motivations Negotiation as an opportunity to be “down the coalface” 
  Self-aggrandisement/ego boosting 
Who and how? Negotiator profile and selection Not every police officer could be a negotiator “It isn’t for everyone” 
  Negotiators are a “certain type of person/police officer” 
 Three tier selection process Paper-based application  
  Role play scenario based assessment 
  Traditional panel interview 
Negotiator training Nature and context of negotiation training  Combining theory with practice 
  Training as intense and incremental in nature 
 Negotiator training objectives Training designed to test resilience 
  Training designed to simulate the reality of negotiating 
 No substitute for the “real thing” On-the-job training/experience as increasing negotiator ability and 
skills 
  Learning by doing/baptism by fire 
 Continuing professional development Negotiation as a perishable skill (“If you don’t use it you lose it”) 
  Use of formal/informal CPD opportunities to reflect on performance 
and share best practice 
Operational negotiator roles  Negotiator cadre roles Level 1 negotiator 
  Level 2 negotiator 
  Hostage negotiator coordinator (HNC) 
  Red negotiator 
 Negotiator cell roles The primary negotiator (“Number 1”/”The communicator”) 
  The secondary negotiator (“Number 2”/”The supporter and advisor”) 
  The hostage negotiator coordinator  (HNC) (“The supervisor and 
command liaison”) 
Negotiator welfare and support Force specific formalised support mechanisms Debriefing procedures 
  Buddying/shadowing system 
  Occupational health/welfare provision 
  “Stepping off the rota” 
 Self-directed negotiator coping strategies Peer support from other members of the cadre 
  Social support from family/friends/colleagues 
  Exercise and/or sport 
  Drinking alcohol 
Underpinning mechanism: Confidence enhancement as a result of increased negotiator deployment  









































Figure 7.1.  Figure depicting conceptual map of the HCN journey model.   
Note: The underpinning mechanism is represented by the “confidence circles”.
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…I make a difference… I genuinely care about people who are in crisis… and sometimes 
they’re there because they can’t help themselves and need a helping hand out… I don’t mind 
being that helping hand…” (G:M:4:123).   
Two thirds of the sample [n = 10] identified this category as their reason for entering 
into (and remaining within) the negotiator world.  Some negotiators referred to a desire to 
protect/safeguard the public and felt that their negotiator role acted as an extension of the oath 
that they had taken when becoming a police officer (i.e. to serve and protect the public): “I find 
it very… interesting work, because it’s about what policing should be.  It’s about saving lives” 
(A:M:1:156).  One negotiator described her role as allowing her to “give something back” to 
people in a way that was not possible in her main police (training) role (M:F:8:24).  This 
category links commonsensically to a number of competencies identified within the negotiator 
profile model discussed in Chapter 10, whereby negotiators are perceived as having to be both 
empathic and caring/compassionate in order to succeed/perform well within the role.    
 
 Vicarious pseudo-altruism.  Just over half of the negotiators [n = 8] within the sample 
described a form of ‘selfish altruism’ whereby the motivation for them becoming and remaining 
a negotiator was double sided.  Negotiators tended to specify that their reason for doing the role 
was to help people or to make a difference to people’s lives, however, this was often followed 
by a self-serving reward-based statement identifying the personal reward that they also obtained 
for performing the role/helping people in crisis:  
“That genuine personal satisfaction that you’ve done the right thing… done something 
really positive and changed somebody’s direction in life.  Stopped them ruining not just 
their life, but many others’, people they sort of know and love them… it’s a huge buzz” 
(L:M:7:54).   
In other words, whilst it would appear that negotiation is a role that is performed for 
selfless/altruistic reasons, the current data indicate that it is not a completely altruistic activity as 
negotiators reported having received personal rewards/benefits as a result of their actions: “I 
also then get to be involved in incidents whereby I’m saving people’s lives… I’m preventing 
serious harm to individuals, protecting vulnerable people… which is incredibly rewarding” 
(E:M:3:114).  This concept was discussed by Honeycutt (1981) who suggested that altruistic 
behaviours may in fact incur delayed or vicarious rewards on the part of the actor thereby 
suggesting that altruism can still result in a form of personal reward which may be experienced 
vicariously through the receiver.  This form of positive reward as a result of doing something to 
help others is also referenced within the counselling and volunteering literature as “the helpers 
high” (Luks 1988), whereby people experience positive emotions (which are rewarding) as a 
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result of helping others: “…then there’s the really… positive things… that sometimes you come 
away and you think, gosh, I really did make a difference today… and… that’s a great feeling” 
(J:F:6:110). 
 
Internally-oriented motivations.  Negotiators described a number of motivations for 
being a negotiator that could be perceived as self-serving or internally-orientated.  Two tertiary 
categories were identified within this category and included: ‘Negotiation as self-
aggrandising/ego-boosting’ and ‘Negotiation as an opportunity to be “down the coalface”’, as 
discussed below. 
  
Negotiation as self–aggrandising/ego-boosting.  For some negotiators [n = 6] it 
became clear that negotiation provided them with an ego-boost or feelings of self-
aggrandisement.   
“…I think there’s possibly a bit of… self-aggrandisement, if you like, in that you’ve 
been called out in the middle of the night to a situation that a bunch of other bobbies 
have found really difficult, and I turn up with my colleague, and sometimes, quite 
quickly, we’ve sorted it all out… because then you get…there’s probably, if I’m totally 
honest, there’s a bit of an ego thing there… I’ll admit to that” (F:M:4:111). 
Negotiators referred to feelings of importance/satisfaction from performing a role that is 
perceived as being complex and “special” to some extent: “…that real satisfaction that you've 
played a significant role in what is really complex and difficult in policing terms” (E:M:3:114); 
some negotiators even stated that they felt important as a result of successfully performing a 
role that others could not and specialising in a fairly niche area of policing: “…I get a lot of 
satisfaction from specialising in a bit of business” (G:M:4:111). 
 
Negotiation as an opportunity to be “down the coalface”.  For a sub-section of 
negotiators within the sample [n = 7], negotiation provided an opportunity for more hands 
on/operational policing: “…well first of all, I get to deploy operationally, periodically… which 
takes me away from the managerial role that I do” (E:M:3:114).  There were a number of 
negotiators who had experienced a reduction in direct public interaction as a result of either 
promotion to higher ranking (i.e. more managerial) positions or a change of role to a position 




“...I do find my training role… lacking in… I deal with the police officers – I don’t deal 
with the public anymore and I do miss that side of policing, actually, so it seemed to be 
a natural thing for me to do...” (M:F:8:24).  
For these officers, being a negotiator provided them with an opportunity to be “down the 
coalface” (A:M:1:156) and one negotiator joked that “…it’s the only time I see fresh air these 
days [Laughter]” (F:M:4:111); indicating that negotiation served the purpose of enhancing their 
opportunities to be involved with operational policing and experience public interaction.   
 
Who and How? Negotiator Profile and Selection 
The second primary category related to the second phase in the negotiator journey in 
terms of who negotiators are and how they are selected.  Interviewees described a belief that 
negotiators are unique within the police officer population and suggested that they tend to be a 
specific type of person/police officer, with the first secondary category being identified as ‘Not 
every police officer could be a negotiator’ (please refer to Chapter 10 for a more detailed 
discussion of the HCN profile).  The second secondary category, entitled ‘Three-tier selection 
process’, depicts the three stage process adopted by the majority of UK territorial police forces 
when selecting new negotiators.   
 
 Not every police officer could be a negotiator.  The vast majority of negotiators [n = 
14] felt that negotiation is a role that not every police officer could easily perform and two 
tertiary categories emerged within this category, including ‘It isn’t for everyone’ and 
‘Negotiators as a certain type of person/police officer’.   
“…a lot of police officers could.  Not any police officer.  There are some I know who… 
God bless them, good people for certain roles, but they wouldn’t do this role very 
well… Some of them rub people up the wrong way when they talk to them… And some 
of them don’t think quickly enough on their feet to be able to… adapt their style to 
what’s needed” (D:M:3:63). 
Interviewees felt that whilst the role is a specialist one that requires intensive training, not every 
police officer could be successfully trained to be a negotiator, as not every officer is suited to/or 
possesses the right attributes for the role.  They described the role as requiring a specific type of 
person, who could commit to the demanding nature of the role and possessed the self-perceived 
“right” characteristics/attributes to be a successful negotiator.   
 
 It isn’t for everyone. 
IV: “…would you recommend the role to others?” 
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IE: “I do… if I judge that they’re sort of the kind of people who’d… enjoy it, and bring 
benefit to it, you know, it’s not for everybody” (F:M:4:111). 
Several negotiators described incidences where colleagues had become negotiators and then felt 
that it was not right for them and had ended up relinquishing their role because they could not 
cope with either the on-call commitments or the nature/pressure of the role: “…because a lot of 
people come on the rota and then think, perhaps think this isn’t for me… And they’ll get off the 
rota…” (H:F:5:50).  Others described colleagues that they felt would be excellent negotiators 
but would “take it all home with them” (F:M:4:111) and struggle to cope with the emotional 
aspect of the role, exemplifying the belief that negotiation is a role that is not suited to every 
police officer. 
 
 Negotiators need to be a certain type of person/police officer.  “…by and large it gets 
it right, and there’s one or two that I just think [sighs] shouldn’t be negotiators” (B:M:2:195).  
Interviewees consistently referred to negotiators as being a certain type of person/police officer 
and when asked whether they would recommend the role to others, they frequently stated that 
they would, but only to ‘certain’ colleagues, on the basis of whether they felt that they were the 
right type of person for the role.   
IV: “…Would you recommend the role to others?” 
IE: “Only some [laughs].  I have… a couple of my colleagues, I’ve said, you need to 
look at this team.  I’ve got one officer who’s working with me at the moment.  She’s 
thought about it for a while, but she’d be really good.  You can just see it in people; 
people that talk and people that can communicate; people that can get information from 
others that other people would never have extracted; your deep thinkers really” 
(C:F:2:96). 
Some felt quite strongly that some of their colleagues would not make good negotiators on the 
basis of a number of factors: 
 “…no, because people are more direct and some people will want that quick solution.  
Some people are not necessarily more physically threatening but are certainly more 
imposing in their need to get things done and get things done quickly.  I absolutely 
recognise those skills, and in the majority of cases that’s exactly what we want for a 
quick and safe resolution.  But where it doesn’t work they are the last people that you 
would want in a protracted negotiation” (I:M:6:84).  
Others suggested that some police officers lacked the right mind-set/attitude (i.e. they rubbed 
people up the wrong way; they saw themselves as a hero; they wanted to use force to resolve 
incidents: “…it’s not for the sort of up and at them, biff, bash, boom, bosh” (L:M:7:54); and 
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others suggested that some police officers were lacking in the appropriate/necessary attributes 
for them to be a successful negotiator (i.e. they weren’t patient/empathic enough; they lacked 
the ability to reserve judgement/compassion).  There was a strong feeling amongst participants 
that only certain police officers would make successful negotiators: “…there are a few… that I 
wouldn’t allow anywhere near the team” (K:M:2:111) and that these individuals (i.e. those who 
would make successful negotiators) constituted a unique sub-group within the police 
population.   
 
Three-tier selection process.  The majority of negotiators described having to take part 
in a three-tier selection process.  This typically involved the completion of a paper-based 
application or expression of interest, a role-play scenario-based assessment and a traditional 
panel interview: “It’s a… three tier process, where there’s a written application form, there is… 
an exercise – a scenario to deal with – and then finally, there’s an interview” (D:M:3:63).  The 
selection process was used as a means of identifying suitable candidates who could go on to 
complete the regional or national HCNn training course (i.e. police officers need to successfully 
complete one of the training courses in order to be fully qualified and work operationally as a 
negotiator27).      
  
 Paper-based application.  Negotiators described a process whereby a paper-based 
application/application book/expression of interest was submitted that required them to 
demonstrate certain competencies (such as communication/decision-making skills, flexibility 
and resilience) and that this document was then used as a shortlisting mechanism for candidates 
to be invited to the next selection stage (i.e. the assessed role play exercise and panel interview).  
“…we ask them… to look at the role profile and put in… an application… so you look 
at effective communication… decision-making… problem solving… flexibility… and 
resilience… they put in their written application against those headings… and then we 
mark them between… nought and three, depending on how much evidence for each one.  
And there’s a weighting, and then we total it all up.  And… the top… depending on how 
many we need, depends on how many we call for interview” (B:M:2:195). 
 
 Role play scenario-based assessment.  The second stage of the selection process 
typically involved candidates taking part in an assessed role play whereby they would be 
required to demonstrate their natural abilities to deal with an individual in crisis.   
                                                          
27 Please refer to the mortar board icon in Figure 7.1 which represents the point at which negotiators 
become fully qualified and operational. 
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“…then we will… invite those individuals along to a practical exercise, and typically 
that will be a simple… scenario of… you’ve got 30 minutes to negotiate with someone 
who is behind that door, but really simple, so it will be like a domestic incident, or an 
easy role play” (A:M:1:156). 
This tended to involve responding to a suicidal subject (role played by a qualified negotiator) 
either on the telephone or through a door.  This role play was observed by senior negotiators 
(i.e. HNCs) within the cadre and was assessed in terms of how well the candidate performed.  
One negotiator described this process as being “quite intuitive” (F:M:4:111) on the basis of the 
fact that candidates were observed in terms of their instinctual response to an individual in crisis 
and were provided with no preparation prior to the assessment.   
“You’re given no other preparation… the time is now… you are a negotiator, the 
phone’s going to ring, and they took you through a role play scenario with an actor 
playing somebody who was in crisis or was threatening harm to somebody” 
(F:M:4:111). 
Once candidates had completed the role play component, they were required to take part in a 
traditional panel interview. 
 
 Traditional panel interview.  The final stage of the selection process involved a 
traditional panel interview: “…the second stage was a sit down sort of formal interview” 
(L:M:7:54), described by those negotiators involved in the selection of new negotiators as a 
means of trying to identify whether candidates possessed the appropriate skills/competencies for 
the role and whether they were fully committed to the role: “…the second part is a more 
structured approach just to make sure you can commit to the on-call arrangements and to drop 
everything at short notice…” (I:M:6:84).  The interview process was also used as a forum to 
discuss the way the candidate performed during the role play assessment and to offer an 
opportunity for reflexivity and feedback: “…after that [the role play], there was an interview 
where they discuss how you dealt with it…” (F:M:4:111).   
 
Negotiator Training 
At the time of the data collection, negotiators within the UK were required to complete 
either a regional or national training course before they could be operationally deployed in their 
role.  The regional course was a one-week intensive course that tended to focus mainly on crisis 
negotiation and was run by a number of police forces across the UK; whereas the national 
course was a two-week course run by the Metropolitan Police at Hendon Police College28.  Four 
                                                          
28 Hendon Police College is the principle training centre for London’s Metropolitan Police Service. 
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secondary categories emerged within this category, including: ‘The nature and context of 
negotiation training’, ‘Negotiator training objectives’, ‘No substitute for the real thing’ and 
‘Continuing professional development’. 
 
Nature and context of negotiation training.  When discussing their experiences of the 
training courses, interviewees described the nature and context of the training by highlighting a 
number of specific elements, including the characteristics of the training as involving a 
combination of both theory and practice components and the perception of the training as being 
both intense and incremental in nature.  The two tertiary categories: ‘Combining theory with 
practice’ and ‘Training as intense and incremental in nature’ are described below. 
  
Combining theory with practice.  Throughout the transcripts, negotiators consistently 
referred to the training courses as having involved a combination of both academic theory (i.e. 
academic inputs/lectures) and practice (i.e. role play based scenarios/exercises):   
“My initial training... classroom-based for some of the day and then you go… out of the 
classroom environment and actually practise your skills in a scenario-based… learning 
exercise.  And that’s pretty consistent for the week… a morning in the classroom and 
afternoon learning scenario” (D:M:3:63). 
This combined method of training was perceived by negotiators as providing a means for 
trainees to learn the necessary theories/methods of negotiation and then to put this academic 
knowledge into practice via the use of practical exercises or role-play based scenarios: “…there 
was a lot of… lectures initially and then there was practical role-plays and you rotated your 
roles.  And then very much after a week’s course… you are qualified as a level two 
negotiator…” (C:F:2:96).  This combination method is one that is applied within other countries 
(such as the USA), with particular emphasis being placed on the use of role-play as an integral 
component within HCNn training courses (Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 2008). 
 
Training as intense and incremental in nature.  Both the regional and national training 
courses were described as being both intense and incremental in nature.  One negotiator 
described the national course as the “most intensive course I’ve ever dealt with, in the Police 
Service” (L:M:7:54) and another felt that the course was “a four weeks course, crammed into 
two” (G:M:4:123).  Negotiators referred to the courses as involving “phenomenally long hours” 
(L:M:7:54) and recounted having experienced 14 or 15 hour days during the training.  
“So the course… fortnight residential at Hendon, structure of the course very gruelling, 
in that you’re in the classroom from half eight having inputs all day, short break for 
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tea, and then you’re straight back… in the evening… for six o’clock, for exercises that 
will run through till they finish.  And then at ten, eleven, midnight, you’ll then have a 
debrief process, where you’ll go, in an informal setting with a beer… but have a formal 
debrief of the… event, get individual feedback, and then…you go to bed about midnight, 
one o’clock, and then you’re back in class the next morning.  Yes, I think there’s an 
element of machismo about that, to be honest… because it’s a tough course” 
(F:M:4:111). 
Negotiators also referred to the incrementality of the training, whereby it tended to 
increase in severity in terms of the context of the exercises/role-play scenarios that they were 
required to complete throughout the course of the training.  
“…so it will build up from a very simple domestic violence incident, to a more 
complicated incident where there’s perhaps two people that you’ve got to negotiate 
with, so the complexity of negotiations… develops as you go through the course…” 
(A:M:1:156).   
The initial phase of the training tended to involve more basic crisis intervention/engaging with 
individuals-in-crisis and as the training progressed, the scenarios tended to become more 
complex and involve hostage-taking incidents, culminating in the depiction of a politically 
motivated terrorist siege involving a plane hijacking within the national course. 
“…they got you out of bed very early in the morning and… got you working on the 
theory and knowledge leading towards some sort of demonstration… that you 
understood what you’d been given and then could apply it… There was some… quite 
intensive debriefing… And gradually as the two weeks went on, the scenarios that we 
used… become slightly more intense…  So for instance, you start with the basic suicide 
intervention…  And we would finish with a massive terrorist hijacking at… Heathrow 
Airport” (B:M:2:195). 
 
Negotiator training objectives.  In addition to the fact that the training was particularly 
intensive, negotiators also felt that the training had been designed with a number of objectives 
that were particularly beneficial to the trainees once they became operational.  Two secondary 
categories emerged within this primary category and included: ‘Training designed to test 
resilience’ and ‘Training designed to simulate the reality of negotiating’.  
 
Training designed to test resilience.  Negotiators felt that the training courses were 
structured in a way that specifically tested and encouraged resilience.  There was a perception 
that the courses tested trainees’ abilities to cope under pressure and ergo their levels of 
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resilience: “Yes, sleep deprivation, getting cold out during the night, it’s all part of the 
psychology, behind the scenes…” (L:M:7:54).  Due to the on-call nature of the role, negotiators 
may be called out at any point during a seven day period, regardless of whether this is in the 
middle of the night after they have completed a long shift for their day job, or during their day 
off.  As such, negotiators need to be able to operate/perform when they may be tired or sleep 
deprived and the training is thought to tap into this requirement for trainees to be resilient and 
able to cope well under pressure/within non-optimal conditions.  There was also an impression 
that the training was utilised as a means of identifying whether negotiators were “cut out” for 
the commitment involved with the negotiator role.     
“…four weeks ago, I ended up doing 21 hours at work, because we had a kidnap 
running.  And all of that took place after my day job had finished.  I was tired… but you 
learn techniques of resilience… I’m certain… it was an unintentional objective of the 
course.  Maybe it wasn’t, but you learn the techniques of being resilient… and rising to 
the challenge when you’re tired… And that’s quite important… Three o’clock in the 
morning when that phone goes off, you’re awake and you’ve got to operate straight 
away” (G:M:4:123). 
 
Training designed to simulate the reality of negotiating.  Negotiators also felt that the 
training was designed to specifically simulate the reality of negotiating, which typically 
involves negotiators having to respond to calls/be deployed outside of normal working hours 
(i.e. typically during evenings and weekends) when they may have already completed a full 
day’s work, for example: “…it simulates that long day, the tiredness, and if you like, you’ve 
done your day job in class, and then you’ve been called out in the evening to do something for 
real…” (F:M:4:111).  There was a perception that the training attempted to mimic/simulate the 
typical conditions that negotiators would be working under when qualified, as a means of 
testing trainee ability to respond in such conditions: “So they are probably fourteen to fifteen 
hour days in any event to try and simulate the tiredness” (I:M:6:84).   
 
No substitute for the real thing.  Operational experience as a negotiator was perceived 
as a vital component within the negotiator journey.  Negotiators were quick to praise the 
training that they received as part of the regional and national training courses, but they also felt 
strongly that there was no substitute for “the real thing” or “live scenarios”.  On-the-job 
training/experience was therefore identified as a vital component in the negotiator journey that 
enhanced both negotiator skills and ability.  In addition to this, negotiators felt that learning by 
doing was a necessary extension to the training courses and that “baptism by fire” was an 
155 
 
important part of the negotiator journey.  Training was therefore conceptualised as an iterative 
process that started during completion of the regional and/or national training course and was 
further built upon via observation and completion of live operational deployments.    
 
On-the-job training/experience as increasing negotiator skills and ability.  
Negotiators consistently referred to the importance of on-the-job training or operational 
negotiator deployment as a method of increasing negotiator skills and ability: “…yes well 
experience is a great thing… it certainly contributes towards you… developing some expertise 
around it…” (E:M:3:114).  They described instances where they had observed other negotiators 
and picked up tips and strategies that they could utilise themselves or where they had simply 
managed to put the training into practice by being deployed and having to negotiate at an 
incident.  There was a strong perception that negotiation is a skill that is developed over time 
and as a result of many operational deployments:    
 “Especially when you are new to it.  Because… like everything in the police… as soon 
as you… qualify, there’s an assumption by the public that you’re an expert at what you 
do.  You’re far from it.  And it takes years… to learn it really” (O:F:9:36). 
One senior negotiator even described how he felt it was important to let more junior colleagues 
take the lead as the primary negotiator so that they got the exposure and experience needed to 
develop their skills and confidence. 
 “My view is… no matter what role I am, my junior… colleague is going to speak… And 
I’ll always put them in to bat… Because I’m at the stage now, where I feel comfortable 
enough to do that and I want them to have the exposure… I’ve got two years left doing 
the job, before I go and find something else; they are the future beyond that… And 
unless we give them that exposure and that experience… Then they’re going to feel 
uncomfortable and unready for it… Sometimes it’s a brutal, brutal… experience” 
(G:M:4:123). 
 
Learning by doing/baptism by fire.  Negotiators also described a process whereby they 
fine-tuned the theoretical skills that they had learned during the training by actually negotiating 
at live incidents: 
“I was very fortunate that once I’d… done the initial course and gone onto a rota we 
went through a busy period, so I had a lot of early jobs to allow me to practise those 




They felt that “learning by doing” was a core part of the negotiator journey: “…I think it’s very 
powerful to learn, actually on the job and do the scenario” (D:M:3:63);  and some described a 
sense of “baptism by fire” when talking about the first incident that they were deployed to after 
having qualified: “When you get that first one out of the way, because it’s a difficult one… you 
feel all right, I now know what to do” (N:F:8:34).  One negotiator described how he had to 
“crack on” with being the primary negotiator as the geography of the force meant that he was 
the first one on the scene and therefore had to start negotiating, despite being newly qualified 
(K:M:2:110) and another negotiator described being “thrown in the deep end and just got on 
with it” when her colleague (the primary negotiator) was unable to negotiate due to him being 
phobic of blood/unable to deal with the fact that the subject had cut himself and there was blood 
everywhere (N:F:8:34). 
 
Continuing professional development.  Negotiators described a plethora of CPD 
opportunities throughout the transcripts and emphasised the importance of CPD as an 
underpinning mechanism within the negotiator journey.  CPD was conceptualised as an on-
going form of training that provided an opportunity for negotiators to maintain/hone and 
develop their skills.  Two tertiary categories were identified within this secondary category: 
‘Negotiation as a perishable skill (“If you don’t use it you lose it”)’ and ‘The use of 
formal/informal CPD opportunities to reflect upon performance and share best practice’.   
 
Negotiation as a perishable skill (“If you don’t use it you lose it”).  Many negotiators 
referred to the concept of negotiation as a skill that is honed by regular use and atrophied by 
infrequent use: “It’s a perishable skill though.  Unless you actually do the do, then… it does die 
off” (G:M:4:123).  Some negotiators used the phrase “if you don’t use it you lose it” when 
referring to negotiation skills and some described a lack of confidence when they had not been 
deployed for a period of time.   
“...you go through periods where you get quite a few calls, and then you kind of have… 
four, five months with nothing, and you then find yourself on call, and you think, I’m 
just going to have a look through my bag, and just refresh my mind, so actually... the 
more you’re doing it, the more comfortable and confident you feel” (J:F:6:110). 
CPD opportunities allowed negotiators to maintain skills to some extent (i.e. by using role play 
and training exercises), however, regular deployment appeared to be the preferred option for 
negotiators to hone and maintain their core negotiation skills: “…there’s no substitute for 




Use of formal/informal CPD opportunities to reflect upon performance and share 
best practice.  Negotiators described a variety of different CPD opportunities including: 
quarterly in-force negotiator team meetings, regional quarterly negotiator meetings, annual call 
out training exercises (in collaboration with firearms teams), regional conferences, use of in-
force deployment records, use of POLKA29, peer-to-peer mentoring/learning from more 
experienced negotiators, acting as stooges in negotiator selection/training exercises and self-
directed learning/reading.   
“…those training days always include… a team meeting.  Separate to that, we also 
have… regular meetings of the coordinators on the force where we share… good and 
bad practice and lessons learnt… we also have our own… site on the force intranet and 
that includes… a list of incidents of note where negotiators have been deployed and 
also includes a deployment form where, after every deployment, we submit a form to 
say we’ve been deployed, what the outcome was, what lessons there were, if any, what 
issues there were… I should mention also we’ve got the POLKA website, which is 
national” (K:M:2:111). 
These opportunities provided a forum for negotiators to reflect upon their performance in recent 
deployments and to share best practice.  Negotiators referred to the importance of reflexivity 
and reflection on previous incidents and how they were managed, as a tool for learning and 
improving their performance in future deployments.  They also described how CPD forums 
would be used to discuss “incidents of note” and in particular, to identify any “lessons learned” 
or elements of best practice to be shared with the cadre (or more widely if appropriate): “And at 
each of those meetings… similar to the force meeting, we will go round the table and say, right, 
lessons learned” (A:M:1:156). 
 
Operational Negotiator Roles 
Once qualified, negotiators perform a variety of roles, both within the cadre generally 
and within the negotiator cell specifically.  Negotiators typically adopted roles within the cadre 
in accordance with the type/level of training they had completed.  Negotiators also adopted 
different roles within the negotiator cell during hostage/crisis incidents and this varied in line 
with negotiator level of training, the context of the incident and the practicalities of who was on-
call at the time.  Two secondary categories emerged within the operational negotiator roles 
category, in the form of ‘Negotiator cadre roles’ and ‘Negotiator cell roles’.       
 
                                                          
29 POLKA = Police Online Knowledge Area (please see glossary in Appendix 1 for more information). 
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Negotiator cadre roles.  Each negotiator cadre contains individuals who have been 
trained to different levels.  Due to the existence of both regional and national negotiator training 
courses, each cadre is likely to contain a combination of both level 1 (i.e. national) trained and 
level 2 (i.e. regional) trained negotiators.  In addition to this, some (normally more senior) 
negotiators will have gone on to complete training in the form of HNC training and red centre 
(i.e. kidnap and extortion) training.  Some negotiators on the cadre may, in fact, have completed 
all four of these training courses and as such can operate within any of the four roles listed 
below.  These roles are conceptualised incrementally, whereby each additional training 
course/qualification builds upon the previous one in order to produce negotiators who are more 
highly qualified to deal with hostage/crisis incidents of increasing complexity.  
 
Level 2 negotiator.  Negotiators who had completed one of the regional HCNn training 
courses in the UK were referred to as level 2 negotiators and were perceived as having been 
trained to mainly respond to crisis (as opposed to hostage) incidents: “…the selection is geared 
mainly towards selecting people to go on the regional course and join the team at that level; 
dealing mainly with domestic sieges or suicide interventions” (K:M:2:111).  Three of the 
negotiators within the current sample were level 2 negotiators having only completed a regional 
training course, and as such, these negotiators were, therefore, not qualified to deal with 
incidents involving ‘true’ hostages: 
“I certainly think the regional was a good introduction… but… the caveat with the 
regional course is that they wouldn’t expect you to go and start dealing with a hostage 
situation anyway… you could go in as support, but you wouldn’t be the number one or 
two negotiator” (J:F:6:110).   
To counteract this, most teams operated a system whereby level 2 negotiators were paired with 
level 1 negotiators (as far as possible) when on call, so as to provide an appropriate level of 
coverage for most types of incident: “…traditionally… if you get called out, you’ve got your 
national and you’ve got your NSO30” (N:F:8:34).   
 
Level 1 negotiator.  The majority of negotiators within the sample were level 1 trained 
negotiators [n = 12].  Negotiators who had completed the two-week national training course at 
Hendon were referred to as level 1 negotiators and were qualified to respond to all types of 
crisis and hostage situation, apart from kidnap and extortion cases which are handled by ‘red 
negotiators’ (see below).  The national training was described as equipping level 1 trained 
negotiators with the skills required to deal with more complex crisis/conflict situations which 
                                                          
30 NSO = Negotiator Support Officer. 
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may involve hostages, terrorism and politically motivated conflict31.  Level 1 negotiators were 
typically perceived as the negotiators who took the lead during most deployments, with level 2 
negotiators taking a support (or Negotiator Support Officer) role: “I would respond to anything 
I get called out to, really… but I would say, having not done the National Course, that if there 
was a hostage… I’d let… the National chaps then… sort of take the lead, really…” (M:F:8:24). 
 
Red negotiator.  The majority of negotiators within the sample [n = 13] had completed 
further training in the form of Red Centre training that qualified them as “red negotiators”: “I’m 
also red centre trained for kidnap…” (B:M:2:195).  Negotiators described this course as “the 
next stage” of negotiator training (G:M:4:123) or as a “bolt on” to the national training course 
for more experienced negotiators (F:M:4:111).  Red negotiators were trained to specifically 
respond to kidnap and extortion situations (i.e. to negotiate covertly).   
“There’s something called a Red Centre Course which specifically deals around a 
kidnap or a hostage environment… because effectively, in an overt world, the subject in 
crisis knows that you’re there and knows that you’re working for the cops.  In a kidnap 
world where there’s a threat to life, very often they can’t know that the police are 
involved, so there’s different techniques in how you deal with them… So that’s the Red 
Centre world” (I:M:6:84). 
Kidnap and extortion scenarios often require the police to remain incognito, to the point 
where the kidnappers are not aware that the police are involved.  This form of covert negotiation 
is incredibly complex and will often require negotiators to negotiate through a third party 
intermediary (TPI):  
“The victim communicator, we call them… they act as the, they’re the number, you’re 
their number one… But they do the talking… And obviously the… aggressor doesn’t 
know… The police are in the room with them, and the set up and everything” 
(H:F:5:50). 
As such the techniques, strategies and processes are different to those utilised within overt 
negotiation.  The red centre training is, therefore, designed to equip negotiators with the 
appropriate skills required to negotiate in covert, kidnap and extortion situations.  
 
Hostage negotiator coordinator (HNC).  Some of the interviewees [n = 7] had 
completed further training which qualified them as HNCs: “And then moving on again, you then 
                                                          
31 In some (mostly metropolitan) forces, all negotiators on the cadre are level 1 trained as they do not 
operate regional courses within some regions.  In these regions, candidates who are successful at the 
selection phase will go on to complete the national course as opposed to completing the regional course 
and then the national course (as is the case in majority of forces/regions).   
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have the coordinator training which is again separate, which is another… three days I think” 
(K:M:2:111).  HNCs tended to take a more supervisory/management role both within the cadre 
and the negotiator cell.  In terms of their role within the cadre, HNCs were often responsible for 
the daily management of the cadre, including organisation of on-call rotas and deployment of 
negotiators when calls come in.  In some forces, HNCs performed a direct line-management role 
which involved the management and supervision of a number of negotiators (the number varied 
in accordance with the size of the cadre and number of HNCs).  This process involved ensuring 
that negotiators were “fit to deploy” and the provision of a CPD forum whereby negotiators 
could discuss incidents with their HNC and receive feedback in relation to their performance:  
“We have a line management structure… I line manage at the moment one, two, three 
active negotiators.  So there’s an opportunity there to discuss one-on-one with them the 
learning points or significant points that have come out of an incident” (B:M:2:195). 
In addition to this, in many cases, the HNC performed a welfare/mentoring role by providing 
advice and support to less experienced negotiators.    
“…I was the coordinator, on for the day and… my number one rang me and she said… 
I’ve got this issue… she’s one of our more junior negotiators, so she rings me and she 
goes, oh, what do I do?  I say, okay, calm down.  So there’s a bit of mentoring and 
teaching…” (G:M:4:123). 
In addition to the four negotiator cadre roles described above, two negotiators 
(E:M:3:114; I:M:6:84) within the sample were also qualified as a Gold Negotiator Advisors32 
(GNAs) which is the highest level of qualification that a negotiator can achieve within the UK.  
GNAs are qualified to advise the Gold Commander33 in relation to the negotiation strategy and 
tactics that should be utilised in order to resolve the hostage/crisis situation.  
 
Negotiator cell roles.  In addition to the roles that negotiators adopted within the cadre, 
negotiators also adopted different roles within the negotiator cell/during operational 
deployment: “I’m one of six coordinators, so at any one time we have a coordinator on-call… 
and two other people on-call to go as a team of three” (I:M:6:84).  For more details in relation 
to the negotiator cell, please refer to Chapter 8 where the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of 
negotiation is described.  The data revealed the existence of three main roles within the 
                                                          
32 Gold Negotiator Advisors (GNAs) are “experienced negotiator coordinators trained to support Gold 
Commanders with advice on negotiation.  GNAs are likely to provide support for Gold Commanders in 
response to more complex incidents such as criminal or terrorist sieges” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).   
33 The Gold Commander is the individual who is in overall strategic organisational control of resources in 
order to resolve an incident.  They will be responsible for formulating a strategy to deal with the incident 
and tend to be off site/scene.  “The Gold Commander is in overall strategic command of the operation and 




negotiator cell, with each actor playing a different part within the negotiation process.  
Negotiators described a process of symbiotic team-working, whereby each role was redundant 
without the support of the others (much like cogs within a machine).  These three roles 
consisted of: ‘The primary negotiator’; ‘The secondary negotiator’ and ‘The hostage negotiator 
coordinator’ and each category is discussed sequentially below.   
 
 The primary negotiator (“Number 1”/“The communicator”).  The primary negotiator 
was also referred to as the “Number 1” and took on the role of “the communicator” or 
“mouthpiece”; whereby they were the individual who formed the direct link between the police 
and the subject: “…my colleague was the number one negotiator, so talking; and he was talking 
to him as we were driving down” (C:F:2:96).  The primary negotiator’s role was therefore to 
engage in dialogue with the subject and to attempt to de-escalate and resolve the hostage/crisis 
situation.  It is important to note that whilst the primary negotiator was the individual who did 
the speaking, they were heavily supported by the secondary negotiator and guided by the HNC 
in terms of specific tactics that they employed or strategies that they utilised within their 
communication with the subject.  Negotiators also described instances whereby the primary 
negotiator became a ‘pseudo’ secondary negotiator.  A third of negotiators [n = 5] for example, 
had taken on an advisory/support role when they had arrived at a scene and the first responder 
(i.e. a non-negotiator trained police officer) had already established a rapport with the subject 
and was successfully de-escalating the crisis situation.  One negotiator referred to this 
adaptation as a means of acting as a “safety blanket” and “coaxing” the first responder through 
the negotiation process (J:F:6:110) in order to prevent breaking a rapport that had already been 
established between the first responder and the subject.  
“…if you turn up, and the first responder, to use the jargon, is doing well, has 
established a good rapport, well, you… we have the number one, number two, and 
number three roles, in an ideal world, actually, you assume number two then, and you 
support the untrained responder.  Because if they’re doing well, why disrupt it all?” 
(F:M:4:111). 
  
The secondary negotiator (“Number 2”/“The supporter and advisor”).  The secondary 
negotiator was also referred to as the “Number 2” and typically adopted the role of the 
“supporter and advisor” within the negotiator cell: “…I was the supporting person; I was the 
number two, so the main role was – stand by my colleague” (C:F:2:96).  The secondary 
negotiator tended to monitor the negotiations/listen to the dialogue that was occurring between 
the primary negotiator and the subject, take notes and make suggestions to the primary in terms 
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of potential strategies that could be utilised or points for discussion that may act as hooks/de-
escalators for the subject: “It’s easier when you’ve got a second negotiator with you because 
you can sotto voce, you can just… exchange a few views… get a triangulation on what’s going 
on and, on occasion, swap negotiator as well” (D:M:3:63).  Post-it notes were frequently used 
by secondary negotiators as an effective and simple means of passing information to the 
primary negotiator or making suggestions in terms of tactics/strategies etc.   
In some forces, the secondary negotiator was referred to as a “Negotiator Support 
Officer” (N:F:8:34) which succinctly synopsises the objective of the secondary negotiator role 
which is to support the primary negotiator.  In addition to operational support, negotiators also 
referred to providing emotional support (i.e. providing an emotional checkpoint), or simply 
acting as a “sounding board” to cross reference ideas/strategies that might be utilised within the 
negotiation. 
“It’s one of the reasons we try to always have… a secondary negotiator there sort of 
monitoring for that.  There are certain situations… I’ve certainly felt it myself and I’ve 
certainly pulled other negotiators for it where they reach a point where actually, they 
get really annoyed with the person they’re talking to… so… one of the roles really is 
to… look for that in the primary, pull them away, engineer a bit of development time 
and say to them look, this is what’s happening… if necessary change them.  But usually, 
pull them and say right, this is what it is, he’s getting under your skin and this is why.  
Then it’s okay and they can go back in.  They recognise it and they deal with it” 
(K:M:2:111). 
This role was depicted as a vital one within the negotiator cell and the findings 
reiterated the importance of negotiation being a team discipline and the importance of trying to 
avoid “negotiating solo” (please refer to Chapter 9 for a discussion of the problems associated 
with negotiating alone).  The secondary negotiator also sometimes acted as a conduit between 
the primary negotiator and silver34/bronze command35 in the absence of a HNC.  This involved 
updating the silver/bronze commander on the progress of the negotiations and/or taking requests 
from the commander in terms of the strategy that needed to be applied to the hostage/crisis 
incident. 
                                                          
34 The Silver Commander “coordinates the individual strategies developed by the Firearms and Public 
Order Strategic Commanders (Bronze) to ensure that they reflect and contribute to Gold’s overarching 
strategy.” (ACPO and NPIA 2009). 
35 Bronze command can refer to either the Firearms Strategic Commander or the Public Order Strategic 
Commander (or both), depending on the situation.  The Firearms Strategic Commander (Bronze) is 
“responsible for developing the firearms strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and 
implemented to support it” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).  The Public Order Strategic Commander (Bronze) is 
“responsible for developing the public order strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and 
implemented to support it” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).    
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The hostage negotiator coordinator (HNC) (“The supervisor and command liaison”).  
The third role within the negotiator cell was that of the HNC who takes on the role of 
“supervisor and command liaison”: 
“…the idea of the coordinator, really, is to provide advice to the silver commander.  So 
there’s a little bit of cross over with the team leader role, but… the coordinator really 
should be… assessing the progress of negotiation, making recommendations to the 
silver and… ideally… providing written updates to the silver as well” (K:M:2:111).   
The HNC was responsible for monitoring the content/progress of negotiations, overseeing and 
informing negotiation strategy and liaising with the silver/bronze command and firearms 
commander (if required/appropriate).  The HNC acted as a conduit between the negotiators and 
the on-scene commanders who make the wider operational decisions in relation to how the 
incident is going to be resolved.  They typically advise the bronze/silver command on the use of 
strategies/tactics that can be offered by negotiators and may also complete position papers36 
throughout the course of the negotiation.   
“Position papers are effectively at a point in time; a negotiator coordinator would draw 
up a position paper which says, at this time this is what’s happening, these are the 
considerations, these are the issues that seem to escalate it, these are the issues that de-
escalate it, this is the way that I think that the negotiation strategy should go… that kind 
of thing” (E:M:3:114). 
In addition to the operational liaison/advisory role, the HNC also performed a 
management/welfare role to ensure that negotiators were fit to continue negotiating and/or were 
appropriate to negotiate in the specific circumstances that were presented: “…we look at welfare 
of staff…” (E:M:3:114).  The HNC role within the UK bears some resemblance to that of the 
crisis negotiation team (CNT) leader within the USA; however, some aspects of the CNT leader 
role would be performed by the force negotiator coordinator lead37 within the UK (see Regini 
2002 for a description of the CNT leader role). 
 
Negotiator Welfare and Support 
The final stage within the negotiator journey model related to the welfare and support of 
operationally active negotiators.  The negotiator role can be incredibly demanding and place 
negotiators under immense amounts of pressure and in circumstances where their actions can 
                                                          
36 Negotiation position papers are used by negotiation teams to help summarise and synopsise the hostage 
and/or crisis incident currently being dealt with.  They typically include information relating to the status 
(an overall description of the incident), assessment (an analysis of the incident) and recommendations 
(guidance and strategy) in relation to the incident (Dalfonzo and Romano 2003).   
37 Force Negotiator Coordinator Leads “work with the regional negotiator coordinator to support 
operational readiness of negotiators within the region” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).   
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have an impact on whether individuals live or die.  As such, it is vital that negotiators receive 
adequate levels of support from their respective forces in order to ensure that they are 
psychologically stable enough to be able to continue within their role.  Two secondary 
categories emerged from the data in relation to the support of negotiators, in the form of ‘Force-
specific formalised support mechanisms’ and ‘Self-directed negotiator coping strategies’.  These 
categories are discussed sequentially below. 
 
Force specific formalised support mechanisms.  Methods of support and welfare 
offered and utilised by specific forces differed to some extent, depending on the policies and 
procedures adopted by each force.  The five tertiary categories below represent some of the 
formalised support mechanisms that were in place for negotiators (although some existed in 
different forms/permutations within different forces).  It is important to note also that some of 
these support mechanisms were not unique to negotiators but were available to police 
officers/police staff as a matter of course.  The mechanisms that were unique to the negotiator 
cadre (in this context) are identified with an asterisk below. 
 
Debriefing procedures.  Debriefing within police terms refers to a process whereby 
incidents are discussed with the aim of identifying good practice and areas for improvement 
(College of Policing 2013).  Debriefing processes should be followed after any critical incident, 
and this concept is, therefore, not unique to hostage and crisis incidents.  Negotiators referred to 
both formal and informal debrief mechanisms and described debriefing as having a number of 
objectives, including to ensure that negotiators involved do not have any unresolved issues (if 
these have arisen as a result of the negotiation): “We always insist that the negotiators 
themselves after an incident… have their own little debrief, because sometimes you might get a 
little bit of conflict between two negotiators dealing with it, so you might have dealt with a 
certain something” (A:M:1:156); to ensure that negotiators are psychologically well enough to 
either drive home (or continue working) and to identify aspects of operational learning/good 
practice. 
 “…the people who just dealt with that situation, if they’ve got a supervisor, if there’s 
anything about them, he will regroup everybody, or she’ll regroup everybody, and 
they’ll talk through the process.  One is a debriefing… for learning.  And the other one, 
just to check that everybody’s behaving as they normally do [Laughs]” (O:F:9:36). 
Whilst the exact mechanisms of debriefing differed from force to force, most negotiators 
referred to the debriefing process as important from both an individual and organisational 
perspective, particularly when the incident had resulted in a negative outcome.   
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Buddying/shadowing system.* Some negotiators referred to a buddying/shadowing 
system that allowed newly qualified negotiators (i.e. those who had just completed their 
regional or national negotiation training course) to shadow more experienced negotiators during 
the initial phase of operational activity: “…we basically get paired up with somebody of more 
experience, and whenever there’s a job on, we try to go out and get involved, learning from the 
more experienced person” (L:M:7:54).  This process was described by negotiators as being an 
important support mechanism, particularly for those who had limited experience of dealing with 
hostage or crisis incidents as a first responder, for example.  This mechanism appeared to serve 
a dual purpose, whereby new negotiators noted the value of being able to observe live incidents 
and learn from their more experienced colleagues prior to dealing with their first deployment as 
the number one negotiator:  
“…we had one [newly qualified HCN] work with us on Tuesday… She said, it’s great to 
listen, because she’d done her regional course but it was nothing like the live scenario.  
She’s eyes open, ears open, and she was looking at me and [Anonymised HCN]; what 
we were doing; how we did it; what we were thinking about.  She was able to listen, 
read the log, give her opinion on things” (C:F:2:96).  
Equally, HNCs noted the value of this system for “quality assuring” new negotiators in terms of 
ensuring that they had the appropriate skill set and they were ready to deploy operationally as a 
negotiator:  
“But what we do now is a mentoring scheme, whereby you’re effectively shadowed by 
an operational negotiator, who will deploy with you on a number of occasions and then 
make an assessment whether or not you are ‘match fit’, and able to deploy 
individually” (E:M:3:114).  
 
Occupational health/welfare provision.  Negotiators also referred to the provision of 
occupational health services as part of the normal police service formalised welfare and support 
mechanisms.  The specific service provided differed slightly across forces/regions and a number 
of different welfare services were discussed, including occupational health provision, access to 
force medical advisors, access to in-house/external counselling services, the Trauma Risk 
Management (TRiM) programme38, and the Employee Assistance Programme39.  
                                                          
38 “TRiM (Trauma Risk Management) is a welfare led process intended to assess the response of a 
member of staff (including certain affiliated groups such as special constables) exposed to a potentially 
traumatic incident” (Kent Police 2014). 
39 Each force may operate a different Employee Assistance Programme.  Employee Assistant 
Programmes normally consist of a free, confidential counselling and advice service which employees can 
access for support. 
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“If, for example, tonight, I got called out and there was a fatality at an incident… and 
this has happened to somebody else quite recently, I know… the very next day, if not at 
the time… I’d have… my phone would be going, and it’d be… is everything okay, is 
there anything you need?  They’d point me in the direction of occupational health, and 
the critical incident debriefing and all the rest of it… So… I’ve got a lot of confidence 
that there would be people coming to me from all sides, checking that I had everything I 
needed” (F:M:4:111). 
Some negotiators [n = 3] also referred to a process whereby they had to take part in 
mandated annual psychological welfare checks: “Ah, mandated, we should go… once every 12 
months to see occupational health; we don’t have to talk to them when we get there, but we do 
have to go” (I:M:6:84).  This typically involved attending an appointment with a mental health 
professional in order to ensure that they were psychologically stable enough to continue being 
deployed as a negotiator. 
 
“Stepping off the rota”.*  Many of the HNCs described a welfare process that enabled 
negotiators to temporarily “step off the rota” if they were experiencing difficulties in terms of 
being able to commit to negotiating or in terms of being in the right “frame of mind” to perform 
within the negotiator role: “…some of my colleagues have been off the rota for one reason or 
another, for a period of time, and we’ll put them back into the rota when they’re ready and we 
will give them support” (D:M:3:63).  The option to temporarily be removed from the rota was 
referred to as a means of allowing negotiators to deal with any issues that they may be 
experiencing and then return to the cadre once they were ready to be deployed again and 
provided negotiators with the time and space that they needed in order to deal with the pressures 
of negotiating.  HNCs were clear to stress that negotiator welfare was paramount and that 
negotiators needed to be in good psychological and emotional health in order to perform 
effectively and safely within their role.   
“…one of them, when she first qualified… she had a job which was putting an awful lot 
of pressure on her, so she was working long hours, it was in an area of work… where 
there was a high stress level to do with child protection issues and so on, and she was 
taking her work home, married to a… serving officer as well, and there were concerns 
about her performance at work from her own day job, if you like, so this was fed to me.  
I spoke with her… and we agreed mutually that she wouldn’t get deployed just for then, 
and then we made some further contact, things had improved greatly, her workload had 
reduced… I was being put under pressure to say that’s she’d still got problems, she 
shouldn’t be deployed, but she was coming to me saying I want to be deployed, why am 
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I not being deployed?  So we ended up… by mutual agreement she went to the force 
medical advisor… who works here on behalf of the force… he looked at the issues and 
said no, from what she says and from what I can observe she is deployable, in fact it 
would do her good, so she has been deployed a couple of times and she’s coming on 
quite well.  So we have a flexible, reactive system to that…” (B:M:2:195). 
 
Self-directed negotiator coping strategies.  In contrast to the formalised welfare 
mechanisms, negotiators also described a variety of self-directed coping strategies that helped 
them to deal with the stress/pressure experienced as a result of negotiating.  These coping 
strategies were categorised into four tertiary sub-categories including: ‘Peer support from other 
members of the cadre’; ‘Social support from family/friends/colleagues’; ‘Exercise and sport’ 
and ‘Drinking alcohol’.  Coping strategies were utilised differentially by negotiators with some 
typically using one particular coping strategy and others utilising a combination of the strategies 
discussed below.   
 
Peer support from other members of the cadre.  Most negotiators described feeling 
incredibly supported by their colleagues and other members of the negotiator cadre: “Often, 
within the negotiator group we support each other straightaway anyway…” (E:M:3:114); 
“…usually, after a job… if there are a couple of you, you’ll sit down and have a cup of tea 
together and talk it through, and that helps a lot” (J:F:6:110).  They described an ethos 
whereby they felt supported and mentored by their colleagues. 
“The big… coping strategy, as far as negotiating is concerned, is the team… they all 
know what we go through when things have been difficult.  Talking to other team 
members, ring you up, you ring them up.  That’s… the best way of coping” 
(D:M:3:673). 
Support received from those negotiators in the cadre who were more senior/experienced 
was perceived as particularly helpful: “We’ve got our own… mentor, which is one of the… 
coordinators… So if I’ve got any issues, I know I can go and speak to them” (N:F:8:34).  Whilst 
some negotiators described a process whereby they actively sought support from their 
colleagues, this relationship appeared to be bi-directional as they also described an atmosphere 
whereby negotiators would also offer support to their colleagues automatically if they felt that 
they needed it:  
“I know when we did have one [a fatality] that other team members sent those 
colleagues… supportive messages; text messages or emails or picked up the phone… 
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and I think that made them feel not isolated; not on their own and that they could talk if 
they needed to” (C:F:2:96). 
 
Social support from family/friends/colleagues.  In addition to seeking support from the 
cadre, negotiators also typically sought support from family members, friends or colleagues 
(non-negotiators):   
“…my wife is absolutely great.  I will offload to her and she’ll sit down and nod, make 
a cup of tea if it needs it, tell me not to be stupid if I’m getting things out of 
proportion… So I think just kind of having somewhere to offload and not bottle-up” 
(G:M:4:123). 
Some negotiators found it helpful to discuss incidents that they had dealt with and to “verbalise” 
some of the feelings that they had around the way the incident was resolved: 
“I’m quite a private person… But I wouldn’t keep things inside like that… I’d be saying 
to one of my mates… Even mates not in the job, I’d be saying I had an absolutely 
horrendous job today… Somebody jumped, or somebody did this… Just to talk about 
it…” (H:F:5:50). 
The utilisation of social support differed within the sample, with some preferring not to discuss 
their negotiation role with family members (and choosing friends or colleagues as their forum 
for social support) and others preferring to utilise their family members/friends as a mechanism 
for social support (but choosing not to discuss with colleagues): “Yes, probably just go home 
and speak to my other half… really… because you can’t speak to the people that you work with 
especially being an inspector” (N:F:8:34).  For others, their choice of confidant was context-
dependent: “Talk about it with other colleagues.  Sometimes the wife, sometimes not, depends 
on the situation” (L:M:7:54). 
 
Exercise and/or sport.  Approximately half of the negotiators interviewed [n = 7] 
described using exercise or sport as a form of coping strategy/mechanism to help deal with 
stress (either as a result of their negotiation role or more generally): “I cope with stress by… 
sport, walking in the countryside, things like that, you know" (F:M:4:111).  Negotiators utilised 
a variety of different forms of exercise including going to the gym, running, walking, hiking, 
biking or playing sport: “I do sport as my number one… exercise to blast out the adrenalin” 
(C:F:2:96); “…I’ve got two black Labradors, and I do a lot of mountaineering and hiking… 
and… I go out and bike with my boys…” (O:F:9:36).  The use of exercise has been recognised 
as one of a number of healthy coping mechanisms used by police officers to combat work-
related stress (Alexander and Walker 1994); and is described as a form of adaptive avoidance-
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behavioural coping which can distract the individual from thinking about negative past 
experiences and improve psychophysiological tolerance to stress (McAuley 1994); an aspect 
that is alluded to in the following excerpt: “I go for a really long run… It just lets you think 
things through, let’s a bit of fresh air around you, and I find it personally… really good for 
clearing your brain out” (I:M:6:84).  
 
Drinking alcohol.  Approximately a third of negotiators [n = 4] mentioned using 
alcohol as a coping strategy: “I’ve had a number of coping strategies over the years, including 
drinking far too much…” (E:M:3:114);“…there’s the classic of going home and having a drink.  
Well, I will do that… I hate having headaches, so it won’t be too much [Laughter]” (J:F:6:110).  
This coping strategy was referred to as something which should not really be done: “Again, they 
say you should never do it, but me, I go to the pub, have a beer” (L:M:7:54); and some were 
reluctant to admit that they used drinking as a coping mechanism, potentially due to the stigma 
attached to the use of alcohol to deal with problems: “…I’d better not say drinking, had I?  
No… it is nice, sometimes, to have a drink and just talk about it, as in have a… beer or a glass 
of wine, and to… talk about it…” (H:F:5:50).  The use of alcohol was mostly referred to as a 
means of relaxing and unwinding and “the pub” was conceptualised as a forum to informally 
debrief the situation with friends/colleagues which was perceived in a positive, as opposed to a 
negative light.        
 
Underpinning Mechanism: Confidence Enhancement as a Result of Increased Negotiator 
Deployment 
Negotiators described an increased level of confidence as they progressed through their 
individual journey and there appeared to be a direct positive correlation between the number of 
deployments and their levels of confidence.   
“…the first time you get a call about a kidnap; your stomach just falls completely, from 
the sky… Crime in action, fact of life, massive, massive, massive risk.  Now, okay, I can 
see clearly, exactly where it is we’re going with this one, what it is that we’re doing… 
there’s always an adrenalin rush when they… come in and there’s always that initial, 
ah, flipping heck, what are we dealing with?  …but I guess what the experience does, is 
it calms that more quickly” (G:M:4:123). 
One negotiator described how she was “absolutely trembling” when she went to her first 
deployment (O:F:9:36) and another simply stated “…the more you do, the more comfortable… 
you feel” (H:F:5:50).  Others felt that experience served to reduce feelings of anxiety more 
quickly once they had received the initial call and helped them to feel more confident about 
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their role as a negotiator and the actions that they needed to take: “…it’s always… a 
challenge… because people are always slightly different but you… the situation itself doesn’t 
faze you as much as perhaps it might have done in the past” (K:M:2:111).  The findings suggest 
that negotiation skill and confidence is something which is developed as the negotiator 
navigates their journey through the negotiator world.  They also implicate the importance of 
regular utilisation (and practising) of negotiation skills as a means of enhancing and maintaining 
both skill and confidence levels within operational negotiators.   
 
Model Synopsis 
The findings provide an insight into the procedural aspects of HCN selection, training, 
operational deployment and support in the UK and help to depict the journey that negotiators 
navigate as a result of entering into the negotiator world.  In addition to these categories, the 
findings also revealed an underpinning mechanism in the form of ‘Confidence enhancement as a 
result of increased negotiator deployment’ thereby highlighting the importance of continuous 
operational deployment for negotiators to remain confident in their abilities to successfully 
resolve incidents.  These findings validate the current practices of HCNn cadres and can be used 
to inform the recruitment, selection, training and operational support of UK HCNs.  The 
following chapter outlines the operational and procedural processes utilised by negotiators when 
deployed to an incident and describes the UK-centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of 




Chapter 8: Qualitative Phase Results Chapter 2: 
The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural 
Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation 
In this chapter, the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of successful police HCNn within 
the UK will be outlined.  Initial, focused and axial coding of the data revealed 3 primary, 9 
secondary, 22 tertiary and 16 quaternary categories that depict the procedural and operational 
aspects of UK HCNn (please refer to Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1).  Whilst the indication is that 
these stages are completed sequentially, there is a recognition that negotiators may have to 
complete certain tasks at different stages, depending on the context and characteristics of the 
subject and/or crisis/conflict scenario. In addition to these categories, three mechanisms were 
identified as core underpinning components within the model.  The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. acronym 
has been utilised to provide a mnemonic mechanism for the key aspects of the procedural 
model: 
 Deployment 
 Information/Intelligence gathering 
 Assessment of risk/threat 
 Methods of communication 
 Open dialogue with subject 
 Negotiator toolbox/repertoire to resolve incident 
 Debriefing procedures    
 
Stage 1: Initial Negotiator Deployment Tasks 
The first stage of the procedural model can be divided into four subcategories that relate 
to the tasks performed by negotiators during the initial phase of deployment: ‘Information 
/intelligence gathering’, ‘Risk/threat assessment and management’, ‘Scene control/sterilisation 
and management’ and ‘Negotiator cell setup’. 
 
Information/intelligence gathering.  Broadly speaking, intelligence gathering refers to 
the process of collecting information (Intelligence Gathering n.d.).  This process constitutes a 
key role within policing and forms part of the National Decision Model that is utilised by police 
forces within the UK (College of Policing 2014b).  Negotiators consistently described the 
process of intelligence gathering, or the collation of information relating to the subject (whether 
that is a hostage-taker or individual in crisis) as one of the initial actions    
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Table 8.1.  Table Depicting the Primary, Secondary, Tertiary and Quaternary Categories within the UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis 
Negotiation 
Primary Categories Secondary Categories Tertiary Categories Quaternary Categories 
Stage 1: Initial deployment tasks 
and roles 
Information/intelligence gathering Information/intelligence gathering as immediate  
  Information/intelligence gathering as a vital 
component used to inform negotiation strategy 
 
 Risk/threat assessment and 
management 
Assessment of risk of harm to negotiator  
  Continuous dynamic risk assessment of subject, 
colleagues and wider community 
 
 Scene control/sterilisation and 
management 
Incident scene control, containment and management  
  Creation and maintenance of a sterile environment  
 Negotiator cell setup Identification of roles within the negotiator cell  
  Liaison with bronze/silver command  
Stage 2: The negotiation process 
and incident resolution 
Engaging with the subject Initiation of communication/dialogue with subject Initiate communication with the subject as 
soon as possible 
   Any communication/dialogue is better than 
none 
  Utilisation of a variety of communication media as 
necessary 
Face-to-face dialogue 
   Telephone conversation 
   Megaphone/loudhailer  
   Text message 
   Email/internet/social networking websites 
 The negotiator toolbox/repertoire Employment of pseudo-therapeutic communication 
techniques 
Use of active listening principles and 
techniques 
   Use of person-centred therapy principles 
  Use of specific negotiation strategies and techniques Establish why the subject is in the situation  
   Honesty  
   Identification of hooks and triggers 
   Matching of negotiator and subject 




   Use of concessions and positive police 
actions 
   Perseverance/persistence 
   Use of time as a tactic/“playing it long” 
   Disassociation from the police  
   Generate options available to 
subject/encourage problem solving 
   Identify commonalities/common ground  
   Encourage dialogue/allow subject to vent 
 Incident resolution  Use of enhanced persuasion  
  Positive facilitation of subject behavioural change  
  Liaison with operational teams and subject to 
orchestrate exit plan/surrender ritual 
Discuss and mutually agree surrender 
ritual/exit plan with subject 
   Allow subject to save face 
Stage 2: Underpinning 
mechanism 
Rapport building/development of 
the pseudo-therapeutic alliance 
Express/demonstrate empathy  
  Establish trust between negotiator and subject  
Stage 3: Post-incident protocol Operational debriefing procedures  Debriefing as an important component of negotiation  
  Debriefing as a means of CPD/therapeutic 
process/welfare check 
 
Entire model underpinning 
mechanism 1 
Formal record keeping 
[Written/Electronic/Audio] 
  
Entire model underpinning 
mechanism 2  


































Figure 8.1.  Conceptual model depicting the categories within the UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model.  Note. F2F = Face-To-Face; SNS = Social Networking Sites.
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carried out when they had been deployed to an incident40.  Within this category, two tertiary 
categories emerged as core themes within the transcripts: ‘Information/Intelligence gathering as 
immediate’ and ‘Information/Intelligence gathering as a vital component used to inform 
negotiation strategy’.    
 
Information/intelligence gathering as immediate.  Negotiators described 
information/intelligence gathering with a sense of immediacy and referred to this process as one 
that began as soon as the initial deployment call had been received.  This process involved a 
variety of different methods that included checking police records, previous negotiator 
deployment logs, gathering information from call handlers/first responders/witnesses and 
speaking to the family and friends of the subject.  Information/intelligence gathering was even 
carried out by negotiators on the way to the incident and some described speaking to various 
different information sources whilst driving (or being driven) to a scene: “…then get more 
details when I’m on the way” (K:M:2:111); “…usually en route I try to get details about any 
background on them” (L:M:7:54). 
“…what you need and what I often try and seek is what do we know about this person?  
Let’s speak to their family, let’s speak to their doctors, let’s speak to their… carers to 
find out about what we call intelligence – I’d say it was just information really… I 
suppose I… use those techniques to try and find out as much as possible about the 
person before engaging with them” (B:M:2:195).   
The information/intelligence gathering process was seen as a vital tool that allowed the 
negotiator to establish some sort of context for the scenario and to inform the approach that was 
going to be taken with the subject once communication was initiated. 
“…you’re able to draw on other things from his life and other detail which often in 
negotiating situations we completely don’t have because there’s no Intel on the system.  
So we rely on our negotiators if we can.  If we’ve negotiated with him before… for 
colleagues to have put in what worked last time; what didn’t work” (C:F:2:96). 
 
Information/intelligence gathering as a vital component used to inform negotiation 
strategy.  All negotiators described the information/intelligence gathering process as a vital 
component of negotiation whereby the information gathered was used to directly inform the 
                                                          
40 Information gathering in this sense refers to the collation of general information about the subject, 
whereas intelligence gathering refers to the collation of information that may relate specifically to the 
subject’s criminal history or background.  Negotiators described engaging in both processes of 
information gathering and intelligence gathering as necessary/appropriate.  An incident involving a 
subject who did not have a criminal history and was not “known to police”, for example, would require 
negotiators to gather information, as opposed to intelligence per se.  
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negotiation strategy, technique or approach utilised when either entering into dialogue with the 
subject, or within continued negotiation/communication with the subject.  One negotiator 
described this process as a means of “delving into their background to find the buttons to press 
to actually get them to come down” (D:M:3:63).  Examples of information/intelligence 
gathering in this context included identifying how the subject presented and the situational 
circumstances around the hostage/crisis event; identifying the existence of existing mental 
health problems/history of substance abuse; identification of criminal history or outstanding 
arrest warrants (“Usually they’ve done intelligence checks.  I dealt with one who had actually 
recently been arrested for sex offending, so obviously… initially it’s a no go area, you wouldn’t 
say, are you wanted by the police for anything? See you later…” (L:M:7:54)); identification of 
previous negotiator call out history; identification of conciliatory and aggravating parties; and 
identification of precipitating factors to the crisis situation.   
The data also indicated that negotiators utilised information/intelligence that had been 
gathered about the subject to directly inform risk assessment processes41.  One negotiator 
described how intelligence gathering was used to assess risk in relation to a suicidal subject and 
axial coding linked the two secondary categories of information/intelligence gathering and 
risk/threat assessment as a result of this relationship42: 
“…yes, he could commit suicide.  There’s always that possibility, but I think you get a 
feeling reasonably early on from… his demeanour, his actions, and his comments as to 
whether or not this is someone who is… actually going to carry out that threat.  You 
obviously look at their criminal past, and all their past, you’ll obviously try to find 
out… from associates or friends or family, has he done this before? And how does he 
react to drink, etc.” (A:M:1:156). 
 
Risk/threat assessment and management43.  Information/intelligence gathering was 
described as directly leading into one of the next initial deployment tasks that involved the 
assessment and management of potential risk/threat to all parties involved in the negotiation.  
Assessment of threat and risk constitutes the second stage within the National Decision Model 
(College of Policing 2014b) and, as such, negotiators appeared to be implementing this model 
within the process of negotiation.   
                                                          
41 The use of intelligence in this way has also previously been identified by McMains and Mullins (2010). 
42 This relationship is represented by a downward-facing vertical connecting arrow between the 
information/intelligence gathering and risk assessment categories in Figure 8.1.   
43 Whilst risk/threat assessment forms a vital component within the first stage of the model (i.e. initial 
negotiator deployment tasks), this process is also one which continues throughout the duration of the 




“My initial thing is safety of myself, that’s the primary thing.  Safety of other officers 
that are there, and then safety of, I’m talking about incidents of people in crisis here, 
safety of them.  My training and whatever has taught me that if they’re going to jump, 
they jump anyway, and what I don’t want to be doing is grabbing somebody and them 
taking me with them.  Luckily… I’ve never grabbed anybody, but you… look for an area 
where you can talk to them safely, where you know that you’re not going to be harmed.  
So that’s the first thing I do” (L:M:7:54). 
Negotiators described risk assessment as a component of negotiation that was vital to ensuring 
the safety of all parties involved and tended to refer to this concept in terms of assessing risk of 
harm to the negotiator and a continuous dynamic risk assessment of the subject, colleagues and 
the wider community.    
 
Assessment of risk of harm to negotiator.  Negotiators were typically deployed to 
scenarios that involved potential risk of harm to not only the subject, but also to the negotiator 
and other police personnel.  This often involved working ‘at height’ or in precarious positions 
whereby the negotiator may be putting him or herself at risk in order to communicate with the 
subject.  Negotiators specified that whilst they were there to try to successfully negotiate/resolve 
an incident and to try and prevent injury or loss of life, their safety was paramount and was 
always considered as the primary risk assessment in relation to the scenario: “You assess it 
yourself so you don’t put yourself at immediate risk” (N:F:8:34).  Some negotiators described 
wanting to get closer to a subject to make communication and developing rapport easier, but 
they were cognisant of the fact that their safety was the most important requirement: “It is better 
to be able to talk with someone if there’s no barriers, but you’ve got to balance it with your own 
safety” (B:M:2:195).   
“I feel that you can really get drawn into that dialogue, and you can put yourself in 
danger… you get that creeping, and you move closer and closer… if you’ve got 
someone who’s going to jump, actually, you don’t want them to take you off, as well” 
(J:F:6:110). 
 
Continuous dynamic risk assessment of subject, colleagues and wider community.  
Negotiators described a process by which risk/threat was continuously and dynamically 
assessed.  This involved evaluation of risk posed to all parties, including the negotiator, subject, 
colleagues and the wider community.  One negotiator described risk as something that he had to 
“continually reassess” (A:M:1:156) and another referred to being “constantly aware of your 
own and their [subject] safety” (B:M:2:195).   
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“…the first thing is, is there a threat to life?  If so, whose life; how can that be mitigated 
against?  …are there any other tactics that the ground commander might want to 
consider to keep the public safe?  To keep me safe?  To keep his staff safe?  …so those 
are kind of the initial dynamic risk assessment” (G:M:4:123). 
 
Scene control/sterilisation and management.  The final task identified within the 
initial phase of the model referred to the concept of scene control/sterilisation and management 
which aligns sympathetically with Poland and McCrystle’s (1999) “containment and 
stabilisation” phase of hostage-taking.  Two tertiary subcategories emerged: ‘Incident scene 
control and management’ and ‘Creation and maintenance of a sterile environment’.  These 
factors were described as tasks that may not necessarily be performed by negotiators per se (i.e. 
they may be operational tasks performed by HNCs, scene commanders or police colleagues 
present at the scene) but were considered to be vital components in relation to the negotiation 
process.   
 
Incident scene control, containment and management.  Negotiators described having 
to initially control the scene upon their arrival or having to direct others (i.e. police colleagues) 
to do this.  This activity ensures that the public are safe, that there is no third party intervention 
and that subjects are contained within a certain area: “…the police need to close down the 
immediate area for us to be able to do our bit” (I:M:6:84).  Negotiators referred to a number of 
activities that fell under the “scene control umbrella” as outlined in the following extract:  
“…if you’re then having to set up a negotiating scenario.  By that you’re… having to set 
up a sterile environment, and… you… may well be evacuating people… so you’re going 
to look at a physical… sterile zone, in which there will be proper cordoning’s; you can 
look at, in certain situations, getting the assistance of technical support units, and 
draining certain phones of batteries…” (A:M:1:156). 
 
Creation and maintenance of a sterile environment.  The importance of creating and 
maintaining a sterile environment was consistently described throughout the transcripts.  
Sterility in this sense as refers to a process that enabled negotiators to complete their role to best 
effect, by ensuring that the subject was only receiving input/dialogue from the negotiator and 
thereby preventing external influence from bystanders or third parties.   
“The actual… atmosphere that you’re… negotiating in can be a problem.  It needs to be 
kept sterile.  I’ve had negotiations going on where… the chap’s mates are all across the 
back, there, shouting the odds, which aren’t helping.  Or we get people… perhaps, who 
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may not know the individual, but… are fed up with the inconvenience being caused to 
them, shouting jump or whatever” (D:M:3:63). 
One negotiator referred to the interference received from bystanders as “diluting your efforts” as 
it was incongruent with the premise of keeping the subject focused on the negotiator and what 
they are saying (A:M:1:156).  Another referred to the negative impact of “not being able to 
isolate the person” (K:M:2:111), thereby emphasising the importance of sterility within the 
negotiation procedure. 
 
Negotiator cell setup.  In line with the national negotiator deployment model (ACPO 
and NPIA 2011), negotiators typically set up a negotiator cell44 (if appropriate) once they had 
arrived at the scene of a hostage/crisis incident.  A full negotiator cell consists of a team leader 
(an experienced negotiator) and four negotiators (ACPO and NPIA 2011); however, the 
majority of incidents do not require the implementation of a full cell.  Two tertiary categories 
were identified within this category: ‘The identification of roles within the negotiator cell’ and 
‘Liaison with bronze45/silver command46’.  
 
Identification of roles within the negotiator cell.  Negotiators are typically deployed in 
pairs, with the intention of adopting the roles of primary (number 1) and secondary (number 2) 
negotiator.  The primary negotiator is the one who engages directly with the subject, whereas 
the secondary negotiator tends to adopt a supporting/advisory role throughout the process.  
Negotiators described the process of having to identify who was going to perform which role 
during the initial deployment phase: “…if there’s two of us for instance, we decide who is going 
to lead, who’s not… who’s going to be number two and if there’s a third one, obviously who’s 
going to provide that link” (K:M:2:111).  This decision was dictated by a number of factors, 
including the nature and context of the scenario and a feeling for who was best placed to engage 
with the subject/develop a rapport: “…what role do you play, are you actually playing an 
advisory role… or are you playing an actual negotiating role; and… that depends on the 
incident” (E:M:3:114).  In addition, negotiators who were trained as HNCs47, described having 
                                                          
44 For the purposes of this research ‘negotiator cell’ could refer to a scenario which only involves two 
negotiators (i.e. the primary and secondary negotiator) and a HNC acting either remotely or at the scene. 
45 The Firearms Strategic Commander (Bronze) is “responsible for developing the firearms strategy and 
ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).  The 
Public Order Strategic Commander (Bronze) is “responsible for developing the public order strategy and 
ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).    
46 The Silver Commander “coordinates the individual strategies developed by the Firearms and Public 
Order Strategic Commanders (Bronze) to ensure that they reflect and contribute to Gold’s overarching 
strategy” (ACPO and NPIA 2009). 
47 “Hostage Negotiator Coordinators are experienced negotiators trained to provide specialist support for 
incident commanders by advising on the development and implementation of negotiation plans and 
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to identify whether they were going to take on a HCN role or a HNC role at this stage in the 
process: “Then it also depends which role I’m taking on; am I taking on a negotiator role or am 
I taking on a negotiator coordinator role?” (E:M:3:114). 
 
Liaison with bronze/silver command.  Negotiators also highlighted the importance of 
forming an early link between the negotiator cell/negotiators and the command structure (i.e. 
silver command or tactical firearms commander) in order to receive instructions in relation to 
how the incident was going to be approached/managed: 
“…the first thing you usually do is… find out who’s in charge… which isn’t always as 
obvious as it should be and… have a word with them, find out what it is they want… 
what they need and… usually give them some advice about what we’re going to do” 
(K:M:2:111). 
Negotiators described the decision-making process as being removed from the negotiators 
themselves and being firmly placed within the remit of the command structure: “…what does 
the commander, whether it be silver or whether it be the senior PC on the ground, what do they 
want from the negotiator?” (J:F:6:110); “…you just have to feed in your view and then accept 
the decision” (C:F:2:96).  These excerpts resonate appositely with the “negotiators negotiate 
and commanders command” concept discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
Stage 2: The Negotiation Process and Incident Resolution 
The second stage of the model relates to the actual negotiation process whereby the 
negotiator attempts to resolve the situation by engaging with the subject, employing a variety of 
negotiation strategies and positively facilitating subject behaviour change.  Three secondary 
categories were identified within this stage of the model: ‘Engaging with the subject’, ‘The 
negotiator toolbox/repertoire’ and ‘Incident resolution’.     
 
Engaging with the subject.  Once negotiators had completed the initial deployment 
tasks referred to above, they described the next step in the process as engaging with the subject.  
Two tertiary categories emerged within this category which included: ‘Initiation of 
communication/dialogue with the subject’ and ‘Utilisation of a variety of communication media 
as necessary’.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
tactics.  HNCs are more likely to provide additional specialist support for incident commanders when 
there is an immediate risk of serious harm or death, or in response to more complex or prolonged 
incidents.  The HNC is also responsible for ensuring that the negotiating plan that has been agreed with 




Initiation of communication/dialogue with the subject.  In order to identify the reasons 
behind the crisis/hostage scenario, negotiators needed to establish communication with the 
subject and encourage bi-directional dialogue.  Negotiators described a typical “default” 
approach that involved introducing themselves and explaining to the subject that they were 
“there to help”.  It was identified as particularly important for negotiators to initiate 
communication with the subject as soon as possible and that to some extent, any communication 
was better than none.   
  
Initiate communication with the subject as soon as possible.  Negotiators described 
attempting to contact the subject as quickly as possible to limit the risks associated with the 
critical period/initial hours of the crisis event.  The “Golden Hour” has been referred to within 
medical science and crisis management literature and in this sense refers to the importance of 
acting quickly in order to reduce/minimise the potential harm/injury to parties involved (Israel 
Crisis Management Group 2016).   
“…when you get there, the first thing I want to do is just to find out exactly what this is 
about and try and get a little bit of background so we’ve got something to start off with.  
And then it’s just, I want to get on with it and start talking to these people” (N:F:8:34).   
The situations that negotiators are involved in can be extremely volatile and negotiators have to 
operate on tight timeframes and initiate communication with the subject quickly in order to 
minimise risk.  They described having to contact the subject via telephone whilst on the way to 
a scene “…if you’re going to a job you need to communicate on the way” (C:F:2:96) or having 
to put a call in “from the kitchen table” (I:M:6:84); and made reference to the importance of 
trying to establish a rapport with the individual straight away, even if this is before the 
negotiators arrive at the scene.  
“…I was on call and it was a job that was at the opposite end of the country, but needed 
to be done by… phone because we didn’t know where this lady was.  So all I say is, to 
the control room, if need be, you’ll need to get the other two that are on-call to come to 
my home, and they will join me and do it that way, because otherwise you’ve got an 
hour of somebody in crisis who just isn’t going to get the contact…” (I:M:6:84). 
 
Any communication is better than none.  Negotiators described a belief that simply 
engaging in dialogue with the subject early on in the process was important, regardless of what 
was said or who was doing the communicating per se: “Just by being there and talking is better 
than not being there at all... So get in there, start talking, see what you’re dealing with” 
(B:M:2:195).  Some negotiators described a resistance from non-negotiator trained officers/staff 
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to engage in dialogue with the subject prior to the arrival of the negotiators, however, there was 
a general consensus that it is important to engage in some form of dialogue with the subject as 
soon as possible, and that any communication (albeit from first responder police officers or call 
handlers) is better than none.   
 
Utilisation of a variety of communication media as necessary.  Negotiators described 
having to utilise a variety of different methods of communication/media including face-to-face 
dialogue (which was often perceived as the most advantageous/efficacious method), telephone 
conversation, text message, email/internet/social networking websites and the use of a 
megaphone/loudhailer48: “…we’d tried… communicating ourselves by phone with him… there 
were family members and so on that turned up on the cordon and we tried going through their 
phones… and then we tried going face-to-face” (K:M:2:111).  Decisions were based on the 
situation in terms of utilising the most appropriate method, an element of personal preference 
and/or being directed by the commander in terms of the specific approach required: “…a lot of 
the time, it’s going to be my choice, but depending on the job, it might be an instruction about, 
this is the way we want it done” (J:F:6:110). 
 
Face-to-face dialogue.  Negotiators described engaging with subjects face-to-face 
where possible: “…if you’re face-to-face that’s best of all” (B:M:2:195).  Most negotiators 
described a preference for this method: “I don’t like the phone call ones… I prefer face-to-face” 
(H:F:5:50).  Some felt that this method was ideal as it allowed the negotiator to read the 
subject’s body language and provided the negotiator with a more suitable environment to 
display empathy and develop rapport/a relationship with the subject.   
“I prefer to do it face-to-face… then the personality comes into it, whereas you don’t… 
pick up people’s personality and they don’t pick up my personality as well… Whereas 
they could think… actually… she’s quite genuine… She does mean that, whereas on the 
phone, you don’t always get that” (N:F:8:34). 
 
Telephone conversation.  In scenarios where face-to-face communication wasn’t 
possible (due to not being able to get close enough to the subject, siege/barricade situations, or 
not having information in relation to a subject’s whereabouts), negotiators described having to 
communicate via telephone: “Yeah, all via the phone.  A lot of ours are, to be honest.  Because 
one, the geography of the force… you know, it’s really difficult” (C:F:2:96); “Face-to-face is 
good, but obviously, if there’s any threat or risk, close to the proximity… it is… a problem… so 
                                                          
48 Loudhailers/megaphones are typically referred to as “bullhorns” within the United States. 
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mobile phones are used often” (F:M:4:111).  They referred to utilising a number of different 
telephone methods including contacting the subject via a landline or mobile telephone and the 
use of a field/throw phone.  It is important that the conversation/dialogue is restricted/contained 
as far as possible, so the police may prefer to utilise a field/throw phone that can only accept 
calls from specified police telephone numbers: “it’s all monitor-able, it’s a secure line of 
communication” (F:M:4:111) or to block incoming/outgoing calls on the subject’s mobile phone 
to ensure sterility of the environment and prevent dilution of the negotiator’s efforts as a result 
of interaction/interference from third parties.    
 
Megaphone/loudhailer.  A few negotiators referred to having utilised (or their 
colleagues having utilised) a megaphone/loudhailer to communicate with subjects.  This method 
was typically resorted to as a result of difficulties getting access to the subject during 
siege/barricade scenarios, or due to the risk associated with negotiators establishing face-to-face 
contact with subjects.   
“…I know a colleague had to… go… up the gas towers... Somebody was up there, at the 
top of one of those.  And he went up.  But I think he quickly realised… if he decides to 
come flying down here, I’m off… or, if he starts throwing stuff at me, or whatever… and 
he came down, and then communicated through a loudhailer” (O:F:9:36). 
The use of megaphones has long been established within the field of negotiation, with McMains 
and Mullins (2014: 102) going so far as to suggest that “a bullhorn should be one of the first 
items obtained by a negotiating team”.  Whilst megaphones can provide a vital tool for making 
contact with subjects when face-to-face/telephone contact is not possible, it has also been 
suggested that there are difficulties associated with developing rapport using such a method 
(Fuselier 1981b) as the use of intonation and specific tone of voice is likely to be impeded via 
the megaphone, so negotiators may have to resort to alternative methods if the use of a 
megaphone is acting as a barrier to rapport building. 
 
Text message.  Negotiators described having to utilise alternative methods of 
communication in some instances, including the use of text messages.  This was described as a 
fairly recent development in the role as a result of enhancements within technology and 
represents another method of communication that can be utilised by negotiators to establish 
contact with subjects: “…negotiation fell dead at about ten o’clock.  And I was texting him still 
and sometimes he would respond to that” (C:F:2:96).  The use of text messages was described 
as being particularly beneficial within cases involving MISPERs and was also identified by one 
negotiator as a helpful method of engaging with certain subjects as a result of perceived cultural 
184 
 
aspects: “…it seems that culturally, people are more likely to respond to texts than they will to 
your phone call for instance” (B:M:2:195).  The use of text messages within crisis negotiation 
scenarios is becoming more common, with negotiators from different countries citing the use of 
this method of communication in addition to the more traditional communication formats 
(Almond and Budden 2012).      
 
Email/internet/social networking websites.  Negotiators also described the use of email, 
the internet or social networking sites to contact subjects, such as those who were classified as 
MISPERs, or the organisers of protests/marches/demonstrations.   
“…it’s all about negotiating with protestors, recognising that they actually have the 
lawful right to… we have to facilitate protests, but it’s all about communicating with the 
individuals.  It’s all social networking stuff.  And sometimes we utilise a negotiator for 
that” (A:M:1:156). 
The emphasis appeared to be on utilising the appropriate method of communication for the 
specific contextual scenario, with one negotiator referring to a blackmail case which was 
running at the time of the interview and “…all the communication’s through the internet… and 
through email and so on…” (K:M:2:111).  
 
The negotiator toolbox/repertoire.  This part of the model relates to the specific skills, 
tools and strategies used by negotiators in order to form a relationship with the subject and 
successfully resolve crisis/hostage scenarios.  The set of skills utilised by negotiators whilst 
engaged in dialogue with subjects is referred to as ‘the negotiator toolbox’ as a means of 
describing a repertoire of skills which can be selected (as appropriate) in order to resolve 
hostage/crisis incidents.  Two secondary categories were identified within this stage of the 
model: ‘Employment of pseudo-therapeutic communication techniques’ and ‘Use of specific 
negotiation strategies and techniques’.   
 
 Employment of pseudo-therapeutic communication techniques.  Negotiators described 
employing a number of different basic therapeutic communication techniques when 
communicating with subjects who were either in crisis or conflict states.  All negotiators 
emphasised the importance of utilising active listening principles and described a variety of 
different techniques that they had used in different negotiation scenarios.  In addition to this, 
they described frequently utilising or adopting a person-centred approach to their 
communication with the subject which included adherence to some of the core 
principles/constructs within person-centred counselling/therapeutic approaches.  These 
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communication techniques are well established within the literature and demonstrate a parallel 
with the techniques utilised within psychotherapeutic/counselling settings in order to form the 
therapeutic alliance between the therapist (i.e. negotiator) and client (i.e. subject).   
 
 Use of active listening principles and techniques.  Active listening was perceived by all 
negotiators to be a core skill utilised within HNCn and examples of active listening were 
explicitly described by most negotiators throughout the interviews. 
“…you will actually say to them… to me, you sound really angry… because they’ll 
either come back and say, what are you on about?  Or it’ll be like, too bloody right… so 
you get your confirmation or whatever, but also, it’s part of your trust building, because 
it’s showing that you’re listening to them and you’re understanding what’s going on 
with them” (J:F:6:110).   
This form of listening was described by some as “effective” or “enhanced” listening but this 
construct is typically referred to within the negotiation literature as “active listening”.  Active 
listening refers to a range of multi-purpose communication tools which can be applied to 
hostage and crisis negotiations (Call 2003, Lanceley 1999, McMains 2002, McMains and 
Mullins 1996, Noesner 1999, Noesner and Webster 1997 and Slatkin 1996, 2005).  It typically 
involves a number of techniques which demonstrate to the recipient (i.e. subject) that the 
negotiator is listening and that they understand what the subject is saying to them; it may also 
implicitly encourage the subject to continue talking/disclose further information.  Examples of 
active listening techniques include the use of emotional labelling, paraphrasing, 
reflecting/mirroring, minimal encouragers, silences and pauses, “I”-messages, and open-ended 
questions (Miller 2005).  Almost all of these specific techniques were demonstrated across the 
interviews with specific examples provided for open-ended questions (G:M:4:123); labelling of 
emotions/reflection of feelings (J:F:6:110); paraphrasing/summarising (M:F:8:24); mirroring 
(H:F:5:50); and the use of “I” messages49 (B:M:2:195).   
Use of person-centred therapy principles.  Use of person-centred therapy principles 
were demonstrated throughout the transcripts, with negotiators referring to three of the core 
conditions described by Rogers (1957) as necessary for therapeutic growth and personality 
change.  These conditions consist of: ‘congruence’, whereby the therapist is congruent or 
                                                          
49 “I” Messages refer to statements that start with “I” or “we” as opposed to “you”; they are non-directive 
and are typically used to explain the way you are feeling without including any element of blame or 
judgment.  “I” messages can be helpful within crisis/conflict situations as people under extreme stress can 
become suspicious and defensive and as such, statements that are overly directive can become perceived 
as an attack or insult.  An example of the “I” message typical format is: “I feel… when you… because”; 
this allows the subject to understand the negotiator’s perception of the situation, whilst also allowing 
some personalisation of the negotiator (Miller 2005), which ultimately helps to build rapport between the 
subject and negotiator.   
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integrated in the relationship with the client (Rogers 1957); ‘unconditional positive regard 
(Rogers 1957), whereby the therapist “experiences a warm acceptance of every aspect of the 
client’s experience” (Rogers 1959: 209) and ‘empathy’, whereby the therapist experiences an 
empathic understanding of the client’s internal frame of reference (Rogers 1957).  In the context 
of the current research, the terms ‘therapist’ and ‘client’ can be replaced by ‘negotiator’ and 
‘subject’, respectively, to represent a micro/condensed version of the client-therapist 
relationship.  Examples of such a humanistic or client-centred approach to communication were 
displayed by a number of negotiators when describing their style of negotiation or the way they 
engaged with subjects who were in crisis/conflict.   
Examples of congruence or authenticity were displayed by negotiators demonstrating 
genuineness, and being themselves: “I think it’s important to just be yourself” (O:F:9:36); being 
prepared to say sorry: “…prepared to say sorry, honesty with them… there are times when I’ve 
said I got that wrong; you told me not to mention family – I need to mention family… because 
they’re worried.  You’ve then gone mad at me, I clearly got that wrong, I’m sorry” (I:M:6:84); 
and in forms of personal self-disclosure: “So occasionally I’ll… disclose something just to try 
and help things along… to try to really build that empathy with the person as quickly as 
possible” (B:M:2:195).   Unconditional positive regard was demonstrated by some negotiators 
by displaying respect for others; having a non-judgemental attitude: “…don’t judge” (O:F:9:36); 
and expressing warmth for subjects: “I would say yes, you are always trying to build up some 
sort of relationship, and with rapport, you tend to think of… some sort of warmth…” 
(J:F:6:110).  Displaying empathy for subjects during the negotiation process was described by 
negotiators as a means of trying to understand why they were in the situation and attempting to 
form a rapport/relationship with them.  This mechanism appears to be in line with the core 
condition of empathic understanding within person-centred therapy/counselling (Rogers 1957). 
“It’s all about active listening... It’s trying to understand what’s brought them to that 
position where they’re on top of a roof, top of a bridge, whatever, and they’re going to 
jump, and then being empathetic is a big thing… telling them that you understand… I 
think negotiating is such a difficult area of business, that you need to actually do what 
you say, and not be judgemental, and be open minded, actively listen, and you know, try 
to be there, supportive, empathic, also” (L:M:7:54). 
 
 Use of specific negotiation strategies and techniques.  Negotiators described the 
utilisation of a variety of different strategies and techniques during the negotiation process.  
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Twelve strategies50 were identified as the most commonly utilised techniques and these 
strategies are discussed in order of most to least frequently utilised, below51.   
 
 Establish why the subject is in the situation.  Most negotiators [n = 12] described trying 
to establish why the subject was in the situation and trying to get to the ‘root of the problem’ as 
one of the key/initial strategies they used once they had entered into dialogue with the subject.  
This was conceptualised as a stepping stone towards resolving the situation by trying to build a 
picture of what had led the subject to be in the situation and what had precipitated the 
crisis/conflict event.  One negotiator described the process as establishing “what’s actually at 
the real heart of this?” (B:M:2:195).  This strategy allowed negotiators to contextualise the 
situation that the subject was in and guided the way the negotiator approached the dialogue with 
the subject: “You’re… trying to find the buttons to press.  You’re trying to find what’s made 
them where they are, and if you can find that, you can generally help them find a solution” 
(D:M:3:63). 
 
 Honesty.  Most negotiators [n = 12] described the use of honesty as a strategy and never 
lying to the subject/keeping any promises made was seen as core tenet of the negotiation 
process: “Being truthful – always be truthful….” (M:F:8:24).  One exception to this rule was 
identified in relation to Red Centre/kidnap and extortion scenarios, whereby lying may be 
necessary as a means of ensuring that covert negotiations remain covert and that police 
involvement is not identified by the kidnappers: “…they tell us not… to lie… You’re away on it 
for the Red Centre, you can tell them anything you want… That’ll work basically.  So it’s a 
different tactic” (H:F:5:50). 
 
 Identification of hooks (de-escalators) and triggers (aggravators).  Most negotiators [n 
= 11] referred to the use of ‘hooks’, which is a term that is well established within the 
negotiation literature.  ‘Hooks’ are described by Slatkin (2009) as important themes or 
potentially fruitful areas to pursue further with the subject; whereas Strentz (2013) refers to 
them as topics/persons that can be used to extract the subject from the crisis.  Hooks are, 
therefore, essentially either topics that serve to perform a de-escalatory function (i.e. de-
escalators) or individuals who act as conciliatory parties for the subject.  Negotiators described a 
                                                          
50 The frequency of strategy utilisation is represented by the thickness of the dashed oval line surrounding 
each strategy in Figure 8.1.  In this case, the thicker the dashed line, the more frequent the utilisation of 
the strategy.   




variety of different topics/individuals that acted as hooks for subjects including pets, 
hobbies/interests and family members.  It is important to note that hooks were not always 
consistent.  With reference to individual family members, for example, they sometimes acted as 
hooks and were therefore a positive addition to the conversation and on other occasions acted as 
triggers and served to escalate levels of emotion/crisis.  Equally, for subjects who had been 
encountered on previous occasions, the same hooks were not always appropriate/relevant on 
different occasions: “…none of the previous hooks and levers that worked the week before were 
working” (C:F:2:96).  Negotiators therefore needed to identify potential hooks carefully and 
adapted their conversation in line with escalatory or de-escalatory cues received from the 
subject.    
“It was trying to establish what his issue was, what his problem was, who he was, why 
he was there… what the big issues were for him… and you’re looking for the hook, 
then, all the time, aren’t you?  The thing that… he’s actually interested in, the thing 
that’s at the heart of his problem” (F:M:4:111). 
‘Triggers’ constitute the exact opposite of ‘hooks’ and have also been referred to in the 
literature as ‘touch points’ (Slatkin 2010) or ‘hot buttons’ (Strentz 2013).  These tend to relate to 
topics/individuals that negotiators need to avoid: “issues that you should never raise with this 
individual…” (A:M:1:156) as they serve an aggravating/escalatory function by increasing 
emotional/arousal levels in subjects: “…I didn’t really get onto the girlfriend side of things 
because obviously I think that might have antagonised him” (N:F:8:24). 
 
 Matching of negotiator and subject.  Most negotiators [n = 10] described utilising a 
strategy which involved matching the negotiator to the subject in some way.  This included 
trying to match the two parties in relation to personality, gender, culture or background.  Whilst 
idealistic matching may not always be logistically feasible, negotiators described instances 
where they felt it was important to try and match the negotiator and subject in order to achieve a 
successful and peaceful resolution.  One negotiator synopsised the concept of personality 
matching with a commonsensical statement: “…if you get on better with that individual, then 
you end up being the number one” (N:F:8:34).  Other negotiators described instances whereby 
personality clashes between the negotiator and subject had resulted in a lack of rapport being 
developed and therefore required a change in the primary negotiator in order to try and build a 
relationship which would lead to the negotiator being able to exert influence/behavioural change 
and resolve the situation: “There’ve been times when you’re just getting nowhere; the person’s 
getting right fed up with you.  So, let’s give someone else a go.  Swap over” (D:M:3:63). 
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With reference to gender, sometimes it was more effective for the subject and negotiator 
to be same-sex matched and in other cases opposite-sex matched (i.e. some subjects would only 
speak to a male or female negotiator as a result of previous experiences and/or belief systems) 
and ergo it was perceived as an important tool for negotiation teams to have the option to utilise 
a negotiator of either gender, as dictated by the situational characteristics of the incident.   
“…there’s only one thing that I haven’t really mentioned and that’s a gender issue… I 
think you have to have that in your toolkit.  So if you’ve got a woman who hates women, 
why are you then putting a woman negotiator or… if you’ve got a domestic situation 
then the bloke might not want to speak to a woman” (C:F:2:96). 
Identifying some sort of commonality/common ground between the two parties should 
also be considered as a possible tool in terms of matching the negotiator and subject.  One 
negotiator, for example, described how one of his fellow negotiator’s military background acted 
as a facilitator to rapport building when dealing with an individual in crisis and this was 
particularly pertinent when negotiators were dealing with subjects who were dealing with ex-
military personnel who were experiencing PTSD/mental health problems: “…[anonymised 
HCN] had been in the army and there was, there was that sort of bond…” (M:F:8:24). 
 
 Adapt strategy in line with situation/subject.  Negotiators described the importance of 
responsivity, or being able to adapt their strategy in line with the situation and/or subject.  Most 
negotiators [n = 10] described utilising this technique in terms of adapting their style of 
communication, choice of narrative, or use of language52.  This adaptation was seen as a vital 
mechanism for developing rapport and building a relationship with the subject.  One negotiator 
described adapting her negotiation strategy or dialogue in line with the subject’s personality 
profile or behaviour displayed in line with dysfunctional personality traits: “So you’re looking at 
personality… profiles and how to respond to… somebody who’s anti-social, somebody who’s 
despondent, somebody who’s… psychopathic, somebody who’s sociopathic…” (C:F:2:96); and 
another highlighted the role of culture in communication: “…if you were negotiating… with a 
male in… a very strict Muslim country, then you need to know your way around, a little bit 
around the culture….” (B:M:2:195).  Other negotiators highlighted the importance of being able 
to adapt their strategy in line with the subject’s background, with one negotiator identifying that 
authority acted as a successful strategy with an ex-military subject. 
“I’ve known a friend of mine who was negotiating with someone who was ex-services.  
He might come across as likeable, as well, but his eventual resolution was reached 
                                                          
52 For a discussion relating to use of language within HNCn, please refer to Taylor and Thomas’s (2008) 
work on Linguistic Style Matching.  
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because… my colleague was a sergeant, he’d got stripes on and he actually ordered the 
guy to come down.  And that worked, in the end.  So, there are… times when other 
strategies work.  There’s no fixed rule” (D:M:3:63). 
Negotiators also specifically identified that they adapted their use of language and style 
of communication to the subject they were dealing with, highlighting that certain types of 
language are more appropriate for certain subjects/situations.  One negotiator highlighted the 
importance of matching her style of language to each individual subject in order to successfully 
develop a rapport: 
“…I can be on a bridge with a girl of 19, or I can be on a bridge with a male who’s in 
his sixties, from a far greater academic background than I am, you know?  And the 
same style will not work with both of them.  So that rapport building… I wouldn’t go in 
straight away and say, right, lovey, what’s wrong with you?  Because… they’ll look at 
me as if I’m a bit deranged, really” (O:F:9:36). 
 
 Use of concessions and positive police actions53.  Most negotiators [n = 9] described the 
use of concessions as a means of encouraging reciprocity from the subject: “…I’ve done this for 
you.  You do this for me” (H:F:5:50) and encouraging behavioural change.  Negotiators typically 
referred to the use of ‘positive police actions’ as opposed to concessions and these were 
conceptualised as actions that the negotiators/police performed which helped to develop rapport 
between the negotiator and subject and encouraged the subject to ‘give something back’: 
“…you’re giving them something so maybe they’ll give back to you” (M:F:8:24).  This system 
appeared to operate on a “quid pro quo” basis and aligns sympathetically with the 
‘reciprocation’ weapon of influence described by Cialdini (1984).  Examples of such actions 
ranged from assuring subjects that they would be taken in peacefully (i.e. without force) when 
they ‘come down’, to providing ‘deliveries’ (i.e. food, drink, cigarettes, clothing etc.).  One of 
the main concessionary tools identified by negotiators related to the provision of cigarettes, with 
one negotiator (J:F:6:110) going so far as to keep a box of cigarettes in her ‘call out/go bag’, 
despite being a non-smoker.   
The decision to provide such concessions always remained with the incident 
commander, as opposed to the negotiator but this was also utilised to the negotiators advantage, 
as if a request to provide a concession was denied by silver command, the negotiator was 
removed from this decision and this helped not to damage the relationship between the 
negotiator and subject.   
                                                          
53 This strategy shares similarities with the “exchanging” (content) strategy described within Giebels’ 
(2002) Table of Ten.   
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“Do you want a smoke?  Tell you what, let me see what I can do for you and relay that 
back… And then if the answer’s no, then it’s not you and me… It’s not me that said no 
to you… All I am doing is relaying the message… So that kind of preserves… that 
relationship” (G:M:4:123). 
 
 Perseverance/persistence.  Most negotiators (n = 9) described having to utilise a very 
basic strategy which involved perseverance or persistence: “…he didn’t want to engage first of 
all but, being persistent, perhaps sounds a bit pushy, but, persevering, perhaps a better word, 
persevering with him, I eventually got it so he was talking to me” (D:M:3:63).  Negotiators 
reported often turning up to a scene or putting in a call to a subject and receiving little or no 
response, despite their efforts: “I’ve spent two hours talking to a loft hatch…” (I:M:6:84).  They 
also described having to continually talk as a means of simply letting the subject know that they 
were still there or persevering with communication when the subject didn’t want to, or didn’t 
feel ready to engage.  
“…I was negotiating with this woman… for about four hours we were there and she 
barely said a word in the whole four hours – and that was a new one for me… I’d never 
had… that was quite… challenging… so I suppose it’s hard talking to people who don’t 
want to communicate… But… you have to just always focus on the fact that they’re 
listening… they can hear what you’re saying” (B:M:2:195). 
On the other end of the spectrum, negotiators also described receipt of a barrage of 
verbal abuse from some subjects; identifying how perseverance was sometimes necessary as a 
means of allowing subjects to vent their emotions and/or direct their anger/frustration towards 
the negotiator without them reacting in any way:  
“…other people can be so rude and horrendous to you, and tell you that you look like a 
bag of shit, and that you’re fat, and you’re this, and you’re that.  And you just stand 
there, and you just take it all” (O:F:9:36).   
Negotiators had learned not to take the abuse personally and reported that simple perseverance 
often resulted in the subject engaging with them, once their emotional/arousal levels had de-
escalated. 
  
Use of time as a tactic/“playing it long”.  Most negotiators [n = 9] referred to the use of 
‘time as a tactic’, ‘playing it long’ or ‘playing the long game’.  Time is seen as a tool within 
negotiation and tends to play to the advantage of the negotiator as it can allow emotion to de-
escalate: “…you’re really… trying to buy time and let them diffuse the anger really, the 
emotion” (K:M:2:111); allow subjects to sober up if under the influence of drugs or alcohol: 
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“…it’s just about spending a bit of time with them until they’ve got sober” (O:F:9:36); and can 
enhance fatigue within subjects: “…my belief is that people can’t stay angry forever, because 
they’re tired… And they burn themselves out” (G:M:4:123).  All of these aspects can act to 
increase rationality in subjects and therefore make the negotiation process easier.  One 
negotiator stated that “negotiation is not a quick business” (B:M:2:195) and another stated 
“we’ve got all the time in the world” (C:F:2:96).  Two other negotiators referred to incidents 
where they felt they had “bored the subject into submission” (F:M:4:111) and the subject had 
simply “run out of steam” (J:F:6:110).  In addition to this, negotiators felt that time served to 
increase confidence and trust between the two parties and encouraged the development of a 
rapport/relationship between the negotiator and subject. 
“They know the negotiators are coming; they know they’re in for a long haul… so I 
think the confidence and the trust is what we work on during this whole tactic every 
time, but you really can’t be in a rush to get there” (I:M:6:84). 
 
Disassociation from the police.  Most negotiators [n = 8] referred to use of a strategy 
that involved them disassociating themselves from the police when negotiating with hostage-
takers/individuals-in-crisis: “…introduce yourself just by name and then really, never say I’m a 
police officer.  And generally I turn up not in police uniform; I wouldn’t turn up in uniform ever 
actually” (M:F:8:24).  Negotiators were eager to explain that they never lied to subjects in 
relation to being a police officer, but that they would simply ‘downplay’ the association with the 
police, or would only identify themselves as a police officer if they were specifically asked by a 
subject.  This disassociation was explained by negotiators on the basis of the police affiliation 
acting as a barrier to relationship building for some subjects.  This was particularly relevant for 
subjects who had previous experience with the police (i.e. had past convictions or a previous 
arrest record) and as such may not have viewed the police in a positive light: “If they’ve got a 
problem with the police, then you’re trying to disassociate yourself, us, them and the police” 
(K:M:2:111).  This disassociation from the police was exemplified by negotiators typically 
deploying in civilian clothing: “…turning up in uniform is another blockage” (F:M:4:111) and 
by an introductory statement that explained they were ‘with the police’ as opposed to ‘a police 
officer’.   
 
 Generate options available to the subject/encourage problem solving.  Some 
negotiators [n = 7] described how generating options available to the subject: “I’m not going 
away, and there are two choices…” (H:F:5:50) could be used as a strategy and described a 
method whereby the subject would be encouraged to problem-solve/identify potential solutions 
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to their current situation.  This strategy is in line with many models of negotiation that have 
been used to inform negotiation training and practice historically.  In fact, the majority of 
existing models of negotiation include reference to problem solving (i.e. the standard model of 
hostage negotiation (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991); the crisis bargaining model (Donohue et al. 
1991); the S.A.F.E. model (Hammer and Rogan 1997); the S.T.E.P.S. model (Kelln and 
McMurtry 2007)); and according to Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano (2005), regardless of 
which model of negotiation is employed, the final stage of crisis intervention within a 
negotiation context always involves problem-solving of some incarnation.   
Negotiators were clear to specify that they did not try to solve the subject’s problems 
but instead facilitated or encouraged the subject to consider solutions to the problem by 
generating or identifying a number of options that were available to the subject: “…you’ve got 
to try and get to the crux of the problem, and then you’ve got to try and get them to come to 
some conclusion about how they’re going to deal with that problem” (O:F:9:36).  When an 
individual is in crisis, it is difficult for them to see that they have a number of options due to 
‘tunnel vision’ (i.e. they may feel that the only solution to their problem(s) is to kill themselves) 
and one negotiator referred to this option generating process as “…trying to get them to see 
another path” (L:M:7:54). 
 
 Identify commonalities/common ground54.  Another strategy identified by some 
negotiators [n = 6] involved identifying commonalities/common ground/a common alliance 
between the negotiator and subject.  Negotiators described trying to establish or identify 
common areas of interest/hobbies etc. that could be used to generate conversation between the 
two parties: “…trying to find that little thing that’s going to give you some kind of rapport… 
with somebody who you otherwise might have nothing… in common with at all” (F:M:4:111); 
“…and it tends to be on really sort of innocuous stuff like… I love walking, or I’ve got dogs… 
those sorts of things… I will use those, relentlessly just to try to build up that… common 
ground” (J:F:6:110).  This ‘common denominator’ was conceptualised as a tool which helped 
negotiators to develop a rapport with the subject and eventually to exert influence and change 
the subject’s behaviour in a positive manner.  
“…it’s constantly searching for… that common thread between the two of you, the place 
where you might… different as anything, one might be… you can be different genders, 
different ages, different life scenarios, different skills, different health, but there is 
                                                          
54 This strategy shares similarities with the “being equal” (relational) strategy described within Giebels’ 
(2002) Table of Ten.   
194 
 
usually a place where you can… hook and bond with the person, and I think that’s 
important… to get to influence” (B:M:2:195). 
 
Encourage dialogue/allow subjects to vent.  The last strategy identified was described 
by some negotiators [n = 5] as simply encouraging subjects to communicate or engage in 
dialogue:  
“…I really just like to try and get people talking, and find something to talk about, even 
if it doesn’t seem directly related… to almost buy the time to start letting people blow 
off that head of steam, or just settle down enough to start reconsidering” (J:F:6:110).   
This communication was often seen as a means of the subject providing context to their crisis 
situation or allowing them to verbalise their emotions or ‘vent/ventilate55’: “…and when the 
venting comes out, let him vent” (G:M:4:111).  This venting is often seen as a method to diffuse 
emotion or de-escalate emotion/arousal levels which then allows the negotiator to engage in 
more rational/problem-solving conversations with the subject.  One negotiator described how 
she encouraged subjects to “talk as much as possible and offload it all” (O:F:9:36) and another 
described how she tried to keep a subject talking “about absolutely anything” (N:F:8:34) as a 
means of encouraging dialogue and de-escalating the subject’s emotion.    
 
Incident resolution.  The third secondary category within Stage 2 of the model relates 
to the successful resolution of the hostage/crisis incident.  The aim of negotiation is to reduce 
injury or minimise potential loss of life and in order to achieve this, negotiators have to 
successfully and positively influence the way a subject is behaving (i.e. facilitate behavioural 
change).  Negotiators described this part of the negotiation process as involving three elements: 
‘Use of enhanced persuasion’, ‘Positive facilitation of subject behavioural change’ and ‘Liaison 
with operational teams and subject to orchestrate surrender ritual/exit plan’.   
 
Use of enhanced persuasion.  Negotiators referred to the successful resolution of 
incidents as involving a form of ‘enhanced persuasion’ whereby they ‘persuaded’, ‘convinced’ 
or ‘influenced’ subjects to change their behaviour in a positive manner: “…he was… tiring and 
more amenable to… discussion and I persuaded him to turn around, go back and give himself 
up to the officers, which he did” (D:M:3:63); “…I think that is, for me, it seems to be my bread 
and butter… just sort of persuading people…” (F:M:4:123); “…even though you go to a house 
                                                          
55 Ventilating is a means that allows and promotes the subject giving voice to his/her grievances, and 
emotions.  It is a communication technique that allows the subject to discharge and de-escalate emotional 
tension and moves the subject toward greater emotional control and a frame of mind where problem 
solving is possible (Slatkin 2010). 
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and maybe you’re not getting in because they’ve barred their way or you want to contain it with 
firearms, you’re still calling and asking them, look… Trying to convince them to come 
outside…” (N:F:8:34).   
The use of persuasion within HCNn is well-established, with negotiators being trained 
to utilise a number of techniques to influence subject behaviour (i.e. Cialdini’s (1984; 2001) 
weapons of influence/principles of persuasion56).  Some of the strategies described above tap 
into these principles and allow the negotiator to persuade the subject to positively change their 
behaviour (i.e. the use of positive police actions aligns with the “reciprocity” principle and the 
use of honesty aligns with the “commitment and consistency” principle).  Similarities can also 
be drawn between some of the aforementioned strategies and the concept of “influence tactics” 
developed by Giebels (2002), and further discussed by Giebels and Noelanders (2004) and 
Giebels and Taylor (2010).     
    
 Positive facilitation of subject behavioural change. 
“And you won’t always gain rapport… but ideally that’s what you’re working towards.  
But in any case, you’re then trying to move to a point where you can influence the 
behaviour” (K:M:2:111). 
Negotiators described a process whereby they would utilise the aforementioned techniques (i.e. 
use of active listening principles and techniques, use of person-centred therapy principles) and 
the underpinning mechanism of rapport building/development of the pseudo-therapeutic alliance 
(discussed below) to get to a point whereby they could exert influence over the subject and 
facilitate behavioural change in a positive manner: “…you are always trying to build up some 
sort of relationship, and with rapport, you tend to think of… some sort of warmth… so you build 
up trust, and you can influence the behaviour…” (J:F:6:110).  This was described as a process 
of getting the subject to do what the negotiator wanted them to do (i.e. to modulate their 
behaviour in a manner which reduced risk of harm to the subject): “…the strategy you will take 
is always going to be the same: It’s build their confidence, influence their views and get them to 
do what you want them to do” (D:M:3:63).  This category bears substantial resemblance to the 
behavioural influence stage of the BISM developed by the FBI (Vecchi, Van Hasselt and 
Romano 2005) and demonstrates the successful incorporation of the BISM within UK HCN 
training.   
 
                                                          
56 Cialdini’s (1984) weapons of influence consist of reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social 
proof, liking, authority and scarcity. 
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Liaison with operational teams and subject to orchestrate surrender ritual/exit plan.  
Once negotiators had successfully de-escalated the situation and managed to positively 
influence the subject’s behaviour to a point whereby the subject had agreed to come out of the 
situation that they were in (i.e. to come out of a barricaded building, end a siege or come down 
from the edge of a tall building or bridge), they emphasised that the process still required further 
steps in order to ensure that the incident was fully and successfully resolved.  Negotiators 
described a collaborative system whereby they needed to discuss and mutually agree a surrender 
ritual57 or exit plan58 with the subject and explained the importance of this step to ensure that 
any potential risk (to the subject or police personnel) was managed right up to the point where 
the subject is either in police custody, or safely removed from the crisis situation.  They also 
highlighted the importance of allowing the subject to save face as a key element within the 
successful resolution of the incident, as discussed below.  This phase of the model aligns 
sympathetically with the “surrender” phase in Madrigal, Bowman and McClain’s (2009) Four-
Phase Model of Hostage Negotiation.       
 
 Discuss and mutually agree surrender ritual / exit plan with subject.  Negotiators 
described a collaborative arrangement which involved discussing and agreeing upon a surrender 
ritual (if the situation involved hostages or victims) or an exit plan (if the situation involved an 
individual in crisis).  This process often involved logistical aspects, such as ensuring that 
subjects followed the appropriate steps specified by the police in order to minimise potential 
risk to hostages/victims or police personnel: “…looking at putting in place appropriate plans to 
deal with certain situations… So, for example, in a siege, how we might deal with a hostage 
being released safely” (E:M:3:114), or simply planning how an individual in crisis was going to 
get from one position to another without causing injury/harm to themselves: “…eventually he 
agreed to come down… we had to negotiate how he was going to get down… and… we used a 
fire service cherry picker, and went up and… and got him” (F:M:4:111).  Negotiators described 
having to liaise with operational teams (i.e. firearms) and incident commanders in order to 
ensure that the surrender ritual/exit plan was executed safely and appropriately and were 
cognisant that the risk had never truly been completely reduced until the exit plan/surrender 
ritual had been successfully executed.   
“We have a few of those as well, where we’ve got somebody that we think’s got… a gun 
in the house, and we talk them out, you know, I want you to come out.  The surrender 
                                                          
57 In this context, a surrender ritual refers to the process taken by a subject in order to give themselves up 
to police custody and come out of a hostage situation (or a situation involving victims). 
58 In this context, an exit plan refers to the process taken by a subject (i.e. individual in crisis) in order to 
successfully and safely exit a crisis situation. 
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plan basically… And that’s all sorted out beforehand… So we say to the bronze 
commander on the ground… what’s your surrender plan?  And they’ll say to us… well, 
we’ll do the, want you to come out the front door… Arms in front of you, like a blind 
man.  Not carrying anything.  No baggy clothing, and… I’ll talk you right out…” 
(H:F:5:50).  
 
 Allow subject to save face.  Orchestration of a successful surrender ritual/exit plan often 
involved negotiators enabling/allowing subjects to save face.  The concept of ‘face-saving’ or 
‘face-honouring’ is one which is well established within the negotiation literature and is 
included as a core tenet within many models of negotiation (Hammer and Rogan 1997, Mullins 
2002 and Taylor 2002).  The term ‘face’ refers to the projected self-image of the subject and the 
S.A.F.E. model of negotiation, for example, suggests that negotiators need to validate the face 
needs of a subject in order to promote face-honouring and de-escalation of the situation 
(Hammer and Rogan 1997).  Negotiators described a range of techniques that they utilised as a 
means of allowing subjects to save face or protect their reputation, which often involved 
subjects being allowed to peacefully surrender themselves:  
“Sometimes it’ll just be a face-saving thing, so I might think well actually, he’s ready to 
surrender but you don’t want to lose face… if I agree to let him have a fag or if I agree 
that he isn’t going to be taken to the ground or… things like that, then he’ll come on 
board” (K:M:2:111).   
For most subjects, saving face involved allowing them to maintain some sort of dignity or 
reduce the potential embarrassment that may have been caused by the situation: “…sometimes 
it’s just literally got to be… well I might hate your guts, but that is a reasonable solution out of 
here… so you’re offering them the least embarrassing option out… keep your pride and all the 
rest of it” (J:F:6:110). 
 
Stage 2 Underpinning Mechanism: Rapport Building/Development of the Pseudo-
Therapeutic Alliance.  Rapport building or the development of a relationship between the 
subject and negotiator was described as a vital component within the negotiation process.  This 
concept shares similarities with the notion of the therapeutic alliance within the 
counselling/psychotherapeutic literature and the author perceives the negotiator-subject 
relationship to exist on a similar, but micro-level scale to that of the therapist-client relationship 
within therapeutic contexts.  Negotiators have far less time to develop this alliance and have to 
establish such a relationship under intensely pressurised conditions; however, the data reveals 
that negotiators utilise the same skills/underpinning mechanisms as counsellors/therapists when 
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developing a therapeutic alliance within a therapeutic context.  Negotiators described two core 
sub-mechanisms that they utilised to build rapport and develop this pseudo-therapeutic alliance: 
‘Express/demonstrate empathy’ and ‘Establish trust between negotiator and subject’.  These 
components are conceptualised as running in parallel with the processes described in Stage 2 of 
the procedural model and are represented by downward-facing vertical arrows in Figure 8.1.   
   
 Express/demonstrate empathy.  Most negotiators [n = 10] described expressing (or at 
least demonstrating) empathy for the subject when negotiating with them: “…being empathic is 
a big thing… telling them that you understand…” (I:M:6:110).  Expression of empathy was 
perceived by negotiators as a vital component within the negotiation process and it was 
described as a pre-cursor to developing rapport with the subject: “…decisions are based upon 
the principles of being totally open and honest, trying to understand… what the individual’s 
going through, or empathise with their situation… It’s a lot about that empathy and rapport 
building…” (A:M:1:156).  The expression of empathy was also perceived as necessary to help 
the negotiator build trust and be viewed by the subject as genuine and trustworthy: “…it’s part 
of your… trust building, because it’s showing that you are listening to them, and you’re 
understanding what’s going on with them” (J:F:6:110).  One negotiator referred to the process 
of demonstrating empathy as a means of developing/building a “stairway of trust” (D:M:3:63) 
between the negotiator and subject and another compared it to “opening an instant can of 
friendship” (G:M:4:123).  
It is worth noting that two negotiators indicated that they found it difficult to empathise 
with certain subjects due to the context of the crisis situation.  Negotiators referred to having to 
deal with “some quite unsympathetic characters” (F:M:4:111), which included individuals who 
may have committed quite emotive/serious crimes or individuals who they felt were wasting 
police time (and had no intention of harming themselves).   
“…it’s also a challenge… in getting the enthusiasm to do it because what you want to 
do is grab them by the scruff of the neck and, and tell them not to be so stupid… You 
can’t do that.  That’s not effective.  You’ve got to bite your tongue and you’ve got to 
play the game” (D:M:3:63).    
In these instances, some negotiators described an ability to demonstrate (or feign) empathy as 
opposed to a genuine/true expression of empathy and this was portrayed as another part of their 
negotiator repertoire:  
“I will be very nice to some people, who are not necessarily… deserving of it… and if 
that’s just being cynical and being a means to an end, then possibly it is… but I’m not 
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going to get anywhere… not achieving any degree of sympathy, or empathy… with the 
individual” (F:M:4:111). 
 
 Establish trust between the negotiator and subject. 
“…negotiation is entirely based on emotions.  It’s about being able to… build up 
enough of a rapport to be able to… exert some influence, which in turn would change 
behaviour… and the only way that you can do that is by building a trusting relationship 
between the two parties” (E:M:3:114). 
The establishment of trust between the negotiator and subject was described by most negotiators 
[n = 12] as an important and necessary pre-cursor to the development of a rapport and ergo the 
ability to influence or change the subject’s behaviour: “…you’re trying to just build on that 
rapport… trying to build trust… and then you’re looking at basically using some influence 
really…” (K:M:2:111).  The building of trust between the two parties was not only perceived as 
vital for the successful resolution of the situation they were currently negotiating, but was also 
considered to be important for potential future scenarios involving the same subject, as if trust 
had not been established (or had been broken in some way) then the subject would be unlikely 
to engage with the negotiator(s) again in the future or see them as a credible entity.   
 
Stage 3: Post-Incident Protocol 
The third and final stage of the model relates to the procedures carried out by 
negotiators and wider police personnel once the crisis/hostage incident had been successfully 
resolved and any threat posed to the subject/other parties had been neutralised.  This category 
includes a single secondary category in the form of ‘Operational debriefing procedures’ and 
refers to the debriefing processes that negotiators take part in post-incident.   
 
 Operational Debriefing Procedures.  The final component within stage three of the 
model refers to the debriefing process which follows resolution of the incident.  This is a 
process that is described by negotiators as important regardless of whether the incident has been 
resolved successfully (i.e. no injuries/fatalities) or not.  To debrief is “to officially question 
(someone) about a job that has been done or about an experience” (Debrief n.d.) and the College 
of Policing (2013) states that the purpose of debriefing is to “identify good practice and areas 
for improvement, which could include organisational learning”.  Within the context of HCNn, 
negotiators described debriefing as being an important part of the process and one which should 
be consistently and thoroughly applied to all incidents.  Negotiators also described debriefing as 
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serving a continuing professional development (CPD) purpose, whereby debriefing provided a 
forum for negotiators to learn from mistakes or identify aspects of good practice. 
 
 Debriefing as an important component of negotiation.  The College of Policing (2013) 
Briefing and Debriefing Policy makes recommendations in terms of how police personnel 
should be debriefed.  Most negotiators referred to having experienced some form of debriefing 
as a result of their role, ranging from “hot debriefs” (I:M:6:84) that occurred on scene, once the 
incident had been resolved, to more extended operational debriefs which often occurred as a 
result of a negative outcome.  The importance of debriefing was also highlighted by negotiators 
describing a lack of consistent or adequate debriefing.  Some described incidents whereby 
debriefing had either not been carried out appropriately at the time of the incident, or, as in the 
case of the excerpt below, had not involved all necessary parties, resulting in some important 
information not being shared:  
“I think sometimes what we’re not very good at doing, and you won’t be surprised by 
me saying this, is that sometimes we’ll go from job to job to job.  We will always have a 
debrief… of the incident.  Or we should have a debrief of the incident.  It’s rare that we 
don’t, although it’s dependent on certain partners.  But sometimes that debrief doesn’t 
quite pick out all the issues, and I remember, we had a gentleman a few years ago, who 
became a negotiator, and who was extremely unlucky, because I think it was the first 
two incidents that he went to, each ended up in a death, and it was obvious he hadn’t 
been properly debriefed... and that’s something we’re not very good at doing… So just 
a small example of that was that… we dealt with this long siege back in 2004… We had 
a media debrief, and we had a debrief, so that was… quite well done, but we never 
actually debriefed with any of the Firearms officers.  They then subsequently came to 
one of our further debriefs, and they were talking to us about some of the things that 
they found in this gentleman’s house, such as the fact that there was a shotgun 
cartridge strategically placed on each step of the staircase.  That was an amazingly 
important thing for us, as negotiators, to know about so sometimes we’re a bit rubbish 
at debriefing” (A:M:1:156).  
 
 Debriefing as a means of CPD/therapeutic process/welfare check.  For some 
negotiators, the debrief process was conceptualised as a means of CPD, whereby the discussion 
held within the debrief exercise once the incident had been resolved allowed negotiators to 
reflect upon their (and other negotiators’) performances during the incident, to identify mistakes 
made/lessons learned and to highlight areas of good practice: 
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 “…whereas the people who just dealt with that situation, if they’ve got a supervisor, if 
there’s anything about them, he will regroup everybody, or she’ll regroup everybody 
and they’ll talk through the process.  One is a debriefing, for learning.  And the other 
one, just to check that everybody’s behaving as they normally do” (O:F:9:36).   
Debriefing was also conceptualised by a couple of senior negotiators (i.e. HNCs) as a 
therapeutic forum for negotiators to discuss any issues that may have been raised or for HNCs 
to check that their team members are functioning appropriately and are safe to either go home or 
continue with their current duties/shift:  
“…the closedown process for me then, which is about extracting my team, bringing 
them back here, debriefing them… making sure that they’re in a fit state to drive home, 
because their adrenalin… Will have sapped a lot of energy… so in terms of… the 
welfare stuff, a lot of that was taken care of by where we set it up, but there was still 
that debriefing and learning and they had concerns that we needed to unpick” 
(G:M:4:123). 
 
Model Underpinning Mechanisms 
In addition to the three stages outlined above, two categories were identified as core 
underpinning mechanisms for the UK negotiation process.  These categories consisted of the 
completion of formal record keeping and the use of defensible decision-making and 
accountability throughout the entire negotiation process.  These underpinning mechanisms are 
described below and are represented by horizontal arrows at the top and bottom of the model 
depicted in Figure 8.1.   
 
Underpinning mechanism 1: Formal record keeping [written/electronic/audio].  
Negotiators consistently referred to the need for and importance of formal record keeping 
throughout the interviews: “…some of the external scrutiny… in terms of the… recording what 
we do, showing an audit trail and what we’ve done and why we’ve done it, that’s changed” 
(K:M2:111).  This process has been conceptualised as an underpinning mechanism throughout 
the negotiation process model as it is a theme that emerged at all stages of the model.  
Negotiators described utilising a variety of different methods of record keeping, including the 
use of written/electronic notes/records/deployment logs: “…when you’ve been deployed on a 
job you do a deployment form” (C:F:2:96) and position papers:  
“…policy logs; so we’ll keep a record, particularly as a coordinator, of decisions that 
have been made, but also… are you aware of position papers? Position papers are 
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effectively at a point in time; a negotiator coordinator would draw up a position paper 
which says, at this time this is what’s happening…” (E:M:3:114). 
Probably most saliently, it was also reported as common practice for negotiators to record the 
negotiation using digital Dictaphones: “We all have digital recorders… and our routine, now 
pretty much, is just to record everything” (F:M:4:111) and this process was perceived as a 
means of record keeping and accountability59.  These findings are in line with the guidance 
provided by the National Decision Model which specifies that there is a requirement for 
decision-making around the resolution of an incident to be recorded (College of Policing 2014b) 
and echo the suggestions of McMains and Mullins (2014: 423) in the USA who state that 
“negotiations should be taped and copies should be made of the tapes”.     
 
Underpinning mechanism 2: Defensible decision-making and accountability.  Due 
to the nature of the role and the high-risk scenarios that they were typically involved with, 
negotiators felt that their actions were always open to scrutiny and that they needed to be able to 
justify their actions/be accountable at all times.  They were cognisant that their actions could be 
subject to scrutiny at coroner’s court or within IPCC60 procedures if the outcome of a 
negotiation was negative:  
“…because if I go to my 84th incident tomorrow, and someone falls off that building, 
and they die, and I’m held liable for what I said, I need to go through those 83 
incidents, and depict my experiences as a negotiator, and that is absolutely crucial” 
(A:M:1:156).   
As a result of this, negotiators described many of their actions as having an underpinning ethos 
of defensible decision-making: 
 “…so I think you do worry about negative consequences and, oh my God, there might 
be an inquest later and, have I done everything that I should have done?  Have I got 
records that I can take and people can read and they can understand?  Will I be able to 
justify the decisions that I make?” (C:F:2:96).   
This concept mirrors that of the National Decision Model utilised by UK police forces which 
specifies that “decision-makers are accountable for their decisions and must be prepared to 
provide a rationale for what they did and why” (College of Policing 2014b). 
                                                          
59 The recording of the dialogue/conversation held between the negotiator and subject plays a number of 
roles within the negotiation process.  It provides an audit trail to verify what was said between the 
negotiator and subject throughout the negotiation process; it enhances negotiator accountability and 
defensible decision making by providing a concrete record of the negotiator’s comments and actions (to 
some extent) and it can be used as evidence within coroner’s court or legal proceedings that may follow 
hostage or crisis incidents (particular in instances where the outcome is negative) to justify the actions 
taken/verbatim used by negotiators. 




The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model has been used to outline the procedure that is followed 
when resolving hostage and/or crisis incidents in the UK.  It contains three stages that are 
normally progressed through sequentially and identifies the core tasks that need to be completed 
by negotiators throughout the deployment process.  The model identifies the actions performed 
by negotiators and enables a picture of successful HCN deployment to be formulated based on 
the experiences of operationally active HCNs.  These findings are helpful as they demonstrate 
one of the first attempts to validate the actions taken and procedures followed by negotiators 
from initial deployment all the way through to debriefing after the incident has been resolved.  
This model can be used to inform the training and CPD of both new and existing HCNs and, as 
such, has a bearing on the practice/discipline of UK HCNn.  The next chapter outlines the 
hostage and crisis negotiator journey model which provides insight into the processes involved 






Chapter 9: Qualitative Phase Results Chapter 1: 
The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator 
Experience Model 
The current chapter synopsises the UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience 
Model, providing an insight into what it is like to be a HCN in the UK and the types of 
experiences HCNs have whilst being part of a police HCN cadre. 
 
The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model 
The experiences of UK police HCNs are described below, with reference to a 
theoretical model that has been derived from the interview data.  This model consists of 3 
primary, 7 secondary and 23 tertiary categories, which are listed in Table 9.1 and are discussed 
sequentially below.    
 
Negotiation positives.  The first primary category that emerged from the data relates to 
the positive aspects associated with the role of negotiation, which were divided into two 
secondary categories: ‘The negotiator family’ and ‘Negotiation as personally and professionally 
rewarding’.  Each secondary category was further divided into smaller tertiary categories as 
outlined below.   
 
The negotiator family.  The language used to describe negotiator experiences suggests 
that the negotiator cadre acts or operates as a family, with negotiators feeling heavily supported 
by other team members.  The cadre is portrayed as a small, closely knit group that has a strong 
team ethos.  Negotiation was conceptualised throughout the interviews as a team discipline that 
is reliant on effective teamwork in order to be successful.  Three tertiary subcategories emerged 





Table 9.1.  Table Synopsising the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Categories within the UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model  
 
Primary Categories Secondary Categories Tertiary Categories 
Negotiation positives The negotiator family Cadre as supportive 
  Camaraderie and comradeship 
  Negotiation as a team discipline 
 Negotiation as personally and professionally rewarding Negotiation as challenging 
  Opportunity for public interface and interaction 
  Negotiation as emotionally rewarding 
  Feeling good from helping others 
Negotiation negatives Operational issues Operational rank/role conflict 
  Lack of operational discipline 
  Competing tactical orientations 
  Negotiating solo 
 Organisational issues Dual role conflict  
  Lack of awareness and support within the force 
  Lack of standardisation and professionalisation of the discipline 
  Negotiation as a Cinderella role 
 Personal sacrifices Disruption to family life 
  Impact on personal/social life 
Negotiation ambivalences Negotiator stress/eustress Negotiation as non-stressful 
  Negotiator eustress 
  Negotiation as a “different type of stress” 
 The evolution of UK negotiation as an entity Changes in deployment frequency and nature 
  Impact of Taser on negotiation deployment 
  Broader use of communication mediums within negotiation 
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The cadre as supportive.  Most negotiators [n = 9]61 described feeling supported by 
other negotiators and portrayed an environment whereby negotiators looked out for each other 
and “watch each other’s back” (G:M:4:123)62.  This support was particularly apparent when 
egotiators experienced a negative outcome and was viewed as a vital coping mechanism that 
enabled negotiators to deal with the trauma associated with fatalities.  One negotiator 
specifically described the support provided by the cadre when he had not successfully resolved 
an incident that had resulted in the death of a subject: “…when we’ve had people die… people 
who’ve jumped, or committed suicide, or hung themselves… we support each other and we kick 
in and everyone checks everyone’s ok…” (B:M:2:195). 
  
Camaraderie and comradeship.  Camaraderie is defined as a form of “mutual trust and 
friendship among people who spend a lot of time together” (Camaraderie n.d.).  This type of 
relationship was described by most negotiators [n = 9] and it was highlighted as a positive and 
important component within the discipline.   
“…we’re quite a close bunch… we sort of work all over the place and in different 
departments… but we’re forever sort of in touch with each other by email and text 
message… we work in groups of three at the moment… so when you have your week on 
call… you work with the same team… and you tend to link in with those quite closely… 
we know each other quite well… we’re all pretty much friends, really” (F:M:4:111). 
One negotiator described how the team ethos served to supersede the rank structure of the police 
(i.e. a metaphorical removal of epaulettes) and enabled all team members to be viewed on an 
equal footing (something that appears to be unique compared to the rest of the police 
organisation). 
“…it’s a very close team… and the guy who runs us… he’s a… very shrewd, but 
inclusive individual… and the decisions and the direction of the craft, is, very much… 
we all have an equal say.  Rank doesn’t exist… we’re all first names.  There’s a… chief 
super sitting in there… couple of superintendents, chief inspectors, inspectors and 
we’re all on first name terms and we will all react to support whoever... And that’s 
quite unique within this organisation” (G:M:4:123).  
 
Negotiation as a team discipline.  Negotiation was portrayed as something that would 
not function without the support of individual team members.  The role and importance of the 
                                                          
61 Most negotiators = theme/category corroborated by 8 or more negotiators; the exact number of 
interviewees is represented in square brackets after the statement (i.e. [n = 9]). 
62 Each interviewee is depicted by an alphanumerical code which represents their interview letter, gender, 
force number and length of service in months as a negotiator (i.e. A:M:1:156 refers to Interview A; Male 
HCN; Force Number 1; and 156 Months of Service as a HCN). 
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team and teamwork was consistently referred to throughout the transcripts by most negotiators 
[n = 9] and was conceptualised as a positive component.   
“They’re [my colleagues] brilliant… one of the first things they say on your national 
course is this… ‘have we got any individuals here?’  If we’ve got any individuals, you 
might as well get up and leave, because it’s not about you; it’s about the team thing” 
(C:F:2:96). 
Team members played a number of roles within the negotiation process that included supporting 
the primary negotiator in terms of ensuring his/her welfare: “You know… making sure people 
have got drinks, people have got something to eat, people are warm enough; do they need a 
break?” (C:F:2:96).  It often also involved providing suggestions or advice in terms of how the 
primary negotiator might approach the next part of the negotiation.  Some negotiators [n = 4]63 
described a form of reflective working whereby they would often bounce ideas off each other in 
order to direct the negotiation effectively: 
“…I think then it’s quite useful, because you’ve got the team round you, so you come off 
the phone, and you’ve had someone who’s… been making a note of what’s been said, 
right, where are we?  And you have that team discussion… which helps deal with your 
own internalised [feelings]… because you’ve got that help” (J:F:6:110). 
 
Negotiation as personally and professionally rewarding.  The perceived rewards cited 
by negotiators could be clearly categorised into four sub-categories described below:  
 
Negotiation as challenging.  Negotiation was conceptualised by some negotiators [n = 
5] as being a rewarding role on the basis of providing individuals with some form of intellectual 
challenge.  One negotiator described a “constant battle of wits” (G:M:4:123) that was personally 
rewarding, whereas another referred to the enjoyment obtained from the challenge of trying to 
successfully negotiate a positive outcome:   
“…I genuinely do care about the outcome, and… I want the best outcome for this 
individual, and some of them are pretty unsympathetic characters to be fair, and trying 
to find that little thing that’s going to give you some kind of rapport… with somebody 
who you otherwise might have nothing… in common with at all… the challenge I 
actually enjoy is… finding that thing that you can both talk about…” (F:M:4:111). 
 
                                                          
63 Some negotiators = theme/category corroborated by 2 – 7 negotiators; the exact number of interviewees 
is represented in square brackets after the statement (i.e. [n = 5]). 
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Opportunity for public interface and interaction.  For negotiators [n = 6] who found 
themselves with less public interaction (as a result of either promotion to more managerial 
positions, or roles with less operational policing activity), negotiation was perceived as a 
rewarding activity that provided them with an opportunity to interact with the public.  The role, 
for example, was described by one senior-ranking officer as an opportunity for him to be “down 
the coalface” (A:M:1:156) and get involved with “hands on policing”.  
“...as a PC you will go to people in lots of different crises...  I don’t get to those jobs.  
So I don’t get to practise those skills in a day-to-day environment because the rank and 
the role change means that it’s… unless I fall across it, it’s probably not appropriate… 
So what it personally gives me is the reminder of how to speak to people, how not to 
speak to people and just that snapshot into what is reality for their life” (I:M:6:84). 
 
Negotiation as emotionally rewarding.  Most negotiators [n = 8] reported experiencing 
a variety of positive emotions, often referring to the excitement and thrill experienced when 
negotiating.  One negotiator described the “massive high” and “great feeling” he experienced 
(A:M:1:156); whereas others described the “adrenalin rush” (J:F:6:110) or “elation” (O:F:9:36; 
H:F:5:50) felt when an incident had been successfully resolved.  The findings indicate that there 
is an element of thrill seeking involved that is likely to be due to the high stake/risk scenarios to 
which negotiators are often deployed.  The input of a negotiator may be pivotal in whether a 
person lives or dies, and as such is likely to evoke a number of emotions.  
“…it was quite exciting to feel that you’re part of something that big… very exciting to 
feel that you’re pivotal in something that big… And… if you asked us all to be totally 
honest, there is that element of thrill. And buzz.  And adrenalin rush that comes with 
it…” (G:M:4:123). 
One negotiator even described the emotions experienced as unique to the discipline, further 
exemplifying the emotional rewards associated with negotiation.   
“…when you’re a police officer, and you’re arresting people, and you’re putting them 
in court, it’s a nice feeling and you think, great, I’ve done a good job today.  But when 
you actually can say, genuinely you’ve saved somebody’s life, it’s like a whole new 
level, so it’s a buzz that you can’t get in any other area of business I don’t think… You 
get a fantastic buzz from it, it’s so unique, that there’s nothing that can compare to it, 
nothing, in the police service” (L:M:7:54). 
 
Feeling good from helping others.  Whilst it is clear that negotiators receive some form 
of short-term positive reinforcement that appears to have a mainly self-serving function, it was 
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also apparent that they obtained positive rewards as a result of helping others whilst performing 
this role.: “I always get a tremendous sense of achievement… that I’ve really made a difference 
to that person at that moment in time” (B:M:2:195).  The main intention was to help people in 
crisis/conflict and to resolve hostage/crisis situations, however, in doing so, negotiators also 
experienced personal reward in the form of positive emotions.  This phenomenon is well 
established within the counselling literature and is described as the “helpers high” (Luks 1988).  
Negotiating may, therefore, serve to provide some form of longer term positive impact on 
negotiators’ self-esteem, egos and identities.  Most negotiators [n = 10] described experiencing 
some form of positive emotion as a result of helping individuals-in-crisis and this was perceived 
by some as a reason/motivating factor for performing the role.  “…there have been times when 
I’ve come away and thought, I think I have saved someone’s life today… and that is such a 
wonderful feeling…” (J:F:6:110).   
 
Negotiation negatives.  The second primary category that emerged related to the 
negative components associated with negotiation, which were categorised into three secondary 
categories: ‘Operational issues’, ‘Organisational issues’ and ‘Personal Sacrifices’.  Each 
secondary category was further subdivided into smaller tertiary subcategories that are described 
below.  These negatives often served to counteract the positives and lend themselves to a 
number of recommendations in terms of improving the discipline of HCNn within the UK64.   
  
Operational issues.  Operational issues refer to the difficulties experienced while 
negotiating at a scene, which were categorised into four tertiary categories: ‘Operational 
rank/role conflict’, ‘Negotiating solo’, ‘Lack of operational discipline’ and ‘Competing tactical 
orientations’. 
 
Operational rank/role conflict.  Negotiators have to work closely with tactical teams 
and the commanders on the ground to successfully resolve incidents.  Negotiators are 
responsible for establishing and maintaining contact with the subject with the intention of de-
escalating the subject’s emotional state and resolving the crisis situation, whereas the tactical 
teams are responsible for ensuring the negotiators’ safety and implementing a tactical response 
if required.  The on-scene commander is responsible for making the decisions that oversee the 
whole police operation.  This includes establishing perimeters and traffic control, directing the 
activity of the negotiators, deploying tactical teams and liaising with emergency services (Miller 
2015). 
                                                          
64 See Chapter 11 (11.5.2.1). 
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Various forms of operational rank/role conflict were reported by some negotiators [n = 
7].  Although the basic premise is that “negotiators negotiate and commanders command” 
(A:M:1:156; D:M:3:63), conflict often arose as a result of dual roles and a lack of clear and 
enforceable boundaries in relation to these roles.   
“…as soon as I rock up, someone says, thank God you’re here boss and what do I do?  
Well hold on, I’m not the ground commander, I’m the negotiator; I work for you in 
these circumstances… And there is always, and I guess that’s something to do with the 
fact that we only negotiate at rank… kind of, that tension… there’s only one occasion 
really, that I’ve had to intervene, to overturn the ground commander’s actions okay?... 
So sometimes it gets… a bit messy round the edges… But there is this… role, rank 
issue” (G:M:4:123).   
The majority of conflicts discussed appeared to have arisen as a result of rank/role issues.  As 
UK HCNs “negotiate at rank” (i.e. have to be of at least Sergeant/Inspector rank), this means 
that on many occasions, the silver commander at the scene will actually be of a lower rank than 
the negotiator.  As a result of the chain of command hierarchy that is strictly observed within 
the police service, this often means that commanders will expect negotiators (of higher rank 
than themselves) to make command decisions, thereby resulting in conflict.  This particular 
form of conflict was reported by some negotiators [n = 4] within the sample (who tended to be 
higher ranking officers).   
“I’m an inspector.  I could turn up at an incident being run by a sergeant, and he or she 
would then look to me to then command the incident.  And negotiators negotiate; 
commanders command.  You’ve probably heard that several times…  and it’s just not 
helpful, so the first thing I do now is, if I am on duty, is actually put my civvy jacket on 
and go down… with badges of rank covered up.  Very often, people will know who I am 
anyway, but it… somehow takes the edge off the situation” (D:M:3:63). 
This rank/role conflict appears to be double sided, however, as other negotiators [n = 3] 
described conflict experienced as a result of senior ranking officers taking on command roles 
when they should not (i.e. high ranking officers making command decisions when they are there 
in a negotiator/non-command role/capacity):  
“Who’s silver command? Sergeant so and so.  Right.  So he or she is in command.  
We’ve got some negotiators in this force who just don’t get that… They make command 
decisions… It’s just down to you as an individual really... I make it quite clear and 
always have done.  That I’m there to negotiate” (B:M:2:195). 
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Lack of operational discipline.  Another operational difficulty described by most 
negotiators [n = 11] relates to a lack of discipline, in terms of colleagues not behaving 
appropriately on scene.  Typically, negotiators described two forms of disciplinary issues.  
Firstly, some [n = 5] described incidents whereby police officers either behaved 
unprofessionally by saying or doing things that were not appropriate, or wanted to get involved 
with the negotiation (despite the fact that trained negotiators were in attendance at the scene):  
“…it may be that they [the subject] pick up on stuff from… police officers on the cordon who 
maybe aren’t as… careful as they should be about what they say or do” (K:M:2:111).  The 
second relates to a lack of scene control and ensuring that the environment is sterile for 
negotiators to deal with the incident.   
“The ones that are more difficult to negotiate… is when we haven’t… set our cell out 
correctly… for example… ones where you’re trying to negotiate with someone, but we 
haven’t created a sterile environment, and we’ve got a load of people from the estate 
that are also talking to him on the roof, and we haven’t got the cordons up properly.  
That’s a nightmare, and that is where it really can go horribly wrong, because… you’re 
speaking to them at the front of the house on the roof, their mates are speaking to… 
them, at the back of the house, and they’re telling him to jump.  And we’re telling him to 
stay up there” (A:M:1:156). 
Sterility in this sense refers to ensuring that the subject is only communicating with the 
negotiator(s) and nobody else.  This is an important component of negotiation as the 
involvement of third parties can serve to exacerbate the crisis situation and increase risk of harm 
to the subject and/or hostages/victims.  Most negotiators [n = 10] referred to the problems 
associated with a lack of scene control and the negative impact that this had on the negotiation.  
“…poor self-discipline… it’s supposed to be in a sterile, quiet room, and you are 
talking and other people are chipping in or pissing around… so lack of team discipline 
would be really [the most difficult/stressful scenario]” (C:F:2:96). 
 
Competing tactical orientations.  The third operational issue related to the concept of 
competing tactical orientations and the resultant conflict experienced between ‘play-it-long’ 
negotiators and ‘tactically minded’ commanders who were keen to get the situation resolved as 
quickly as possible.  Negotiators are trained to utilise time as a tactic and to “play the long 
game” (F:M:4:111) to allow subjects the time to decrease emotional arousal levels; however, 
commanders are often concerned with the potential impact of a long police operation on police 
and public costs.  Examples of such conflict were described by most negotiators [n = 10].  One 
negotiator, for example stated: “…sometimes there will be increasing pressure for the 
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negotiators to be used and then withdrawn, because commanders want to get the situation 
resolved quickly” (A:M:1:156) and these opposing ethea sometimes resulted in on-scene 
conflict, as demonstrated by the following incident.  
“…we negotiated him, talked to him over a period of two or three hours and got him 
down to the steps… by which time everyone was panicking because it was daylight and 
there’s trains running and the road was closed and the fire brigade are there and 
ambulance and police.  But we managed to get him to the top of the steps so he was 
about, sort of fifteen feet above us… then I remember… a colleague who I still know 
who was the local… uniformed inspector at the time.  So he was like… the incident 
commander, the silver commander.  And he suddenly disappeared having been there 
getting quite frustrated at how slow we were at getting this bloke off the bridge.  He 
came back and he’d been… to put on a harness with all the ropes from the fire brigade 
who were there and just suddenly started going up the steps to grab this bloke.  He said, 
‘if you don’t come down, I’m coming to get you’.  He started to go up and of course you 
can guess what happened – the bloke decided to climb back up onto the bridge.  So it 
took us another forty-five minutes to get him back again” (B:M:2:195). 
 
Negotiating solo.  Negotiation training dictates that negotiators should never negotiate 
on their own, and this concept was identified early on within the negotiation literature (i.e. 
Fuselier 1981b: 13); however, due to logistical difficulties associated with reaching the scene, it 
is often the case that negotiators will attend an incident (or respond to an incident via telephone) 
on their own in the initial stages of deployment.  Having to negotiate with a subject without any 
support (or a “number 2”) was described by some [n = 5] as a negative experience that goes 
against the grain of the team ethos associated with the discipline: “…that’s I think where your 
back up is needed.  Because I have been on my own quite a bit… it is, that immense, you’re 
thinking everything is on me” (H:F:5:50); “Quite often, you’d be there on your own for quite 
some time before another one turned up.  There was quite a lot of… pressure on you initially…” 
(K:M:2:111). 
One negotiator described how having to negotiate with a high-risk MISPER who was 
suicidal on the phone caused her to experience increased stress levels as a result of feeling 
isolated and not being able to relay information back to the silver commander, a job that is 
usually performed by the secondary negotiator or HNC.   
“And I was on my own… Nobody had really arrived and you could hear… initially she 
was in a café, so… that was fine; I was quite happy to carry on talking to her... but then 
I heard the stream outside and she was walking and she was on her way to the edge of 
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the river and she was going to go.  That was really hard… you could feel your stress 
level rising, because I’m thinking… where’s my support?  How do I… you’re speaking 
to somebody on the phone; how do you then give that information to… the inspector or 
the units out there?” (C:F:2:96).   
 
Organisational issues.  Issues that negotiators experienced as a result of organisational 
structure, policies or procedures resulting in negative negotiator experiences were categorised 
into four tertiary categories: ‘Dual role conflict’, ‘Lack of awareness and support within the 
force, ‘Lack of professionalisation and standardisation of the discipline’ and ‘Negotiation as a 
Cinderella role’. 
 
Dual role conflict.  Negotiators were typically required to be on-call for a period of one 
week in five (or six) dependent on the specific force and the size of the cadre.  It is, therefore, 
inevitable that they would be called out at some point during their “normal” working hours and 
this often (described by most negotiators [n = 14]) caused difficulties: “…when the negotiator 
job conflicts with your day-to-day deadlines, which sometimes you can’t miss… it’s really hard” 
(C:F:2:96).  One negotiator referred to this process as a form of “role corruption” (F:M:4:111) 
that often resulted in negotiators experiencing stress from trying to manage both their day jobs 
and their role as negotiators.  Some described difficulties associated with having to manage a 
variety of different on-call duties in addition to their day jobs: “I do get called out, and it can be 
more than once a night… then I’ve got… kidnapping/extortion cover.  And all my force nights 
cover for a full tour of duties, for a week… and then you’ve got your own job to do” (O:F:9:36).  
One HNC referred to the logistical difficulties associated with negotiators having to keep 
“spinning those plates” in terms of the “double hatting” they perform (E:M:3:114); and others 
made reference to tension caused within the workplace and experiencing conflict with their 
superiors/managers who often had to find someone to cover the negotiator’s duties or manage 
their absences in some way. 
“Yes, in that your day-to-day responsibilities rely on you being here day-to-day, 
generally working longer hours than you are contractually obliged… and when you’re 
not here… being instructed to something else such as a negotiator incident that is not 
necessarily in your immediate line manager’s area of responsibility, depending on how 
long you’re away for, can be… not positively viewed… Um, it won’t get you promoted.  
When you get called out in the middle of the night and you’re not available to come in 
the following day because you’ve been up all night, they have to try and find somebody 




Lack of awareness and support within the force.  Although every police force within the 
UK has a cadre of negotiators and force policy dictates that negotiators are consulted and 
deployed in certain situations (e.g. firearms incidents) (ACPO, ACPOS and NPIA 2011), most 
negotiators [n = 9] referred to a general lack of awareness about the role:  
“…I think upfront there’s still… a lack of understanding about what it [negotiation] is.  
Some people… watch it on Hollywood blockbuster movies and think, that looks the 
business that does, but the reality is somewhat different” (L:M:7:54).  
This included a lack of recognition amongst colleagues about the benefit of utilising negotiators 
and a lack of budgetary support from the force that combined to produce an overall feeling of a 
lack of organisational understanding, awareness and support in relation to the negotiator role.  
This was described by some [n = 4] as having a direct impact on the utilisation and deployment 
of negotiators, whereby control room staff either failed to deploy negotiators when they were 
needed, or deployed negotiators when it was not appropriate to do so. 
“…on occasions we do miss incidents that a negotiator should have been called… 
and… that’s not critical against one particular person, it’s just the realities of life that 
sometimes there’s quite a lot of changeover, into the control rooms, and some people 
won’t be aware of the fact that there’s negotiators and what… role they carry out…”  
(A:M:1:156). 
 
Lack of standardisation and professionalisation of the discipline.  Protocol in terms of 
how negotiators should be selected, deployed, quality assured and supported differed across 
forces, and was dependent on force ethos, policies and procedures (and to some extent the 
attitudes of the Chief Constable and Force HCN Lead).  This was described by some [n = 5] as 
problematic as it often meant that negotiators were operating differently across forces.   
“…it’s very much, over to you; you’re the hostage negotiation team; you know what you 
want; you design your package.  But I’ve worked in HR in recruitment and I know… it’s 
probably not very standard… And then you are using assessors who are assessing new 
candidates who might not be… quality assured… you know, not trained… They’re 
just… negotiators” (C:F:2:96). 
Some negotiators suggested a need for the selection processes to be nationally standardised and 
for assessors to be appropriately trained and another commented on the lack of standardisation 
across the training courses which he felt was potentially problematic. 
“…I think we need the regional courses to be standardised… and I think there needs to 
be some clarity about whether or not they are a course which feeds into the national 
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[course] or not.  And I think the national needs to… come out of Hendon; we need to 
have far more of those courses and they need to be delivered around the country” 
(K:M:2:111).     
One negotiator also felt that courses would benefit from having an internally and externally 
validated accredited status in order to enhance professionalisation of the discipline. 
“…it’s mandated, pretty much accepted now that if you join, or if you become a 
detective or if you become a PCSO, that you’ll be trained to national standards and 
they will be assessed, so it’s all quality assured and there’s internal verification, and 
there’s external verification, it’s all professionalised.  I think that’s a good thing, and 
that would be the one thing I would say… there should be in place for negotiators” 
(B:M:2:195). 
There were also discrepancies in the way that negotiators recorded their deployment 
activities across different forces; however, work was being done to try and rectify this issue: “I 
was lucky enough to go last week to the national negotiator group and talk about trying to 
standardise… data returns following deployment” (E:M:3:114).  One negotiator (A:M:1:156) 
even went so far as to suggest that the discipline needed to be standardised in line with other 
specialisms within the police (i.e. firearms/public order). 
 
Negotiation as a Cinderella role.  The role of negotiation in the majority of territorial 
forces (with the exception of a couple of metropolitan forces) is a voluntary one that negotiators 
perform alongside, or in addition to their day-to-day roles within the police.  The specifics of 
remuneration differed from force to force, with some negotiators receiving no financial 
remuneration, others receiving some form of small additional payment and others receiving 
payment in terms of “overtime” if they were below an Inspector rank.  Negotiation was 
frequently referred to as a “Cinderella role” or a “Cinderella service”; phrases that are used 
within police circles to describe the nature of negotiation as a voluntary and additional role.  
This terminology was also used to describe a perception of the role as being less important and 
less valued than other police roles or disciplines.   
Most negotiators [n = 11] referred to the lack of tangible recognition and remuneration 
as an example of the perception of negotiation as a Cinderella role within the police 
organisation.  Negotiators [n = 11] consistently referred to the lack of financial remuneration 
they received for the role and specified that it would be nice to receive some (or more) monetary 
remuneration in recognition for their services.  Some [n = 5] also felt 
undervalued/unappreciated by the force (particularly the management), despite feeling that they 
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were performing a vital voluntary role that often involves deploying when they are off duty and 
during unsociable hours.   
“It’s not all about money at all, because anybody who’s doing negotiating for money is 
in the wrong place, but for example… there was a reward payment that some officers 
get… so that they might get called out on unsociable hours, they have bigger 
responsibility than most officers.  And all these things that… massively tick the box for 
negotiators.  And we never, ever got that payment, and it was just left to us doing it 
down to good will… they don’t understand, although the chief constable did come to 
our training exercise… the last one.  But for me, his words were quite empty… ‘I really 
appreciate the good job that you do’.  I thought you don’t actually have a clue what we 
do… There is a massive demand on the team… because I think if we weren’t there, 
there’d be a lot of deaths, there’d be a lot of bad, bad stuff going on.  So I don’t think 
up that level we get appreciated.  They don’t realise the disruption to our family lives; 
two o’clock call-out in the morning.  Yeah, okay, I’ll come out.  And you don’t get any 
money for that” (C:F:2:96).   
One negotiator described the thanks for doing the role as “intermittent” (E:M:3:114) and 
another stated “I don’t think the force recognises negotiators much at all…” (G:M:4:123). 
Others described the disappointment they felt in association with the lack of substantive 
recognition received from their superiors for performing the role: “There could be… some better 
reward and recognition for us… I think in sixteen years I’ve had one certificate saying you’ve 
done ten years!  Literally, because I’d done ten years…”  (B:M:2:195).   
Negotiation was consistently referred to as a specialism that was considered to be a 
lower priority within the ‘pecking order’ of police specialist areas; for example, it was described 
by one negotiator as the “poor relative” (H:F:5:50) in relation to other specialisms/specialist 
divisions. This perception was linked by some [n = 4] to the limited budgetary support gained 
from the force.  
“…I know that they’ve got a fairly small budget really… Sometimes the kit is a bit old.  
And perhaps because it’s almost an add-on, it’s not something that the force thinks, 
right, this… is a priority… So therefore we get a smaller budget” (N:F:8:34). 
The fact that negotiation is performed alongside officer’s core responsibilities meant that 
negotiators were unable to dedicate themselves fully to the role and it was often perceived as a 
“secondary function” (L:M:7:54) or a “bolt-on” (E:M:3:114) to their day jobs.  It was described 
by one negotiator as an “extracurricular activity” (F:M:4:111) and by another as a “hobby” 
(A:M:1:156) and negotiators gave the impression that their negotiator role did not always 
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dovetail neatly with their core policing role “It’s an adjunct to our everyday duties, it doesn’t fit 
well, at all...” (F:M:4:111). 
 
Personal sacrifices.  As a result of the on-call commitments, unsociable hours and 
urgency of deployment, most negotiators [n = 11] described some form of personal sacrifice and 
two tertiary categories were identified within this category: ‘Disruption to family life’ and 
‘Impact on personal and social life’.  
 
Disruption to family life.  Negotiators often have to “walk out of the door and leave 
family commitments behind” (I:M:6:84) and some [n = 7] described difficulties associated with 
having to renege on family commitments.  Others referred to the negative feelings associated 
with disturbing family members when they were deployed: “…there’s personal difficulties… 
you know, disturbing the family’s sleep as I’m coming and going” (G:M:4:123) and the feeling 
of letting family members down due to not being able to “go anywhere or do anything” 
(J:F:6:110) as a result of being on call.   
“I’ve been in town with my family… having a meal, and having to… put them in a taxi 
and then go off to… help somebody out.  So huge… I don’t think there’s anything that 
recognises the impact on the individuals” (F:M:4:111). 
 
Impact on personal and social life.  Some negotiators [n = 5] also described the adverse 
impact on their social lives, whereby they would often not be able to consume alcohol or would 
have to turn down offers to socialise to ensure that they were safe to drive if deployed to an 
incident: “…when you’re on call, no we can’t go to that party, no we can’t go outside the force, 
I’ve got to stay dry” (G:M:4:123).  Negotiation was therefore conceptualised by some as a role 
which restricted them socially and therefore negatively impacted on their personal/social life. 
“It’s a huge demand on you, negotiating, and it impacts on your personal life, quite a 
bit, when you’re on call.  All your mates are down the pub and you’re sat watching East 
Enders or whatever, it can be a bit rubbish” (L:M:7:54). 
 
Negotiation ambivalences.  The third and final primary category that emerged from the 
data related to elements of the negotiator experience that contained both positive and negative 
aspects and as such has been labelled ‘Negotiator ambivalences’.  Ambivalence was observed as 
a result of inconsistency both within and between categories, thereby exemplifying the 
mixed/contradictory feelings associated with certain elements of the negotiator experience.  This 
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category contained two secondary categories: ‘Negotiator stress/eustress’ and ‘The evolution of 
UK negotiation as an entity’ and these categories are discussed sequentially below.     
 
Negotiator stress/eustress.  Despite having to perform a highly challenging role that 
often involved dealing with life or death situations, negotiators tended to display an air of 
ambivalence about “stress” experienced in this context.  Not only were there contradictions in 
terms of negotiators experiencing or not experiencing stress; the stress experienced was also 
explained in somewhat contradictory terms, thereby demonstrating ambivalence on two levels.  
Some [n = 5] felt that negotiation was not stressful; whereas others (n = 10) reported having 
experienced stress during their role (albeit in different forms).  The latter group tended to either 
conceptualise stress in the form of “Eustress”65 whereby they felt that negotiation provided them 
with a challenge that often resulted in a combination of both positive (eustress) and negative 
stress, or described the emotions associated with negotiating as “a different type of stress”, 
somehow lessening the perceived impact of this stress. 
    
Negotiation as non-stressful.  One third of negotiators [n = 5] felt that negotiation did 
not cause them to experience any form of stress.  Some were fairly “matter-of-fact” about the 
datum that they did not experience stress when negotiating: “Well, I don’t personally get any 
stress from doing the negotiating stuff…”  (N:F:8:34) and provided fairly succinct answers with 
little elaboration.  IV: “Do you ever kind of experience stress or anxiety as a result of actually 
negotiating?” IE: “I haven’t so far” (M:F:8:24).  One negotiator described a process of 
reflection that he often went through after an incident had been resolved, which sometimes 
resulted in him questioning his actions and reflecting upon whether he could have responded 
differently, but was adamant that this process did not cause him any stress: “No… I don’t feel 
stressed” (O:F:9:36).  Another related the lack of stress he experienced to the confidence in his 
ability to negotiate or act as a HNC at an incident.  It would appear that his confidence served to 
alleviate any stress that he might have experienced from negotiating if he had not felt assured of 
his knowledge and skills66.   
“…I don’t feel any stress when I’m negotiating; I really don’t.  I know the tactic that I 
want to employ; I know the route I want to go down or I want to direct my team down; 
                                                          
65 Eustress is defined as “moderate or normal psychological stress interpreted as being beneficial for the 
experiencer” (Eustress n.d.).  
66 It is worth noting here that the police service has historically been perceived as having a particularly 
macho culture, whereby officers want to be perceived as strong and efficient enforcers of the law.  This 
type of environment is likely to have an impact on whether people feel able to disclose feeling stressed 
within the workplace within an interview setting.  Social desirability and impression management may, 
therefore, have played a role in some negotiators’ responses. 
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I’ve got the confidence to challenge when somebody says, I want you to engage this 
tactic; I’ve also got the confidence that if they say, no, that’s what I am going to do, 
then, I’m going to deploy that to the best of my ability… so I don’t feel any stress when 
I’m either negotiating or supervising the team” (I:M:6:84).  
 
Negotiator eustress.  Some reported experiencing stress but tended to conceptualise this 
as “eustress” as opposed to conventional “stress”, thereby giving it a positive rather than a 
negative connotation.  For some [n = 3], negotiation was conceptualised as a challenge, as 
opposed to something that caused stress per se: “…it’s different.  No, it’s a challenge.  It’s not a 
stress… No, I wouldn’t say it was stressful” (C:F:2:96); and for others [n = 3], they felt that the 
role involved the manifestation of a combination of both negative and positive stress; with the 
positive stress often counteracting the effects of the negative stress.    
“…yes, I do [experience stress].  So you’re putting yourself on offer.  But equally 
there’s the argument to say that in the vast majority of situations when the matter’s 
resolved, you’re getting a lot of positive stress, so it’s like a blooming cup… you’ve got 
a load of negative here, but the potential is it’s actually all going to be smiles” 
(A:M:1:156). 
 
Negotiation as a “different type of stress”.  Negotiators frequently encountered highly 
pressurised situations that involved high risk decision-making involving potential risk of harm 
or fatality to those involved.  These types of scenario would typically induce stress within most 
individuals, however, the experience was consistently conceptualised by most negotiators [n = 
10] as being “different” to the stress experienced within other domains of their lives.  Some [n = 
3] described the stress experienced from negotiating as less intense/severe than the stress 
experienced in their day jobs.  
“…somewhat perversely, I think although negotiating is always a crisis… I don’t find 
that it stresses me out really as much as the frustrations of any day-to-day… issues that 
you might come across.  Poor leadership and poor management really stresses me 
out… sometimes the… brutality of the situation or the… sort of crisis of the situation, 
you go straight into dealing with that there and then, there are people standing, you 
know, threatening to kill you and… all the stuff that they come out with or what they’re 
going to do to you and your families… I can absorb that a lot easier really” 
(B:M:2:195). 
Whereas others [n = 3] felt that the stress was more intense than the stress experienced within 
their daily life/day job. 
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“Oh, goodness me, poles apart, absolutely poles apart… my everyday life… at work, is 
busy.  It’s not at all stressful, not in comparison with some of the bits that I do… some 
of my staff think it is, right – it isn’t!  I’ve been in far more stressful situations, with 
people throwing knives at me… and bottles at me, while I’m trying to talk them out of a 
situation… so yes, I’ve been in more stressful situations” (G:M:4:123). 
And some negotiators [n = 2] felt that the stress was different but equal in terms of intensity: “I 
don’t think one is greater than the other, I think it’s just a totally different dynamic” (L:M:7:54).  
These disparities are likely to reflect individual differences between negotiators, whereby they 
perceive and respond to stress differently in line with their experiences and individual coping 
mechanisms.   
Negotiation was also conceptualised as different as a result of the intensity and duration 
of the stress experienced.  Some [n = 4] described the stress as intense but short-lived.  This 
high intensity, low duration (i.e. acute as opposed to chronic) stress was utilised as a 
justification for the stress not having too much of an impact on them in terms of their emotional 
wellbeing and functioning.   
“It’s a different kind of stress really… and bear in mind I’ve done a variety of roles over 
the last nine years… some much more stressful than others…  Being a negotiator is 
stressful at the time you are doing the negotiation, but… realistically, I deal with fifteen 
to twenty incidents a year, whereby I deploy… how many of those are over fairly 
quickly… probably another half again.  So I’m talking about three or four that can 
become… very emotionally intense, difficult, long running” (E:M:3:114). 
 
The evolution of UK negotiation as an entity.  Interviewees varied in terms of their 
length in service both as police officers and negotiators.  Length of experience as a negotiator 
ranged from two years (M:F:8:24) to 16 years (B:M:2:195).  The evolution of negotiation was 
discussed in a combination of both positive and negative lights, with some feeling that changes 
had had a positive impact on the discipline and others feeling that the changes were potentially 
detrimental.  This category was further subdivided into three tertiary sub-categories which are 
discussed below: ‘Changes in deployment nature and frequency’, ‘The impact of Taser on 
negotiation deployment’ and ‘Broader use of communication media within negotiation’.       
 
Changes in deployment nature and frequency.  There was a feeling amongst some [n = 
7] (particularly those with longer service) that the nature and frequency of their deployments 
had changed from when they started the role.  A minority [n = 2] felt that they were now dealing 
with a broader range of deployments and some [n = 7] also felt that the type of incident they 
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typically responded to had changed in terms of situational characteristics.  Negotiators 
exemplified this with reference to more involvement MISPERs and public order work (i.e. 
protests/marches/demonstrations).   
“…I think it’s changed in that we’ve sort of really tried to promote ourselves as, if you 
need anything for MISPERs and the like… people that you feel are in crisis, it might be 
a telephone call as opposed to that come out and do a face-to-face...” (J:F:6:110). 
Negotiators had also recently started to be involved with planned 
protests/demonstrations/marches whereby they act as “protest liaison officers” (N:F:8:34) to 
establish rules of engagement with the protest organisers and ensure that the protest remains 
peaceful.   
“…the role is changing… areas of use are increasing.  The actual job of negotiating… 
is pretty similar to how it was when I started… but, increasingly now, looking to be 
used in other situations… such as dealing with protesters.  If we’ve got… a group we 
know are going to come and protest in a particular area, and we fear there’s going to 
be an adverse reaction, one way or another, because of that protest, then, increasingly, 
we’re getting negotiators involved in that to try and facilitate… a better outcome for all 
parties” (D:M:3:63). 
There is no doubt that the skills possessed by negotiators can be utilised in a broad 
variety of settings and it may be that their skills are being underutilised to some extent.  One 
negotiator even referred to the potential use of negotiators as “in-force mediators to mediate for 
conflict resolutions” (A:M:1:156), an idea which may gain momentum in the future.  Despite a 
perceived increase in breadth of deployment, in terms of deployment frequency, there was a 
strong feeling amongst some negotiators [n = 6] that the number of deployments had decreased 
and that negotiators were being called out less frequently than in previous years. 
“…there’s an anecdotal feeling that it’s dropped off a bit… we always do a full week on 
cover… so from seven o’clock Monday morning, till seven o’clock the next Monday 
morning, and anecdotally, it always felt like it was… two or three calls a week, I’d 
get… now, one or two, and sometimes… I’ve had some weeks with no calls, at all” 
(F:M:4:111). 
 
The impact of Taser on negotiation deployment.  Taser67 was introduced within UK 
police forces in 2004 for use by authorised firearms officers and was extended to use by 
specially trained units in 2008 (ACPO 2013).  “Taser provides an additional option to resolve 
                                                          
67 The Taser (conducted energy device) is a single shot device designed to temporarily incapacitate a 
subject through use of an electrical current which temporarily interferes with the body’s neuromuscular 
system (College of Policing 2014a). 
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situations, including the threat of violence, which can come from any section of the public” 
(ACPO 2013) and is used as an alternative to other physical tactical options, such as physical 
restraint, and the use of police dogs or batons.  Negotiators felt that the implementation of Taser 
had had a direct impact on the nature and frequency of their deployment with almost half [n = 7] 
reporting having observed a decrease in the number of call outs they received: “there’s been a 
big drop in incidents since Taser’s come on the scene” (K:M:2:111); “So with the advent of 
Taser, that’s seen a reduction in the number of negotiating incidents, because the police officers 
at the scene are able to deal with it adequately, quickly, and safely by the use of Taser” 
(A:M:1:156). 
Some [n = 5] also reported a change in the nature of their deployments: “so without a 
doubt, there are some… types of job, which are on the decrease” (G:M:4:123); whereby they 
were less likely to be deployed to barricade or domestic siege scenarios because Taser was seen 
as a quicker (and sometimes more efficient/cheaper) solution to this type of incident (as 
opposed to a potentially lengthy and protracted negotiation): “…two minutes after we arrive, 
he’s been zapped, and he’s subdued, and that’s the end of it” (F:M:4:111). 
 
Broader use of communication media within negotiation.  Historically, negotiation has 
been conducted face-to-face or via telephone; however, advances in communication technology 
and equipment have resulted in negotiators having to communicate with subjects via a variety of 
different methods.  Some [n = 5] reported having carried out negotiations with individuals via 
text message, email and social networking sites (SNS) in addition to the traditional methods of 
communication.  These developments have been attributed to the increase in these forms of 
communication within society and the accessibility of digital methods of communication.  
Individuals who experienced some form of crisis ten to twenty years ago would have been more 
likely to speak to somebody face-to-face or perhaps on the telephone, whereas in the current 
digital era, there is a plethora of online methods of communication that provide the individual 
with a forum for dialogue.  As such, negotiators have had to “move with the times” in order to 
communicate with individuals-in-crisis, particularly those of the younger generation who are 
more likely to engage in text messaging or chatting on SNS.       
“As we sit here now, there’s probably… maybe half a dozen high-risk missing persons 
in [anonymised location] alone… A lot of those… we could have an intervention with 
them by a phone call.  Or a text… Remember some of the technology’s changed as well.  
I’ve found that I’ve ended up carrying out part of negotiations via text… Email… 
Facebook… all of that is a massive change from when I started certainly” (B:M:2:195). 
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One negotiator also described the way that electronic communication was perceived as 
a means of providing individuals who are committing a crime with a form of anonymity, 
whereby extortionists may believe that their actions are less traceable as a result of email (as 
opposed to telephone) communication.  He referred specifically to an increase in deployment 
to/involvement with extortion cases involving threats to disclose personally damaging 
information via the internet and indicated that negotiators were now having to work with cases 
that solely involved communication via electronic/digital media.  
“Yes, we’re finding more of those internet-related now where people are engaging in 
sexual activity, it’s being filmed on the internet and then… This film’s going to be 
released; it’s going to be sent to everyone on your Facebook account… So you’re 
getting those types of jobs now, which we haven’t seen before” (K:M:2:111).  
 
Model Synopsis 
This model provides a synopsis of the experiences of police HCNs in the UK.  It 
indicates that being a negotiator can be an incredibly positive experience, as the role is both 
personally and professionally rewarding.  Some negotiators stated that being a negotiator was 
their core reason for coming to work, thereby demonstrating the positive attitudes associated 
with the discipline.  As is the case with any job role or vocation, negotiators equally described 
some negatives associated with their role and other experiences that were not necessarily 
polarised as positive or negative, and as such were labelled as negotiation ambivalences.  The 







Chapter 10: Qualitative Phase Results Chapter 
4: The Self-Perceived Successful Hostage and 
Crisis Negotiator Model 
In this chapter the self-perceived characteristics and competencies that are required for 
negotiators to be successful are outlined.  A conceptual model has been developed on the basis 
of the categories that emerged from the interviews and includes 3 primary and 18 secondary 
categories that can be used to depict the successful negotiator profile (as perceived by 
operationally active negotiators in the UK).  Please refer to Figure 10.1 for details of the 
conceptual model.  A form of framework analysis was used to cross-reference and validate the 
emerging themes and to identify those characteristics/competencies that demonstrated the 
highest concordance rates within the sample (please refer to Table 10.1 in Appendix 30 for 
details of the code co-occurrence frequency matrix).  The negotiator profile could be clearly 
divided into three main categories: ‘Negotiator entry requirements’, ‘Negotiator attributes’ and 
‘Negotiator skills’.  Each of these categories will be discussed sequentially below.  
 
Negotiator Entry Requirements 
HCNn is a voluntary role that is performed in addition to a police officer’s day-to-day 
role.  In order to work as a negotiator, police officers have to apply, be selected, and 
successfully complete the regional or national negotiator training course.  The data revealed a 
number of entry requirements that must be met in order for an officer to be selected to complete 
one of these training courses and these consisted of: a requirement for negotiators to operate “at 
rank”; a requirement for negotiators to demonstrate a substantial and significant commitment to 
the role; and for officers to be “in it for the right reasons”.  These three components were 
perceived as the core components for an officer to be eligible to apply for the negotiator role 
and are discussed sequentially below. 
   
Minimum rank requirement.  Historically, police officers had to be, of at least, 
Inspector rank or above to apply for the negotiator role, however, during the five years prior to 
data collection, this requirement appears to have been relaxed within most rural forces, with 
officers being able to apply for the role once they reached the rank of Sergeant: “And it used to 
be at inspector level, so you could only actually apply once you became an inspector… Actually, 
that’s been reduced now to a sergeant” (N:F:8:34).  There was, however, still an enhanced rank 
requirement within some metropolitan forces (e.g. Force 4 and Force 9), whereby police officers 











































Figure 10.1.  Conceptual map depicting the self-perceived successful HCN profile.   
Note.  The concepts surrounded by solid borders represent competencies that were cited by at least a third of interviewees and the concepts surrounded by dashed borders 
represent categories that were cited by less than a third of interviewees.  Frequency of citation is also represented by thickness of surrounding borders, with thicker lines 
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criterion that was non-negotiable, this rank requirement produced mixed feelings from 
participants, with some feeling that the rank requirement was important for negotiators to have 
the appropriate/adequate amount of operational policing experience and senior level decision-
making ability, and others feeling that the requirement was too stringent and “precludes some 
really good potential negotiators” (J:F:6:110). 
“The only thing that I disagree with is that, I know a lot of people who are at constable 
level, who have a lot of good qualities to do that work… It certainly isn’t about rank.  
It’s about… an individual’s ability.  And that can be any rank” (O:F:9:36). 
It is worth noting, therefore, that whilst the entry criteria stipulated that officers could only 
apply to become negotiators once they were of Sergeant/Inspector rank or above, this was not a 
criterion that was perceived by all negotiators as being necessary (or sufficient in isolation) for 
officers to perform the negotiator role successfully. 
 
Committed to the role68.  In addition to the rank requirement, negotiators described a 
requirement for officers to be substantially and significantly committed to the role in order to 
succeed and perform effectively within the cadre:  
“I’d be looking at… people who are level-headed, but who are really enthusiastic, and 
who are committed to the role.  Sometimes, very rarely, we’ll get those people who do 
find it a bit of a shock to be part of a 24/7 rota when the phone goes at three o’clock in 
the morning” (A:M:1:156).   
Negotiation is a voluntary role that is performed in addition to daily duties and as such, 
negotiators would be required to drop things at a moment’s notice and respond to a call.  This 
often impacted on negotiators’ personal lives and involved them making extensive personal 
sacrifices.   
Senior negotiators, and those involved with the selection process (i.e. HNCs) frequently 
described a need for applicants to demonstrate a substantial time commitment to the role: “We 
will expect you to be a negotiator for at least five years…” (A:M:1:156); and an attitude that 
verified their understanding (and ability) to drop things at a moment’s notice if required.  They 
felt that these aspects were effectively addressed within the application and selection process, 
part of which involved a panel interview whereby officers were asked to explain their 
understanding of, and commitment to, the role.  There was also an acknowledgement of the cost 
implications for forces in terms of ensuring that investment in negotiator training provided some 
form of return by a commitment from the officer to remain on the cadre for a certain period of 
                                                          
68 This competency has also been identified within the USA literature, whereby McMains and Mullins 





time: “…the second part is a… more structured approach to make sure that you can commit to 
the on-call arrangements and to drop everything at short notice, from the… need to train people 
and get your value for money really” (I:M:6:84). 
 
In it for the right reasons.  Negotiators (particularly those involved in the selection 
process) felt that it was very important that officers were applying for (and performing) the role 
“for the right reasons”: “…you clearly don’t want people who want to get trained because 
there’s a tick in the box and it looks good on their promotion and all the rest of it…” 
(K:M:2:111).  Some described incidents historically where officers had applied for the role as a 
means of enhancing their CV/chances for promotion without genuinely committing to the role: 
“…there is always a risk when you recruit people, that they’re doing it as a… sort of CV filler 
for a couple of years…” (J:F:6:110) and others referred to the difficulties that this type of 
attitude had caused for cadres:   
“They have problems in other forces, of people applying for it, because it’s a good tick, 
it’s a good attribute to have, on the CV… their people, they’ll do it for a year or two, 
and they’re, no, I’m bored of this now, and they move on, and it causes a problem.” 
(F:M:4:111). 
Negotiators felt that filtering out individuals who were applying for the role for the wrong 
reasons was an important part of the selection process and specified that the incorporation of 
questions into the traditional panel interview was a means of doing this.  
 
Negotiator Attributes 
The second primary category relates to attributes that were perceived by negotiators as 
important for successful performance.  An attribute is defined as “an inherent characteristic” 
(Attribute n.d.) and for the current purposes refer to characteristics that are perceived as required 
in order to succeed as a negotiator.  These attributes emerged in the context of discussions 
relating to perceived successful negotiator characteristics (i.e. “what makes someone a good 
negotiator?”) and the characteristics that they would look for if they were selecting new 
negotiators for the cadre.  Ten secondary categories emerged within this category, with six 
being corroborated by at least a third of negotiators within the sample.  The categories are 
discussed in order of frequency below, with the most highly corroborated attributes being 
discussed first.  
 
Empathic.  The first attribute that most negotiators [n = 9] identified was the concept of 





empathise with subjects, regardless of their history, background or the context of the 
hostage/crisis incident.  Demonstration of empathy is referred to as a vital component within the 
D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of negotiation (see Chapter 8) as a means of establishing 
rapport with the subject and eventually influencing behavioural change as a result of the 
developed relationship between the negotiator and subject.  This finding, therefore, further 
triangulates this concept by identifying the need for negotiators to be empathic in order to 
succeed in their role.  One negotiator described “having some sympathy or understanding of 
what they’re going through” (N:F:8:34) as her main tool when negotiating and others 
consistently referred to the ability to empathise as being a core attribute within the successful 
negotiator profile: “…you have to be able to empathise with somebody.  You’ll never fully 
understand what they’re going through.  But how can you move forward if you don’t 
appreciate… what it is they’re going through?” (O:F:9:36). 
Interestingly, there was a suggestion from some negotiators that they perhaps do not 
need to be truly 100% empathic individuals, as long as they possess the ability to demonstrate 
empathy when it is needed.  One negotiator, for example, alluded to an ability to switch 
empathy on and off as required, or to demonstrate/feign empathy when needed, even though 
true empathy may not have been experienced at the time.  He referred to the concept of both 
sympathy69 and empathy70 and it may be that negotiators need to be able to display sympathy if 
they are unable to display true empathy (i.e. to genuinely share the feelings and emotions that 
the subject is experiencing). 
“…there are people who think that negotiating is just a waste of time... you know, why 
are you being nice to them?  …because there… quite frankly, there are some really 
unsympathetic characters, and I think they think that… this is my next best mate… we 
will, I speak for myself, I will be very nice to some people, who are not necessarily… 
deserving of it… and if that’s just being cynical and being a means to an end, then 
possibly it is… but I’m not going to get anywhere… not achieving any degree of 
sympathy, or empathy… with the individual” (F:M:4:111). 
 
Non-judgemental attitude/respect for others.  The second attribute identified by most 
negotiators [n = 9] related to the concept of being non-judgemental.  Negotiators felt that it was 
vital for negotiators to be non-judgemental towards subjects, demonstrate respect for others and 
possess an ability to withhold judgement about subjects throughout negotiations: “You’ve got to 
                                                          
69 Sympathy is defined as “the feeling that you care about or are sorry about someone else’s troubles, 
grief, misfortune, etc.” (Sympathy n.d.). 
70 Empathy is defined as “the feeling that you understand and share another person’s experiences and 






be able to build a rapport whether they’re a masked murderer or whether they’re a… petty 
shoplifter or whatever” (C:F:2:96).  Negotiators described instances whereby they had to deal 
with individuals who may have committed horrendous crimes in the past, or may be particularly 
“unsympathetic characters” (F:M:4:111), but emphasised the need to withhold judgement of 
these individuals in order to successfully negotiate and resolve the crisis/hostage situation.  
“I think certainly not being judgemental is one, because you deal with some people 
that… if they jump, some people would say, thank goodness, but you’re there to do a 
job… I’ve never found that difficult, actually, I said about the one sex offender, I mean, 
he was guilty, and he actually did want to commit suicide for that, to save face for what 
he did, but you don’t treat him differently.  Any police officer would say to treat people 
the same, but I think in reality, that’s not always the case.  I think negotiating is such a 
difficult area of business, that you need to actually do what you say, and not be 
judgemental, and be open-minded, actively listen, and you know, try to be there, 
supportive, empathic, also” (L:M:7:54). 
One negotiator described the importance of being able to respect/have consideration for subjects 
by being able to “step out of your uniform… and talk to someone as an individual” (J:F:6:11), 
whereas another referred to “separating the person from what they’ve done” when negotiating 
with people who may have “done things that you find really repugnant” (K:M:2:111) as a 
means of demonstrating the importance of a non-judgemental attitude within the negotiation 
role. 
 
Flexible71.  The third attribute endorsed by most negotiators [n = 9] related to the ability 
for negotiators to be flexible and to be able to manage both work and personal commitments 
whilst on call:  
“…somebody that’s flexible as well.  It’s a huge demand on you, negotiating, and it 
impacts on your personal life, quite a bit, when you’re on call.  All your mates are down 
the pub and you’re sat watching EastEnders or whatever, it can be a bit rubbish” 
(L:M:7:54).   
Flexibility in this sense refers to negotiators being able to drop things at a moment’s notice and 
respond to deployment calls as and when they occur: “…flexible… in terms of being able to turn 
out all sorts of times and day” (G:M:4:123).  One negotiator referred to the need to be flexible 
in terms of working with and supporting other team members: “…what we’re looking for very 
much is flexibility, support, help within that team” (E:M:3:114).  Whereas another negotiator 
                                                          
71 Flexibility has also been identified as a core competency for negotiators within the USA literature, 
whereby Fuselier (1981b) and Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano (2005) both identified that negotiators 





exemplified the importance of flexibility when describing an incident whereby she had to take 
on the primary negotiator role quickly when her colleague was phobic of blood and a subject 
had cut himself:   
“Unfortunately my number one is… not keen on blood... So whilst he's stood there 
starting his negotiations, he went, can you just take over for a bit? And I didn't know... 
And he went off… And then I just stood here and just cracked on with it…” (N:F:8:34).  
 
Operational policing experience/credibility.  Some negotiators [n = 7] felt that 
officers needed to have a substantial amount of operational policing experience and ergo police 
credibility in order to successfully perform the role of negotiator:  
“I think there’s a degree of experience coming in here… I think it’s important to have 
someone who has experienced these sorts of scenarios… they’ve experienced getting 
involved in the siege situation.  They can understand how it works… they’ve got a good, 
wide experience of different types of policing, so I think that’s important” (A:M:1:156). 
Negotiators referred to the need for officers to have the appropriate level of police experience 
and skills in order to know how to respond appropriately during hostage/crisis incidents and to 
be able to control their emotions in relation to such incidents. 
“Yeah, operational credibility, being capable to respond during a crisis incident is 
really key because part of… building that relationship is controlling your own 
emotions, and, actually, if you get really excited by the whole thing, that’s difficult… 
and so what you need is that operational experience around just crisis incidents” 
(E:M:3:114).    
One negotiator also felt that it was important for negotiators to possess the appropriate level of 
legal/legislative/procedural knowledge (as gleaned from operational policing experience) in 
order to advise subjects appropriately throughout the negotiation process. 
“…having a legal knowledge around the subjects that you’re talking about.  Because if 
you don’t know that you can’t make the right promises.  So you’ve got to be legally 
sound to… you know, not advise, but to make those promises.  And procedure.  You’ve 
got to know all about… the force procedures about the subject matter that you are 
talking about” (O:F:9:36).   
 
Patient.  Interviewees described a requirement for negotiators to be patient individuals: 
“I think the people who tend to do it, by and large, tend to be of that mind that… they’re 
prepared to listen, they’re prepared to take the long game, patience” (F:M:4:111) and many [n 





and/or perseverance: “As is often the way, he didn’t want to engage first of all but, being 
persistent, perhaps, sounds a bit pushy… persevering, perhaps a better word, persevering with 
him, I eventually got it so he was talking to me” (D:M:3:63).  They described incidents whereby 
they would have to attempt to engage with subjects who were MISPERs or individuals who 
were at risk of self-harm/suicide and would perhaps have to continually try to make contact with 
the subject via telephone/in person as the subject may not be ready to engage in dialogue for 
some time.  This could involve subjects consistently hanging up the phone, verbally abusing the 
negotiator or simply refusing to engage in dialogue. 
“I’ve spent two hours talking to a loft hatch, and eventually the loft hatch is opened and 
that’s the first noise you would have.  But because the people on the ground are doing 
all the other work you’ve just got to trust them to say we’re ruling out all the other 
options so keep going, we think this person is there without any necessary 
confirmation… That they’re even listening or that they can hear… they might be 
wanting to listen but they’ve barricaded it or they’re so far away that my voice isn’t 
going to carry that far.  The easy ones are where they shout and bawl back because at 
least you’ve got confirmation that they’re there… and you can then got to try and work 
on what… the right thing that’s going to get them engaging” (I:M:6:84). 
   
Resilient.  Just under half of the sample [n = 7] felt that resilience was a key attribute 
for negotiators to possess.   
“…you have to be resilient… resilience comes as a close second… Because, unless 
you’re personally resilient, no matter how good you are at everything else, if you’re 
distracted, if you’re tired… if you’re worried, if you’re stressed, the other thing is, you 
might be the best listener and the best communicator in the world, but when the stress is 
on… It robs you… some people, of the ability of… rational thought” (G:M:4:123). 
They described this need in terms of being able to cope emotionally and physically with the 
demanding nature of the role: “I think the only other thing would probably be some resilience 
where… they’ve got to be prepared to slog it out… sometimes… in bad weather in… dodgy 
places” (K:M:2:111).  In addition to this, they described the need for negotiators to have a 
“thick skin” in order to deal with the verbal abuse that often goes hand-in-hand with such highly 
pressurised and emotive incidents: “A thick skin is… crucial” (G:M:4:123). 
“…some people, you can say, you know, why are you here?  And they’ll tell you straight 
away.  And other people can be so rude and horrendous to you, and tell you that you 





stand there, and you just take it all.  And you’ve got to know that you don’t… take any 
of that personally” (O:F:9:36). 
Caring/compassionate.  A third of negotiators [n = 5] felt that it was important to be 
caring and/or compassionate and to demonstrate attributes that were indicative of a desire to 
help or support other people: “You’ve got to be there because you want to be there, because you 
genuinely want to help that person” (H:F:5:50); “I think… it’s somebody who… are caring.  
Compassionate... a person who’s willing to listen.  And a person who actually cares to take it to 
the next level” (O:F:9:36).  It is worth noting, however, that a couple of negotiators (C:F:2:96; 
F:M:4:111) felt that whilst a caring and compassionate nature was important, they also felt that 
this needed to be balanced with psychological stability.  They felt that some of their colleagues 
would be excellent in terms of the supporting nature of the role (due to their compassionate and 
caring nature) but would struggle to “leave it behind” once the incident had been resolved.  One 
negotiator referred to the need for negotiators to balance altruism/a desire to help people with 
psychological stability and an understanding that not everyone can be helped/not every situation 
can be successfully negotiated as a means of exemplifying this balance:  
“…you’ve got to be altruistic to a certain degree… I want to help people, but I can’t 
help everybody.  I will do my best, but I think there are some people that are… in 
danger of either burnout or psychological problems themselves because it went wrong” 
(C:F:2:96). 
   
Mentally agile.  A third of interviewees [n = 5] felt that it was important for negotiators 
to be able to “think on their feet” (K:M:2:111) and to be mentally agile: “They should be 
mentally agile…” (E:M:3:114).  The ability to think on your feet was deemed important for 
negotiators to be able to adapt their style/strategy of negotiation to the subject/context in order 
to successfully resolve the hostage/crisis situation, along with being able to engage in, follow 
and plan the next part of the dialogue with the subject.   
“…but it’s also to multi-task because although you’re still talking to them and listening 
to what they’re saying you’ve also got to plan what you’re going to say next… so 
you’ve just got to stay with it as well so it can be mentally quite tiring” (N:F:8:24). 
Mental agility was highlighted as being a particularly vital attribute when dealing 
with/responding to kidnap and extortion situations where time is particularly crucial and the 
response needs to be immediate, efficient and appropriate due to the high risk stakes involved in 
red centre incidents72.  
                                                          






“Mental agility… and that’s… particularly… plays out in kidnap and extortion, 
where… you’re trying to deal with a huge amount of information.  You’re trying to 
process it very, very quickly and pass on the most pertinent points really, really quickly 
and do that in an environment where you potentially can’t speak or anything else” 
(E:M:3:114). 
In addition to more generic mental agility, one negotiator also highlighted the importance of 
having a good memory: “Your memory’s got to be pretty key because if they’re giving you stuff 
you need to be able to show you’ve absorbed it, show you’re interested in them” (D:M:3:63). 
 
Genuine/trustworthy.  Just under a third of interviewees [n = 4] felt that it was 
important for negotiators to be credible, trustworthy and to portray themselves as genuine 
individuals who are there to help subjects in crisis/conflict: “I think it’s important to just be 
yourself” (O:F:9:36); “You’ve got to be… somebody they can trust…” (C:F:2:96).  The 
D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of negotiation discussed in Chapter 8 makes reference to the 
importance of building trust between the negotiator and subject and highlights this aspect as a 
vital component within the de-escalation and resolution of hostage/crisis situations.  This 
finding therefore further validates the importance of negotiators being trustworthy and being 
able to foster trust on the part of the subject: “And just being genuine… you’ve… got to be true 
to yourself, and true to them, really… And try and say, you know, this is how I can help you” 
(H:F:5:50). 
 
Intuitive.  Some participants [n = 4] felt that it was important for negotiators to be 
intuitive or to be able to rely on their intuition to some extent.  One negotiator referred to the 
importance of intuition being used to identify hooks that can be focused on and used to de-
escalate the crisis situation: “Yeah, you’ve got to be intuitive to pick up on those hooks73 and 
levers” (C:F:2:96).  Whereas another negotiator described how instinct or intuition was 
important and used to guide the conversation being held between the two parties and ergo the 
negotiation process. 
“So… those skills as well as communication, the non-verbal communication, if you 
like… the other skills.  I mean it’s difficult to put a label, but when I say instinct, just 
sort of intuitively… it’s constantly searching for that, that common thread between the 
two of you, the place where you might… different as anything, one might be… you can 
be different genders, different ages, different life scenarios, different skills, different 
                                                          
73 “Hooks” are described by Slatkin (2009) as important themes or potentially fruitful areas to pursue 





health, but there is usually a place where you can… hook and bond with the person, 
and I think that’s important… to get to influence…” (B:M:2:195).  
 
Negotiator Skills 
The third primary category that emerged from the data related to the perceived skills 
that negotiators needed to possess in order to perform as effective negotiators.  Five secondary 
categories were identified: ‘Listening’, ‘Communication’, ‘Team-Working’, ‘Problem-Solving’ 
and ‘Honesty’.  These are discussed sequentially below, in order of the most frequently to least 
frequently identified skills.  
 
Listening74.  Listening was the most frequently identified skill [n = 14]: “They must be 
a… particularly a good listener, not so much a talker” (E:M:3:114).  To listen is defined as “to 
hear something with thoughtful attention” (Listen n.d.), which aptly describes the technique 
required within the negotiation process.  Individuals who are in crisis or conflict need to be able 
to explain the difficulties/emotions that they may be experiencing and “to be heard” by 
somebody:  
“But the common theme when you’re face-to-face or speaking to somebody is definitely 
enhanced listening… Listening with a real intent to try and understand and empathise 
with them; what is it that’s brought them to this place on this day?” (B:M:2:195).   
As such, negotiators often form the role of confidant and the findings indicate that “becoming 
the confidant” is very much part of the negotiation process.  A number of different terms were 
utilised throughout the transcripts to refer to listening skills, including “enhanced listening” 
(B:M:2:195), “effective listening” (A:M:1:156) and “active listening” (F:M:4:111) but the 
common theme running throughout relates to the ability of negotiators to listen to the subject 
and to demonstrate to the subject that they hear and understand what is being said to them (i.e. 
active listening).   
“I think the primary one is active listening, you’ve got to listen to what you’ve been told.  
I guess it’s like what you said earlier, about having a strategy.  I think if I went there 
with my own agenda and my own strategies, I think that I could miss the boat.  So I try 
to really focus on what I’ve been told and feed off that.  So for example, I said about 
triggers, I might talk about football, girls, nights outs, whatever… and if something is 
said to me, if I don’t pick up on it… it could delay things or it could be quite a disaster 
                                                          
74 Listening (with an emphasis on active listening) is also an aspect that has been identified within the 
USA literature as playing a core role within the HNC selection process (Fuselier 1981b and Vecchi, Van 





really.  So you need to listen to what you’ve been told and take the hook when it’s given 
to you” (L:M:7:54). 
In addition to being the most frequently identified skill, most negotiators also described 
listening as the key/core/most important skill required by negotiators in order to succeed: 
“…probably listening is the biggest single one” (I:M:6:84); “…listening is probably the key 
one…” (J:F:6:110). 
 
Communication.  The second most frequently identified skill [n = 12] related to 
communication: “Well, communication is… the trump card to any of it really” (O:F:9:36); “It’s 
definitely got to be communication, that’s got to be the main bit because that’s what you are 
doing all the time” (N:F:8:34).  Communication is defined as “the imparting or exchanging of 
information by speaking, writing or using some other medium” (Communication n.d.) and this 
process synopsises the dialogue that is exchanged between the negotiator and the subject during 
the negotiation process.  Whilst the concept of HCNn might appear to be a complex and 
mysterious entity, in essence, negotiators are simply communicators engaging with individuals-
in-crisis/conflict in order to try and establish why they are in the situation and to try and work 
collaboratively with the subject in order to resolve the incident and minimise injury or loss of 
life: “…what we are is we are very good communicators… Enhanced communicators, 
probably… I think foremost it’s around your skills to communicate.  That’s definitely number 
one” (B:M:2:195).  Communication skills were also identified by several negotiators involved 
in the selection of new recruits as one of the skills that are assessed within the selection process, 
thereby further validating the importance of this skill within the negotiator repertoire: “…what 
we’re looking for is someone who’s got… some natural ability to communicate.  Negotiation, of 
course, is two ways, listening as well as talking” (D:M:3:63). 
 
 Team-Working75.  The majority of negotiators [n = 9] referred to the importance of 
team-working skills, which was the third most frequently cited skill: “… at the end of the day, 
it’s all about teamwork” (A:M:1:156); “And teamwork is crucial… Because this thing don’t 
work… on that individual basis… There’s no such thing as a lone wolf, you know, absolutely it 
is the team” (G:M:4:123).  HCNn incidents have extremely pressurised parameters and involve 
high risk situational variables and, as such, can involve negotiators dealing with highly emotive 
and risky situations.  The nature of HCNn, therefore necessitates teamwork, with negotiators 
operating on a primary (i.e. communicator) and secondary (i.e. support) negotiator basis: “But 
                                                          
75 McMains and Mullins (2001) refer to the importance of the candidate “believing in the team” when 





we’re also looking for someone who has a team fit.  I think we do work very closely and very 
well as a negotiators team.  We’re looking for someone who’s going to fit in to that team…” 
(D:M:3:63).  In this context, “team fit” is conceptualised as the ability for an individual to fit 
into and effectively integrate into an already established negotiator cadre.  Several negotiators 
also made reference to the fact that this skill was considered as part of the selection process, 
further validating the relevance of this skill within the negotiation arena.    
“…part of the selection process is actually around… that team fit… and what we’re 
looking for very much is flexibility, support, help within that team, because we… do 
deal with… complex, emotionally difficult incidents where, regularly, people are very 
focused on harming themselves or harming somebody else.  So, actually, the 
consequences of that can be somebody being seriously hurt or dying… and the support 
mechanisms we have in place; not only have we got the organisational ones, but 
actually that team response is a very big, big part of it” (E:M:3:114). 
 
 Problem-Solving.  Almost a third of negotiators [n = 4] felt that negotiators needed to 
possess problem-solving skills: “Listening… personal communication… Some problem-
solving… those I would… highlight as… top [skills]” (G:M:4:123).  One negotiator described 
this skill as an important competency within police work generally: “But police officers, 
generally, have to relate to people, they have to communicate with people, they have to 
problem-solve so… the majority of them should have the skills” (K:M:2:111), thereby 
suggesting an extension/extrapolation of this skill from generic police work into HCNn 
specifically.  Problem-solving is well established within the negotiation literature as a strategy 
that can be used to try and resolve hostage/crisis incidents (Miller 2005) and is identified as the 
fourth crisis intervention stage by Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano (2005).  It is a strategy that 
tends to be utilised once emotions have been de-escalated and the subject is considered to be 
thinking more rationally and according to Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano (2005), “problem 
solving is a multistep behavioural process in which the negotiator helps the person in crisis 
explore alternatives and concrete solutions”.    
   
Honesty.  Some negotiators [n = 4] felt that honesty was an important skill for 
negotiators to possess. 
“…decisions are… based upon the principles of being totally open and honest, trying to 
understand… what the individual’s going through, or empathise with their situation, 
certainly not lying to them, at all. Absolutely not… Being totally honest with the 





be anything that’s going to change that… So if you then say no, you’re not, and they 
know that they are not being dealt with by someone who’s truthful, the chances are 
they’ll stay in there for a lot longer period of time” (A:M:1:156).   
This extended not only to being honest with subjects about what would happen to them once 
they had surrendered themselves or the crisis incident had been resolved but also about 
themselves: “I think you’ve got to be very fair, very honest, not only to them, but about yourself 
as well” (C:F:2:96).  One negotiator described honesty as being one of the core skills that he 
would be looking for in a candidate when selecting officers to complete the negotiator training: 
“Empathy… effective listening, clarity, honesty… rapport building” (A:M:1:156); and others 
referred to the role of honesty as a tactic/strategy within the negotiation repertoire and 
emphasised the importance of being honest with subjects throughout the entire negotiation 
process:  
“…prepared to say sorry, honesty with them... there are times when I’ve said I got that 
wrong; you told me not to mention family – I need to mention family… because they’re 
worried.  You’ve then gone mad at me, I clearly got that wrong, I’m sorry” (I:M:6:84). 
 
Model Synopsis 
This model outlines the characteristics and competencies that were perceived as 
important by operationally active HCNs.  The data indicates that negotiators needed to meet a 
number of entry requirements, possess a number of specific attributes/characteristics and 
demonstrate a number of specific skills in order to perform successfully within the role of 
negotiator.  At a glance, the model depicts an officer who has reached a certain level of seniority 
(as a result of operational policing experience); is genuinely committed to the role; is empathic, 
non-judgemental, flexible, and resilient; and has effective listening, communication and 
problem-solving skills.  Identification of this profile should serve to validate the competencies 
that are sought within police officers who volunteer to be trained as negotiators in the future, but 
would benefit from further empirical validation in order to strengthen and triangulate the claims 





Chapter 11: Discussion, Evaluation and 
Conclusion 
11.1. Overall Synopsis 
This chapter synopsises the findings from the quantitative and qualitative components 
of this research and identifies the potential implications for both practice and policy.  The 
findings represent one of the first empirical attempts to systematically identify whether HCNs 
constitute a unique group within the police population and to identify the characteristics and 
traits that are held by operationally active HCNs in the UK.  The quantitative data revealed the 
existence of a “police officer profile” with both police samples differing significantly from the 
student sample on all five constructs; but failed to identify the existence of a unique “HCN 
profile”.  In addition to this, the qualitative data enabled a grounded theoretical model of UK 
HCNn to be developed and established the existence of five micro-models that can be used to 
depict UK HCNn.  The research provides a unique contribution to the literature by utilising the 
actual experiences of operationally active UK HCNs to understand: 1) the nature and 
characteristics of HCNn deployments; 2) the processes involved in the selection, training and 
support of HCNs, 3) the entire HCNn process/procedure from initial deployment to debrief 
(including the communication styles/strategies and techniques utilised by HCNs); 4) the 
experiences of HCNs and what it is like to be part of a HCN cadre; and 5) the characteristics 
and competencies possessed by effective HCNs.  These findings have implications for police 
officer selection processes/identification of officer training needs and have been used to make 
recommendations in terms of the selection, training, operational activity and support of UK 
HCNs which are discussed below.    
 
11.2. Methodological Considerations and Consolidation of Findings 
A mixed-methodological approach was adopted to address the identified research 
questions as I felt that the specific gaps in the literature base in relation to HCNn could not be 
addressed satisfactorily via one research method alone.  Whilst a quantitative research design 
enabled me to address the hypotheses in relation to the potential existence of a unique HCN 
profile via the use of a cross-sectional survey, this method would not have served to gather the 
more detailed/richer data required to provide an insight into the actual experiences of UK 
HCNs.  Mixed methods approaches have been praised on the basis of their abilities to provide 





conducted in this vein benefit from the fact that they build upon the strengths of different 
methods (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004 and Johnson and Turner 2003).  Hence, the design 
adopted allowed the findings to exist as complementary components addressing two distinct sets 
of research questions.  Mixed methods approaches have been referred to as both expansive and 
creative (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004) and as such have enabled me to explore this 
phenomenon from two perspectives, which when taken as a whole, provide a more 
comprehensive account.  Equally, this approach has contributed insight and understanding that 
would not have been identified on the basis of a single method alone and, as such, provides 
strength to the overall conclusions drawn. 
It is important to note that my aim was not to triangulate the quantitative findings with 
the qualitative models. Instead, a mixed-methodological approach was taken to explore the 
phenomenon from two different angles - the first being to identify the characteristics and traits 
of HCNs and the second being to develop a model of HCNn.  The findings, therefore, represent 
fairly distinct contributions and offer limited opportunities for triangulation.  Nevertheless, there 
were some areas where the findings overlapped.   
Although no quantitative evidence was found for a unique HCN profile, interviewees 
frequently referred to or inferred that HCNs required a distinctive set of 
competences/characteristics, as outlined in the “not every police officer could be a negotiator” 
category within the HCN journey model (Chapter 7).  Similarly, the HCN profile model 
discussed in Chapter 10 identifies a number of specific perceived competencies that are required 
by HCNs in order for them to be effective within the role.  As such, the qualitative and 
quantitative findings are contradictory.  There are a number of potential explanations for these 
contrasting findings.  Firstly, there is a possibility that the selected psychometric tests were not 
sensitive enough to identify subtle differences between the police sub-samples.  Secondly, it 
could be the case that HCNs perceive a “uniqueness” that is not actually warranted/present or 
under-estimate how much these relevant/necessary competencies are represented in non-
negotiator trained officers.  In light of these contradictory findings, follow-up research is 
necessitated to: 1) validate the characteristics perceived to be important by HCNs, as outlined in 
the HCN profile model; 2) to identify if there are measures that are able to identify differences 
in the characteristics/constructs included in this study, 3) to establish if differences exist in 
terms of other characteristics/constructs; and 4) to establish whether or not most officers would 
make effective HCNs. 
   





The findings of this study need to be understood within its methodological limitations. 
As outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, the quantitative findings have to be understood within the 
context of the sampling strategies and the socio-demographic differences between the police and 
student samples.  A police officer profile, for example, might be less apparent when officers are 
compared to employees/professionals in other roles (and when utilising a matched-pairs design).  
It is also important to note that officers and HCNs were not assessed on their 
success/effectiveness within their roles, or for the police officers, their potential as HCNs. Some 
of the police officers included in the study, may possess the skills/competencies that were 
believed to be important for effective HCNs to have, and the HCNs might have varied in their 
levels of effectiveness, which might have masked differences between the groups.  Future 
research could, therefore, attempt to identify whether HCNs who are more successful/effective 
in their role possess different profiles, i.e. levels of the characteristics/skills thought to be 
important, than those who are less successful/effective.  However, assessing 
“success/effectiveness” in this context might be difficult.  Use of speed of resolution as a metric, 
for example, may not always be a valid method of success measurement; there are an infinite 
number of variables that may influence how quickly an incident is resolved, or whether it is 
resolved at all; and the use of the number of successful deployments also poses problems as 
some incidents may simply be more complex/complicated than others (and this may not, for 
example, be related to the skill of the HCN).  A potential solution may be to utilise supervisor 
ratings to identify those HCNs who are perceived as being more successful/effective and this 
could be incorporated into a future research design.  In addition, comparisons should be made 
between officers deemed not suitable for the role of HCN and current/existing HCNs to perhaps 
more clearly identify the characteristics of the profiles of the two groups.  One way of achieving 
this comparison, could be to identify the police officers who were selected to complete the HCN 
training but were unsuccessful in passing the training course.  A direct comparison of those 
officers that passed the training versus those that didn’t might provide one way of identifying 
the attributes/competencies that differentiate successful HCN police officers from non-
negotiator officers in a more nuanced manner (i.e. police officers that apply to become HCNs 
may “on paper” and in the assessment process, present as appropriate candidates for the role, 
however, the intensity of the training may filter out individuals who don’t possess the key 
characteristics/competencies to succeed as a HCN).  Future research would, therefore, benefit 
from exploration of this concept by comparing successful and unsuccessful HCN trainees. 
Furthermore, whilst there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to attest to the effectiveness of 
HCNn as a police tool, there is limited rigorous empirical research evidence that clearly and 





factors.  Firstly, there is a lack of research that specifically identifies whether HCNn is more 
effective than other methods of intervention, for example.  This is mainly because police work 
generally (and HCNn, more specifically) does not lend itself to controlled research whereby 
direct comparisons could be made between different tactical interventions.  It would be 
unethical, for example, to design a study whereby one individual-in-crisis received an HCNn 
response and another received a tactical (i.e. using force) response to compare which was most 
effective!  Similarly, controlled laboratory experiments attempting to identify the effectiveness 
of HCNn would fail to recreate the reality of a HCNn scenario and as such would lack in 
ecological validity.  In addition to this, whilst a HCN may have passed the regional/national 
training course, there is limited evidence to suggest/verify that this officer is an effective HCN 
during live scenarios, or remains to be effective due to a specific lack of re-accreditation once 
they have passed the initial HCN training course.  More broadly, the question regarding HCN 
effectiveness also links to the lack of a centralised HCN deployment database within the UK 
(but this may also apply to other countries), without which it is incredibly difficult to 
measure/assess the effectiveness of HCN as a specific deployment method in hostage/crisis 
scenarios.  The current findings should, therefore, be considered in light of this information, i.e. 
bearing in mind the caveat that whilst HCNn is thought to be effective, specific robust empirical 
evidence to confirm this perception indisputably, is currently lacking.                
 There are well documented issues and debates associated with the perceived lack of 
scientific rigour of qualitative research (Rolfe 2006), which has historically been evaluated on 
the basis of the criteria utilised to evaluate quantitative research (i.e. validity, reliability and 
generalisability) (Noble and Smith 2015).  However, it is now accepted that as these two 
research paradigms differ so significantly in their ethea, philosophical positions and purpose, 
alternative frameworks for establishing rigour are necessary (Guba 1981 and Sandelowski 1993 
and Schofield 2002).  The findings are, of course, limited by the fact that the data represents the 
experiences and perceived realities of 15 HCNs from 9 forces, and therefore, cannot be taken to 
fully and exhaustively represent the experiences of all HCNs within the UK.  Nevertheless, data 
collection, did, however, continue until saturation76 of the data had been achieved, whereby no 
new categories/themes emerged from the interviews (Guest, Bunce and Johnson 2006) and as 
such, enhance the validity of the findings.  The semi-structured nature of the interview schedule 
and the utilisation of both detailed and probing questions throughout the interview helped me to 
reach saturation of data via the creation of a state of epoche77, whereby all judgement was 
                                                          
76 Please refer to Chapter 4 (4.14.2.1.2.) for a full discussion in relation to data saturation. 
77 Epoche is a process that the researcher engages in to remove, or at least become aware of prejudices, 
viewpoints or assumptions regarding the phenomenon under investigation (Katz 1987: 36 cited in Patton 





suspended and interviewees were given “the stage” to discuss their experiences (and ergo 
perceived reality).  Interestingly, this methodological ambience echoes with the state of epoche 
created by HCNs when negotiating with subjects (please see the discussion relating to the 
importance of remaining non-judgemental in Chapters 8 and 10).  
The theoretical models were developed on the basis of the socially constructed realities 
of a sub-sample of the total HCN population in the UK (N = ~800) and I attempted to counteract 
the problems associated with this by utilising HCNs from a range of both rural and metropolitan 
police forces, from a range of ranks/roles within the police service and with a range of lengths 
of experience to attempt to provide a sample that represented a broad cross-section of the 
population.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that the current findings provide a unique 
insight into HCNn within the UK and as such are limited by their application to HCNn within 
other countries.  It is, therefore, difficult to identify whether these models have cross-cultural 
applicability until further research has been conducted to validate these models within different 
countries/cultures.     
Qualitative research has been criticised for its potentially subjective nature, whereby the 
interpretation can be inherently biased (Daly and Lumley 2002).  The grounded theory process 
relies heavily on self-reported data which is provided by the participants and per se, only 
reflects the respondents’ interpretations, in the same way that the findings reflect the 
researcher’s interpretations of these interpretations.  As such, there are two potential layers of 
bias that can be introduced to the interpretation both from the stance of the 
“participant/experiencer” and the “analyst/researcher”.  In addition to achieving a stance of 
epoche as a means of remaining neutral and unbiased throughout the interview, coding and 
analysis phases of the research, I also validated interpretative meaning and ergo methodological 
rigour by allowing participants to view and comment upon the models developed.  Additional 
methods/strategies that were adopted in order to enhance overall credibility and trustworthiness 
of the findings are described in Chapter 4 (4.12.2.1.15). 
Lastly, as a final point worthy of note, several of the participants who were interviewed 
(n = 3) were due to retire soon after taking part in the interview as a result of A19 regulations.  I 
was cognisant that this action could have influenced the data in terms of the polarisation of the 
commentary and that these interviewees may have been more willing to disclose certain 
information or may have been more emotive in their choice of language as a result of this.  This 
fact was borne in mind throughout the analysis and this information was used as a contextual 
backdrop to frame the data collected from these three HCNs.   
 





I would like to acknowledge the fact that an ideal extension to this research would have 
been to explore the actual narratives of HCNn incidents via analysis of live audio-recorded 
negotiator deployments; however, access to such audio-recordings were not granted by the 
National Negotiator Group (NNG).  An attempt to examine such data would have provided an 
opportunity to validate and triangulate the current findings and I feel that this is an important 
next step within the research process that will be explored in due course.   
 
11.5. Recommendations and Implications for Policy and Practice  
11.5.1. Quantitative research phase: Implications and recommendations   
Whilst the findings suggest that the psychometrics used within the current study would 
not be suitable for negotiator selection, they do have a number of implications in relation to the 
selection process and the training/CPD offered to established HCNs.  Taken at face value, the 
findings indicate that HCNs do not possess a unique profile in relation to the constructs 
measured within this research, when compared to their non-negotiator colleagues.  This 
suggests that potentially all police officers (that meet the entry requirements stipulated within 
Chapter 10) could train as HCNs and as such, there is a large pool of officers from which to 
draw the next cadre of trainee HCNs, or even that there is no need for this to be a ‘special’ role 
within the force, since most officers would be capable of performing the role.  Having said this, 
it is important to note that whilst the findings suggest that HCNs are not significantly different 
from their non-negotiator colleagues, this only applies to the constructs that have been measured 
within the current research and it may be that: 1) the psychometric tools utilised are not 
sensitive enough to identify differences that do exist; or 2) HCNs may differ in relation to 
constructs that have not been measured within the current research.  As such, it is important to 
more clearly understand the competencies/characteristics that are currently assessed as part of 
the selection process and to further validate whether these competencies are in fact linked to 
effective performance within the HCN role (i.e. candidates are assessed on aspects such as 
team-working ability and communication skills but these constructs have yet to be assessed in 
terms of predictive validity for effective negotiation performance).  
More generically, the findings indicate that police officers could utilise cognitive coping 
strategies that are considered to be adaptive/functional more frequently.  In addition, a bespoke 
form of cognitive coping skills/cognitive emotion regulation training could be developed to 
encourage officers to utilise adaptive coping mechanisms in response to operational stress.  This 
would be likely to have a positive impact on officer health and wellbeing, as more adaptive 





associated with certain forms of psychopathology (such as depression, anxiety and suicidality) 
(Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002).  The findings also implicate the potential role of EI 
training for both negotiator and non-negotiator trained police officers, in light of the theoretical 
association between the need to be able to identify and control emotions (both in terms of self 
and others) and conflict resolution tasks that are often required within police work.  Further 
research to evaluate the effectiveness of bespoke coping skills/EI training for officers would 
enable more specific recommendations to be made in relation to these constructs.       
 
11.5.2. Qualitative research phase: Implications and recommendations  
11.5.2.1. The UK hostage and crisis negotiator journey model: Implications and 
recommendations.   
This model depicts the way HCNs are selected, trained and supported and provides a 
consensus in relation to similarities observed across different geographical regions and 
territorial forces.  This is helpful as it indicates that whilst each force may operate individually 
(and have slightly different internal policies and procedures), there are aspects of 
selection/training processes and operational activity/support that are consistent across force 
boundaries.   
In particular, this model identifies the perceived importance of “on-the-job training” and 
operational experience and suggests that new/trainee HCNs should be given as much 
opportunity as possible to shadow/observe qualified HCNs within live scenarios (as far as 
operationally possible) prior to completing the regional/national training course.  This would 
also enable interested parties to get a “feel for the role” and to identify whether it is “right for 
them”.  The model also highlights the concept of negotiation being a perishable skill and 
suggests that HCNs would benefit from more regular opportunities to practise these skills in 
terms of live scenario-based exercises.  The UK could potentially benefit from adopting a 
system utilised within the USA whereby HCNs have to attend monthly training/CPD sessions 
and complete a full hostage/crisis incident training exercise in collaboration with the SWAT 
team on a monthly basis. 
The findings also implicate the role of reflexivity within the discipline and the 
importance of being able to utilise CPD opportunities to share best practice and learn from 
mistakes.  As such, it seems prudent to recommend that opportunities for such CPD should 
continue and be enhanced/increased where logistically possible.  Investing in negotiator CPD in 
this way would enable HCNs to remain skilled and effectively equipped to respond to 





academic/practice developments within the field (and remain “current”), which in turn is likely 
to increase negotiator skill sets and confidence within their abilities.        
Lastly, and probably most importantly, the model suggests that negotiator confidence is 
positively correlated with negotiator deployment, with HCNs unanimously indicating that their 
confidence increased the more incidents they attended.  Operational experience is, therefore, a 
vital component within the negotiator skill set and HCNs (particularly newly qualified HCNs) 
would benefit from more opportunities to attend live incidents (perhaps in a 
shadowing/observational format).  Whilst HCNs can be trained to utilise the core 
communication skills and strategies that are deemed to effective, it is more difficult to train 
HCNs in relation to incident command process and how the negotiator cell operates in relation 
to the silver/bronze commander etc.  These dynamics are likely to differ from incident to 
incident and as such it is impossible to provide HCNs with an understanding of exactly how 
incidents are managed from a textbook perspective.  This is, however, something that could be 
trained via observational methods and allowing newly qualified HCNs (or those interested in 
training as HCNs) to observe the policies/procedures adopted within the police response to 
hostage/crisis incidents.  
 
11.5.2.2. The UK-centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of hostage and crisis 
negotiation: Implications and recommendations.  
This model provides an insight into the processes and protocols that UK HCNs follow 
when they are deployed and identifies the breadth of tasks that HCNs need to complete when 
attempting to de-escalate and resolve such incidents.  The model highlights the wider role of the 
negotiator in terms of identifying the tasks that fall outside of the negotiator-subject dialogue 
component (i.e. stages 1 and 3 within the model) and differs from many of the pre-existing 
models as a result of this.  The majority of pre-existing negotiation models (i.e. see models 
described in Grubb (2010)/Chapter 2) have tended to focus on the style of communication and 
type of dialogue used by HCNs when attempting to de-escalate hostage/crisis incidents, as 
opposed to identifying the wider roles performed by HCNs which equally form part of the 
overall “jigsaw puzzle”.  The model will enable future cross-cultural comparisons to be 
completed by providing a baseline model for such comparisons.  The development of this model 
has enabled a number of recommendations to be made.  Specifically, the findings:       
 Identify the importance of the initial phases of the deployment process, in particular, the 
role of information/intelligence gathering which has been identified as a vital 





suggest that information/intelligence gathering should continue to be emphasised and 
that this role should commence as soon as the deployment call is received.  Similarly, 
the model identifies the importance of risk assessment within the negotiation protocol, 
and highlights the need for this to be a dynamic assessment which is continuously 
conducted throughout the negotiation, with the intention of keeping all parties involved 
in the incident safe. 
 Highlight the importance of entering into early communication with the subject and 
suggest that any communication is better than none.  To some extent, this reinforces the 
importance of communication being initiated by early responders, until trained HCNs 
can reach the scene and provides support for first responders (and potentially call 
handlers) being trained in basic crisis intervention skills/strategies (such as the person-
centred principles and active listening skills referred to in Chapter 8). 
 Emphasise the importance of HCNs having access to a “toolbox” or negotiator 
repertoire in terms of potential techniques and strategies that can be used to de-
escalate/resolve HCNn incidents.  Negotiators therefore need to continue to learn a 
breadth of techniques that can be selected or adapted in line with the subject/scenario 
that they encounter.    
 Identify a number of strategies/stratagems that are utilised by HCNs (including those 
which are most frequently utilised and are deemed to be effective) and can be used to 
validate/inform regional/national negotiator training courses.  Please refer to Table 11.1 
in Appendix 31 for details of an example training document.  In particular, the findings 
validate the importance of active listening as a core underpinning technique within 
negotiation, a finding which is well-established within the negotiation literature (Call 
2003, Lanceley 1999, McMains 2002, McMains and Mullins 1996, Miller 2005, 
Noesner 1999, Noesner and Webster 1997, Slatkin 1996, 2005, Van Hasselt, Romano 
and Vecchi 2008 and Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005); and suggest that training 
for both new and established HCNs should focus on enhancement of this skill, perhaps 
utilising the M.O.R.E.P.I.E.S. mnemonic method developed by the CNU of the FBI78 
(n.d. cited in Gaunt 2016).  Training could also incorporate the Active Listening Skills 
Target79 developed by the CNU of the FBI (Dalfonzo and Deitrick 2015) as an 
                                                          
78 M.O.R.E.P.I.E.S. is an acronym/mnemonic used to encourage the recall of the different active listening 
skills that can be utilised within crisis situations.  M = Minimal encouragers; O = Open-ended questions, 
R = Reflecting/Mirroring, E = Emotional labelling, P = Paraphrasing, I = Use of “I” Statements, E = 
Effective Pauses and S = Summary (CNU, FBI n.d. cited in Gaunt 2016). 
79 The Active Listening Skills Target can be used to create a visual representation of the negotiator’s 





assessment tool for evaluating the effectiveness of negotiator active listening skills 
within simulated or “back-to-back” training/role play scenarios. 
 Highlight the importance of person-centred therapy principles within the negotiation 
process and validate the use of pseudo-therapeutic techniques more broadly.  As such, 
they provide evidence to incorporate such principles into regional/national training 
packages and implicate the potential role of more specific bespoke training on pseudo-
therapeutic techniques (i.e. such as the use of person-centred/solution focused therapy 
principles and motivational interviewing techniques).   
 Emphasise the importance of debriefing for HCNs and their wider police colleagues and 
suggest that debriefing should be performed more consistently and thoroughly both as a 
means of CPD and for negotiator welfare purposes.  Debriefing should be completed in 
line with the College of Policing (2013) Briefing and Debriefing Policy. 
 Identify the importance of both formal record keeping and defensible decision-making 
within the negotiation process.  Negotiators need to be accountable for their actions and 
their decisions may be subject to scrutiny at coroner’s court or IPCC proceedings.  As 
such, HCNs need to ensure that they consistently record their actions and that they 
engage in decision-making that is both justifiable and formally recorded. 
 Suggest that the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. acronym80 could be utilised as a mnemonic within 
negotiator training/CPD in order to highlight the key aspects within the negotiation 
procedural model (i.e. from deployment to debriefing) that need to be completed by 
HCNs when responding to and successfully resolving hostage/crisis incidents.  Please 
refer to Appendix 32 for details of an exemplar crib sheet that could be used within 
negotiator training/CPD for these purposes. 
 
11.5.2.3. The UK hostage and crisis negotiator experience model: Implications and 
recommendations.   
This model provides a unique insight into the experiences of police HCNs in the UK 
from an operational, professional and personal perspective.  The negotiation positives suggest 
that being a negotiator can be an incredibly positive experience and that the discipline is both 
personally and professionally rewarding.  Some HCNs even identified the role as being their 
core reason for coming to work, thereby further attesting to the rewarding nature of the role for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
to Dalfonzo and Deitrick (2015) for more details in relation to the target and how it can be utilised within 
HCN training. 
80 The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Acronym: D = Deployment, I = Information/intelligence gathering, A = 
Assessment of threat/risk, M = Methods of Communication, O = Open dialogue with subject, N = 





some officers.  Others identified the rewards associated with negotiation as being unique to the 
discipline and these findings implicate the benefits and added value that HCNs felt as a result of 
being part of the negotiator cadre.  This provides justification for the existence of the negotiator 
role, which is mutually beneficial, both for subjects who are in crisis/conflict and the HCNs 
whose job it is to resolve these situations.  As such, aspects of the model could be used within 
recruitment strategies as a means of encouraging officers to apply for the role. 
In contrast, the negotiation negatives category indicates that there is scope for 
improvement within the discipline to enhance practice and improve negotiator experiences.  As 
such, this allows for a number of recommendations to be made in light of HCNs’ experiences, 
including:  
 Trying to more clearly differentiate the roles of negotiator/commander via educating and 
training staff on the negotiator role and remit.  This could be achieved by increasing and/or 
enhancing awareness training provided to commanders and HCNs to try to avoid 
operational rank/role conflict on scene (i.e., to ensure that both parties stick to the 
“negotiators negotiate and commanders command rule”).  
 Ensuring that HCNs are deployed in pairs (where logistically possible) and trying to 
minimise the length of time that primary HCNs are negotiating on their own so as to reduce 
the pressure/stress experienced as a result of “negotiating solo”. 
 Raising awareness of the benefits of using HCNs within the firearms world and trying to 
educate firearms commanders/teams in terms of why HCNs play the “long game” and how 
negotiation can successfully resolve situations without the need for tactical intervention.  
This should help to reduce some of the stress caused as a result of competing tactical 
orientations held by HCNs and firearms commanders. 
 Raising awareness of the negotiator role within forces and trying to increase internal “public 
relations and marketing” associated with the role so that control room operators, duty 
inspectors and anyone else involved in the deployment of HCNs are aware of the benefit of 
utilising HCNs and the appropriate incidents in which to deploy them.  Part of this could 
also involve training first responders/uniformed officers in terms of the HCNn 
procedures/protocol (and in particular highlighting the importance of scene 
control/maintenance of a sterile environment).  Overall, greater publicising of the work that 
HCNs do may also help to enhance awareness of the role within the force and to encourage 
financial and general support for HCNs. 
 Professionalising the discipline by standardising the procedures that are utilised to recruit, 
select, train and support HCNs.  This would involve ensuring that the selection criteria and 





receive a standardised accredited training course, which is (ideally) accredited and validated 
by an external institution/organisation, to ensure that both regional and national training 
courses are working to the same curriculum.  Provision of more regular “refresher training” 
would also allow HCNs to remain accredited and ensure that the members of the cadre are 
appropriately skilled and equipped to deal with hostage and crisis situations.  This could be 
performed annually, for example, and could involve a blended learning CPD course which 
could be delivered online initially with a face-to-face assessment component used to 
conduct a skills based assessment.  In addition, standardisation of the deployment logs and 
recording processes would allow for better empirical comparison of deployments and ergo 
enable a statistical/epidemiological picture of the nature and extent of UK HCNn to be 
developed81.  This would then have a secondary benefit in terms of being able to inform the 
training and CPD of HCNs using an evidence base (thereby meeting the needs of the 
requirement for more emphasis on evidence-based policing, as suggested by the College of 
Policing (2014c) Five Year Strategy document). 
 Whilst it may not be financially possible/feasible to enhance the financial remuneration 
HCNs receive, the findings indicate that it is recognition and feeling valued by the 
organisation that are perceived as more important forms of remuneration by HCNs 
themselves.  Enhancing the personal recognition by superiors of the work that HCNs do, by 
perhaps acknowledging the number of incidents that the cadre have successfully resolved on 
an annual basis may be one way to do this.  Provision of a certificate for individual HCNs 
would also allow them to keep a formal record of their negotiation deployments and could 
be utilised within appraisal/personal development procedures.  Simply raising awareness of 
the nature of the role (and the work that HCNs do on top of their daily tasks) within the 
higher echelons of the organisation may help to encourage greater recognition and 
remuneration for HCNs. 
 Increasing the awareness of the negotiator role within management levels may help to avoid 
some of the problems associated with dual-role conflict, although the logistics associated 
with having to manage missed deadlines associated with their day job or problems 
associated with exceeding the working time directive may not be as easily resolved.  Many 
of these problems may, in fact, be down to individual differences within management styles 
and, as such, may not be easily resolved by this approach. 
 Whilst the nature of the role dictates that HCNs are likely to experience a negative impact 
on their personal, family and social lives, greater recognition of the importance of the role 
                                                          
81 Work is currently underway to standardise the deployment logs/record utilised by HCNs (and this work 
is being led by Louis Provart from Norfolk Constabulary in collaboration with the National Negotiator 





and greater appreciation of the work that they do within the force would help to negate 
some of the sacrifices that they make in relation to these aspects of their lives. 
 Better budgetary/financial support for HCNs would help HCNs to feel valued and supported 
within their role.  Whilst this does not necessarily mean increased individual financial 
remuneration, the provision of an increased budget would allow cadres to be provided with 
appropriate equipment (i.e. clothing, recording equipment etc.) and it would also enable 
greater opportunities for HCNs to undergo CPD and/or specific training events which are 
likely to have a positive impact on their negotiation performance. 
 Whilst it is not feasible to suggest an alternative to negotiation as a voluntary position in the 
UK due to the overall lack of demand for HCNs on a full time basis, increasing awareness, 
recognition and remuneration for HCNs would go some way to alleviate the negativities 
associated with negotiation being viewed as a “Cinderella service”.  The role of the HCN is 
an important one which deserves appropriate recognition on the basis of the excellent work 
that is performed by HCNs across the country on a daily basis.  Without HCNs, there is no 
doubt that many individuals would die, or be seriously injured; as such, this role should be 
given more credence within the policing arena and HCNs should be credited more highly 
for the work that they do.   
Findings in relation to the negotiation ambivalences category suggest that the discipline 
of negotiation has evolved over the past ten-fifteen years in terms of the nature, frequency and 
style of negotiation.  Changes in deployment frequency and nature may be attributed to changes 
in police technology and equipment (such as the implementation of Taser), whereas changes in 
the style and method of communication are likely to be as a result of changes within society in 
relation to the ‘digital era’.  These findings suggest the need for HCNs to be flexible in terms of 
adapting to the ever changing ‘terrain’ that they may be exposed to.  Negotiators need to be able 
to adapt their styles to whatever incidents they may be deployed to and this also relates to the 
need for HCNs to stay up-to-date with evolving incidents so that they are equipped to deal with 
new and different situations that they may encounter.  Negotiators also need to be able to 
respond to subjects utilising a variety of different communication methods (i.e. text, email, 
social networking/chat) and as such would benefit from specific bespoke training which 
addresses the use of said communication methods within negotiation contexts.  Lastly, this 
category suggests that it might be prudent to work with HCNs further in terms of identifying 
whether stress is an issue and whether resiliency training/bespoke coping skills training would 






11.5.2.4. The self-perceived successful hostage and crisis negotiator profile model: 
Implications and recommendations.   
This model highlights the competencies that are considered important for effective 
HCNs and provides a basis for the selection criteria utilised by police forces.  The majority of 
the competencies are ostensibly assessed via the current selection processes implemented within 
individual forces, although the exact competency assessment/interview questions may differ 
slightly across forces.  However, there are a number of other competencies, mostly in relation to 
negotiator attributes, that could be assessed more formally as part of the selection process.  In 
the main, this applies to constructs that might be considered to be “softer skills”, such as the 
ability to actively listen and the ability to empathise with others; these are skills that could be 
measured by psychometric tests such as the Active Empathic Listening Scale (Bodie 2011 and 
Drollinger, Comer and Warrington 2006), for example.  Similarly, psychometrics are available 
that measure physical and emotional resilience and could be utilised to assess the extent to 
which candidates possess the ability to cope with adversity/emotional stress/recover from 
traumatic incidents (i.e. the Resilience Test; St. Jean, Tidman and Jerabek 2001; the Resilience 
Quotient; Russell and Russell 2009).  The latter of these, could also be used to assess the 
attribute of “flexibility” (i.e. a specific facet of resilience) suggested as necessary for HCNs to 
succeed in their role.   
More generally, the profile outlined in the model could be utilised as a crib sheet to 
develop/inform questions used in the application process/interview to select candidates to 
complete the regional/national negotiator training course.  Scenario-based/situational judgement 
questions, for example, could be developed as a means of identifying candidates who possess 
higher levels of the necessary/identified skills/attributes.  Alternatively, the model could simply 
be used to validate/provide credibility to existing selection methods.  Please refer to Table 11.2 
in Appendix 33 for details of an exemplar assessment information sheet that could be used to 
inform current selection processes.  
 
11.6. Future Directions 
 This thesis provides a platform for further research to be conducted as a means of 
further validating the current findings and enhancing our understanding of HCNn as an entity.  
Research utilising a matched pairs design and/or more rigorously comparable control groups 
would address some of the aforementioned limitations associated with the comparison samples 
utilised and ensure that participants were more similar demographically.  In addition, it would 





possessed by police officers within different specialist roles within the police (i.e. uniformed 
officers, Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers, Authorised Firearms Officers 
(AFOs), dog handlers etc.) to identify whether these officers differ in their socio-psychological 
profiles.  In light of some of the findings in relation to competing tactical orientations 
highlighted within the current research, one particular comparison that is of interest and has 
implications for selection processes concerns the comparison of the traits and characteristics 
possessed by HCNs and AFOs. 
It would also be beneficial to explore the possibility that whilst the current findings 
have failed to identify a unique HCN profile, it may be the case that HCNs do differ from their 
non-negotiator colleagues, albeit on constructs that were outside of the remit of the current 
research.  I, therefore, suggest that it would be beneficial to conduct follow-up research that 
compares these two samples in terms of “softer skills” (i.e. active listening, empathy, 
compassion etc.), as the findings from the qualitative research phase indicate that HCNs may in 
fact constitute a unique sub-group, but that it may be a different set of traits/characteristics that 
differentiate them from the overall police population.  Research utilising the Active Empathic 
Listening Scale (Bodie 2011 and Drollinger, Comer and Warrington 2006), for example, could 
help to identify whether such differences exist.  Similarly, whilst the findings have failed to 
identify a unique HCN profile with respect to personality (as measured by the BFI), recent 
developments within the field have led to the concept of the big five personality factors being 
expanded to include six major dimensions of personality.  These dimensions consist of: 
Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness (versus anger), 
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience (Ashton, Lee and de Vries 2014).  The addition 
of the honesty-humility dimension may be particularly salient to the current study, with 
reference to the identification of honesty as both an attribute that is perceived as being required 
for police officers to be successful HCNs (as discussed in Chapter 10) and a skill that is used by 
HCNs as a HCNn strategy when trying to resolve hostage/crisis incidents (as discussed in 
Chapter 8).  Follow up research would therefore benefit from the utilisation of a psychometric 
personality test that measures honesty in addition to the other five personality factors, such as 
the HEXACO-60 (Ashton and Lee 2009) to establish whether HCNs demonstrate higher levels 
of trait honesty-humility than non-negotiator police officers. 
In addition to this suggestion, whilst lengthier discussion of the correlations between 
variables was beyond the remit of the current thesis, however, it is worth noting that it is 
possible that the combination/constellation of certain variables may serve to differentiate 
between the HCN and non-negotiator trained police officer samples (as discussed in the Chapter 





differences between the HCN and police officers in terms of correlations between personality 
traits and cognitive emotion regulation strategies, personality traits and cognitive emotion 
regulation strategies, personality traits and decision-making styles, cognitive emotion regulation 
strategies and emotional intelligence, and coping style strategies and decision-making styles.  
These initial findings, therefore identify a possible direction for future research in terms of 
ascertaining whether HCNs possess certain constellations of the constructs/variables measured 
and whether these constellations constitute something that differentiates HCNs from their non-
negotiator colleagues.       
 It would also be prudent to cross-culturally validate the findings from both the 
quantitative and qualitative phases of the study.  A semi-replication of the quantitative phase of 
the research has already been completed within the USA (see: Young 2016) to identify the 
characteristics and traits of USA HCNs and I plan to conduct comparative follow-up research to 
compare the UK and USA findings and establish whether HCNs from the UK/USA differ in 
relation to personality, decision-making style and cognitive emotion regulation.  In addition, I 
have started follow-up qualitative research within the USA with a sample of HCNs (n = 10) 
from two police departments in Lubbock, Texas, with the intention of developing an Anglo-
American model of HCNn.  
Furthermore, whilst the current findings provide an insight into the types of incident 
that HCNs are typically deployed to within the UK, they fail to empirically validate the 
frequency with which these different categories of incident are encountered or to identify the 
specific characteristics that are associated with typical deployments (i.e., use of weapons, 
subject intoxication, prevalence of mental health problems/suicidal ideation etc.).  To date, it 
has been very difficult to conduct research which identifies these characteristics due to the lack 
of a centrally organised database system/mutually agreed upon system for recording incidents 
across the 43 territorial police forces within England and Wales.  More recently, however, work 
is underway to establish a centralised database that can be used to record HCNn deployments in 
a systemised and identical manner across all forces and these developments will therefore allow 
for future quantitative research to be conducted to empirically identify the nature and 
characteristics of HCNn in an epidemiological fashion.  This database can be used, for example, 
to establish the types of incident that HCNs are typically deployed to; the characteristics of such 
deployments; and to identify potential “hot spots” and areas that require target hardening etc.  
Such findings would have immense implications for policy/practice and could be used to 
directly inform HCNn training/CPD and operational practice within the UK. 
Similarly, aspects of the other qualitative models developed as a result of the current 





strategies, styles and techniques used by HCNs within the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model 
could be empirically validated via the use of live HCNn incident transcripts (however, these 
transcripts are difficult to access as a result of confidentiality and RIPA82 regulations).  
Nevertheless, the author purports that if access to such data were granted, follow-up research of 
this nature would be beneficial to inform HCNn policy and practice83.  For example, 
identification, in particular, of those strategies that are more successful versus those that aren’t, 
would be particularly informative for HCNn training/CPD by providing a basis for “what 
works” within the HCNn arena. 
  
11.7. Significance of the Study 
 The findings from the current study have a number of implications and applications in 
terms of policy and practice for operationally active HCNs.  The research was always intended 
to have an applied focus whereby the findings could be utilised to inform and enhance the 
current practice for UK HCNs.  In line with this ethos, the key implications of the findings are 
listed below: 
 
 Identification of the traits and characteristics possessed by HCNs can be used to inform 
the selection of future trainee HCNs.  
 Identification of potential training needs of HCNs (i.e. whether they are utilising 
maladaptive/dysfunctional coping styles/strategies or could be utilising adaptive 
strategies more frequently) can be used to inform training/CPD for current HCNs. 
 This research represents the first attempt at providing an insight into UK HCNn and 
understanding the experiences of UK HCNs.  In particular, the findings identify positive 
and negative aspects of the role that can be used to inform the selection, training and 
operational support/welfare of HCNs.  
 The research develops a process/procedural model of HCNn which identifies how 
HCNs respond to and resolve hostage/crisis incidents in the UK; findings that can be 
used to inform training/CPD of HCNs in terms of identifying best practice and what is 
effective when negotiating hostage/crisis incidents.  
 The findings can be used to validate current best practice and to further improve, 
standardise and professionalise the discipline of HCNn within the UK.   
                                                          
82 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
83 A similar approach was adopted by Giebels and Noelanders (2004) whereby live negotiation transcripts 
were used to validate the “Table of Ten” content and relational strategies utilised by HCNs within 35 





The current thesis, therefore, makes a direct contribution to the existing literature base, thereby 
enhancing our understanding of the entity of police HCNn. 
 
11.8. Conclusion 
 The current thesis constitutes one of the first empirical academic insights into the HCNn 
discipline within the UK.  The findings have identified 1) the characteristics possessed by 
HCNs, 2) the typical situational characteristics and parameters of UK hostage/crisis incidents, 
3) the strategies, styles and techniques utilised by HCNs when successfully resolving 
hostage/crisis incidents, 4) the procedures in place for the recruitment, selection, training and 
operational support of HCNs and 5) the self-perceived competencies of successful/effective 
HCNs.  These findings have been used to make recommendations in relation to current policy 
and practice for operationally active HCNs and as such have implications for understanding and 
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Appendix 1.  Glossary of Key Terms and Phrases 
Term/Phrase Meaning 
Cold Debrief refers to a debrief which takes place a period of time after the 
operation/event/incident has been resolved. 
Critical Incident Manager (CIM) refers to “a substantive or temporary Inspector who is available 
for immediate deployment to incidents within Local Police 
Authorities throughout 24 hours acting as the Duty Officer. 
Following notification of an incident, the CIM is to consider 
either assuming command as Silver as soon as possible, or to 
ensure the appointment of an appropriate Silver Commander 
with immediate effect. The CIM will have a responsibility to 
include Critical Incident management” (Devon and Cornwall 
Police 2013). 
Firearms Strategic Commander 
(Bronze) 
is “responsible for developing the firearms strategy and ensuring 
that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it” 
(ACPO and NPIA 2009).    
Firearms Tactical Advisor (TA)  “advises on the capabilities and limitations of Authorised 
Firearms Officers and other police resources being deployed.  
They are responsible for advising the Strategic or Tactical 
Firearms Commander on the implication of any tactical 
parameters which have been set and the available tactical options 
with the existing strategy and any tactical parameters set.  They 
advise the Firearms Commanders on the tactical considerations, 
contingencies and implications for each tactical option and 
should be in position to assist and advise the Tactical Firearms 
Commander at all stages of the operation.  They provide tactical 
advice reflecting the existing threat assessment and ensure that 
advice given is recorded” (ACPO, ACPOS and NPIA 2011). 
Force Incident Manager (FIM) refers to “a substantive Inspector located in one of the Control 
Rooms, who acts as Force Duty Officer, performing a passive 
GOLD Command role on behalf of ACPO ranks within the 





Force Negotiator Coordinator 
Leads 
 “work with the regional negotiator coordinator to support 
operational readiness of negotiators within the region” (ACPO 
and NPIA 2011).   
Gold Commander refers to the individual who is in overall strategic organisational 
control of resources in order to resolve an incident.  They will be 
responsible for formulating a strategy to deal with the incident 
and tend to be off site/scene.  “The Gold Commander is in 
overall strategic command of the operation and sets the 
overarching strategy that all other plans must take account of” 
(ACPO and NPIA 2009). 
Gold Negotiator Advisors (GNA) are “experienced negotiator coordinators trained to support Gold 
Commanders with advice on negotiation.  GNAs are likely to 
provide support for Gold Commanders in response to more 
complex incidents such as criminal or terrorist sieges” (ACPO 
and NPIA 2011).   
Hooks refers to the term that negotiators use to describe areas of 
discussion which are worth pursuing with the subject and may 
prove fruitful in helping the negotiator to build a relationship 
with the subject.  The term can be used to refer to conciliatory or 
de-escalatory topics of conversation. 
Hostage 
 
refers to a person seized or held as security for the fulfilment of 
a condition (Hostage n.d.). 
Hostage and Crisis Negotiators 
(HCNs) 
are police officers who are “trained to respond to a wide variety 
of incidents, which include suicide intervention and domestic 
barricades as well as high-risk hostage situations such as 
criminal or terrorist incidents” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).  A 
negotiator is an officer trained to negotiate with subjects to 
resolve an operation peacefully, and to gather information which 
may assist as part of the intelligence-gathering process (ACPO, 
ACPOS and NPIA 2011).   
Hostage Negotiator Coordinators 
(HNCs) 
are “experienced negotiators trained to provide specialist support 
for incident commanders by advising on the development and 





likely to provide additional specialist support for incident 
commanders when there is an immediate risk of serious harm or 
death, or in response to more complex or prolonged incidents.  
The HNC is also responsible for ensuring that the negotiating 
plan that has been agreed with the incident commander is 
implemented by the Negotiator Cell” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).   
Hostage Situation refers to an incident whereby a subject holds another person or 
persons for the purpose of forcing the fulfilment of substantive 
demands upon a third party, usually law enforcement (Noesner 
1999). 
Hostage-Taker (HT) refers to a person who seizes or holds someone as security for 
the fulfilment of a condition (Hostage-Taker n.d.). 
Hot Debrief refers to a debrief which takes place immediately after the 
operation/event/incident.  
Individual-in-Crisis (IiC) refers to an individual who is experiencing some form of 
personal/ emotional/ psychological crisis and is threatening to 
either harm themselves or someone else. 
International Negotiator Cadre consists of a team of negotiators from a variety of police forces 
in the UK (normally high ranking and trained as HNCs) who are 
available to be deployed to support hostage incidents abroad.   
Kidnap to abduct (someone) and hold them captive, typically to obtain a 
ransom (Kidnap n.d.). 
National Negotiator Group (NNG) “is a national network of negotiators who share best practice and 
are able to provide mutual support in seeking to bring incidents 
to a successful conclusion.  The group is responsible for 
exercising strategic oversight of police negotiation” (ACPO and 
NPIA 2011). 
National Negotiator Training refers to a two week training course that is run by the 
Metropolitan police and takes place at Hendon police training 
college.  This training course equips police officers with the 
skills necessary to be able to respond to hostage-taking 
incidents.  Police officers who have completed this training are 





Negotiation Position Papers are used by negotiation teams to help summarise and synopsise 
the hostage and/or crisis incident currently being dealt with.  
They typically include information relating to the status (an 
overall description of the incident), assessment (an analysis of 
the incident) and recommendations (guidance and strategy) in 
relation to the incident (Dalfonzo and Romano 2003).  This 
information can be used to brief bronze commanders on the 
situation as it progresses and also acts as a method of record 
keeping in line with police policy and procedure.   
Negotiator Cell refers to the area which is dedicated for hostage negotiators to 
work from when negotiating an incident.  In some cases, the cell 
would be set up in a mobile operations vehicle (if available or 
required) but more often than not, the cell will be set up in a 
room within a building or police station (or vehicle) where 
negotiators can set up their team and equipment (as necessary).  
In reality, a full negotiator cell is only set up on large and 
protracted incidents involving a full team of negotiators. 
Nonhostage Situation refers to an incident whereby an individual acts in an emotional, 
senseless, and often self-destructive way (Noesner 1999). 
POLKA (Police OnLine 
Knowledge Area) 
refers to an internal online platform which is used to disseminate 
information to police officers within the UK.  “POLKA is a 
secure online collaboration tool for the policing community to 
network, ask questions, share insights, discuss ideas and suggest 
new ways of working” (The College of Policing 2015). 
Primary Negotiator (a.k.a. “The 
Number 1”) 
refers to the individual who is directly involved in 
communications with the subject.  Communications are initiated 
by the primary negotiator and all communications with the 
subject are conducted through the primary negotiator (however, 
the individual performing this role may change as practicable). 
Public Order Strategic 
Commander (Bronze) 
is “responsible for developing the public order strategy and 
ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to 
support it”  (ACPO and NPIA 2009). 





and extortion/ransom situation. 
Red Centre Negotiator (a.k.a. Red 
Negotiator) 
refers to “a crisis negotiator who is additionally trained to 
provide support in relation to offences of kidnap and extortion” 
(ACPO and NPIA 2011). 
Red Centre Training Force Lead refers to a negotiator who is responsible for the training and 
organisation of kidnap and extortion (i.e. red centre) situations 
within their force. 
Regional Negotiator Coordinators  “form the membership of the National Negotiator Group 
exercising strategic oversight of police negotiation” (ACPO and 
NPIA 2011). 
Regional Negotiator Training refers to a one week training course within the UK run 
regionally which equips police officers with the skills necessary 
to be able to respond to crisis situations.   Police officers who 
have completed this training are often referred to as “Level 2 
Trained” negotiators. 
Secondary Negotiator (a.k.a. “The 
Number 2”) 
refers to the negotiator who is supporting the primary negotiator 
in his/her role.  The secondary negotiator will be listening to the 
conversation and providing suggestions to the primary negotiator 
in terms of communication style and/or content. The secondary 
negotiator is also required to feed information to other members 
of the negotiator team and/or the firearms tactical advisor as 
necessary.   
Silver Commander refers to the individual who manages the strategic direction from 
the gold commander and creates a number of actions to be 
carried out by the bronze commander at the scene.  “The Silver 
Commander coordinates the individual strategies developed by 
the Firearms and Public Order Strategic Commanders (Bronze) 
to ensure that they reflect and contribute to Gold’s overarching 
strategy” (ACPO and NPIA 2009). 
Subject refers to the person that the hostage and crisis negotiator is 
communicating with (i.e. either a hostage-taker or individual in 
crisis). 





surrender/end the incident and exit the hostage/crisis situation.  
This process will have been mutually agreed between the subject 
and the HCN prior to the execution of the surrender ritual.  The 
exit plan will also include logistical factors such as which part of 
the building/area the subject may need to exit from, and how 
they should do this to prevent any parties being injured.  This 
may also include factors such as ensuring that all hostages have 
been released prior to the subject exiting the premises/area, 
ensuring that the subject is no longer armed when he/she exits 
the premises/area, specific requests by the subject to save face 
(i.e. covering face to avoid media coverage) etc. The term 
‘surrender ritual’ tends to be utilised within hostage-taking 
incidents/incidents involving victims and the term ‘exit plan’ 
tends to be utilised within crisis incidents. 
Third Party Intermediary (TPI) is the term used to describe an individual who speaks to the 
hostage-taker or individual in crisis on behalf of the negotiator.  
TPIs often include family members or friends of the hostage-
taker or individual in crisis. 
Tiger Kidnap is the term used by the police to describe an incident that 
involves the short-term hostage-taking of family members of 
someone who has immediate access to cash or valuables. The 
captives are frequently held overnight and the aim of the 
criminals is to frighten their victims to such a degree that they 
will not contact the Police, even when they have an opportunity 
to do so (Police Service of Northern Ireland 2013). 
Trauma Risk incident 
Management (TRiM) 
is a welfare led process intended to assess the response of a 
member of staff (including certain affiliated groups such as 
special constables) exposed to a potentially traumatic incident 
(Kent Police 2014). 
Triggers (a.k.a. Barbs; a.k.a. Hot 
Points/Buttons) 
refers to the term that negotiators use to describe areas of 
discussion which should be avoided as they may serve to 
aggravate the subject or escalate the situation.  The term can be 





Appendix 2.  List of Key Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Abbreviation/Acronym Full Terminology 
ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers 
AFO Authorised Firearms Officer 
BFI The Big Five Inventory 
BIDR The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding  
CERQ The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
CIM Critical Incident Manager 
CST-R The Coping Skills Test-Revised 
DFA Discriminant Function Analysis 
EDL English Defence League 
EI Emotional Intelligence 
FIM Force Incident Manager 
GDMS The General Decision-Making Style Questionnaire 
Genos EII The Genos Emotional Intelligence Inventory 
GNA Gold Negotiator Advisor 
HCN Hostage and Crisis Negotiator 
HCNn Hostage and Crisis Negotiation 
HCNs Hostage and Crisis Negotiators 
HNC Hostage Negotiator Coordinator 
HT Hostage-Taker 
IiC Individual-in-Crisis 
MISPER Missing Person 
NNG National Negotiator Group 
NNWG National Negotiator Working Group 
NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency (No longer in existence) 
NPP Negotiator Position Papers 
NSO Negotiator Support Officer 
PN Primary Negotiator 
POLKA Police OnLine Knowledge Area 
SN Secondary Negotiator 
TA Firearms Tactical Advisor 





Appendix 3.  Exemplar Gatekeeper Permission Letter (Sanitised Version) 
Miss Amy Rose Grubb 







Telephone: 024 7688 8795 
Fax: 024 7688 8300 
Email: amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk 
 
Friday the 23rd of October 2009 
 
Dear Superintendent [Anonymised], 
 
I am writing to request permission to carry out a piece of research relating to Hostage (Crisis) 
Negotiation within the UK.  My research is designed to look at the use of hostage negotiation by 
trained hostage negotiators within the UK Police Force.  The aim of the research is to devise/compile 
a preliminary model of British based hostage negotiation, in the absence of comprehensive UK-
based research on this topic.  The current research on hostage negotiation is currently heavily 
biased towards US based techniques and procedures for crisis/hostage situations, utilised by both 
police forces and the FBI in the USA.  I hope that the results will provide an insight into UK-based 
negotiation experiences and yield direction for the development, training and selection of police 
negotiators in the future.   
 
The proposed research has been discussed with both [Anonymised] and [Anonymised] Negotiators 
and both parties have agreed to take part in the research.  The research consists of two stages: 
 
1) A quantitative analysis comparing police hostage negotiators and police officers (non-negotiators) 
on the following aspects: 
 
a) Personality 
b) Coping Style 
c) Decision Making Style 
d) Cognitive Coping Style & Emotion Regulation 
e) Emotional Intelligence 
 
2) A qualitative analysis looking at the experiences of hostage negotiators focusing on the following 
aspects: 
 






c) Role -Specific Skills 
d) Negotiation Decision Making 
e) Support Structures / Coping Strategies 
 
Stage 1 of the research would involve both negotiators and police officers completing a set of 
questionnaires.  Stage 2 of the research would involve a sample of negotiators (approximately 5) 
taking part in a semi-structured interview to discuss their experiences of the role.  The data 
gathered will be used to explore whether hostage negotiators possess different personality traits, 
coping styles, decision making styles, cognitive coping strategies and levels of emotional intelligence 
to that of police officers (non-negotiators) and the general public; and to develop a model exploring 
the experiences of negotiators from the initial stages of recruitment and selection through to 
carrying out their role and the coping strategies they employ to deal with highly stressful situations. 
  
I would very much appreciate the opportunity to carry out such research with your current hostage 
negotiation team.  If permission is granted, individual negotiators will be approached and asked 
whether they would be willing to take part in the research.  If participants consent to take part in 
the research, a suitable time and venue will be arranged for the interview to take place.  Any data 
gathered will be confidential with participants being allocated unique participant reference codes.  
All data will be stored securely during the research and any data collated electronically will be 
stored on a password protected computer.  The raw data (i.e. questionnaires and interview tapes) 
will be destroyed once the research is complete.  The results of the research will be written up in the 
form of a PhD Thesis and will be submitted to academic journals for publication.  In the instance of 
publication, all data will be reported at a group/aggregate level and no individual officer will be 
identified/or be able to be identified in any written accounts.  The force may also remain 
anonymous if you deem this appropriate.  Upon completion, I would be happy to present the 
findings to the police at whatever level deemed appropriate in order to disseminate beneficial 
findings.     
 
The research will be supervised by Dr Sarah Brown who is a Chartered Forensic Psychologist and 
Reader in Forensic Psychology Development at Coventry University and will be subject to approval 
by the Coventry University Ethics Committee.  If you would like to discuss the research in more 
detail or ask any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me via email at 
amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk or telephone me on 024 7688 8795.  If you are happy for the research 
to go ahead please can you write a brief letter of approval and send to the address detailed above.  
  






Miss Amy Rose Grubb 






Appendix 4.  UK Police Forces by ACPO84 Region invited to Take Part in Study 
Table 4.1. Table Depicting UK Police Forces by ACPO Region 
ACPO Region Police Forces 
1. South West Region a. Devon and Cornwall Constabulary 
b. Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
c. Dorset Police 
d. Gloucestershire Constabulary 
e. Wiltshire Constabulary 
f. States of Jersey Police 
g. Guernsey Police 
2. South East Region a. Hampshire Constabulary 
b. Kent Police 
c. Surrey Police 
d. Sussex Police 
e. Thames Valley Police 
3. London Region a. Metropolitan Police Service 
b. City of London Police 
4. Eastern Region a. Bedfordshire Police 
b. Cambridgeshire Constabulary 
c. Essex Police 
d. Hertfordshire Constabulary 
e. Norfolk Constabulary 
f. Suffolk Constabulary 
5. East Midlands Region a. Derbyshire Constabulary 
b. Leicestershire Constabulary 
c. Lincolnshire Police 
d. Northamptonshire Police 
e. Nottinghamshire Police 
6. West Midlands Region a. Staffordshire Police 
b. Warwickshire Police 
c. West Mercia Constabulary 
d. West Midlands Police 
7. North West Region a. Cheshire Constabulary 
b. Cumbria Constabulary 
c. Greater Manchester Police 
d. Merseyside Police 
e. Lancashire Constabulary 
f. Police Service of Northern Ireland 
8. North East Region a. Cleveland Police 
b. Durham Constabulary 
c. Humberside Police 
d. North Yorkshire Police 
e. Northumbria Police 
f. South Yorkshire Police 
g. West Yorkshire Police 
9. Scotland85 a. Central Scotland Police 
b. Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary 
c. Fife Constabulary 
d. Grampian Police 
e. Lothian and Borders Police 
f. Northern Constabulary 
g. Strathclyde Police 
h. Tayside Police 
10. Wales a. Dyfed Powys Police 
b. Gwent Police 
c. North Wales Police 
d. South Wales Police 
Note: An Garda Siochana (Ireland’s National Police Service) is not currently listed as part of ACPO but were 
invited to take part in the current study.  
                                                          
84 Association of Chief Police Officers 
85 The territorial police forces in Scotland now exist as a single police force in the form of “Police Scotland” 





Appendix 5.  Participant Debrief Sheet (HCN Sample) 
Participant Reference Number………………….. 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
(Hostage Negotiator Sample - Stage 1) 
 
Thank you for completing this research study. The aim of the study is to investigate crisis/hostage 
negotiation from a UK police perspective.  This stage of the research involves the investigation of a 
number of specific factors which may help to make an “effective negotiator”.  These factors 
include: personality, decision-making style, coping style, emotion regulation and emotional 
intelligence.  Previous research indicates that these factors may help individuals to cope more 
effectively within stressful situations.   
 
In line with previous research looking at coping and performance within stressful situations, it is 
hypothesised that hostage negotiators will be:  
 
a) more likely than police officers or the general public to possess certain personality traits,  
b) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain coping styles,  
c) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain cognitive coping strategies 
& methods of emotion regulation, 
d) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain decision-making styles,  
e) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise emotionally intelligent 
behaviours. 
 
Research shows that these constructs are all important elements within coping and performance 
in high stress occupations, such as hostage negotiation.  The data obtained from your 
questionnaires will be compared with data obtained from police officers (non-negotiators) and a 
sample of the general public.  This will enable me to identify whether negotiators display certain 
traits and characteristics more than others and as such will provide an insight into the skills, traits 
and characteristics that are required in order to be a competent police negotiator.  
 
The findings of this research will have implications in terms of police hostage negotiation 
recruitment, selection and training and will hopefully provide a basis for recommendations on the 
following aspects: 
 
 Psychometric tools that could be used in the selection of hostage negotiators  
 Psychometric tools that could be used to identify training needs of officers  
 Changes in policy in terms of selection, training and support of operationally active 
hostage negotiators. 
 
Should you want further information regarding any component of this study, please contact the 






Miss Amy Grubb, Lecturer in Forensic Psychology, Psychology Department, Coventry University, 
Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB.  Tel: 02476 888 795, Fax: 02476 888 300, Email: 
amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk. 
 
Please note that you have the right to withdraw your data from the study up to two weeks 
following completion of the questionnaire.  If you would like to withdraw your data please contact 
me via email quoting your unique participant reference number (at the top right hand corner of 
this page). 
 
If at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please 
feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry 
Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB.   Professor Marshall is independent 
of the research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry 
University Ethics Committee. 
 
I would like to thank you again for taking part in this study.  Your input is very much 
appreciated.  
 
 Please return the completed questionnaire pack to the researcher at the address 
above using the prepaid envelope provided or hand it to the lead hostage negotiator 
coordinator for your force.   
 
 Please can you now distribute the second questionnaire pack to a colleague who is 






Appendix 6.  Letter Given to Negotiators for Recruiting Non-Negotiator Police Officer 
Colleagues 
Information Sheet relating to Consent (For Negotiators) 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study.  Your input is very much appreciated.   
 
I would now like you to pass a copy of the psychometric test battery that you have completed to a 
“non-negotiator” police officer colleague who is willing to take part in the research.  Once they 
have completed the test battery they can return it to me in the envelope provided – or they can 
return it to the negotiator co-ordinator for the force.   
 
I must reiterate that participation in this research is completely voluntary and that no one is 
obliged to take part in the research if they do not wish to do so.  Choosing not to take part in the 
study will not have any consequences in relation to your role within the police.  This information 
is included in the Participant Information Sheet but please make sure you do not put pressure 
on potential participants and keep their participation in the research confidential.   
 
If you have any queries relating to the research please do not hesitate to contact the researcher at 
amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk. 
  
This research has been designed in line with the BPS ethical code of conduct, which requires the 
following principles to be adhered to:  
 
1.3 Standard of informed consent 
 
(ii) Seek to obtain the informed consent of all clients to whom professional services or research 
participation are offered. 
 
1.4 Standards of self-determination 
 
(ii) Ensure from the first contact that clients are aware of their right to withdraw at any time from 
the receipt of professional services or from research participation. 
 
(iii) Comply with requests by clients who are withdrawing from research participation that any 
data by which they might be personally identified, including recordings, be destroyed. 
 
3.3 Standard of protection of research participants 
 
(vi) Inform research participants from the first contact that their right to withdraw at any time is 






Appendix 7.  Ethics Approval Form 
REGISTRY RESEARCH UNIT 
ETHICS REVIEW FEEDBACK FORM 
(Please return to Registry Research Unit within 10 working days) 
 
Name of applicant and Faculty/School:  Amy Grubb, Psychology  
 
Research project title:  An exploratory study of modern-day police hostage (crisis) 
negotiation within the UK 
 
Comments by the reviewer 
 
4. Evaluation of the ethics of the proposal: 
 
A well written and detailed proposal which clearly explains the research to be undertaken; materials to be used; 
data collection techniques and participant group.  
There are no substantial ethical concerns identified by this research proposal that have not been addressed. 
 
5. Evaluation of the participant information sheet and consent form: 
 




(Please indicate as appropriate and advise on any conditions.  If there any conditions, the applicant will be 
required to resubmit his/her application and this will be sent to the same reviewer). 
 
X        Approved - no conditions attached 
 
        Conditional upon the following – please use additional sheets if necessary 
 
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 
       Rejected for the following reason(s) – please use other side if necessary 
 
  _______________________________________________________________________  
 
 _______________________________________________________________________  
 
 Further advice/notes - please use other side if necessary 
 
 Should add on the debrief contact details for Andy Bridges for any complaints about the way the 
 research has been conducted.  
 
 
Name and signature of reviewer: Gail Steptoe-Warren 





Appendix 8.  Description of Core Ethical Issues and How They Were Managed 
Throughout the Research 
Informed Consent   
 
All participants were provided with a participant information sheet prior to taking part in the 
research (please refer to Appendix 34–36).  The information sheet clearly explained the aims and objectives 
of the research, the nature of participant involvement and how the data would be used.  Participants were 
clearly informed that there was no obligation to take part in the research.  It is worth noting that some of the 
negotiators may have felt obliged to take part in the research when asked by their HNC (who tended to be a 
higher ranking officer) to take part, however, all regional or force lead HNCs were informed that 
participants should take part on a voluntary basis and were not obliged to take part in the research if they 
did not wish to do so.  It is important to note that not all negotiators from each force took part in the 
research which indicates that participants chose to take part of their own free will.  With regards to the 
police officers who were recruited using snowball sampling, HCNs were informed not to put pressure on 
individuals to take part in the research if they did not wish to do so and were reminded that participation 
should be on a voluntary basis only (please see Appendix 6 for a copy of the information sheet that was 
provided to negotiators regarding dissemination of the second psychometric test battery to a non-negotiator 
colleague).  All participants were required to complete and sign an informed consent form prior to taking 




 No deception was utilised at any point throughout this study.  All participants were made fully 
aware of the aims, objectives and nature of the research and what they would be required to do in order to 
take part.  Participants who agreed to take part in the second phase of the research were provided with a 
brief synopsis of the themes that would be covered in the semi-structured interview prior to consenting to 
take part.  Any participants who felt uncomfortable with certain themes were therefore provided with an 
opportunity not to take part in the interview prior to it taking place.  Participants were therefore able to 
provide full informed consent to take part in both phases of the research. 
 
Debriefing   
 
All participants were provided with a debrief sheet at the end of both stages of the research (please 
refer to Appendix 5, 40 and 41).  The debrief sheet provided a detailed description of the aims and 





researcher's contact details were also provided so that participants could contact the researcher at a later 
date for further information about the study or to request withdrawal of their data.  Participants who took 
part in the second stage of the research were also provided with details of support/counselling services 
should they feel the need to access support after the interview as a result of discussing potentially 
distressing or emotive topics relating to their role as a negotiator.     
 
Withdrawal from Investigation   
 
All participants were provided with the opportunity to withdraw from the research at any point 
with no negative consequences.  Participants were informed that they also had the opportunity to withdraw 
their data from the research for a period of up to two weeks after having completed the psychometric test 
battery or interview.  Participants in the first stage of the research were provided with a unique participant 
reference number which could be used to identify individual participants should they wish to withdraw 
their data from the research.  Instructions for withdrawal were clearly outlined in the participant 
information sheet and debrief sheet given to participants.  Participants in the second stage of the research 
were offered the same opportunity to withdraw their interview data from the research for a period of up to 
two weeks after taking part in the interview and were instructed to contact the researcher via email to 




Confidentiality of data was maintained at all points throughout the research.  All hard copies of the 
psychometric test batteries were stored in a locked filing cabinet with consent forms stored separately from 
the completed tests.  Participants taking part in the first phase of the research were allocated a unique 
participant reference number and data was reported in an aggregated manner.  At no point were individual 
scores referred to or identified.  All forces involved were assured that their identities would remain 
anonymous throughout the execution, write up and dissemination of the research.  For the purposes of the 
thesis, all forces remained anonymous and were allocated a numerical code in order to identify aggregated 
data (i.e. Force 1, Force 2, Force 3 etc.).  Participants that took part in the interview were allocated an 
alphanumerical code86 that was then used to refer to individual interviewees in the thesis and ensured 
anonymity of individual negotiators.  All interviewees were also provided with the opportunity to verify the 
accuracy of the transcripts after the interview and to redact or sanitise any data which may identify 
themselves or their force, thereby compromising their anonymity.  The dictaphone used to record the 
                                                          
86 Each interviewee was allocated a code which represents their interview letter, gender, force number and length 





interviews was stored in a locked filing cabinet at all times throughout the research and audio recordings 
from each interview were downloaded from the dictaphone regularly after each interview and stored on a 
password protected computer.  Participants were informed that the audio recordings would be destroyed 
upon completion of the PhD but that transcribed data would be securely retained for a period of two years 
after submission of the PhD thesis in order to allow for potential publication of the findings and further 
research. 
 
Protection of Participants   
 
Participants were informed throughout the research that they were not obliged to take part in any 
stage of the research and that it was completely voluntary.  They were assured that they did not have to 
answer any questions that they did not feel comfortable answering and that they had the opportunity to 
withdraw from the research at any point, including for a period of two weeks after completing the 
psychometric test battery or taking part in the interview, respectively.  Participants taking part in the 
interview were the nature of participant involvement and how the data would be used.  Participants were 
clearly informed that there was no obligation to take part in the research.  It is worth noting that some of the 
negotiators may have felt obliged to take part in the research when asked by their HNC (who tended to be a 
higher ranking officer) to take part, however, all regional or force lead HNCs were informed that 
participants should be reminded that the information they provided would be treated confidentially and that 
they would remain anonymous via the use of participant reference codes in the write up of the research.  
The researcher was also aware that the interview might involve participants discussing emotive or 
distressing incidents involving their role as a negotiator and participants were assured at the start of the 
interview that they did not have to answer any questions that they did not feel comfortable answering.  The 
details for a number of support services were provided to participants within the debrief sheet in case 
negotiators felt the need to access further means of support.  
 
Protection of the Researcher   
 
The safety of the researcher was considered at all points throughout the research and there were no 
significant anticipated risks posed to the researcher during either phase of the research.  The interviews for 
the second phase of the research were conducted at the negotiator's place of work, in an interview room 
within the police station.  As such, there was no risk of physical harm posed to the researcher.  There was a 
potential risk of psychological harm posed to the researcher as a result of discussion of emotive or sensitive 
material during the interviews with negotiators but this risk was mediated by the awareness of appropriate 









                                                          
87 Power analyses were conducted in various permutations based on the number of predictor/independent and 
dependent variables utilised within each MANOVA.  These figures represent the power analyses performed for: 1) 
the BFI/GDMS measures (with five sub-scales/DVs), 2) the CST-R measure (with 18 sub-scales/DVs), 3) the CERQ 
measure (with 11 subscales/DVs), and 4) the Genos EII measure (with eight sub-scales/DVs).  In each of these cases, 
the number of groups consisted of two predictor variables (i.e. Group with three levels: HCN/PO/Student; Gender 





Appendix 10.  Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
Good morning/afternoon… 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview with me today.  Your input into the research is 
very much appreciated.  I would like you to speak as honestly and freely as you can but please 
note that you are not obliged to answer any questions that you are not happy answering and that 
you will get a chance to review the transcripts in order to sanitise or remove any information that 
you do not wish to be reported on. 
 




 Can you tell me a bit about yourself in terms of your police role? 
o How long have you been in the police? 
o What is your current day to day role within the police? 
 
Recruitment / Selection 
 
 Can you tell me how you came to become a negotiator? 
o How were you recruited? 
o Did you volunteer for the post? And if so why? 
 
 What did the selection process involve? 
o Psychometric tests? 
o Role play / Interviews? 
 
 Were you successful at your first application? 
o If no were you informed of the aspects that you needed to work on/improve in 
order to be successful at your next application? 
 




 What training did you receive once you had been selected? 
 
o Do you feel this training adequately equipped you to cope with crisis situations? 
 If yes, in what way do you feel it equips you? 
 If no, what do you think would improve the training? 
o Do you have continuing professional development/on-going training as a 
negotiator?   





o Are there regular opportunities for you to share good practice/successful 
strategies etc. with other negotiators both within your force and force-wide? 
o Is there any form of international training or sharing of good practice with other 
countries? 
o How much contact do you have with others in this role?   
 
Experiences as a negotiator 
 
 Can you describe the first incident that you were involved in as a negotiator? 
 
o What happened? 
o How did you respond? 
o What was the outcome? 
o How do you think the situation was dealt with? 
o How would you deal with the situation differently? 
 
 Can you describe the most recent incident that you have been involved in? 
 
o What happened? 
o How did you respond? 
o What was the outcome? 
o How do you think the situation was dealt with? 
o How would you deal with the situation differently? 
 
 Do you feel that the role has changed since you have been doing the job? 
 Approximately how many incidents have you been directly involved with as a negotiator?  
 Do you feel that you have grown in confidence, the more incidents you attend? 
 What type of incidents are you typically involved in?  What would you say is the most 
common type of incident you deal with? 
 How do the jobs vary? 
 Are certain incidents more difficult to deal with? 
o If so, which do you feel are more difficult, and why? 
 How do you tend to feel during the incidents?   
 How do you tend to feel once a situation has been resolved? 
 
Decision making process 
 
 What are the decision making processes involved in negotiating crisis situations? 
 Do you tend to naturally use one process more than others? 
 Are there any specific strategies, styles or techniques that you use when you are 
negotiating?  
 If so, what do you feel is the most effective strategy, style or technique? 
 To what extent do you feel “in control” when negotiating at an incident? 








 What skills do you think you use whilst dealing with crisis situations? 
 What skills do you think are important to be an effective negotiator? 
 What do you think makes a person a good negotiator?  
 What skill or attribute do you think is the most important for a negotiator? 
 What would you look for in others if you were selecting people to do this role? 
 
Support Structure and Coping Strategies 
 
 Do you suffer from stress or anxiety in your everyday life (outside of your negotiator role?) 
 If so, how do you normally cope with this stress/anxiety? 
 How does this compare to your role as a negotiator?  Is this different to how you cope 
during negotiator situations? 
 What aspects of the role do you find most stressful? 
 How do you cope with the stress involved in crisis negotiation? (I.e. what strategies do you 
use to cope with stressful situations?) 
 Do you feel that negotiation causes more stress than your role as a police officer 
generally? 
 Do you feel that you are supported sufficiently in your role by the police? 
o Do you feel supported physically in terms of risk? 
o Do you feel supported psychologically in terms of emotional support? 
 What sort of help & support is available to you (both in theory and realistically)? 
 Have you ever utilised this support? 
o If yes, did you find this helpful? 





 How does your negotiator role fit in with your general role within the police force? 
 Is your role accommodated by your superiors?  Does it cause any tension when you have 
to leave other duties to attend an incident? 
 How important do you feel your role is within the UK? 
 What do you get out of your role as a negotiator? 
 Would you recommend the role to others? 
 In your opinion, is there anything that the police service or government could do to 
improve the role or to support negotiators within their role? 
 
Is there anything else which we haven’t covered which you feel is pertinent to your role as a 
negotiator? 
 






Appendix 11.  Demographic Questionnaire (Qualitative Phase: HCN Interview 
Sample) 
Participant Reference Number……………. 
 

















5. Metropolitan/Rural Force 
 
 
6. Current Rank 
 
 









10. Length of police service (Years & Months) 
 
 
11. Length of negotiator service (Years & Months) 
 
 
12. Approximate number of incidents deployed to 
as a negotiator 
 
 
13. Are you a Hostage Negotiator Coordinator 
 
Yes / No 
 
14. Are you a Hostage Negotiator Force Lead 
 
Yes / No 
 
15. Are you a Hostage Negotiator Regional Lead 
 







Appendix 12.  Debrief Sheet (Qualitative Phase: HCN Interview Sample) 
Participant Reference Number………………….. 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
(Hostage Negotiator Sample - Stage 2) 
 
Thank you for completing this research study. The aim of the study is to investigate crisis/hostage 
negotiation from a UK police perspective.  This stage of the research involves the exploration of 
hostage negotiation from the perspective of the negotiator.  I am interested in exploring the 
processes and procedures that are involved in the recruitment, selection, training and support of 
negotiators, along with experiences of operationally active negotiators in the UK.   
 
I hope that the findings will provide an insight into the complex role of police hostage negotiators 
in UK-based police forces and may enable a number of recommendations to be made in order to 
enhance the efficacy and experiences of those individuals working as negotiators across the 
country. 
 
Should you want further information regarding any component of this study, please contact the 
researcher at the following address:   
 
Miss Amy Grubb, Lecturer in Forensic Psychology, Psychology Department, Coventry University, 
Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB.  Tel: 02476 888 795, Fax: 02476 888 300, Email: 
amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk. 
 
Please note that you have the right to withdraw your data from the study up to two weeks 
following completion of the interview.  If you would like to withdraw your data please contact me 
via email to request removal of your data.  You will be provided with a copy of the transcribed 
interview data upon request in order to verify accuracy and request sanitisation or removal of 
specific content. 
 
If at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please 
feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry 
Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB.   Professor Marshall is independent 
of the research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry 
University Ethics Committee. 
 
 







Appendix 13.  Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for 
Psychometric Test Battery 
Table 4.6.  Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the BFI 




Agreeableness 217, 285, 415 3.92 3.94 .00 
Conscientiousness 305,424, 429 3.90 3.92 .00 
Neuroticism None 2.47 2.45 .00 
Openness None 3.54 3.54 .02 
Extraversion 233, 297, 359, 378 3.54 3.56 .00 
Note.  There were no missing values for the BFI data so raw data was analysed in original format with all 
cases included. 
 
Table 4.7.  Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the CERQ 




Self-Blame 315, 353, 363, 368, 386, 392, 
397, 400, 424, 426, 437 
9.30 9.15 .00 
Acceptance None 12.21 12.16 .00 
Rumination None 10.76 10.66 .00 
Positive Refocus 43, 112, 423, 438 10.07 10.00 .00 
Refocus on Planning 50, 424 13.96 13.99 .00 
Positive Reappraisal 359, 424 14.43 14.54 .00 
Perspective Taking 268 13.79 13.81 .00 
Castastrophising 36, 297, 353, 386, 425 7.27 7.01 .00 
Other Blame 29, 80, 231, 281, 289, 305, 320, 
331, 353, 371, 400, 406, 421, 
422 
8.29 8.12 .00 
Adaptive Strategies 359, 423, 424 12.89 12.91 .14* 
Maladaptive Strategies 23, 297, 320, 353, 386, 400, 423 8.92 8.81 .00 
Note. * = Non-significant result indicating normality of distribution.  The following cases were excluded from 





Table 4.8.  Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the CST-R88 




Problem Solving 315, 388, 424 70.97 71.46 .00 
Information Seeking 22 55.23 55.43 .00 
Negotiation 23, 301, 315, 318, 341, 388, 
424, 425, 434 
70.08 70.60 .00 
Social Support None 49.45 49.48 .04 
PC Restructuring 287, 295, 318, 341, 424, 
425 
71.20 71.86 .00 
Emotional Regulation 217 58.15 58.11 .00 
Distraction 52, 217, 341, 425 60.89 61.56 .00 
Rumination None 41.10 40.61 .00 
Avoidance 35, 301, 331, 353, 397, 423, 
424 
27.11 26.07 .00 
Helplessness 305, 315, 359, 397, 424 23.07 21.96 .00 
Social Withdrawal 296, 301, 302, 313, 359, 
397, 423, 424 
31.47 30.72 .00 
Opposition 23, 306, 318, 424, 425 31.57 30.78 .00 
Problem Focused Coping 301, 388, 424, 425 65.43 65.71 .00 
Emotion Focused Coping 115, 217, 424, 425 59.87 60.08 .02 
Hang Ups 23, 35, 305, 315, 353, 359, 
397, 424   
30.83 30.07 .00 
Adaptive Coping Skills 115, 216, 217, 233, 424, 
425  
435.96 437.62 .13* 
Maladaptive Coping Skills 35, 301, 305, 315, 353, 359, 
397, 424,  
154.32 150.51 .00 
Overall Coping Skills 22, 115, 217, 301, 305, 315, 
359, 424, 425 
65.13 65.51 .00 
Note. * = Non-significant result indicating normality of distribution.  There were no missing values for the 
CST-R data so raw data was analysed in original format with all cases included. 
                                                          
88 The CST-R was purchased from a test publisher and therefore the scoring algorithm was not accessible to 
the researcher.  The completed CST-R scores were inputted into a web-based system (i.e. ArchProfile88) and 
the scored data was returned to the researcher in the format of an excel spread sheet.  This data was then 






Table 4.9.  Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the GDMS 




Intuitive 15, 163, 207, 250, 275, 350, 391 3.57 3.59 .00 
Rational 65, 141, 280, 289, 331, 344, 
336, 388, 422 
3.90 3.92 .00 
Dependent 6, 81, 411 3.30 3.30 .00 
Spontaneous 336 2.70 2.68 .00 
Avoidant 225, 359, 370, 414, 424 2.15 2.09 .00 
Note.  The following cases were excluded from the analysis due to having more than two missing values: 391. 
 
Table 4.10.  Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the EII 




Emotional Self-Awareness 381, 429 39.97 40.07 .00 
Emotional Expression 336, 359, 392, 434 38.00 38.09 .00 
Emotional Awareness of Others 233, 370, 429, 434 38.90 39.01 .00 
Emotional Reasoning 370, 378 36.40 36.47 .00 
Emotional Self-Management 43, 115, 116, 217, 
326, 331, 359 
36.87 36.92 .00 
Emotional Management of 
Others 
233, 336, 359, 370, 
429, 434 
39.13 39.25 .00 
Emotional Self Control 35, 289, 296, 336, 
390 
38.49 38.60 .00 
Total Emotional Intelligence 336, 359, 429 268.01 268.54 .07* 
Note. * = Non-significant result indicating normality of distribution.  The following cases were excluded from 
the analysis due to having two or more missing values: 116, 294, 297, 300, 321, 332, 342, 371, 382, 388, 397, 
404, 412 and 41889.  
 
 
                                                          
89 The EII data included a fairly large number of missing values which is likely to be caused by the length of 
the psychometric test and potentially the layout of questions.  The questions are very close together and 
participants tended to confuse the answer for one question with the answer for another question.  The 
layout/format of the questionnaire was unavoidable due to a pre-existing psychometric test being provided by 





Table 4.11.  Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the BIDR 




Overall BIDR 86, 194, 284 165.24 165.46 .20* 
Social Desirability 400 88.18 88.27 .20* 
Impression Management 354, 372, 423 77.06 77.27 .05* 
Note. * = Non-significant result indicating normality of distribution.  The following cases were excluded from 







Appendix 14.  Inter-Correlation Matrices for the Psychometric Test Battery 
Table 4.12.  Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-
Revised Sub-Scales [Table 1 of 5] 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Extraversion 1 .165** .247** -.336** .194** -.164** -.054 -.124** 
2. Agreeableness  1 .426** -.365** .234** -.177** -.048 -.178** 
3. Conscientiousness   1 -.440** .155** -.270** -.136** -.255** 
4. Neuroticism    1 -.252** .422** .100* .464** 
5. Openness     1 .018 .012 .007 
6. Self-Blame      1 .299** .545** 
7. Acceptance       1 .344** 
8. Rumination        1 
9. PR         
10. ROP         
11. PReap         
12. PT         
13. Catastrophising         
14. Other Blame         
15. Intuitive         
16. Rational         
17. Dependent         
18. Spontaneous         
19. Avoidant         
20. ESA          
21. EE          
22. EAO          
23. ER          
24. ESM          
25. EMO          
26. ESC         
27. Total EI          
28. OCS         
29. PFC         
30. PS         
31. IS         
32. Negotiation         
33. EFC         
34. SS         
35. PCR         
36. ER         
37. Distraction          
38. Hang Ups         
39. Rumination         
40. Avoidance         
41. Helplessness         
42. SW         
43. Opposition         
Note. PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; 
ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional 
Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-
Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = 
Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive 





Table 4.13.  Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-
Revised Sub-Scales [Table 2 of 5] 
 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Extraversion .138** .213** .287** .134** -.180** .009 .120* .050 -.069 
2. Agreeableness .164** .169** .282** .203** -.278** -.253** -.031 .211** .006 
3. Conscientiousness .010 .283** .317** .098* -.343** -.171** -.161** .366** -.215** 
4. Neuroticism -.098* -.219** -.318** -.230** .495** .122* .095* -.106* .316** 
5. Openness .093 .305** .325** .188** -.162** -.025 -.002 .294** -.111* 
6. Self-Blame .026 .069 -.026 -.024 .449** .111* .026 .044 .253** 
7. Acceptance .078 .188** .203** .288** .227** .144** .157** .095* .184** 
8. Rumination .074 .155** .046 -.004 .523** .140** .070 .110* .335** 
9. PR 1 .322** .269** .210** -.020 .114* .129** -.038 .105* 
10. ROP  1 .680** .431** -.194** .037 .055 .350** -.005 
11. PReap   1 .522** -.260** -.014 .079 .358** -.038 
12. PT    1 -.185** -.063 .085 .178** -.070 
13. Catastrophising     1 .384** .026 -.122* .242** 
14. Other Blame      1 .047 -.088 .068 
15. Intuitive       1 -.140** .070 
16. Rational        1 .178** 
17. Dependent         1 
18. Spontaneous          
19. Avoidant          
20. ESA           
21. EE           
22. EAO           
23. ER           
24. ESM           
25. EMO           
26. ESC          
27. Total EI           
28. OCS          
29. PFC          
30. PS          
31. IS          
32. Negotiation          
33. EFC          
34. SS          
35. PCR          
36. ER          
37. Distraction           
38. Hang Ups          
39. Rumination          
40. Avoidance          
41. Helplessness          
42. SW          
43. Opposition          
Note. PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; 
ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional 
Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-
Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = 
Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive 






Table 4.14.  Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-
Revised Sub-Scales [Table 3 of 5] 
 
 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1. Extraversion .036 -.280** .263** .405** .365** .336** .346** .442** .130** 
2. Agreeableness -.202** -.316** .289** .436** .399** .342** .416** .461** .398** 
3. Conscientiousness -.394** -.586** .508** .567** .534** .510** .509** .565** .487** 
4. Neuroticism .018 .419** -.286** -.434** -.311** -.329** -.491** -.383** -.440** 
5. Openness -.018 -.181** .256** .287** .320** .290** .382** .276** .279** 
6. Self-Blame .075 .309** -.151** -.296** -.194** -.153** -.240** -.191** -.213** 
7. Acceptance .065 .101* -.041 -.038 -.059 -.046 .045 -.044 -.031 
8. Rumination -.038 .262** -.087 -.190** -.103* -.063 -.202** -.160** -.176** 
9. PR .084 -.001 -.018 .090 .059 .073 .107* .087 .064 
10. ROP -.057 -.271** .299** .293** .332** .352** .344** .334** .272** 
11. PReap -.038 -.241** .307** .384** .375** .410** .463** .429** .308** 
12. PT .027 -.134** .116* .211** .189** .227** .261** .208** .167** 
13. Catastrophising .061 .374** -.301** -.371** -.337** -.275** -.383** -.325** -.351** 
14. Other Blame .210** .204** -.234** -.229** -.187** -.143** -.234** -.180** -.196** 
15. Intuitive .461** .121* .042 .027 .028 -.010 .039 .070 -.076 
16. Rational -.421** -.331** .285** .352** .289** .366** .338** .285** .302** 
17. Dependent -.067 .311** -.147** -.112* -.153** -.079 -.188** -.110* -.148** 
18. Spontaneous 1 .241** -.211** -.244** -.187** -.179** -.142** -.168** -.218** 
19. Avoidant  1 -.401** -.507** -.449** -.445** -.469** -.503** -.413** 
20. ESA    1 .661** .727** .595** .619** .654** .530** 
21. EE     1 .732** .650** .738** .744** .582** 
22. EAO      1 .741** .644** .790** .531** 
23. ER       1 .608** .740** .498** 
24. ESM        1 .670** .697** 
25. EMO         1 .549** 
26. ESC         1 
27. Total EI           
28. OCS          
29. PFC          
30. PS          
31. IS          
32. Negotiation          
33. EFC          
34. SS          
35. PCR          
36. ER          
37. Distraction           
38. Hang Ups          
39. Rumination          
40. Avoidance          
41. Helplessness          
42. SW          
43. Opposition          
Note. PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; 
ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional 
Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-
Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = 
Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive 






Table 4.15.  Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-
Revised Sub-Scales [Table 4 of 5] 
 
 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
1. Extraversion .383** .372** .258** .305** .148** .166** .361** .338** 
2. Agreeableness .470** .489** .373** .328** .181** .407** .394** .226** 
3. Conscientiousness .624** .536** .439** .461** .176** .440** .309** .111* 
4. Neuroticism -.449** -.642** -.324** -.365** .013 -.476** -.463** -.037 
5. Openness .361** .328** .347** .320** .226** .294** .297** .008 
6. Self-Blame -.236** -.358** -.050 -.073 .126** -.210** -.170** -.015 
7. Acceptance -.036 -.110* .043 -.042 .101* .042 .000 .030 
8. Rumination -.159** -.307** .017 -.030 .204** -.180** -.139** .155** 
9. PR .086 .219** .182** .167** .168** .091 .325** .254** 
10. ROP .376** .433** .548** .553** .371** .389** .389** .158** 
11. PReap .457** .516** .559** .541** .357** .451** .489** .193** 
12. PT .237** .314** .277** .261** .134** .287** .334** .075 
13. Catastrophising -.390** -.545** -.303** -.289** -.069 -.408** -.348** -.026 
14. Other Blame -.233** -.215** -.087 -.069 -.049 -.100* -.116* -.045 
15. Intuitive .017 -.016 .024 -.020 .030 .055 .053 .069 
16. Rational .377** .288** .410** .428** .281** .266** .197** .066 
17. Dependent -.162** -.148** .033 -.020 .229** -.178** -.021 .288** 
18. Spontaneous -.224** -.191** -.201** -.219** -.168** -.081 -.104* -.075 
19. Avoidant -.542** -.536** -.379** -.388** -.126** -.429** -.335** -.135** 
20. ESA  .816** .468** .417** .410** .191** .417** .318** .081 
21. EE  .872** .605** .503** .513** .254** .456** .420** .237** 
22. EAO  .882** .508** .464** .471** .218** .449** .363** .183** 
23. ER  .826** .503** .474** .493** .212** .457** .368** .180** 
24. ESM  .842** .609** .463** .486** .181** .477** .487** .137** 
25. EMO  .878** .567** .469** .486** .234** .423** .426** .229** 
26. ESC .743** .512** .356** .388** .096* .402** .350** .021 
27. Total EI  1 .642** .539** .556** .241** .524** .467** .189** 
28. OCS  1 .776** .729** .445** .711** .835** .423** 
29. PFC   1 .857** .782** .744** .679** .467** 
30. PS    1 .489** .560** .606** .346** 
31. IS     1 .302** .471** .573** 
32. Negotiation      1 .555** .147** 
33. EFC       1 .539** 
34. SS        1 
35. PCR         
36. ER         
37. Distraction          
38. Hang Ups         
39. Rumination         
40. Avoidance         
41. Helplessness         
42. SW         
43. Opposition         
Note. PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; 
ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional 
Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-
Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = 
Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive 






Table 4.16.  Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-
Revised Sub-Scales [Table 5 of 5] 
 
 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 
1. Extraversion .247** .165** .255** -.310** -.280** -.197** -.292** -.357** -.161** 
2. Agreeableness .424** .298** .137** -.443** -.314** -.358** -.310** -.363** -.477** 
3. Conscientiousness .369** .278** .092 -.541** -.429** -.547** -.459** -.353** -.429** 
4. Neuroticism -.488** -.431** -.333** .698** .713** .523** .668** .337** .580** 
5. Openness .318** .332** .168** -.222** -.172** -.171** -.257** -.074 -.233** 
6. Self-Blame -.139** -.179** -.143** .510** .522** .411** .430** .325** .379** 
7. Acceptance .105* -.096* -.034 .221** .219** .182** .181** .102* .218** 
8. Rumination -.146** -.197** -.210** .474** .571** .372** .412** .168** .374** 
9. PR .244** .204** .199** -.097* -.066 .005 -.077 -.183** -.092 
10. ROP .453** .283** .181** -.252** -.132** -.228** -.308** -.200** -.179** 
11. PReap .560** .339** .266** -.333** -.241** -.287** -.341** -.236** -.268** 
12. PT .516** .156** .180** -.214** -.173** -.188** -.227** -.142** -.146** 
13. Catastrophising -.383** -.335** -.231** .600** .547** .485** .565** .378** .476** 
14. Other Blame -.135** -.101* -.032 .268** .188** .237** .213** .179** .283** 
15. Intuitive .045 -.051 .096* .073 .071 .101* .057 -.023 .083 
16. Rational .302** .150** .017 -.180** -.071 -.246** -.185** -.108* -.142** 
17. Dependent -.120* -.132** -.105* .269** .357** .220** .286** -.050 .242** 
18. Spontaneous -.114* -.127** .040 .172** .099* .224** .128** .134** .131** 
19. Avoidant -.349** -.287** -.155** .556** .463** .530** .507** .375** .399** 
20. ESA  .381** .276** .141** -.426** -.347** -.432** -.404** -.239** -.311** 
21. EE  .439** .332** .150** -.563** -.469** -.548** -.483** -.412** -.395** 
22. EAO  .383** .271** .169** -.445** -.359** -.424** -.419** -.303** -.320** 
23. ER  .411** .268** .158** -.424** -.340** -.386** -.394** -.294** -.320** 
24. ESM  .471** .443** .301** -.548** -.493** -.454** -.508** -.315** -.459** 
25. EMO  .418** .324** .205** -.507** -.406** -.455** -.446** -.386** -.384** 
26. ESC .399** .392** .149** -.521** -.432** -.457** -.481** -.246** -.502** 
27. Total EI  .503** .390** .210** -.582** -.476** -.538** -.528** -.376** -.455** 
28. OCS .724** .695** .476** -.871** -.728** -.711** -.773** -.664** -.700** 
29. PFC .628** .495** .290** -.449** -.278** -.401** -.403** -.425** -.364** 
30. PS .576** .469** .285** -.486** -.330** -.448** -.490** -.358** -.387** 
31. IS .292** .298** .139** -.095* .060 -.079 -.028 -.325** -.071 
32. Negotiation .681** .430** .282** -.542** -.450** -.475** -.497** -.334** -.456** 
33. EFC .734** .801** .710** -.528** -.452** -.332** -.479** -.492** -.420** 
34. SS .171** .180** .146** -.182** -.020 -.066 -.063 -.662** -.011 
35. PCR 1 .517** .339** -.516** -.445** -.433** -.487** -.295** -.445** 
36. ER  1 .526** -.496** -.469** -.349** -.459** -.239** -.499** 
37. Distraction    1 -.269** -.324** -.063 -.326** -.169** -.207** 
38. Hang Ups    1 .878** .859** .880** .666** .805** 
39. Rumination     1 .687** .775** .414** .664** 
40. Avoidance      1 .692** .542** .598** 
41. Helplessness       1 .477** .645** 
42. SW        1 .373** 
43. Opposition         1 
Note. PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; 
ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional 
Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-
Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = 
Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive 





Table 4.17. Table Depicting Correlations between Personality Traits and Cognitive Emotion Regulation Strategies used by the HCN and 
Police Officer Samples 
 
HCNs Police Officers 
 E A C N O E A C N O 
Self-Blame -.178 -.031 -.218*S .425**M .017 .008 .013 -.140 .209*S .096 
Acceptance -.017 .079 -.052 .025 -.121 -.052 .033 -.045 .081 -.017 
Rumination -.148 -.075 -.257**S .422**M -.069 .013 -.018 -.003 .269**S .028 
Positive Refocusing -.005 .172 .003 .004 -.025 .131 .217* -.032 -.131 .283**S 
Refocus on Planning .132 .171 .088 -.112 .052 .191*S .191*S .299**M -.196*S .331**M 
Positive Reappraisal .204*S .234*S .226*S -.168 .138 .329**M .394**M .343**M -.304**M .279**S 
Putting into Perspective -.052 .137 .015 .018 -.031 .303**M .277**S .062 -.391**M .200*S 
Castastrophising -.178 -.025 .001 .277**S -.071 .090 -.058 -.021 .237**S -.015 
Other Blame -.083 -.048 .035 .139 .224*S .025 -.160 -.097 .088 .017 
 
Note.  * Significant at p < .05 level; ** Significant at p < 0.01 level. Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; 








Table 4.18. Table Depicting Correlations between Personality Traits and Coping Styles used by the HCN and Police Officer Samples 
HCNs Police Officers 
 E A C N O E A C N O 
Overall Coping Skills Test Score .291**S .360**M .257**S -.513**L .261**S .455**M .508**L .471**M -.599**L .338**M 
Problem Focused Coping .128 .292**S .238**S -.229*S .233*S .435**M .426**M .472**M -.368**M .353**M 
Problem Solving .138 .236*S .292**S -.252**S .266**S .388**M .357**M .508**L -.374**M .302**M 
Information Seeking .087 .151 .150 -.071 .111 .352**M .212*S .312**M -.153 .321**M 
Negotiation .085 .362**M .120 -.268**S .196*S .319**M .551**L .340**M -.439**M .226*S 
Emotion Focused Coping .251**S .355**M .142 -.328**M .172 .461**M .471**M .336**M -.426**M .331**M 
Social Support .287**S .220* .052 -.177 -.104 .498**L .287**S .223*S -.157 .175 
Positive Cognitive Restructuring .084 .373**M .073 -.230*S .264**S .376**M .496**L .294**S -.498**L .352**M 
Emotional Regulation .065 .294**S .166 -.254**S .328**M .225*S .362**M .331**M -.349**M .262**S 
Distraction .282**S .116 .113 -.282**S .000 .247**S .266**S .142 -.276**S .202*S 
Hang Ups -.279**S -.230*S -.230*S .588**L -.214*S -.303**M -.415**M -.412**M .699**L -.217*S 
Rumination -.195*S -.155 -.159 .624**L -.227*S -.266**S -.320**M -.332**M .673**L -.079 
Avoidance -.093 -.103 -.350**M .311**M -.233*S -.174 -.195*S -.366**M .495**L -.106 
Helplessness -.234*S -.136 -.142 .517**L -.138 -.178 -.200*S -.316**M .575**L -.277**S 
Social Withdrawal -.392**M -.158 -.053 .224*S .077 -.397**M -.285**S -.243**S .317**M -.193*S 
Opposition -.158 -.304**M -.207*S .485**M -.283**S -.118 -.503**L -.295**M .530**L -.177 
 
Note.  * Significant at p < .05; ** Significant at p < .01.  Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; Superscript L = 






Table 4.19. Table Depicting Correlations between Personality Traits and Decision-Making Styles used by the HCN and Police Officer 
Samples 
 
HCNs Police Officers 
 E A C N O E A C N O 
Intuitive .220*S .053 -.174 .138 -.200*S .096 .025 -.149 .128 .020 
Rational -.141 .051 .331**M -.129 .250**S .020 .156 .350**M -.227*S .133 
Dependent -.018 .068 -.061 .176 -.103 -.052 .010 -.192* .165 -.019 
Spontaneous .253**S .021 -.312**M -.066 -.079 -.059 -.204*S -.487**M .183*S .073 
Avoidant -.248**S -.042 -.315**M .143 -.146 -.308**M -.252**S -.546**L .429**M -.133 
 
Note.  * Significant at p < .05; ** Significant at p < .01.  Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; Superscript L = 






Table 4.20. Table Depicting Correlations between Cognitive Emotion Regulation Strategies and Emotional Intelligence in the HCN and 
Police Officer Samples 
 








Perspective Castastrophising Other Blame 
HCNs          
Emotional Intelligence          
     Emotional Self Awareness -.087 -.002 -.004 .040 .234*S .326**M -.057 -.202*S .012 
     Emotional Expression -.178 .051 -.105 .079 .298**S .359**M .059 -.134 .044 
     Emotional Awareness of Others -.187**S .023 -.045 .133 .231*S .268**S -.005 -.078 .027 
     Emotional Reasoning .018 -.004 .104 .054 .228*S .261**S .073 .048 .029 
     Emotional Self-Management -.291**S .141 -.203**S .109 .258**S .454**M .084 -.169 .089 
     Emotional Management of Others -.175 .007 -.058 .130 .237*S .346**M .026 .026 .111 
     Emotional Self Control -.149 -.079 -.134 .112 .160 .295**M .004 -.079 .033 
     Total Emotional Intelligence Score -.185*S .024 -.077 .117 .295**M .413**M .033 -.104 .061 
Police Officers          
Emotional Intelligence          
     Emotional Self Awareness -.062 -.052 -.074 .008 .167 .203* .101 -.038 -.264** 
     Emotional Expression -.156 .042 -.111 .190* .183* .334** .299** -.120 -.283** 
     Emotional Awareness of Others -.062 -.108 -.067 .071 .179 .302** .247** -.189* -.186* 
     Emotional Reasoning .049 .020 .126 .153 .266** .401** .233* -.070 -.081 
     Emotional Self-Management -.168 -.058 -.121 .219* .236* .399** .215* -.197* -.233* 
     Emotional Management of Others .008 .025 .082 .175 .298** .469** .308** .016 -.131 
     Emotional Self Control -.176 .015 -.083 .169 .269** .335** .179 -.256** -.063 
     Total Emotional Intelligence Score -.092 -.021 -.046 .189* .256** .426** .277** -.137 -.223* 
Note.  * Significant at p < .05; ** Significant at p < .01.  Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; Superscript L = 






Table 4.21. Table Depicting Correlations between Coping Styles and Decision-Making Styles in the HCN and Police Officer Samples 
 
HCNs Police Officers 
 I R D S A I R D S A 
Overall Coping Skills Test Score -.029 .213*S -.059 -.067 -.343**M .002 .273**S .029 -.224*S -.460**M 
Problem Focused Coping .049 .274**S .167 -.090 -.314**M .057 .375**M .143 -.192*S -.374**M 
Problem Solving .022 .283**S .043 -.112 -.343**M -.015 .393**M .094 -.240**S -.390**M 
Information Seeking .046 .168 .241**S .117 -.207*S .042 .262**S .169 -.118 -.231*S 
Negotiation .062 .217*S .098 .051 -.210*S .133 .262**S .062 -.110 -.314**M 
Emotion Focused Coping .081 .130 .002 .006 -.228*S .035 .231*S .169 -.125 -.363**M 
Social Support .220*S -.097 .225*S .051 -.119 .120 .151 .232*S -.100 -.273**S 
Positive Cognitive Restructuring .089 .283**S .042 .090 -.288**S .047 .296**M -.004 -.115 -.349**M 
Emotional Regulation -.121 .132 -.142 -.118 -.154 -.083 .144 .066 -.182*S -.220*S 
Distraction .061 .089 -.137 .015 -.121 .018 .093 .179 .036 -.236*S 
Hang Ups .158 -.130 .231*S .080 .265**S .070 -.132 .204*S .251**S .432**M 
Rumination .166 -.086 .342**M .014 .168 .142 -.015 .254**S .262**S .331**M 
Avoidance .192*S -.258**S .066 .211*S .232*S .004 -.116 .209*S .155 .372**M 
Helplessness .160 -.133 .197*S .072 .243**S .136 -.157 .176 .131 .379**M 
Social Withdrawal -.122 .026 -.043 -.022 .203*S -.169 -.145 -.087 .056 .303**M 
Opposition .206*S -.090 .234*S .066 .182*S .113 -.090 .179 .293**S .259**S 
 
Note.  * Significant at p < .05; ** Significant at p < .01.  Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; Superscript L = 
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Appendix 19.  Table Depicting the Number of Concepts and Categories Initially Identified Within Each of the Micro-Models 
Developed and Exemplars from Each Category 
Table 4.22.  Table Depicting the Number of Concepts and Categories Initially Identified Within Each of the Micro-Models Developed and Exemplars 
from Each Category 
Micro-Model Concepts Quaternary Categories Tertiary Categories Secondary Categories Primary Categories 
1 22 0 12 4 2 
Example Sad people on bridges ~~~~~~~~~~ Suicide intervention Spontaneous negotiation 
deployment 
Crisis negotiation 
2 103 (5) 0 32 (0) 12 (1) 5 (1) 
Example It’s all about saving lives ~~~~~~~~~~ Desire to help people Externally-orientated 
motivations 
Why?  Reasons for 
entering into (and 
remaining within) the 
negotiator world 
3 92 (17) 23 15 (4) 8 (3) 3 (3) 
Example Establishing contact with 
subject early is important 
Initiate communication 





Engaging with the subject Stage 2: The negotiation 
process and incident 
resolution 
4 51 0 23 7 3 
Example We all watch each other’s 
back 
~~~~~~~~~~ The negotiator cadre as 
supportive 
The negotiator family Negotiation positives 
5 30 0 0 18 3 
Example Requirement for 
negotiators to be of 
Sergeant rank or above 






320 23 86 53 20 
Note. Micro-Model 1 = The Nature and Characteristics of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation; Micro-Model 2 = The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey; 
Micro-Model 3 = The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation.  Micro-Model 4 = The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator 
Experience; Micro-Model 5 = The Self-Perceived Successful UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile.  The numbers in brackets represent the concepts and 





Appendix 20.  Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey Model 
Table 4.23.  Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey Micro-Model 
Interview Transcript Excerpts Concepts Tertiary Categories Secondary Categories Primary Categories 
“I find it very, very interesting work, because it’s about what policing should be.  It’s 
about saving lives” (A:M:1:156).   
“Why do I do it?  Um, I make a difference.  I, I get the opportunity to resolve a 
situation, whereas other times I arrange for other people to go and resolve that 
situation.  Um, I genuinely care about people who are in crisis… Ah, and sometimes 
they’re there because they can’t help themselves and need a helping hand out… Um, I 
don’t mind being that helping hand, to help people out” (G:M:4:123). 
“Um, I think it is genuinely to, to kind of try and help people… (H:F:5:50). 
“That genuine personal satisfaction that you’ve done the right thing, that you’ve done 
something really positive and changed somebody’s direction in life.  Stopped them 
ruining not just their life, but many others’, people they sort of know and love them 
and whatever, it’s a huge buzz” (L:M:7:54).   
“…then there’s the really, you know, the real positive things, as I say, that sometimes 
you come away and you think, gosh, I really did make a difference today.  Um, and 
that’s… that’s a great feeling” (J:F:6:110). 
“I also then get to be involved in incidents whereby I’m saving people’s lives, um, I’m 
preventing serious harm to individuals, protecting vulnerable people, ah, which is 
incredibly rewarding” (E:M:3:114).     
1. Genuine desire to help people 
2. Desire to protect people and 
safeguard them (both individuals 
and the community)  
3. “It’s about saving lives and 
catching villains” 
4. Police oath to serve and protect 
the public 
5. Vicarious/masked altruism 
(protecting 
individuals/community is 
personally rewarding/feeling of 
elation/importance from helping 
someone out of a difficult 
situation/to make a difference) 
6. To make a difference/to give 
something back (removal from the 
frontline due to rank/position 
results in less ability to make a 
difference) 











1. Why? Reasons for 




“...I thought, yes, I would and I’d like to do something because I do find my training 
role, um, lacking in… I deal with the police officers – I don’t deal with the public 
anymore and I do miss that side of policing, actually, so it seemed to be a natural thing 
for me to do, which I did” (M:F:8:24).  
“…well first of all, I get to deploy operationally, periodically, um, which takes me 
away from the managerial role that I do” (E:M:3:114).   
“…it’s the only time I see fresh air these days [Laughter]” (F:M:4:111). 
“…I get a lot of satisfaction from specialising in a bit of business” (G:M:4:111). 
“You get a lot of satisfaction, um… I genuinely feel for someone like…well, for me, I’ll 
just speak for me, it’s almost like a vocational thing in it. I sort of, as I’ve referred to 
before, I do enjoy a job that goes well. Um, when… I…I think there’s possibly a bit of, 
um, self-aggrandisement, if you like, in that you’ve been called out in the middle of the 
night to a situation that a bunch of other bobbies have found really difficult, and I turn 
up with my colleague, and sometimes, quite quickly, we’ve sorted it all out, you know, 
and… You know, so…because then you get…there’s probably, if I’m totally honest, 
7. “Down the coalface” - Provides 
non-operational officers with 
public interface/more hands on 
policing 
8. Provides senior officers/those 
with more managerial roles an 
opportunity to get their hands 
dirty/get involved with 
operational policing 
9. Short term positive 
reinforcement/reward (adrenalin 
rush/buzz/thrill seeking) 
10. Long term positive 
reinforcement/reward (enhanced 
self esteem from doing a good 
3. Negotiation as an 
















there’s a bit of an ego thing there, I’ll…I’ll admit to that. Uh, it doesn’t work very well 
when it all goes badly, uh, but you know, so there’s a double edged sword there, but 
you know, uh, I…I’ve always enjoyed, in the police, getting involved in the big jobs. So 
I can’t deny that, you know, if there’s a picture, a job in the front page of the 
[Anonymised Local Newspaper], you know, ah, my that, you know, that…that was… 
You know, uh, you know, when…when my son says, what…what were you doing 
banging around at three in the morning? Well, it’s that one there, front page of the 
[Anonymised Local Newspaper], that was me!” (F:M:4:111). 
“Um, but, again, that real satisfaction that you've played a significant role in what is 
really complex and difficult in policing terms” (E:M:3:114). 
job/helping others) 
11. Feeling of fulfilment/self-
importance/satisfaction from 
being involved in something that 
big/being pivotal in resolving 
crisis situations  
12. Ego boosting 
13. Self-aggrandisement 
14. Negotiation conceptualised as a 
“craft”/art-form/special skill 
within the police  
“…it’s not for everybody” (A:M:1:156). 
“Um, a lot of police officers could.  Not any police officer.  There are some I know 
who, who, God bless them, good people for certain roles, but they wouldn’t do this role 
very well… Some of them rub people up the wrong way when they talk to them… And 
some of them don’t think quickly enough on their feet to be able to, to, to, adapt their 
style to what’s needed” (D:M:3:63). 
“…because a lot of people come on the rota and then think, perhaps think this isn’t for 
me… And they’ll get off the rota…” (H:F:5:50). 
IV: “Okay.  And I mean would you recommend the role to others, for example?” 
IE: “I do, if I… if I judge that they’re sort of the kind of people who’d be, uh, who’d 
enjoy it, and bring benefit to it, you know, it’s not for everybody” (F:M:4:111). 
“…it’s not for the sort of up and at them, biff, bash, boom, bosh” (L:M:7:54)  
“…there are a few [police officers] that I wouldn’t allow anywhere near the team” 
(K:M:2:111).   
IV: “…Would you recommend the role to others?” 
IE: “Only some [laughs].  I have… a couple of my colleagues, I’ve said, you need to 
look at this team.  I’ve got one officer who’s working with me at the moment.  She’s 
thought about it for a while, but she’d be really good.  You can just see it in people; 
people that talk and people that can communicate; people that can get information 
from others that other people would never have extracted; your deep thinkers really” 
(C:F:2:96). 
IV: “…And would you recommend the role to others?” 
IE: “Yes.” 
IV: “Okay.  To everyone?” 
IE: “No [chuckles].” 
IV: “Just to certain people?” 
IE: “Um, no, because people are more direct and some people will want that quick 
solution.  Some people are not necessarily more physically threatening but are 
certainly more imposing in their need to get things done and get things done quickly.  I 
absolutely recognise those skills, and in the majority of cases that’s exactly what we 
15. It is not for everyone 
16. Not every police officer is right 
for the role  
17. Some officers lack the right mind-
set/characteristics/attitude to be a 
negotiator (i.e. not 
patient/empathic enough; lack 
ability to reserve judgement; lack 
compassion; rub people up the 
wrong way/ you don’t want a 
hero) 
18. Ability of negotiators to recognise 
other negotiators/Negotiators as 
“tuned in” to what a negotiator 
looks like/can recognise a 
negotiator from the way they 
speak/how they behave and how 
they present themselves 
19. Negotiators as a certain type of 
person 
20. Negotiators as born and not made 
5. “It isn’t for 
everyone” 
6. Negotiators are a 
“certain type of 
person/police 
officer” 
3. Not every police 
officer could be a 
negotiator 







want for a quick and safe resolution.  But where it doesn’t work they are the last 
people that you would want in a protracted negotiation” (I:M:6:84). 
“It’s a, sort of, three tier process, where there’s a written application form, there is a, 
um, an exercise – a scenario to deal with – and then finally, there’s an interview” 
(D:M:3:63). 
“…when we select them in [Anonymised Force] we have a selection process where we 
mark… we ask them for, to look at the role profile and put in a, an application, it’s 
actually an application book now.  So you look at effective communication, um, 
decision-making, um – what are the other areas?  Problem solving; um, there’s 
nothing in there about strategy; um, flexibility; um, and resilience.  So all of those… 
they put in their written application against those headings… and then we mark them 
between, um, nought and three, depending on how much evidence for each one.  And 
there’s a weighting, and then we total it all up.  And, um, the top… depending on how 
many we need, depends on how many we call for interview” (B:M:2:195). 
“And then we will, then, invite those individuals along to a practical exercise, and 
typically that will be a simple, a very simple scenario of, you, you’ve got 30 minutes to 
negotiate with someone who is behind that door, but really simple, so it will be like a 
domestic incident, or an easy role play” (A:M:1:156). 
“You’re given no other preparation, you know, the time… the time is now, uh, you are 
a negotiator, the phone’s going to ring, and they took you through a role-play scenario 
with an actor playing somebody who was in crisis or was threatening harm to 
somebody” (F:M:4:111). 
“…and then the second stage was a sit down sort of formal interview” (L:M:7:54). 
“So once you get through the shortlisting process, and then I came on an assessment 
day where I had various scenarios that I needed to deal with, um, and then that 
resulted in the end in an interview, and that’s when I knew that I’d passed the selection 
procedure” (M:F:8:54). 
“Um… was it just those two?  And then we had the interview after that… The main 
questions of, why do you want to do this?  What skills have you got?  What would you 
do in these circumstances?  That sort of thing” (N:F:8:34). 
21. Paper-based application / 
expression of interest 
22. Why do you want to be a 
negotiator? 
23. Assessment of core competencies 
required for the role 
24. Scenario based role play to assess 
potential negotiator skills/see how 
they cope under pressure 
25. Role play as realistic 
representation of likely 
deployment situations 
(suicide/crisis intervention via 
telephone) 
26. Formal panel interview 
(interviewed by senior members 
of the negotiator cadre) 
7. Paper-based 
application 
8. Role play scenario 
based assessment  
9. Traditional panel 
interview 
4. Three tier 
selection process 
2. Who and how?  
Negotiator profile 
and selection 
“A week’s course, regional course in [Anonymised Place].  I think there were about 
twelve of us, um, from the region.  Um, there was a lot of, um, lectures initially and 
then there was practical role-plays and you rotated your roles.  And then very much 
after a week’s course, you know, you’re now… you are qualified as a level two 
negotiator…” (C:F:2:96). 
“My initial training, ah, was a, a regional negotiator’s course – which is a one week 
intensive course, starting on a Sunday night, finishing on a Friday afternoon – and 
that’s, um, classroom-based for some of the day and then you go, um, out of the 
classroom environment and actually practise your skills in a scenario-based, ah, 
learning exercise.  And that’s pretty consistent for the week, sort of, a morning in the 
classroom an afternoon learning scenario” (D:M:3:63). 
27. Context of training as a means of 
combining academic theory with 
practice (i.e. combining academic 
inputs/lectures with practical 
exercises) 
28. Theory of active listening, 
communication methods, crisis 
intervention, models of 
negotiation Practical exercises 
used to test negotiation skills 
(assessed by qualified negotiators) 
10. Combining theory 
with practice 
11. Training as intense 
and incremental in 
nature 









“…on that course [regional course] would be a variety of theoretical inputs, and also 
practical inputs, where you’ll be tested and scored against certain criteria and given 
feedback” (A:M:1:156). 
“So the course, straight to Hendon, fortnight residential at Hendon, structure of the 
course very gruelling, in that you’re in the classroom from half eight having inputs all 
day, short break for tea, and then you’re straight back, uh, in the evening, uh, for six 
o’clock, for exercises that will run through till they finish.  And then at ten, eleven, 
midnight, you’ll then have a debrief process, where you’ll go, in an informal setting 
with a beer, uh, but have a formal debrief of the, uh, the event, get individual feedback, 
and then, you know, you… you’; go to bed about midnight, one o’clock, and then 
you’re back in class the next morning.  Yes, I think there’s an element of machismo 
about that, to be honest, you know, because it’s a tough course” (F:M:4:111).  
“…so it will build up from a very simple domestic violence incident.. to a more 
complicated incident where there’s perhaps two people that you’ve got to negotiate 
with, so the complexity of negotiations, um, develops as you go through the course…” 
(A:M:1:156). 
“You know, they, they got you out of bed very early in the morning and… um, got you 
working on the theory and knowledge leading towards some sort of demonstration of 
the, ah, that, that you understood what you’d been given and then could apply it… 
There was some, some quite intensive debriefing… And gradually as the two weeks 
went on, the scenarios that we used, ah, become slightly more intense…  More towards 
the serious end…  Or not serious, um, on a scale they would be the, the serious end of 
that scale…  So for instance, you start with the basic suicide intervention…  And we 
would finish with a massive terrorist hijacking at, um, Heathrow Airport” 
(B:M:2:195). 
“…it started off, again, with suicide intervention and domestic siege, er, and then over 
the course of the two weeks, built up so that the scenarios were more complex and the, 
um, type of negotiation was slightly different as well in as much as you’re also dealing 
with more hostage incidents” (K:M:2:111). 
“…phenomenally long hours…the most intensive course I’ve ever dealt with, in the 
Police Service” (L:M:7:54). 
“…a four weeks course, crammed into two” (G:M:4:123).   
29. Role play used to test negotiator 
skills and assess abilities in 
relation to different potential 
scenarios 
30. “Back to backs” used frequently 
within training 
31. Role play as a vital component 
within negotiator training/Role 
play at the heart of negotiator 
training 
32. Training scenarios increase in 
severity as the training progresses 
(i.e. from suicide/crisis 
intervention to a terrorist siege) 
33. Training as intense in nature 
“And then to be given the skills of unpicking that and to put those skills into practice of 
an exercise, um, and then to sit through it the following day, tired and more tired and 
more tired… Ah, four weeks ago, I ended up doing 21 hours at work, because we had a 
kidnap running.  And all of that took place after my day job had, finished.  I was tired, 
um, but you learn techniques of resilience.  And one of the… I’m certain it; it was an 
unintentional objective of the course.  Maybe it wasn’t, but you learn the techniques of 
being resilient… and rising to the challenge when you’re tired… And that’s quite 
important… Three o’clock in the morning when that phone goes off, you’re awake and 
you’ve got to operate straight away” (G:M:4:123). 
34. Training scenarios as 
extreme/OTT/farfetched – 
designed to test you (if you can 
deal with this then you can deal 
with anything)  
35. Training designed to see whether 
you can cope under pressure/test 
your resilience/teach resilience 
36. Training designed to simulate the 
12. Training designed 
to test resilience 
13. Training designed 











“Yes, sleep deprivation, getting cold out during the night, it’s all part of the 
psychology, behind the scenes I guess, to make sure that you are, you know, not 
somebody that performs nine to five and then you go home.  In fact, I can count on one 
hand the amount of times I’ve been called out during the working day, it’s always in 
the evening or weekend” (L:M:7:54). 
“Uh, so yes it does; it simulates that long day, the tiredness, and if you like, you’ve 
done your day job in class, and then you’ve been called out in the evening to do 
something for real, you know” (F:M:4:111). 
“So they are probably fourteen to fifteen hour days in any event to try and simulate the 
tiredness.  They just don’t do the small o’clock phone call to go with it” (I:M:6:84).   
reality of negotiating (i.e. when 
you have done a full day at work 
and then get called to a job) 
“Ah, yes well experience is a great thing.  Um, it certainly contributes towards you, 
um, developing some expertise around it…” (E:M:3:114). 
“Especially when you are new to it.  Because, um, like everything in the police, as, as 
soon as you, um, qualify, there’s an assumption by the public that you’re an expert at 
what you do.  You’re far from it.  And it takes years, you know, to learn it really” 
(O:F:9:36). 
“My view is, um, no matter what role I am, my junior, ah, colleague is going to 
speak… And I’ll always put them in to bat… Because I’m at the stage now, where I feel 
comfortable enough to do that and I want them to have the exposure… Because they… 
I’ve got two years left doing the job, before I go and find something else; they are the 
future beyond that… And unless we give them that exposure and that experience… 
Then they’re going to feel uncomfortable and unready for it… Sometimes it’s a brutal, 
brutal, ah experience” (G:M:4:123). 
“I was very fortunate that once I’d been, done the initial course and gone onto a rota 
we went through a busy period, so I had a lot of early jobs to allow me to practise 
those skills in a live situation without having to rely on the theory side of it solely” 
(I:M:6:84). 
“Um, I think it’s very powerful to learn, actually on the job and do the scenario” 
(D:M:3:63).  
“When you get that first one out of the way, because it’s a difficult one, because then 
you’ve got, you know, you feel all right, I now know what to do” (N:F:8:34). 
37. Importance of operational 
negotiator experience in 
negotiating/on-the-job training 
38. Need for negotiators to be of 
sergeant/inspector rank or above 
to reflect operational experience 
39. Experience/live deployment 
builds confidence/reaffirms belief 
in ability 
40. Baptism by fire 






15. Learning by 
doing/Baptism by 
fire 
7. No substitute for 
the “real thing” 
3. Negotiator training  
“It’s a perishable skill though.  Unless you actually do the do, then… it does die off” 
(G:M:4:123).  
“...you go through periods where you get quite a few calls, and then you kind of have 
sort of four, five months with nothing, and you then find yourself on call, and you 
think, I’m just going to have a look through my bag, and just refresh my mind, so 
actually, it does, um… The more you’re doing it, the more comfortable and confident 
you feel” (J:F:6:110). 
“…there’s no substitute for actually getting back and getting in there and start using 
it… Or else you’ll lose it” (B:M:2:195). 
“So between forces what happens is that, and this is mandated nationally, each region, 
42. Importance of regular utilisation 
of skills 
43. Negotiation as a perishable skill 
44. “If you don’t use it you lose it”  
45. Formalised CPD opportunities 
46. Force-specific/In-force quarterly 
team meetings  
47. Regional quarterly meetings to 
share best practice 
48. Annual/bi-annual/tri-annual call 
16. Negotiation as a 
perishable skill (“If 
you don’t use it, 
you lose it”) 
17. Use of 
formal/informal 
CPD opportunities 
to reflect upon 
performance and 









so we’re in the [Anonymised Region], must hold quarterly meetings, and that’s where 
you get each force coordinator in the role there… The emphasis there is, we have a 
continuous development plan, in terms of how negotiating within the [Anonymised 
Region] develops, and how you learn.  And at each of those meetings again, similar to 
the force meeting, we will go round the table and say, right, lessons learned” 
(A:M:1:156). 
“Yes.  What we have is… again, those training days always include, er, a team 
meeting.  Separate to that, we also have, er, regular meetings of the coordinators on 
the force where we share, um, good and bad practice and lessons learnt.  Um, we also 
have our own, er, site on the force intranet and that includes, um, a list of incidents of 
note where negotiators have been deployed and also includes a deployment form 
where, after every deployment, we submit a form to say we’ve been deployed, what the 
outcome was, what lessons there were, if any, what issues there were… Um, I should 
mention also we’ve got the POLKA website, which is national” (K:M:2:111). 
out training exercises with 
firearms 
49. Regional negotiator 
conferences/seminars/forums/ann
ual international conference for 
negotiators  
50. Informal CPD opportunities 
51. Use of in-force deployment 
records (intranet) as learning tools  
52. Self-directed learning / reading / 
CPD (up to the individual to 
recognise need for CPD and hone 
skills)  
53. Use of the Police OnLine 
Knowledge Area (POLKA) 
54. Peer-to-peer 
mentoring/buddying/observation/l
earning from other negotiators  
“…the selection is geared mainly towards selecting people to go on the regional 
course and join the team at that level; dealing mainly with domestic sieges or suicide 
interventions” (K:M:2:111).   
“I certainly think the regional was a good introduction, um, but the, obviously, the 
caveat with the regional course is that they wouldn’t expect you to go and start dealing 
with a hostage situation anyway, that you’d be… you could go in as support, but you 
wouldn’t be the number one or two negotiator” (J:F:6:110).   
“…traditionally you’ve got, if you get called out, you’ve got your national and you’ve 
got your NSO [Negotiator Support Officer]” (N:F:8:34).  
“Um, [Anonymised Force] insists on a regional course followed by a national course.  
National policy is you can go straight to a national course, but there aren’t enough 
spaces.  So a lot of forces, us included, will have a, a regional training, ah, which is an 
eight-day course that deals with everything short of international terrorism, 
negotiating via intermediaries – normally because of the language barrier – ah, but 
isn’t approved for hostage real hostage scenarios; it’s persons in crisis” (I:M:6:84)  
“I would respond to anything I get called out to, really.  Um, but I would say, having 
not done the National Course, that if there was a hostage, ah, well anything really I 
would probably, um, I’d let the National, the National chaps then, yeah, sort of take 
the lead, really…” (M:F:8:24). 
IV: “Okay, great, thank you.  Once you’d actually been selected, what training did you 
receive?” 
IE: “Um, a week’s course for the regional, um, or the… not the regional, well it’s a 
regional course but it was the support officer, the negotiating support officer role.” 
55. Negotiators within the cadre 
trained to different levels 
56. Regional (Level 2) Trained 
Hostage Negotiator is trained to 
respond to crisis incidents  
57. National (Level 1) Trained 
Hostage Negotiator is trained to 
respond to crisis and hostage 
incidents 
58. Hostage Negotiator Coordinator 
has completed HNC training and 
takes a supervisory/management 
role  
59. “Red” Negotiator has completed 
Red Centre Training and is 
trained to respond to kidnap and 
extortion situations 
60. Force Lead Negotiator 
Coordinator is the lead for the 
negotiator cadre within the force  
61. Regional Lead Negotiator 
Coordinator is the regional 
hostage negotiator lead and 
18. Level 1 negotiator  
19. Level 2 negotiator 
20. Hostage negotiator 
coordinator (HNC) 
21. Red negotiator 








 IV: “Okay. 
IE: “Which is what I do at the moment.” 
IV: “So is that basically you’re, you’re number two, as it were?  So you’re a 
secondary negotiator?” 
IE: “Yes, yeah, yeah.  Doesn’t always work like that, you quite often end up being 
number one because you get there first, but, but, yes, it’s traditionally you’ve got, if 
you get called out, you’ve got your national and then you’ve got your NSO 
[Negotiating Support Officer]” (N:F:8:34). 
“I’m also red centre trained for kidnap…” (B:M:2:195). 
“There’s something called a Red Centre Course which specifically deals around a 
kidnap or a hostage environment.  Um, because effectively, in an overt world, the 
subject in crisis knows that you’re there and knows that you’re working for the cops.  
In a kidnap world where there’s a threat to life, very often they can’t know that the 
police are involved, so there’s different techniques in how you deal with them… So 
that’s the Red Centre world” (I:M:6:84). 
“Yes, I did, the Red Centre course, um, about 18 months ago… And it’s, it’s for kidnap 
and extortion… Um, so it’s, you have, you obviously take the person that someone’s 
trying to blackmail, or… The victim communicator, we call them.  And you kind of, 
they act as the, they’re the number, you’re their number one… But they do the 
talking… And obviously the, the aggressor doesn’t know… The police are in the room 
with them, and the set up and everything” (H:F:5:50). 
“And then moving on again, you then have the coordinator training which is again 
separate, which is another… I think it was three or four days, three days I think” 
(K:M:2:111).   
“I was the coordinator, on for the day and, um, my number one rang me and she said, 
um, I’ve got this issue.  In fact she said; I had a strange call.  Well go on, what’s the 
call?  Well this detective has rung me and said, um, if you had somebody who was 
involved in a kidnap, where would you take them to?  Where would you put them so 
it’s safe?  She said, ah, I’d probably take them to such and such a hotel.  Oh, that’s 
fine, thank you very much indeed… So, she thinks no more of it until she gets a call 
back, about an hour later to say, um, I’ve been to the hotel, they know nothing about 
police facilities here and I’m here with the family of the person who’s, who’s been 
taken hostage.  And she says; who’s been taken hostage?  Oh there’s a guy… a job 
running?  What do you mean there’s a job running?  Well there’s a job running.  Well, 
you didn’t tell me that.  Well there is and we’ve now blown our, our safe house… So 
what do we do?  So she went, stay there don’t go anywhere, I’ll ring you back.  And 
she’s one of our more junior negotiators, so she rings me and she goes, oh, what do I 
do?  I say, okay, calm down.  So there’s a bit of mentoring and a teaching… You make 
your way.  We, we agreed where the new safe house was going to be, you make your 
way to, to there, ah and I will, ah, put arrangements in place for that.   But for 
goodness sake, take control, of, of that family” (G:M:4:123). 
usually represents the region at 
the National Negotiator Working 
Group 
62. Gold Negotiator Advisor has been 
trained specifically to be able to 
advise gold commanders in large 





“We have a line management structure… So for instance I line manage at the moment 
one, two, three active negotiators.  So there’s an opportunity there to discuss one-on-
one with them the learning points or significant points that have come out of an 
incident” (B:M:2:195). 
“I’m one of six coordinators, so at any one time we have a coordinator on-call, ah, 
and two other people on-call to go as a team of three” (I:M:6:84).  
“…my colleague was the number one negotiator, so talking; and he was talking to him 
as we were driving down” (C:F:2:96). 
“Um, the team worked well though.  [Anonymous Negotiator] was talking.  Um, I, ah, 
I was in there and a fellow called [Anonymous Negotiator] was, was in there and we 
dropped into our roles really quickly of, of supporting and keeping the boards and the 
logs running… And the intelligence feed backwards and forwards and, and so on and 
so forth” (G:M:4:123). 
“…if you turn up, and the first responder, to use the jargon is doing well, has 
established a good rapport, well, you… we have the number one, number two, and 
number three roles, in an ideal world, actually, you assume number two then, and you 
support the untrained responder.  Because if they’re doing well, why disrupt it all?” 
(F:M:4:111).  
“…I was the supporting person; I was the number two, so the main role was – stand by 
my colleague” (C:F:2:96). 
“…our operating procedure that we, we have a duty number one who’s, who is the on 
call, has a fast vehicle that they keep with them all week… And we have a 40 minute 
response time to anywhere in the force… So we’re hurtling around in blues and twos… 
In that thing… Um, the number two may vary during the week, but the number one 
always knows who his number two is… Um, now… and, and generally the number one 
goes in to speak and the number two comes on behind, picks up the pieces and 
supports him” (G:M:4:123) 
“…I was working with one other negotiator, and also a coordinator.  So my role was 
to back up that number one negotiator…” (A:M:1:156). 
“It’s one of the reasons we try to always have the, um, a secondary negotiator there 
sort of monitoring for that.  There are certain situations, um, I’ve certainly felt it 
myself and I’ve certainly pulled other negotiators for it where they reach a point where 
actually, they get really annoyed with the person they’re talking to, and so, um, one of 
the roles really is to, is to look for that in the primary, pull them away, engineer a bit 
of development time and say to them look, this is what’s happening… Um, if necessary 
change them.  But usually, pull them and say right, this is what it is, he’s getting under 
your skin and this is why.  Then it’s okay and they can go back in.  They recognise it 
and they deal with it” (K:M:2:111). 
“It’s easier when you’ve got a second negotiator with you because you can sotto voce, 
you can just, just, um, exchange a few views, get a, get a triangulation on what’s going 
on and, on occasion, swap negotiator as well” (D:M:3:63). 
63. The negotiation process as a 
machine (with each team member 
acting as a cogwheel) 
64. Minimum of two negotiators 
deployed to any call out (never 
negotiate alone/avoid negotiating 
alone) 
65. Importance of matching 
negotiators in terms of personality 
(i.e. so that they can operate 
effectively as a team) 
66. Two/Three main actors within the 
negotiation process and each have 
different roles within the 
negotiating cell 
67. Primary negotiator as the Number 
1 
68. Primary negotiator is in direct 
communication with the subject 
and does the talking (or may 
advise first responder/TPI if a 
relationship/rapport has already 
been established)  
69. Secondary negotiator as the 
Number 2/Negotiator Support 
Officer (NSO)  
70. Secondary negotiator as the 
support role – advises/supports 
the primary negotiator/used as a 
sounding board  
71. Secondary negotiator monitors 
negotiations and makes 
suggestions (i.e. Post-it notes)  
72. Secondary negotiator will liaise 
with bronze command in the 
absence of a Hostage Negotiator 
Coordinator (i.e. takes 





















“I’m one of six coordinators, so at any one time we have a coordinator on-call, ah, 
and two other people on-call to go as a team of three.  And, predominantly, I will go to 
the scene with the two members of staff and I’ll set the tactics that I’ll want them to 
employ” (I:M:6:84).  
“Er, the idea of the coordinator, really, is to provide advice to the silver commander.  
So there’s a little bit of cross over with the team leader role, but, um, the coordinator 
really should be, er, assessing the progress of negotiation, making recommendations to 
the silver and, er, ideally, er providing written updates to the silver as well” 
(K:M:2:111). 
“Position papers are effectively at a point in time; a negotiator coordinator would 
draw up a position paper which says, at this time this is what’s happening, these are 
the considerations, these are the issues that seem to escalate it, these are the issues 
that de-escalate it, this is the way that I think that the negotiation strategy should go, 
um, that kind of thing.  And we also do things like mood charts; so whereby we’ll plot 
time against mood, um, that sort of thing… Ah, what else have we got?  Ah, then we 
look at welfare of staff…” (E:M:3:114).  
requests/updates them on the 
status of the negotiation) 
73. Secondary negotiator acts as an 
emotional check point (monitors 
primary negotiator’s emotions)  
74. Secondary negotiator monitors 
risk to primary negotiator and 
perform dynamic risk assessment 
(i.e. checks the primary negotiator 
isn’t getting sucked in/drawn 
in/too close to the subject) 
75. The Hostage Negotiator 
Coordinator performs a 
supervisory/line management role 
76. The Hostage Negotiator 
Coordinator is responsible for 
monitoring the content/progress 
of negotiations/The HNC 
oversees/informs negotiation 
strategy  
77. The HNC liaises with silver 
command/firearms commander 
(HNC acts as a conduit to the 
commander who makes the 
decisions – i.e. HNC acts as the 
bronze commander of the 
negotiators) 
78. HNC advises bronze/silver 
command on use of 
strategies/tactics that can be 
offered by negotiators  
79. HNC will sometimes complete 
position papers to provide a 
synopsis of key parties involved 
80. HNC monitors and is responsible 
for the welfare of the primary and 
secondary negotiators 
81. HNC may have to obtain 
permission/authorisation for 
tracking of phone calls etc. 





contact for the control room and 
has to deploy/turn out 
primary/secondary negotiators  
“We always insist that the negotiators themselves after an incident, always actually 
have their own little debrief, because sometimes you might get a little bit of conflict 
between two negotiators dealing with it, so you might have dealt with a certain 
something, I would have disagreed with the way that you dealt with it, so we need to 
make sure that, okay, yeah, the person came down safely; are we okay between 
ourselves?  So we always do that… We always then have the part of the formal 
command debrief” (A:M:1:156). 
“She fell probably 25, 30 foot and got some quite serious injuries, that obviously all 
the team had witnessed.  Um, the first part that… we’d already told them that would 
happen was that their recording sticks would have to be seized and so on to make sure 
that they were open to scrutiny.  They did the hot debrief on the night; they had a 
follow-up debrief the following day” (I:M:6:84). 
“Um, whereas, the people who just dealt with that situation, if they’ve got a 
supervisor, if there’s anything about them, he will regroup everybody, or she’ll 
regroup everybody, and they’ll talk through the process.  One is a debriefing for, for 
learning.  And the other one, just to check that everybody’s behaving as they normally 
do [Laughs]” (O:F:9:36). 
“Okay, well the way we do it, we basically get paired up with somebody of more 
experience, and whenever there’s a job on, we try to go out and get involved, learning 
from the more experienced person” (L:M:7:54). 
“…we had one [a newly qualified negotiator] work with us on Tuesday.  We called 
her… she said, oh thanks for calling me.  I said, it wasn’t me, if was the control room!  
She said, it’s great to listen, because she’d done her regional course but it was nothing 
like the live scenario.  She’s eyes open, ears open, and she was looking at me and 
[Anonymised Negotiator]; what we were doing; how we did it; what we were thinking 
about.  She was able to listen, read the log, give her opinion on things” (C:F:2:96).   
“The process now is that you would, first of all, go on a week-long regional course, 
which means that you can, um, deploy as soon as you come back.  But what we do not 
is a mentoring scheme, whereby you’re effectively shadowed by an operational 
negotiator, who will deploy with you on a number of occasions and then make an 
assessment whether or not you are ‘match fit’, and able to deploy individually”  
(E:M:3:114).  
“…if I needed… if I …if I had a particularly traumatic incident or something, you 
know, I know I have utter confidence that the senior negotiators would, uh, be in touch 
to see if I need… If, for example, tonight, I got called out and there was a fatality at an 
incident, I… you know, and this has happened to somebody else quite recently, I know, 
the… the very next day, if not at the time, you know, I’d have… my phone would be 
going, and it’d be, you know, is everything okay, is there anything you need?  You 
83. Debriefing process (differs across 
forces) 
84. TRIM (Trauma Response Incident 
Management) panel 
85. Use of Hostage Negotiator 
Coordinator/Mentors as support  
86. Buddying/shadowing system 
between experienced/new 
negotiators in some forces  
87. In-house welfare /counselling 
services 
88. Specialist independent 
counselling services in some 
forces 
89. Occupational health provision 
/Access to Force Medical Advisor  
90. Post Incident Management 
Trained team members 
91. Employer assistance programme  
92. Mandated annual psychological 
welfare checks in some forces  
93. Access to psychologists in 
advisory role/negotiator welfare 
capacity in some forces (Force 
Psychologist Advisor) 




















know, they’d point me in the direction of occupational health, and the critical incident 
debriefing and all the rest of it… So I… you know, I’ve got a lot of confidence that 
there would be people coming to me from all sides, checking that I had everything I 
needed” (F:M:4:111). 
“…in those situations, we would have a debrief and if it’s one, um, where it’s required, 
there is also… we have a procedure called TRiM which is, um, I think most forces use 
it now, the trauma risk management… And it comes from the Royal Marines and all 
the forces use it now.  Um, so that is just basically making sure people are okay, really.  
Um, but then separate to that, what you’ve got is if, for example, that somebody’s been 
killed, then, um, there are set post incident procedures and as part of them, they’ve, 
they’ve… we now have something called post incident manager, um, we’ve made sure 
we’ve got a couple of people in the force who are, um, post incident managers and 
who are aware of who the negotiator was and what they’re doing… They basically 
effectively become your welfare officer…  Um, we’ve got all the.. as I said, the TRiM is 
your basic, um, and then obviously you could be referred into occupational health or 
what have you” (K:M:2:110). 
“Ah, mandated, we should go, ah, once every 12 months to see occupational health; 
we don’t have to talk to them when we get there, but we do have to go” (I:M:6:84). 
“Um, we’ve got our yearly, our annual, um, sort of welfare assessment with a mental 
health nurse, um, which we go to as negotiators…” (J:F:6:110). 
“Um, some of my colleagues have been off the rota for one reason or another, for a 
period of time, and we’ll put them back into the rota when they’re ready and we will 
give them support” (D:M:3:63). 
“…one of them, when she first qualified, uh, she had a job which was putting an awful 
lot of pressure on her, so she was working long hours, it was in an area of work to do 
with, um, where there was a high stress level to do with child protection issues and so 
on, and she was taking her work home, married to a, an officer, serving officer as well, 
and there were concerns about her performance at work from her own day job, if you 
like, so this was fed to me.  I spoke with her, um, and we agreed mutually that she 
wouldn’t get deployed just for then, and then we made some further contact, things had 
improved greatly, her workload had reduced.  Um, I was being put under pressure to 
say that’s she’d still got problems, she shouldn’t be deployed, but she was coming to 
me saying I want to be deployed, why am I not being deployed?  So we ended up… we 
went by, by mutual agreement she went to the force medical advisor, the FMA who 
works here on behalf of the force.  Uh, he looked at the issues and said no, from what 
she says and from what I can observe she is deployable, in fact it would do her good, 
so she has been deployed a couple of times and she’s coming on quite well.  So we 
have a flexible, reactive system to that…” (B:M:2:195). 
“Um, and usually, after a job, you know, if there are a couple of you, you’ll sit down 
and have a cup of tea together and talk it through, and that helps a lot” (J:F:6:110). 
“Often, within the negotiator group we support each other straightaway anyway…” 
95. Peer support  
96. Obtaining 
support/mentoring/coaching from 
29. Peer support from 












“We’ve got our own, like, mentor, which is one of the… um, coordinators… So if I’ve 
got any issues, I know I can go and speak to them” (N:F:8:34). 
“I know when we did have one [a fatality] that other team members sent those 
colleagues, um, supportive messages; text messages or emails or picked up the 
phone… Yeah, and I think that made them feel not isolated; not on their own and that 
they could talk if they needed to” (C:F:2:96). 
“The big, um, coping strategy, as far as negotiating is concerned, is the team.  Uh, 
they all know what we go through when things have been difficult.  Talking to other 
team members, ring you up, you ring them up.  That’s, that’s the best way of coping” 
(D:M:3:673). 
“Yes, probably just go home and speak to my other half and that, really… Um, 
because you can’t speak to the people that you work with especially being an 
inspector” (N:F:8:34).  
“Talk about it with other colleagues.  Sometimes the wife, sometimes not, depends on 
the situation” (L:M:7:54). 
“Um, but my wife is absolutely great.  I will offload to her and she’ll sit down and nod, 
make a cup of tea if it needs it, tell me not to be stupid if I’m getting things out of 
proportion, you know… So I think just kind of having somewhere to offload and not 
bottle-up” (G:M:4:123). 
“I’m private, I’m quite a private person… But I wouldn’t keep things inside like that… 
I’d be saying to one of my mates, even… Even mates not in the job, I’d be saying I had 
an absolutely horrendous job today… You know.  Somebody jumped, or somebody did 
this, or… you know… Just to talk about it…” (H:F:5:50).  
“I cope with stress by talking it through with my wife, uh, sport, walking in the 
countryside, things like that, you know” (F:M:4:111). 
“Yeah, I do sport as my number one, ah, really; exercise to blast out the adrenalin” 
(C:F:2:96).     
“…I’ve got two black Labradors, and I do a lot of mountaineering and hiking… And 
I’ve got, I go out and bike with my boys…” (O:F:9:36). 
“Yeah, I go for a really long run… It just lets you think things through, let’s a bit of 
fresh air around you, and I find it personally, apart from the health benefits, it’s really 
good for clearing your brain out” (I:M:6:84). 
“I’ve had a number of coping strategies over the years, including drinking far too 
much…” (E:M:3:114) 
“Again, they say you should never do it, but me, I go to the pub, have a beer” 
(L:M:7:54).  
“Um, yes, I mean, there’s the… there’s the classic of going home and having a drink.  
Well, I will do that, you know.  Um, I hate having headaches , so it won’t be too much 
[Laughter]” (J:F:6:110). 
“Um… I’d better not say drinking, had I?  No… It, it is nice, sometimes, to have a 
colleagues/team members and or 
more senior/experience 
negotiators/HNCs 
97. Use of POLKA discussion forums 
(support from other negotiators in 
the country) 
98. Social support (from 
family/friends/colleagues) 
99. Verbalising / talking about issues 
with family/friends/colleagues  
100. Hobbies (i.e. going out on the 
boat; getting away from it all and 
switching off)  
101. Exercise / Playing sport / Going 
for a run  
102. Walking the dogs / Walking in the 
countryside 
103. Drinking alcohol/going to the pub 




31. Exercise and/or 
sport 





drink and just talk about it, as in have a… Have a beer or a glass of wine, and to… To 
talk about it, which is nice” (H:F:5:50). 




5 Primary Categories 
“Probably, mm, about 20 a year for the last nine years, give or take; so probably 
between 150 – 200 incidents… Ah, yes well experience is a great thing.  Um, it 
certainly contributes towards you, um, developing some expertise around it…” 
(E:M:3:114). 
“Especially when you are new to it.  Because, um, like everything in the police, as, as 
soon as you, um, qualify, there’s an assumption by the public that you’re an expert at 
what you do.  You’re far from it.  And it takes years, you know, to learn it really” 
(O:F:9:36). 
“My view is, um, no matter what role I am, my junior, ah, colleague is going to 
speak… And I’ll always put them in to bat… Because I’m at the stage now, where I feel 
comfortable enough to do that and I want them to have the exposure… Because they… 
I’ve got two years left doing the job, before I go and find something else; they are the 
future beyond that… And unless we give them that exposure and that experience… 
Then they’re going to feel uncomfortable and unready for it… Sometimes it’s a brutal, 
brutal, ah experience.” (G:M:4:123). 
“Um, I think it’s probably part of my own personality, but I think there absolutely 
would have been some stress, but that would have been a lack of confidence stress 
rather than anything else.  And I think I… I was very fortunate that once I’d been, done 
the initial course and gone onto a rota we went through a busy period, so I had a lot of 
early jobs to allow me to practise those skills in a live situation without having to rely 
on the theory side of it solely” (I:M:6:84). 
“When you get that first one out of the way, because it’s a difficult one, because then 
you’ve got, you know, you feel all right, I now know what to do” (N:F:8:34). 
“…the more you do, the more comfortable… You feel” (H:F:5:50). 
“…it’s always, um, a challenge, um, because people are always slightly different but 
you… the situation itself doesn’t faze you as much as perhaps it might have done in the 
past” (K:M:2:111). 
“Absolutely.  Absolutely… I mean, the first time you get a call about a kidnap; your 
stomach just falls completely, from the sky… Crime in action, fact of life, massive, 
massive, massive risk.  Now, okay, I can see clearly, exactly where it is we’re going 
with this one, what it is that we’re doing… Um, there’s always an adrenalin rush when 
they, when they come in and there’s always that initial, ah, flipping heck, what are we 
dealing with?  Um, but I guess what the experience does, is it calms that more quickly” 
(G:M:4:123). 
1. Positive correlation between 
number of deployments and 
negotiator confidence 
2. The more jobs you do the more 
confident you become 
3. You become more robust the 
more incidents you deal with 
4. Risk assessment ability improves 
with time/operational experience 
5. Importance of on the job 
training/observation/operational 
negotiator experience for building 
confidence as a negotiator 
 1. Confidence 





1. Entire model 
underpinning 
mechanism 









Appendix 21.  Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the Nature and Characteristics of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Model 
Table 4.24.  Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the Nature and Characteristics of Hostage and Crisis 
Negotiation Micro-Model 
Interview Transcript Excerpts Concepts Tertiary Categories Secondary Categories Primary Categories 
“…sad people on bridges…” (F:M:4:111). 
“…people who are suicidal, on a high rise, or bridges, or tops of buildings” 
(O:F:9:36).   
“I got a call basically saying that it was a girl on a bridge, and, um, she would only 
speak to police women… She was going to throw herself off the bridge” (H:F:5:50). 
“Um, generally crisis intervention, really, people at height, um, some sort of 
personal, ah, situation that… in, in their lives… And/or aggravated by mental health 
and/or drugs… Um, seen a fair bit of psychosis, brought about by cannabis.  
Particularly skunk.  Um, that’s causing people to get things out of proportion, a fair 
bit” (G:M:4:123). 
“I had one the week before last where it was not an enviable scenario where 
somebody is threatening… it was a high risk missing person threatening to kill 
themselves and very, um, you know, depressed…” (C:F:2:96).   
“We’ve got someone today who’s, um, a high risk, um, missing person… this 14 year 
old girl has gone off with a new boyfriend who they met on Facebook...” 
(B:M:2:195).   
“The typical incident that we deal with is someone refusing to come out of a 
premises, ah, after having committed some form of criminal offence… or they’re then 
to be questioned about an offence.  So that tends to be an individual in a house, 
perhaps we want to execute a filed warrant, and we need them out of the house, or 
they’ve committed a domestic violence incident”  (A:M:1:156). 
“The one that always sticks in my mind is a guy that was in a flat… He’d just 
smashed up the place but it was covered in blood and his girlfriend managed to leave 
the flat… And he was refusing to come out, and he’s cutting himself and there was, 
um, fuel all over the place… And he was threatening to set light, light to himself” 
(N:F:8:34). 
“…that was a barricade situation where a lady had, um, domestic, she chased her 
husband out with a knife, and then was threatening to assault anyone else who sort 
of came in” (J:F:6:110).   
1. Suicide/self-harm 
intervention   
2. Individuals in 
personal/emotional/psychol
ogical crisis 
3. “Sad people on 
bridges”/jumpers  
4. Mental health/substance 
abuse precipitated crisis  
5. High risk MISPERs 
(young/vulnerable missing 
persons)  
6. Criminals evading 
apprehension (wanted 
individuals/barricade after 
commission of an offence – 
i.e. domestic assault) 
7. Dwelling based barricade 
(without victims)  
8. Individual-in-crisis 
barricades self within a 
dwelling 
9. No victims involved in 
barricaded scenario (just 
the individual-in-crisis) 
10. Threat is to individual-in-









3. High risk MISPERs 
4. Criminals evading 
apprehension 






1. Crisis negotiation  
“…the next category is the firearms operation where very much it’s part of the tactics 
in the planning for how you can resolve it, whether it’s spontaneous or pre-
planned… And a negotiator team will be put in there to, um, as a part of a tactical 
option.  So you end up putting in an early call to try and persuade the person to, you 
know, look out the window, you’re surrounded, come out with your hands held high, 
type thing.”  (B:M:2:195) 
11. Facilitating execution of 
high risk warrants 
12. Firearms operational 
support 
13. Use of negotiators as 
protest liaison officers 














“Um, the role is changing, um, in as much as I think, ah, areas of use are increasing.  
The actual job of negotiating, I think, is pretty similar to how it was when I started, 
ah, but, increasingly now, looking to be used in other situations, um, such as dealing 
with protesters.  If we’ve got, um, a group we know are going to come and protest in 
a particular area, and we fear there’s going to be an adverse reaction, one way or 
another, because of that protest, then, increasingly, we’re getting negotiators 
involved in that to try and facilitate, um, a better outcome for all parties”  
(D:M:3:63). 
“And sometimes, for pre-planned operations, we miss negotiators out.  So for 
example, recently we had a very large EDL march in [anonymised place], and there, 
I was a bit surprised that negotiators weren’t even consulted as part of the planning 
process…” (A:M:1:156). 
14. Protest/demonstration 
liaison & management (to 
ensure adherence to terms 
of engagement and ensure 
protest remains peaceful) 
15. Use of negotiators to 
support pre-planned 
marches (i.e. EDL) 
management 
“Well, the specific one that’s most memorable would be in [Month, Year], being 
called out to two police officers who, who’d been taken hostage in [Anonymised] by 
an armed man” (E:M:3:114).   
“…it was a fellow who was mentally ill, lived in, ah, in [Anonymised Place].  Um, he 
had previously been in treatment for Schizophrenia and, um, had failed to maintain 
his regime and his contact with his physicians, to the point that, on, on a home visit, 
the CPN said, this guy is now dangerously unstable; we need to get control of him 
again... The psychiatrist decided that he knew better than the risk assessment and 
picked up one of his nurses and went to the house…where he was admitted by the 
man’s wife, shown into the lounge where the man said, excuse me a minute, 
disappeared and came back with a 9mm, ah, turned on the video camera and pointed 
the 9mm at the doctor… The CPN managed to get away and run away and raised the 
alarm.  And then there were a series of demands that went in, from him, via his 
solicitor and from them to, to the cops.  Um and we ended up with a fairly major 
siege, that ran for 48 hours” (G:M:4:123). 
“…domestic, household family-based crises where they end up in some sort of siege.  
Where they might not be threatening to kill themselves, but they’re threatening to do 
all sorts of things to all sorts of people.  Often they don’t actually have a hostage but 
sometimes they do, you know.  It’ll be partner, girlfriend, wife, children, whoever” 
(B:M:2:195).   
“…the majority of times where there’s been a hostage/victim there, it’s tended to be, 
um, a domestic siege type of thing where he’s also grabbed the kids or grabbed the 
wife.  Or it’s been, um, something like a mental health assessment where he’d 
grabbed hold of whoever… Or it could be a friend, who just happens to be in there” 
(K:M:2:111). 
16. Hostage-taking incidents 
(police officers taken 
hostage)  
17. Domestic siege incidents 
(involving victims) 
18. Domestic barricades (where 
family members/medical 
professionals prevented 
from leaving the premises)  
8. Hostage-taking 
9. Domestic siege 
(involving 
victim(s)) 





“There’s something called a Red Centre Course which specifically deals around a 
kidnap or a hostage environment.  Um, because effectively, in an overt-world, the 
subject in crisis knows that you’re there and knows that you’re working for the cops.  
In a kidnap world where there’s a threat for life, very often they can’t know that the 
police are involved, so there’s different techniques in how you deal with them” 
(I:M:6:84). 
“It was probably about, my first deployment was not for about four months actually, 
and it was a kidnap, and it was international.  Basically what had happened, we had 
a family in the north of the country, and demands were coming in from the hostage-
takers in Indonesia, and the brother, who we had to negotiate through.  Quite often, 
on those occasions, it turned out to be false previously, but that one was a genuine 
kidnap” (L:M:7:54). 
“So it’s not one where someone’s threatening, or is required to hand over £1 million 
and they’ve got the bank manager’s wife.  It’s not that type of thing.  It’s a drug deal 
for £150 that’s gone wrong” (A:M:1:156).   
“Um, that was a kidnap, about… A member of an organised crime group, um, who 
was of interest to us, in any case, had been snatched from outside his house, by, um, 
gangsters, bundled into a car, his mobile phone was thrown out of the car, before 
they sped off and he disappeared.  And the intelligence picture was such that this was 
likely to become a murder.  This was a significant incident of high risk and threat… 
it was without a doubt, a criminal vendetta.. a sum of money had exchanged hands 
somewhere, that had not gone through the family; it certainly hadn’t touched the 
police anywhere.  Um, more likely to be that your victim, your hostage has been 
encouraged to do some electronic bank transfer of money whilst he was held.  Um, 
and he turned up at about three o’clock in the morning, battered and bruised… in the 
local hospital” (G:M:4:123). 
“Um, and the guy had received a letter that said, um, that they can make some 
threats towards his business; that they’d got some compromising photographs of 
him, which they had, which were going to destroy his family life.  Um, and this guy 
wanted a specific payment of £146,000” (I:M:6:84).   
IE: “Most of the time, um, it can be a product contamination but they’re more rare.  
Most of the time, it tends to be they’re threatening to expose somebody.” 
IV: “Right, for something that could be potentially damaging, personally damaging 
to them perhaps?” 
IE: “Yes, we’re finding more of those internet related now where people are 
engaging in sexual activity, it’s being filmed on the internet and then... this film’s 
going to be released, it’s going to be sent to everyone on your Facebook account” 
(K:M:2:111).   
19. Kidnap and Extortion 





threats to discredit 
individual 
personally/professionally)  
21. Pseudo/fake kidnappings 
(i.e. Crime in Action)  
22. “Bad on Bad” kidnappings 
(gang/criminal vendettas, 
drug dealer conflict) 






2. Hostage negotiation 











Appendix 22.  Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model 
Table 4.25.  Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model 
Interview Transcript Excerpts Concepts Tertiary Categories Secondary Categories Primary Categories 
“Yeah, I, I think you’re right.  Um, but I also think that this is where the, the 
family of negotiating comes in, that we all watch each other’s back” 
(G:M:4:123). 
“Within our own team, we’re quite supported… And there’s a, almost like a 
separate camaraderie that, ah, is lacking in lots of other areas I think at the 
moment” (B:M:2:195).    
“It’s quite close… it seems to be quite a close little team actually” (M:F:8:24).   
“They’re [my colleagues] brilliant, yeah.  I think… one of the first things they 
say on your national course is this… have we got any individuals here?  If we’ve 
got any individuals, you might as well get up and leave, because it’s not about 
you; it’s about the team thing.  I don’t think we’ve really got anybody that I’ve 
worked with who… on our team who I think is not going to look after you as 
number one.  You know, rule… making sure people have got drinks, people have 
got something to eat, people are warm enough; do they need a break?  Yeah, it’s 
very supportive” (C:F:2:96). 
1. We all watch each other’s back 
2. We all support each other 
3. Camaraderie/comradeship within 
the cadre 
4. A team ethos 
5. Closely knit cadre 
6. Negotiation as a team discipline  
1. The negotiator 
cadre as supportive 
2. Camaraderie/comra
deship 
3. Negotiation as a 
team discipline 




“And you don’t know… at that point in time, you don’t know how close you can 
get to the individual… and what that’s going to do.  Um, and I guess that’s 
where the thrill of negotiating comes in, because you have to be mentally agile.  
It’s like a constant battle of wits.  And that, that, I find very rewarding, very 
exciting, very draining” (G:M:4:123). 
“What I personally get out of it is… on the odd occasion I’ll be down the 
coalface, and it’s a great feeling to, to deal with it.  That’s absolutely fantastic.  
I love that, and everyone gets a massive high on it.  Um, but I suppose what I get 
out of it, I mean, I find it very, very interesting work, because it is, it’s about 
what policing should be.  It’s about saving lives” (A:M:1:156). 
“Um, I’ve usually got a bit of an adrenalin rush going for several hours.  Um, 
and you know, if it’s been one way, you’ve spoken to people, and it’s all ended 
happily, it’s a real, like, oh, yes!  You know, and literally go bouncing home…” 
(J:F:6:110). 
“I think in general, I think at the end of it, it’s like when you’re a police officer, 
and you’re arresting people, and you’re putting them in court, it’s a nice feeling 
and you think, great, I’ve done a good job today.  But when you actually can 
say, genuinely you’ve saved somebody’s life, it’s like a whole new level, so it’s a 
buzz that you can’t get in any other area of business I don’t think.”  “You get, 
well for me, you get a fantastic buzz from it, it’s so unique, that there’s nothing 
that can compare to it, nothing, in the police service” (L:M:7:54). 
7. Negotiation conceptualised as a 
challenge 
8. Negotiation conceptualised as 
interesting 
9. “At the coalface” (i.e. provides 
non-operational officers with 
public interface/interaction) 
10. “Massive high”/”Great 
feeling”/Adrenalin 
Rush/Buzz/Excitement/Thrill/Elati
on (i.e. short term positive 
reinforcement) 
11. Great feeling from saving 
lives/helping people (i.e. pseudo-
altruistic) 
12. Vicarious reward from helping 
others 
13. Sense of achievement/reward from 
making a difference in a person’s 
life  
4. Negotiation as 
challenging  
5. Opportunity for 
public interface and 
interaction 
6. Negotiation as 
emotionally 
rewarding 
7. Feeling good from 
helping others 











I do?  Well hold on, I’m not the ground commander, I’m the negotiator; I work 
for you in these circumstances… And there is always, and I guess that’s 
something to do with the fact that we only negotiate at rank.  Um, and there is 
always, kind of, that tension.  Um, there’s only one occasion really, that I’ve had 
to intervene, to, ah, overturn the ground commander’s actions okay?... So 
sometimes it gets… it can get a bit messy round the edges… But there is this, this 
role, role rank issue” (G:M:4:123). 
“I’m an inspector.  I could turn up at an incident being run by a sergeant, and 
he or she would then look to me to then command the incident.  And negotiators 
negotiate; commanders command.  You’ve probably heard that several times.  
Ah, and it’s just not helpful, so the first thing I do now is, if I am on duty, is 
actually put my civvy jacket on and go down and go down as… with badges of 
rank covered up.  Very often, people will know who I am anyway, but it, it 
somehow takes the edge off the situation” (D:M:3:63). 
“And I was on my own… Nobody had really arrived and her… you could hear… 
initially she was in a café, so I was… that was fine; I was quite happy to carry 
on talking to her about that.  Um, but then I heard the stream outside and she 
was walking and she was on her way to the edge of the river and she was going 
to go.  That was really hard… and I could… you could feel your stress level 
rising, because I’m thinking, where are my… where’s my support?  How do I… 
you’re speaking to somebody on the phone; how do you then give that 
information to, um, the inspector or the units out there?” (C:F:2:96). 
“…it may be that they [the subject] pick up on stuff from… police officers on the 
cordon who maybe aren’t as… careful as they should be about what they say or 
do” (K:M:2:111).   
: “…sometimes there will be increasing pressure for the negotiators to be used 
and then withdrawn, because commanders want to get the situation resolved 
quickly” (A:M:1:156).    
commanders (i.e. Negotiators 
negotiate and commanders 
command) 
15. Dual role conflict (i.e. 
commanders wanting negotiators 
to make command 
decisions/senior negotiators taking 
on command roles) 
16. Negotiating alone/solo 
17. Lack of team/colleague discipline   
18. Conflict between negotiators  
19. Lack of scene control/non sterile 
environment  
20. Pressure to resolve situation 
quickly but negotiators want to 
play it long/conflict between 
tactically minded commanders and 
“play it long” negotiators  
role conflict  
9. Negotiating solo 
10. Lack of operational 
discipline  











































“…sometimes when the negotiator job conflicts with your day-to-day deadlines, 
which sometimes you can’t miss… it’s really hard” (C:F:2:96). 
“…but I think upfront there’s still a bit of a lack of understanding about what it 
[negotiation] is.  Some people, like me, watch it on Hollywood blockbuster 
movies and think, that looks the business that does, but the reality is somewhat 
different” (L:M:7:54). 
“Um, I think we need the regional courses to be standardised.  Um, and I think 
there needs to be some clarity about whether or not they are a course which 
feeds into the national [course] or not.  And I think the national needs to, um, 
come out of Hendon; we need to have far more of those courses and they need to 
be delivered around the country” (K:M:2:111).    
“There could be, perhaps, also some better reward and recognition for us… 
Because we’re not… I think in sixteen years I’ve had one certificate saying 
you’ve done ten years!  Literally, because I’d done ten years…”  (B:M:2:195).    
“Um, I know that they’ve got a fairly small budget really.  Um, sometimes the kit 
is a bit old.  And perhaps because it’s almost an add-on, it’s not something that 
21. Conflict with day job/Double 
hatting conflict 
22. Lack of awareness about the role 
within the force  
23. Lack of recognition of the benefit 
of using negotiators 
24. Lack of budgetary support from 
force  
25. Inappropriate utilisation of 
negotiators i.e. Not called when 
needed/called when not needed 
26. Lack of professionalisation 
/standardisation of the discipline  
27. Lack of tangible 
recognition/reward/substantial 
remuneration for the role 
12. Dual role conflict 
13. Lack of awareness 
and support within 
the force 
14. Lack of 
professionalisation 
and standardisation 
of the discipline 





















28. Negotiation as an add-on/adjunct 
to/bolt on the day job/ 
29. Negotiation as “the poor relative” 
30. Negotiation as a voluntary 






“…walk out of the door and leave family commitments behind” (I:M:6:84). 
“…there’s personal difficulties… you know, disturbing the family’s sleep as I’m 
coming and going” (G:M:4:123). 
“I’ve been in town with my family, you know, having a meal, and having to sort 
of put them in a taxi and then go off to a… a… the docks to help somebody out.  
So huge… you know, I don’t think there’s anything that recognises the impact on 
the individuals” (F:M:4:111). 
“It’s a huge demand on you, negotiating, and it impacts on your personal life, 
quite a bit, when you’re on call.  All your mates are down the pub and you’re sat 
watching East Enders or whatever, it can be a bit rubbish” (L:M:7:54). 
“You know, when, when you’re on call, no we can’t go to that party, no we can’t 
go outside the force, I’ve got to stay dry” (G:M:4:123).   
31. Disruption to family life 
32. Disruption to social and personal 
life 
33. Having to “stay dry” 
34. Having to stay local if on call 
35. Missing out on family events etc., 
due to being on call  
16. Disruption to 
family life  
17. Impact on social 








“Well, I don’t personally get any stress from doing the negotiating stuff…”  
(N:F:8:34). 
IV: “Do you ever kind of experience stress or anxiety as a result of actually 
negotiating?”  
IE: “I haven’t so far” (M:F:8:24).   
“No… I don’t feel stressed” (O:F:9:36).   
“Um, I don’t feel any stress when I’m negotiating; I really don’t…” (I:M:6:84).  
“What I would say to that is, yes, I do [experience stress].  So you’re putting 
yourself on offer.  But equally there’s the argument to say that in the vast 
majority of situations when the matter’s resolved, you’re getting a lot of positive 
stress, so it’s like a blooming cup.  You know, you’ll get, you’ve got a load of 
negative here, but the potential is it’s actually all going to be smiles” 
(A:M:1:156). 
“Um, it’s different.  No, it’s a challenge.  It’s not a stress.  Um… No, I wouldn’t 
say it was stressful” (C:F:2:96) 
“…somewhat perversely, I think although negotiating is always a crisis, um, I 
don’t find that it stresses me out really as much as the frustrations of any day-to-
day, uh, issues that you might come across.  Poor leadership and poor 
management really stresses me out.  Um, sometimes the, the sort of brutality of 
the situation or the, the, um, sort of crisis of the situation, you go straight into 
dealing with that there and then, there are people standing, you know, 
threatening to kill you and if, you know, all the stuff that they come out with or 
what they’re going to do to you and your families, that, um, I can absorb that a 
lot easier really” (B:M:2:195). 
“Oh, goodness me, poles apart, absolutely poles apart… Um, I… my, my 
everyday life, at, at work, is busy.  It’s not at all stressful, not in comparison 
with some of the bits that I do.  Ah, some of my staff think it is, right – it isn’t!  
36. Stress as a result of potential or 
actual negative operational 
outcomes / due to high stakes of 
situation  
37. Stress due to decisions constantly 
being under scrutiny 
38. Stress due to the on-call 
commitment (“on tenterhooks”; 
“up and down like a yo-yo”) 
39. Stress induced by conflict between 
negotiators and commanders  
40. Negotiation conceptualised as a 
challenge rather than as stressful 
41. Negotiation as a combination of 
“negative and positive stress”  
42. Negotiation as not stressful  
43. Negotiation as a different type of 
stress 
44. Negotiator stress as intense but 
short lived  
18. Negotiation as non-
stressful  
19. Negotiator eustress 
(Negotiation 
conceptualised as a 
challenge/combinat
ion of positive and 
negative stress) 
20. Negotiation as a 
























I’ve been in far more stressful situations, with people throwing knives at me, 
and, and bottles at me, while I’m trying to talk them out of a, a, situation… It’s 
not, um, so yes, I’ve been in more stressful situations” (G:M:4:123). 
“I don’t think one is greater than the other, I think it’s just a totally different 
dynamic” (L:M:7:54). 
“Um, I think it’s changed in that we’ve sort of really tried to promote ourselves 
as, if you need anything for MISPERs and the like, you know, people that you 
feel are in crisis, it might be a telephone call as opposed to that come out and do 
a face-to-face.  Um, yes” (J:F:6:110). 
“Um, the role is changing, um, in as much as I think, ah, areas of use are 
increasing.  The actual job of negotiating, I think, is pretty similar to how it was 
when I started, ah, but, increasingly now, looking to be used in other situations, 
um, such as dealing with protesters.  If we’ve got, um, a group we know are 
going to come and protest in a particular area, and we fear there’s going to be 
an adverse reaction, one way or another, because of that protest, then, 
increasingly, we’re getting negotiators involved in that to try and facilitate, um, 
a better outcome for all parties” (D:M:3:63). 
“…there’s an anecdotal feeling that it’s dropped off a bit, and we, you know… 
I’ve had some weeks with no calls, at all” (F:M:4:111). 
“…there’s been a big drop in incidents since Taser’s come on the scene” 
(K:M:2:111).   
“It is interesting, however, that in the last two to three years… the number of 
day-to-day negotiating incidents appears to be on the decrease, and the reason 
for that is because the police now have other tactical options to deal with the 
scenario, but the big one there is Taser.  So with the advent of Taser, that’s seen 
a reduction in the number of negotiating incidents, because the police officers at 
the scene are able to deal with it adequately, quickly, and safely by the use of 
Taser” (A:M:1:156). 
“As we sit here now, there’s probably, um, maybe half a dozen high-risk missing 
persons in [anonymised place] alone… Who a lot of those, you know, we could 
have an intervention with them by a phone call.  Or a text.  And that’s, that’s… 
Remember some of the technology’s changed as well.  I’ve found that I’ve ended 
up carrying out part of negotiations via text.  Yeah.  Email.  Yeah.  Facebook.  
You know, it’s… all of that is a massive change from when I started certainly” 
(B:M:2:195). 
“Yes, we’re finding more of those internet related now where people are 
engaging in sexual activity, it’s being filmed on the internet and then… This 
film’s going to be released; it’s going to be sent to everyone on your Facebook 
account, it’s going to be… So you’re getting those types of jobs now, which we 
haven’t seen before” (K:M:2:111).  
45. Changes in deployment 
frequency/nature (decrease in 
number of deployments)  
46. Broader range of deployments (i.e. 
Use of negotiators in pre-planned 
as well as spontaneous incidents)  
47. Use of negotiators in public order 
management 
(protests/demonstrations/marches) 
48. Impact of Taser on 
nature/frequency of deployment 
(i.e. Less deployments as a result 
of Taser – “Taser instead of 
negotiators”) 
49. Less use of negotiators within 
barricade/domestic siege scenarios 
due to Taser  
50. Use of negotiators to facilitate 
Taser  
51. Broader use of communication 
mediums (i.e. use of 
email/text/social networking etc. 
to negotiate)  




22. Impact of Taser on 
negotiator 
deployment  






6. The evolution of 















Appendix 23.  Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis 
Negotiation 
Table 4.26.  Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of 
Hostage and Crisis Negotiation 
Interview Transcript Excerpts Concepts Quaternary 
Categories 
Tertiary Categories Secondary 
Categories 
Primary Categories 
“Whereas actually what you need and what I often try and seek is what do we know 
about this person.  Let’s speak to their family, let’s speak to their doctors, let’s speak 
to their, ah carers to find out about what we call intelligence – I’d say it was just 
information really… So I suppose I, kind of, use those techniques to try and find out 
as much as possible about the person before engaging with them” (B:M:2:195).   
“Um, and then get more details when I’m on the way” (K:M:2:111). 
“So I go over my introduction, usually en route I try to get details about any 
background on them” (L:M:7:54). 
“Um, you’re able to draw on other things from his life and other detail which often 
in negotiating situations we completely don’t have because there’s no Intel on the 
system.  So we rely on our negotiators if we can.  If we’ve negotiated with him 
before… for future… for colleagues to have put in what worked last time; what 
didn’t work” (C:F:2:96). 
“Usually they’ve done intelligence checks.  I dealt with one who had actually 
recently been arrested for sex offending, so obviously, so initially it’s a no go area, 
you wouldn’t say, are you wanted by the police for anything? See you later…” 
(L:M:7:54). 
“Um, yes, he could commit suicide.  There’s always that possibility, but I think you 
get a feeling reasonably early on from, ah, his demeanour, his actions, and his 
comments as to whether or not this is someone who is, who is actually going to carry 
out that threat.  You obviously look at their criminal past, and all their past, you’ll 
obviously try to find out um, from associates or friends or family, has he done this 
before? And how does he react to drink, etc., etc.” (A:M:1:156). 
1. Intelligence gathering as 
vital to negotiation/used 
to inform the negotiation 
strategy and approach 
Intelligence gathering 
starts as soon as 
negotiator is 
deployed/Gathering 
intelligence on the way 
to the scene  
2. Identify how subject has 
presented and the 
situational circumstances 
3. Analyse what the subject 
has said to call 
handlers/first 
responders/witnesses to 
provide context to 
situation  
4. Identification of existing 
mental health 
problems/history of 
substance abuse (liaise 
with mental health 
teams/GPs etc.)  
5. Identification of subject 
criminal history or 
outstanding warrants 








gathering as a 
vital component 






1. Stage 1: Initial 
deployment 







6. Identification of 
form/previous call 




for the situation  
“You assess it yourself so you don’t put yourself at immediate risk” (N:F:8:34).  
“It is better to be able to talk with someone if there’s no barriers, but you’ve got to 
balance it with your own safety” (B:M:2:195). 
“My initial thing is safety of myself, that’s the primary thing.  Safety of other officers 
that are there, and then safety of, I’m talking about incidents of people in crisis here, 
safety of them.  My training and whatever has taught me that if they’re going to 
jump, they jump anyway, and what I don’t want to be doing is grabbing somebody 
and them taking me with them.  Luckily, I mean, I’ve never done that, I’ve never 
grabbed anybody, but you have to, you look for an area where you can talk to them 
safely, where you know that you’re not going to be harmed.  So that’s the first thing I 
do” (L:M:7:54). 
“I feel that you can really get drawn into that dialogue, and you can put yourself in 
danger, you know, you get that creeping, and you move closer and closer… if you’ve 
got someone who’s going to jump, actually, you don’t want them to take you off, as 
well” (J:F:6:110). 
“I mean, the, the first thing is, is there a threat to life?  If so, whose life; how can that 
be mitigated against?  Am I the right person to be doing this?  Is there somebody 
else who should be with me?  Um, are there any other tactics that the ground 
commander might want to consider to keep the public safe?  To keep me safe?  To 
keep his staff safe?  Um, so those are kind of the initial dynamic risk assessment” 
(G:M:4:123). 
7. Risk assessment of self, 
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risk assessment process) 
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1. Stage 1: Initial 
deployment 
tasks and roles 
“…if you’re then having to set up a negotiating scenario.  By that you’re set, having 
to set up a sterile environment, and by that you will, may well be evacuating 
people… Okay, so you’re going to look at a physical, um, sterile zone, in which there 
will be proper cordoning’s, you can look at, in certain situations, getting the 
assistance of technical support units, and draining certain phones of batteries” 
(A:M:1:156). 
“So the considerations that I would make are all around what the primary response, 
um, what the primary functions of a negotiation are, um, and also containing that 
incident; um, administration and logistics…” (E:M:3:114). 
“And there’s different controls and pressures on us depending on how wide the 
12. Creation of a sterile 
environment (to keep 
subjects in and third 
parties out) 
13. Importance of scene 
control and maintaining 
a sterile environment 
14. Importance of 
proper/effective 
cordoning 












1. Stage 1: Initial 
deployment 





police need to close down the immediate area for us to be able to do out bit.” (I: 
M:6:84). 
 “The actual, ah, atmosphere that you’re, um, negotiating in can be a problem.  It 
needs to be kept sterile.  I’ve had negotiations going on where there’s… the chap’s 
mates are all across the back, there, shouting the odds, which aren’t helping.  Or we 
get people, um, perhaps, who may not know the individual, but are, are fed up with 
the inconvenience being caused to them, shouting jump or whatever” (D:M:3:63). 
15. Negotiators may have to 
initially control the scene 
or direct others to 
control the scene 




17. Third party interference 
as diluting negotiator 
efforts/derailing 
negotiation  
“Er, and so if we’re going to do that, if there’s two of us for instance, we decide who 
is going to lead, who’s not… who’d going to be number two and if there’s a third 
one, obviously who’s going to provide that link” (K:M:2:111). 
“…I think it’s also about the establishment of roles and responsibilities.  That’s a 
very key thing, and again that’s about setting out the cell, the police cell, correctly, 
so you get to a scene, and it’s… but sometimes I don’t do this.  Um, but it’s really 
important to try and establish, right, you’re doing that role, I’m doing this role, and 
you’re doing that role, so everybody understands” (A:M:1:156). 
 “…the decision-making is usually around, um, what your initial response is going to 
be to the situation that’s developing; um, what role do you play, are you actually 
playing an advisory role, um, or are you playing an actual negotiating role; ah, and, 
again, that depends on the incident.  Then it also depends which role I’m taking on; 
am I taking on a negotiator role or am I taking on a negotiator coordinator role?” 
(E:M:3:114). 
“Er, the first thing you usually do is, um, find out who’s in charge, um, which isn’t 
always as obvious as it should be and, er, have a word with them, find out what it is 
they want, um, what they need and, um, usually give them some advice about what 
we’re going to do” (K:M:2:111). 
 “…you just have to feed in your view and then accept the decision” (C:F:2:96). 
“Again, decision, what does the commander, whether it be silver or whether it be the 
senior PC on the ground, what do they want from the negotiator? So you’ve 
probably heard this about negotiators negotiate, commanders command, so at least 
get a feel for the way… the direction we’re going in” (J:F:6:110). 
18. Identification of 
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22. Negotiators negotiate 
and commanders 
command 
23. Negotiator/wider team 
positioning 
 7. Identification of 
roles within the 
negotiator cell 
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bronze/comman
d 
2. Negotiator cell 
setup 
1. Stage 1: Initial 
deployment 
tasks and roles 
“And when you get there the first thing I want to do is just to find out exactly what 
this is about and try and get a little bit of background so we’ve got something to start 
off with.  And then it’s just, I want to get on with it and start talking to these people” 
(N:F:8:34). 
“…if you’re going to a job you need to communicate on the way” (C:F:2:96)    
24. Establish/initiate some 
form of 
communication/dialogue 
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“…I was on call and it was a job that was at the opposite end of the country, but 
needed to be done by a phone because we didn’t know where this lady was.  So all I 
say is, to the control room, if need be, you’ll need to get the other two that are on-
call to come to my home, and they will join me and do it that way, because otherwise 
you’ve got an hour of somebody in crisis who just isn’t going to get the contact…” 
(I:M:6:84). 
“Just by being there and talking is better than not being there at all... So get in there, 
start talking, see what you’re dealing with” (B:M:2:195).  
“…suddenly you get asked to put an early call in, and you put an early call in and 
you make contact... And the job goes live and it’s, like, two hours away.  What do 
you do?  Do you abandon that contact and continuity for two hours until you get 
there?  Do you get a team up there?  Do you maintain contact?  Really we need to 
do… do the rapport building by the time… we get there” (C:F:2:96). 
“I was called out to a bloke who was sat on top of a car park in [Anonymised 
Place], threatening to jump.  I was given a quick briefing by the uniformed officer 
who was there, who did his best, he’d obviously done a good job, because he hadn’t 
jumped” (L:M:7:54) 
“Um, so you’ve probably been woken up out of bed so the first thing I usually do is 
go out to the kitchen and, um, I’ll speak to whoever’s in the control room, and, er, I 
will just establish some, um, key details really about what type of incident it is, where 
it is, who’s in charge of it, um, and also, we just give some basic advice to start with 
because what we sometimes find is we’ll turn up at an incident and nobody’s even 
tried to engage with the person… Because they think, well we’re coming and that’s 
their job” (K:M:2:111).  
dialogue is better than 
none 
26. Establishing contact with 
subject early is important 
27. Just being there can be 
enough 
28. Initial first responder 
contact as important  
29. The “golden hour” 
concept  
30. Putting calls in from the 
kitchen table 







e is better 
than none 
“…we’d tried, um, communicating ourselves by phone with him.  Um, there were 
family members and so on that turned up on the cordon and we tried going through 
their phones, um, and then we tried going face-to-face” (K:M:2:111). 
“So once I’ve got that all set up and my kit set up, sometimes I’ve got some detailed 
information, sometimes I’ve got real vagaries and the bunches of five will be around 
those two things.  And then it’s either put the call in or if it’s face-to-face, do that 
approach as well to just get close enough and try and open up some dialogue” 
(I:M:6:84). 
“When it actually comes down to the, um, you know, I’m at the scene, well, okay, 
what are my methods of communication?  You know, am… and I going to holler 
through a door, you know, a letter box, have we got mobile phones, etc?  And again, 
a lot of the time, it’s going to be my choice, but depending on the job, it might be an 
instruction about, this is the way we want it done”  (J:F:6:110). 
“I don’t like the phone call ones, I like, for me personally, I prefer face-to-face” 
(H:F:5:50). 
“…if you’re face-to-face that’s best of all.  If you’re doing it over a phone that’s 
32. Establish dialogue with 
subject using a variety of 
methods/forms of 
communication 
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communication in line 
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difficult but it’s second best sort of thing… Ah, and therefore another step further 
removed to some sort of electronic communication via email or text is even harder” 
(B:M:2:195). 
“Yeah, all via the phone.  A lot of ours are, to be honest.  Because one, the 
geography of the force… you know, it’s really difficult” (C:F:2:96). 
“Face-to-face is good, but obviously, if there’s any threat or risk, close to the 
proximity, you know, it is, you know, a problem.  Um, so mobile phones are used 
often” (F:M:4:111). 
“Okay, so you’re going to look at a physical, um, sterile zone, in which there will be 
proper cordonings, you can look at, in certain situations, getting the assistance of 
technical support units, and draining certain phones of batteries… You can use an 
element of subterfuge, um, so it might be that they’re on the phone to you, um, but 
that, you can actually work it out that your phone’s not working, and that the only 
way that it’s going to work is that you chuck in a field phone into that individual, so 
they’re speaking to you on the field phone” (A:M:1:156). 
“Um, I know a colleague had to, um, go, you know, up the gas towers, and around 
those.  Somebody was up there, at the top of one of those.  And he went up.  But I 
think he quickly realised, you know, if he decides to come flying down here, I’m off.  
Um, or, if he starts throwing stuff at me, or whatever.  Uh, and he came down, and 
then communicated through a loudhailer” (O:F:9:36). 
“Um, my most recent callout was last Saturday, which was just a callout asking to 
put a phone call in to a person who’d been reported missing, and was believed to be 
implying that they were going to take their own life through some text messages, but 
I didn’t actually do any negotiation with them, so… and that, for me, over the last 
year, has been an increasing trend that a lot of callouts seem to be either resolved by 
the time we get there, or because it’s text message or, um, phoning people who won’t 
necessarily respond to you, so it’s about leaving messages, hoping that they’ll tend 
pick up and phone someone else, or come back to us” (J:F:6:110). 
“I’ve found that I’ve ended up carrying out part of negotiations via text.  Yeah, 
email.  Yeah, Facebook.  You know, it’s… all of that is a massive change from when 
I started certainly” (B:M:2:195). 
“Um, the most recent one actually was blackmail which is still running yesterday 
and today.  But it’s, um, it’s an odd one in the sense that it, um, all the 
communication’s through the internet.  And through email and so on and we’re just 
getting at the stage, hopefully today, where we’ll move to phone contact” 
(K:M:2:111).  
36. Use of 
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“Let’s start listening to what you’re saying; tell me what’s going on.  And when the 
venting comes out, let him vent.  Some good elective questioning to active listening, 
some good open questioning, just to facilitate some sort of understanding” 
(G:M:4:123). 
40. Use/importance of 
effective /enhanced 
listening 
41. Use of active listening 
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“…you will actually say to them, you know, to me, you sound really angry, um, 
because they’ll either come back and say, what are you on about?  Or it’ll be like, 
too bloody right.  Um, and you, so you get your confirmation or whatever, but also, 
it’s part of your trust building, because it’s showing that you’re listening to them and 
you’re understanding what’s going on with them”  (J:F:6:110). 
“I think the main skills are listening – listening and sort of summarising…” 
(M:F:8:24). 
“And kind of mirroring them, I suppose, their energy levels, and… You know, trying 
to kind of lift them and… If they are low, you know, just try to mirror, a little bit, of 
how they’re talking” (H:F:5:50). 
“I personally give quite a lot of “I” messages to the person…” (B:M:2:195). 
“I think it’s important to just be yourself” (O:F:9:36).  
“So even it someone’s sort of… you know, will happily spit in your face when they 
come down off the roof, they’ve at least got that trust that when you say, okay, we’re 
going to put a ladder up, or we’re going to send the fire brigade, that you… that they 
can trust what you’re going to say, and that when they come down, what you say is 
going to happen will happen” (J:F:6:110). 
IV: “…if you had to choose one skill, or attribute, what would you say is the most 
important for a negotiator? 
IE: I suppose it’s, it’s that listening, and not being judgemental… Um, and, and 
being a bit, being genuine… If someone’s talking to you, and you’re, you’re at your 
wit’s end, or it’s the worst thing that’s ever happened to you, and you’ve got 
someone that’s not on the wavelength, or not there… 
IV: Doing it for the wrong reasons? 
IE: Yes… and it’s all a bit false. 
IV: You can see… 
IE: They’ll see right through you, won’t they? 
IV: Right through it, yeah… You’ve got to be there because you want to be there, 
because you genuinely want to help that person” (H:F:5:50). 
“Um, prepared to say sorry, honesty with them.  Um, there are times when I’ve said 
I got that wrong; you told me not to mention family – I need to mention family 
because of, because they’re worried.  You’ve then gone mad at me, I clearly got that 
wrong, I’m sorry” (I:M:6:84). 
“And as you go from the, sort of, active listening up, you maybe start to disclose a 
little about your own situation, your own life experience – what’s up with your 
children or in your relationship or your health and stuff… So, ah, I don’t mind 
personally doing that; it is a personal preference… So occasionally I’ll, um, disclose 
something just to try and help things along.  So I, sort of, try to, try to really build 
that empathy with the person as quickly as possible” (B:M:2:195).  
“Okay.  Empathy.  Um.  Effective listening, clarity, honesty, um, rapport building.  I 
42. Open questioning to 
encourage story telling 
43. Reflective Listening 
(Repeating or 
rephrasing/paraphrasing/
reflection of feeling) 





47. Labelling emotions  
48. Use of “I” messages  
49. Use of motivational 
interviewing principles  
50. Support self-efficacy by 
empowering/instilling 
confidence in subject 
51. Use of person-centred 
therapy principles 
52. Demonstration of 
congruence/genuineness/ 
being yourself 
53. Being prepared/able to 
say sorry  
54. Personal/self-disclosure 
55. Demonstration of 
unconditional positive 
regard and respect for 
others  
56. Importance of 
demonstrating a non-

















think those communication skills, um, respecting the individual, all those things I 
think come together to try and actually get quite a good, polished negotiating 
performance” (A:M:1:156). 
“I think, I would say yes, you are always trying to build up some sort of relationship, 
and with rapport, you tend to think of, you know, some sort of warmth…” 
(J:F:6:110). 
“…it’s a large amount of listening, and it’s very little talking.  And it’s to make sure, 
try and get them to talk as much as possible and offload it all.  And, and that’s all 
I’ve tried to do now.  And don’t judge” (O:F:9:36). 
“It’s all about active listening and feeling, of whatever you’ve been told.  It’s trying 
to understand what’s brought them to that position where they’re on top of a roof, 
top of a bridge, whatever, and they’re going to jump, and then being empathetic is a 
big thing.  Like not shouting, being empathetic, telling them that you understand… I 
think negotiating is such a difficult area of business, that you need to actually do 
what you say, and not be judgemental, and be open minded, actively listen, and you 
know, try to be there, supportive, empathic, also”  (L:M:7:54). 
“Listening with a real intent to try and understand and empathise with them; what is 
it that’s brought them to this place on this day?” (B:M:2:195). 
“You’re, you’re, as I said, you’re trying to find the buttons to press.  You’re trying to 
find what’s made them where they are, and if you can find that, you can generally 
help them find a solution” (D:M:3:63). 
“It’s about trying to establish a rapport, uh, you know, uh, and using the active 
listening, reflecting back, uh, trying to get to the bottom of what is really happening 
here, uh, you know, and then exploring with the individual, you know, ways of… 
other ways of doing, you know, other courses of action” (F:M:4:111). 
“Um, I think it’s just listening and understanding why they’ve actually got to that 
point and sort of just talking it through with them.  Being truthful – always be 
truthful, um… yeah” (M:F:8:24). 
“And I’ve got some slight regrets with that one, because they tell us not, not to lie, 
on them, the Red Centre, you, you know, you… You’re away.  Yeah.  You’re away on 
it for the Red Centre you can tell them anything you want… That’ll work basically.  
So it’s a different tactic” (H:F:5:50). 
“It was trying to establish what his issue was, what his problem was, who he was, 
why he was there, trying to establish what the big issues were for him, you know, um, 
and you’re looking for the hook, then, all the time, aren’t you?  The thing that he… 
he’s actually interested in, the thing that’s at the heart of his problem” (F:M:4:111). 
“…I didn’t really get onto the girlfriend side of things because obviously I think that 
might have antagonised him” (N:F:8:24). 
“We’ve actually got a formal record of them doing it on this first occasion, and we 
can, on the return it basically says, you know, issues that you should never raise with 
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this individual, and issues that you did raise with the individual, which helped you 
resolve it” (A:M:1:156). 
“It’s easier when you’ve got a second negotiator with you because you can sotto 
voce, you can just, um, exchange a few views, get a, get a triangulation on what’s 
going on, and on occasion, swap negotiator as well.  There’ve been times when 
you’re just getting nowhere; the person’s getting right fed up with you.  So, let’s give 
someone else a go.  Swap over” (D:M:3:63). 
“Um, there’s only one thing that I haven’t really mentioned and that’s a gender 
issue, um, because you have to have… I think you have to have that in your toolkit.  
So if you’ve got a woman who hates women, why are you then putting a woman 
negotiator or a… if you’ve got a domestic situation then the bloke might not want to 
speak to a woman” (C:F:2:96). 
“You know, if you were negotiating… with a male in, um, and in a very strict Muslim 
country, then you need to know your way around, a little bit around the culture… 
And just think about how you’re, um, listening and how you’re communicating with 
that person” (B:M:2:195). 
“I’ve known a friend of mine who was negotiating with someone who was ex-
services.  He might come across as likeable, as well, but his eventual resolution was 
reached about because the, um, my colleague was a sergeant, he’d got stripes on 
and he actually ordered the guy to come down.  And that worked, in the end.  So, 
there are, there are times when other strategies work.  There’s no fixed rule” 
(D:M:3:63). 
“I mean, I can be on a bridge with a girl of 19, or I can be on a bridge with a male 
who’s in his sixties, from a far greater academic background than I am, you know?  
And the same style will not work with both of them.  So that rapport building, 
straight away, um, I wouldn’t go in straight away and say, right, lovey, what’s 
wrong with you?  Because, you know, you’ll sort of, they’ll look at me as if I’m a bit 
deranged, really” (O:F:9:36). 
“Um, and you’re trying to just build on that rapport, trying to get agreement on 
things, trying to build trust, maybe do deliveries, um, maybe give them a drink, 
maybe give them a cigarette, um, and then you’re looking at basically using some 
influence really, in terms of reciprocity, scarcity, those types of things to try and 
influence that change” (K:M:2:111). 
“You know, and it’s like, come on, let’s have a cigarette.  You know, yes, I can get 
one to you, but, you know, if I get one to you now, I want you to promise me, so a lot 
of this, I’ve done this for you.  You do this for me” (H:F:5:50). 
“I’ve spent two hours talking to a loft hatch, and eventually the loft hatch is opened 
and that’s the first noise you would have… The easy ones are where they shout and 
bawl back because at least you know that you’ve got confirmation that they’re 
there… and you can then, got to try and work on what the, the right thing that’s 
behaviour to the 
situation/subject 
64. Use of concessions and 
positive police actions to 
encourage reciprocity or 
build rapport 
65. Use of weapons of 
influence (i.e. reciprocity 
and ingratiation) 
66. Quid pro quo (i.e. if I do 
something for you will 




ground between the 
negotiator and subject 
68. Perseverance/persistence 
Generation of options 
available to the 
subject/encouraging 
problem solving 
69. Concept of “bunches of 
fives” 
70. Honesty/genuineness 
/never lie to the subject 
71. Keep promises you make 
(with Red Centre 
scenarios as exception to 
the rule) 
72. Play it long /Use of time 
as a tactic/Bore people 
into submission/Allow 
subject to sober up 
73. Encourage dialogue/keep 
them talking/allow them 
to talk/verbalise/vent 
74. Try to establish why 
they are in the 




17. Use of time 
as a 
tactic/”playi
ng it long” 
18. Disassociati






















going to get them engaging” (I:M:6:84). 
“Um, but at this place I was negotiating with this woman, ah, for about four hours 
we were there and she barely said a word in the whole four hours – and that was a 
new one for me… I’d never had… that was quite, ah, challenging.  And so I suppose 
it’s hard talking to people who don’t want to communicate… But you have to… you 
have to just always focus on the fact that they’re listening… they can hear what 
you’re saying” (B:M:2:195). 
“Generally speaking, once you’ve got the communication, um, most of the time, in 
the most common forms of negotiation, crisis negotiation and what have you, the 
first thing you do is once you’ve established communication, you’re really, um, 
trying to buy time and let them diffuse the anger really, the emotion” (K:M:2:111). 
“And a lot of it is alcohol-fuelled.  You know.  Uh, where, you know, for that period 
of time, there’s some distorted thinking.  And sometimes, it’s just about spending a 
bit of time with them until they’ve got sober” (O:F:9:36). 
“I remember it very clearly, the first one I, I, I dealt with.  Um, I turned up in 
uniform, which is something I learnt, quite quickly, is not helpful for a number of 
reasons.  Firstly, it, it, it may influence the view of the person you’re trying to 
negotiate with because you’re just another cop…” (D:M:3:63). 
“…introduce yourself just by name and then really, never say I’m a police officer.  
And generally I turn up not in police uniform; I wouldn’t turn up in uniform ever 
actually” (M:F:8:24).   
“I’m not going away, and there are two choices.  You’re, you know, the reality is you 
jump or you’re coming with us.  You know, I really don’t want you to jump, and this 
is why…” (H:F:5:50). 
“Um, and so, and then, from that rapport building, then you, you’ve got to try and 
get to the crux of the problem, and then you’ve got to try and get them to come to 
some conclusion about how they’re going to deal with that problem” (O:F:9:36). 
“And you know, obviously, it depends on the person, but I don’t have a problem with 
a certain amount of self-disclosure as well, so if there are things that I think link in, 
um, and I can genuinely relate to, I will use that, and it tends to be on really sort of 
innocuous stuff like, you know, I love walking, or I’ve got dogs, or, you know, those 
sorts of things, I will… I will use those, relentlessly just to try to build up that sort of, 
um, common ground” (J:F:6:110). 
“So he was a bit incoherent, very rambling.  Um, we went through, what I’ve now 
come to understand is, the first hour of nothing, but venting.  And in such a situation, 
I fully expect just to be abused verbally, for the first hour or two and a half.  Don’t 
expect anything less.  Um, my belief is that people can’t stay angry forever, because 
they’re tired… And they burn themselves out” (G:M:4:123). 
of the problem 
“At that point, he’d, he’d stopped talking to me.  He’d had enough.  He didn’t want 
to talk.  So, cooling off period, back in on another call and, by that time, he was… 
75. Negotiators as exerting 
behavioural 










we were on first name terms, as we try to establish, and he was, um, tiring and more 
amenable to, ah, to discussion and I persuaded him to turn around, go back and give 
himself up to the officers, which he did” (D:M:3:63). 
“…because the people we’re dealing with are beyond that suicidal moment, they’ve 
got to get past that suicidal moment on the way back, and I… I think that is, for me, 
it seems to be my bread and butter, you know, just sort of persuading people…” 
(F:M:4:123). 
“Because even though you go to a house and maybe you’re not getting in because 
they’ve barred their way or you want to contain it with firearms, you’re still calling 
and asking them, look… Trying to convince them to come outside… And explaining 
to them the reasons why they should be doing that and what’s in their best 
interests…” (N:F:8:34). 
“Um, the strategy you will take is always going to be the same: It’s build their 
confidence, influence their views and get them to do what you want them to do.  
That’s the strategy, as simple as that really” (D:M:3:63). 
“…I would say yes, you are always trying to build up some sort of relationship, and 
with rapport, you tend to think of, you know, some sort of warmth… so you built up 
trust, and you can influence the behaviour…” (J:F:6:110).  
“Um, once you’ve done that, really what you’re then looking to do is influence the 
behaviour.  And you won’t always gain rapport, um, but ideally that’s what you’re 
working towards.  But in any case, you’re then trying to move to a point where you 
can influence the behaviour” (K:M:2:111). 
“I’m concentrating on you; you’re the most important person.  I’ve heard what 
you’re saying; I’m interested in what it is that you do.  We’ve got this rapport, so 
you can move through rapport, into influence.  So you get to a stage, you say well 
look, we’re all cold out here, why don’t you come down off there and let’s go and 
talk about it, somewhere warm” (G:M:4:123). 
influence/change  
76. Negotiators as 
“professional 
persuaders”  
77. Use of enhanced 
persuasion to change 
subject’s behaviour 
78. Encouraging subject to 










“Um, we ended up having to get to get the fire service out, uh, because eventually he 
agreed to come down, uh, we had to negotiate how he was going to get down, uh, 
and eventually, we used a fire service cherry picker, and went up and… and got him 
medical attention, uh, and he went back to hospital with his mother” (F:M:4:111). 
“We have a few of those as well, where we’ve got somebody that we think’s got a, a 
gun in the house, and we talk them out, you know, I want you to come out.  The 
surrender plan basically… And that’s all sorted out beforehand… So we say to the 
bronze commander on the ground, what’s, what’s your surrender plan?  And they’ll 
say to us, well, okay, well, we’ll do the, want you to come out the front door… Arms 
in front of you, like a blind man.  Not carrying anything.  No baggy clothing, and… 
the… And I’ll talk you right out…” (H:F:5:50).  
“Sometimes it’ll just be a face-saving thing, so I might think well actually, he’s ready 
to surrender but you don’t want to lose face, um, if I agree to let him have a fag or if 
79. Discuss how the subject 
is going to “come 
down”/“come out from 
premises/building” 
80. Discuss how the subject 
can surrender peacefully 
81. Mutually agree surrender 
ritual/exit plan with 
subject or plan for 
release of hostages 
82. Importance of surrender 
ritual 
83. Importance of allowing 




























I agree that he isn’t going to be taken to the ground or, you know, things like that, 
then he’ll come on board” (K:M:2:111). 
“…sometimes it’s just literally got to be, um, well I might hate your guts, but that is 
a reasonable solution out of here, you know, so you’re offering them the least 
embarrassing option out, you know, the keep… keep your pride and all the rest of it” 
(J:F:6:110) 
subject to save face 
84. Promotion of face-
honouring 
85. Minimise embarrassment 
for subject to encourage 
resolution/surrender 
“I think sometimes what we’re not very good at doing, and you won’t be surprised 
by me saying this, is that sometimes we’ll go from job to job to job.  We will always 
have a debrief, um, of the incident.  Or we should have a debrief of the incident.  It’s 
rare that we don’t, although it’s dependent on certain partners.  But sometimes that 
debrief doesn’t quite pick out all the issues, and I remember, we had a gentleman a 
few years ago, who became a negotiator, and who was extremely unlucky, because I 
think it was the first two incidents that he went to each ended up in a death, and it 
was obvious he hadn’t been properly debriefed.  Ah, and that’s something we’re not 
very good at doing… We’re not very good.  So just a small example of that was that, 
as I say, we dealt with this long siege back in 2004.  I got all the.. We had a media 
debrief, and we had a debrief, so that was, it was quite well done, but we never 
actually debriefed with any of the Firearms officers.  They then subsequently came to 
one of our further debriefs, and they were talking to us about some of the things that 
they found in this gentleman’s house, such as the fact that there was a shotgun 
cartridge strategically placed on each step of the staircase.  That was an amazingly 
important thing for us, as negotiators, to know about so sometimes we’re a bit 
rubbish at debriefing” (A:M:1:156).  
“Um, whereas the people who just dealt with that situation, if they’ve got a 
supervisor, if there’s anything about them, he will regroup everybody, or she’ll 
regroup everybody and they’ll talk through the process.  One is a debriefing, for 
learning.  And the other one, just to check that everybody’s behaving as they 
normally do” (O:F:9:36). 
“So we then got the, the closedown process for me then, which is about extracting 
my team, bringing them back here, debriefing them.  Ah, making sure that they’re in 
a fit state to drive home, because their adrenalin… Will have sapped a lot of 
energy… Um, so in terms of that, kind of the welfare stuff, a lot of that was taken 
care of by where we set it up, but there was still that debriefing and learning and 
they had concerns that we needed to unpick” (G:M:4:123). 
86. Debrief as important 
component of 
negotiation process 
87. Debriefing of 
hostages/subjects/negoti
ators/wider team  
88. Debriefing as 
inconsistent/inadequate 
89. Good at debriefing when 
things go wrong but not 
so good when they go 
well 
90. Different types of 
debrief (hot debrief, 
operational debrief etc) 
91. Debriefing as a means of 
CPD and learning from 
mistakes or highlighting 
good practice 
92. Debriefing as a 
therapeutic process for 
negotiators 












3. Stage 3: Post-
incident protocol 






3 Primary Categories 
“…decisions are based upon the principles of being totally open and honest, trying 
to understand the, what the individual’s going through, or empathise with their 
situation, certainly not lying to them, at all.  Absolutely not… It’s a lot about that 
empathy and rapport building, and understanding their situation, and the trust 
1. Demonstration of 
empathy in order to 








opment of the 
pseudo-








“Um, because, you know, part of the training is that if you believe that you identify, 
you know, you will actually say to them, you know, to me, you sound really angry, 
um, because they’ll either come back and say, what are you on about?  Or it’ll be 
like, too bloody right.  Um, and you… so you get your confirmation or whatever, but 
also, it’s part of your con… trust building, because it’s showing that you are 
listening to them, and you’re understanding what’s going on with them” (J:F:6:110). 
“It’s all about active listening and feeling, of whatever you’ve been told.  It’s trying 
to understand what’s brought them to that position where they’re on the top of a 
roof, top of a bridge whatever, and they’re going to jump, and then being empathic is 
a big thing.  Like not shouting, being empathic, telling them that you understand…” 
(I:M:6:110). 
“There was a job where there was a young lad on the roof of a building.  Um, in fact 
there’ve been two jobs just like that, lad on the roof of a building.  He was clearly 
just intent on causing disruption.  Ah, it’s hard to build up sympathy for that 
particular individual when you’re dealing with that.  Um, they, they’re, um, in both 
cases they were either teenagers or young twenties, um, quite an arrogant attitude 
towards the police, towards society and trying to build up that, that rapport with 
them is a challenge.  Ah, it’s a challenge, not only physically doing it, it’s also a 
challenge, to some extent, in getting the enthusiasm to do it because what you want 
to do is grab them by the scruff of the neck and, and tell them not to be so stupid… 
You can’t do that.  That’s not effective.  You’ve got to bite your tongue and you’ve 
got to play the game” (D:M:3:63).  
“Uh, you know there are people who think that negotiating is just a waste of time, 
uh, you know, why are you being nice to them?  You know, because there… quite 
frankly, there are some really unsympathetic characters, and I think they think that, 
you know, this is my next best mate, you know, um, and I speak for myself, I will be 
very nice to some people, who are not necessarily, uh, deserving of it, you know, uh, 
and it that’s just being cynical and being a means to an end, then possibly it is.  Uh, 
but I’m not going to get anywhere, um, not achieving any degree of sympathy, or 
empathy, you know, with the individual” (F:M:4:111). 
“You need to keep that person focused on you.  You’re the one that’s going to help 
them, you’re going to build up that trust with them and then you can try and 
influence their behaviour” (D:M:3:63). 
“…negotiation is entirely based on emotions.  It’s about being able to, um, build up 
enough of a rapport to be able to, um, exert some influence, which in turn would 
change behaviour.  Ah, and the only way that you can do that is by building a 
trusting relationship between the two parties” (E:M:3:114). 
“Um, so I think the confidence and the trust is what we work on during this whole 
tactic every time, but you really can’t be in a rush to get there” (I:M:6:110). 
alliance 
2. Feign/fake empathy if 
not truly felt (i.e. 
empathy may not be 
genuine but needs to be 
demonstrated in order to 
build relationship 
between negotiator and 
subject) 
3. Importance of 
establishing trust 
between negotiator and 
subject 
4. Establish relationship 
between subject and 
negotiator 
5. Development of a 
pseudo-therapeutic 
alliance between the 
negotiator and subject 
6. Negotiator/subject 
relationship aligns with 










“Um, and you’re trying to just build on that rapport, trying to get agreement on 
things, trying to build trust, maybe do deliveries, um, maybe give them a drink, 
maybe give them a cigarette, um, and then you’re looking at basically using some 
influence really, in terms of, um, reciprocity, scarcity, those types of things to try and 
influence that change” (K:M:2:111). 
“…um, some of the external scrutiny, um, in terms of the, um, recording what we do, 
showing an audit trail and what we’ve done and why we’ve done it, that’s changed” 
(K:M2:111). 
“Um, policy logs; so we’ll keep a record, particularly as a coordinator, of decisions 
that have been made, but also… are you aware of position papers? Position papers 
are effectively at a point in time; a negotiator coordinator would draw up a position 
paper which says, at this time this is what’s happening, these are the considerations, 
these are the issues that seem to escalate it, these are the issues that de-escalate it, 
this is the way that I think that the negotiation strategy should go, um, that kind of 
thing” (E:M:3:114). 
7. Importance of formal 
record keeping  
8. Electronic record 
keeping (deployment 
logs etc.) 
9. Written record keeping 
(position papers, logs 
etc.) 
10. Audio record keeping 
(i.e. use of dictaphones 
to record negotiations)  
11. Evidential recovery as a 
concern 
12. Nature of the role/high 
risk scenarios denote 
need for record keeping 
13. Need for an audit trail of 
decisions and actions 
taken throughout the 
negotiation 
 3. Written 
4. Electronic 
5. Audio 
2. Formal record 
keeping 
2. Entire model 
underpinning 
mechanism 1 
“That’s what I say to all my negotiators.  I say to them, whatever, however you do it, 
and I’ll give them some suggestions as to how they do it, you need to be able to say, 
at any one point, how, what your negotiating career is about, because if I go to my 
84th incident tomorrow, and someone falls off that building, and they die, and I’m 
held liable for what I said, I need to go through those 83 incidents, and depict my 
experiences as a negotiator, and that is absolutely crucial” (A:M:1:156). 
“Um, so I think you do worry about negative consequences and, oh my God, there 
might be an inquest later and, have I done everything that I should have done?  Have 
I got records that I can take and people can read and they can understand?  Will I be 
able to justify the decisions that I make?” (C:F:2:96). 
14. Requirement for 
defensible decision-
making 
15. Decisions/actions may 
be questioned in court 
16. Need to be able to justify 
actions  
17. Negative outcomes will 
be subject to scrutiny in 
coroner’s court/IPCC 
procedures/acting as an 
expert witness in court 
  3. Defensible 
decision-
making 
3. Entire model 
underpinning 
mechanism 2 
Total number of concepts and categories identified: 17 Concepts 0 Quaternary 
Categories 









Appendix 24.  Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the Self-Perceived Successful Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile Model 
Table 4.27.  Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the Self-Perceived Successful Hostage and Crisis 
Negotiator Profile Model 
Interview Transcript Excerpts Concepts Secondary Categories Primary Categories 
“And it used to be at inspector level, so you could only actually apply once you became an inspector… 
Actually, that’s been reduced now to a sergeant” (N:F:8:34). 
“The only thing that I disagree with is that, I know a lot of people who are a constable level, who have a 
lot of good qualities to do that work… It certainly isn’t about rank.  It’s about, um, a individual’s ability.  
And that can be any rank” (O:F:9:36). 
“…there is always a risk when you recruit people, that they’re doing it as a… as a sort of CV filler for a 
couple of years, yes” (J:F:6:110).  
“…you clearly don’t want people who want to get trained because there’s a tick in the box and it looks 
good on their promotion and all the rest of it…” (K:M:2:111). 
 “I’d be looking at, at people who are level-headed, but who are really enthusiastic, and who are 
committed to the role.  Sometimes, very rarely, we’ll get those people who do find it a bit of a shock to be 
part of a 24/7 rota when the phone goes at three o’clock in the morning” (A:M:1:156).  
“…we’ve just established a thing in [Anonymised force], I don’t know why, that the people who’ve opted to 
do it, looking around all the individuals, genuinely seem to be simpatico that way.  They have problems in 
other forces, of people applying for it, because it’s a good tick, it’s a good attribute to have, on the CV, I 
think partly because of the fact we’ve long learnt there’s no advantage to you, career wise, that’s sort of 
never been a motivator for people in this force.  [Anonymised force] where, you know, they… their people, 
they’ll do it for a year or two, and they’re, no, I’m bored of this now, and they move on, and it causes a 
problem.  Nobody from our cadre has stepped off the rota.  They’ve been taken off because they’ve got 
promoted and stuff, but everybody is still there.  So you know, we… we all sort of enjoy what we do, that 
way” (F:M:4:111). 
 “…the second part is a, a more structured approach to make sure that you can commit to the on-call 
arrangements and to drop everything at short notice, from the, the need to train people and get your value 
for money really” (I:M:6:84). 
“We will expect you to be a negotiator for at least five years…” (A:M:1:156). 
“…the second part is a, a more structured approach to make sure that you can commit to the on-call 
arrangements and to drop everything at short notice, from the, the need to train people and get your value 
for money really” (I:M:6:84). 
1. Requirement for negotiators to be of 
sergeant/inspector rank or above 
2. Need for operational policing 
experience 
3. Demonstration of commitment to the 
role  
4. “In it for the right reasons” (i.e. trying 
to filter out the people who are simply 
trying to add it to their CV/use it as a 
tool to get promoted) 
5. Willing to drop things at a moment’s 
notice 
6. Flexible enough to be able to respond 
on call/when needed 
7. Expected time frame for commitment 
(not just a short term commitment) 
1. Minimum rank 
requirement 
2. Commitment to the 
role  
3. In it for the right 
reasons 
1. Negotiator entry 
requirements 
“I think certain people are good negotiators in different ways, and by that I’ll go back to, you know, the 
fact that I feel my strength is with people who are in crisis, because, you know, I think possibly, personally, 
whatever, I genuinely do feel some empathy there, and I think that comes across…” (J:F:6:110). 
“I think, um, you have to be able to empathise with somebody.  You’ll never fully understand what they’re 
going through.  But how can you move forward if you don’t appreciate what, what it is they’re going 
8. Listening/active listening skills/ 
ability to listen (14) 
9. Communication skills (12) 
10. Ability to empathise/demonstrate 
empathy/empathic (9) 











“Uh, you know, there are people who think that negotiating is just a waste of time, uh, you know, why are 
you being nice to them?  You know, because there… quite frankly, there are some really unsympathetic 
characters, and I think they think that, you know, this is my next best mate, you know… we will, I speak for 
myself, I will be very nice to some people, who are not necessarily, uh, deserving of it, you know, uh, and if 
that’s just being cynical and being a means to an end, then possibly it is.  Uh, but I’m not going to get 
anywhere, um, not achieving any degree of sympathy, or empathy or, you know, with the individual” 
(F:M:4:111). 
“You’ve got to be able to build a rapport whether they’re a masked murderer or whether they’re a, you 
know, petty shoplifter or whatever” (C:F:2:96). 
“Somebody that’s quite open minded really, and not judgemental… I think certainly not being judgemental 
is one, because you deal with some people that are going to jump, they can be, if they jump, some people 
would say, thank goodness, but you’re there to do a job and whatever.  I’ve never found that difficult, 
actually, I said about the one sex offender, I mean, he was guilty, and he actually did want to commit 
suicide for that, to save face for what he did, but you don’t treat him differently.  Any police officer would 
say to treat people the same, but I think in reality, that’s not always the case.  I think negotiating is such a 
difficult area of business, that you need to actually do what you say, and not be judgemental, and be open 
minded, actively listen, and you know, try to be there, supportive, empathic, also” (L:M:7:54). 
“…flexible, um, in terms of being able to turn out all sorts of times and day” (G:M:4:123).  
“…what we’re looking for very much is flexibility, support, help within that team” (E:M:3:114).  
“Um and flexibility in terms of you clearly don’t want people who want to get trained because there’s a 
tick in the box and it looks good on their promotion and all the rest of it, but, actually, I’m flexible enough 
to be available out of hours and to come and to do the job and to be available at short notice” 
(K:M:2:111). 
“…somebody that’s flexible as well.  It’s a huge demand on you, negotiating, and it impacts on your 
personal life, quite a bit, when you’re on call.  All your mates are down the pub and you’re sat watching 
East Enders or whatever, it can be a bit rubbish.” (L:M:7:54). 
“I think there’s a degree of experience coming in here… I think it’s important to have someone who has 
experienced these sorts of scenarios… they’ve experienced getting involved in the siege situation.  They 
can understand how it works, and they’ve got a good… Perhaps a better way of phrasing it they’ve got a 
good, wide experience of different types of policing, so I think that’s important” (A:M:1:156). 
“Yeah, operational credibility, being capable to respond during a crisis incident is really key because part 
of controlling… building that relationship is controlling your own emotions, and, actually, if you get really 
excited by the whole thing, that’s difficult.  And, and so what you need is that operational experience 
around just crisis incidents” (E:M:3:114). 
“…having a legal knowledge around the subjects that you’re talking about.  Because if you don’t know 
that you can’t make the right promises.  So you’ve got to be legally sound to, um, you know, not advise, but 
to make those promises.  And procedure.  You’ve got to know all about, um, the force procedures about the 
subject matter that you are talking about” (O:F:9:3). 
“I think the people who tend to do it, by and large, tend to be of that mind that hey… they’re prepared to 
11. Non-judgemental attitude towards 
others/respect for others/ability to 
withhold judgement/care 
about/concern for others (9)  
12. Team working ability/team 
player/”team fit” (9)  
13. Flexibility (9)  
14. Operational policing 
experience/credibility/skills/legal 
knowledge (7)  
15. Perseverance/Patience (7) 
Resilience/Thick skin (7)  
16. Mental agility/Good memory/Ability 
to think on your feet (5)  
17. Care about people/desire to help 
people/supportive/compassionate (5)  
18. Intuition/Intuitive (4)  
19. Problem solving ability (4) 
20. Genuine/Trustworthy/Credible/Be 
Yourself (4)  
21. Ability to persuade / manipulate/ 
exert influence over others (3) 
22. Level headed/calm/methodical (3) 
Knowledge of mental 
disorders/Interest in psychology of 
human behaviour (3)  




regulate emotions (3)  
25. Ability to stay calm/operate well 



















listen, they’re prepared to take the long game, patience” (F:M:4:111). 
“As is often the way, he didn’t want to engage first of all but, being persistent, perhaps, sounds a bit pushy, 
but, but, but.., persevering, perhaps a better word, persevering within him, I eventually got it so he was 
talking to me” (D:M:3:63). 
“I’ve, I’ve spent two hours talking to a loft hatch, and eventually the loft hatch is opened and that’s the 
first noise you would have.  But because the people on the ground are doing all the other work you’ve just 
got to trust them to say we’re ruling out all the other options so keep going, we think this person is there 
without any necessary confirmation, um… That they’re even listening or that they can hear.  You know, 
they might be wanting to listen but they’ve barricaded it or they’re so far away that my voice isn’t going to 
carry that far.  The easy ones are where they shout and bawl back because at least you’ve got 
confirmation that they’re there… and you can then got to try and work on what the, the right thing tat’s 
going to get them engaging” (I:M:6:84). 
“Well you’ve got to… you have to be resilient… resilience came as a close second… Because, unless 
you’re personally resilient, no matter how good you are at everything else, if you’re distracted, if you’re 
tired, if you’re… if you’re worried, if you’re stressed, the other thing is, you might be the best listener and 
the best communicator in the world, but when the stress is on… It robs you… some people, of the ability 
of, of rational thought” (G:M:4:123). 
“I think the only other thing would probably be some resilience where, um, you know, they’ve got to be 
prepared to slog it out… Um, sometimes in, in bad weather, in, um, dodgy places” (K:M:2:111). 
“A thick skin is, is crucial” (G:M:4:123). 
“I mean, some people, you can say, you know, why are you here?  And they’ll tell you straight away.  And 
other people can be so rude and horrendous to you, and tell you that you look like a bag of shit, and that 
you’re fat, and you’re this and you’re that.  And you just stand there, and you just take it all.  And you’ve 
got to know that you don’t, um, you don’t take any of that personally” (O:F:9:36). 
“You’ve got to be there because you want to be there, because you genuinely want to help that person” 
(H:F:5:50). 
“I think it’s, it’s somebody who, um, are caring.  Compassionate.  Um, a person who’s willing to listen.  
And a person who actually cares to take it to the next level” (O:F:9:36). 
“…you’ve got to be altruistic to a certain degree; like, I want to help people, but I can’t help everybody.  I 
will do my best, but I think there are some people that are… in danger of either burnout or psychological 
problems themselves because it went wrong” (C:F:2:96). 
  “I’ve had many a situation with people in crisis, where, you know, they’re quite pathetic characters with 
really sad stories and all the rest of it, and not necessarily somebody I’d instinctively take home to meet 
my missus, but you know, at the time, I really feel that I do care what happens to them, and I genuinely… I 
genuinely feel that I care what happens to them, and I want the best result, and I want them to come down, 
and all the rest of it” (F: M:4:111). 
“They should be mentally agile and they should have a natural ability to calm people down in conflict 
situations” (E:M:3:114). 
“Um, but it’s also to multi-task because although you’re still talking to them and listening to what they’re 





so it can be mentally quite tiring” (N:F:8:24). 
“Mental agility, yeah, and that’s, that’s particularly… plays out in kidnap and extortion, where, ah, you’re 
trying to deal with a huge amount of information.  You’re trying to process it very, very quickly and pass 
on the most pertinent points really, really quickly and do that in an environment where you potentially 
can’t speak or anything else” (E:M:3:114). 
“You’re memory’s got to be pretty key because if they’re giving you stuff you need to be able to show 
you’ve absorbed it, show you’re interested in them” (D:M:3:63). 
“I think it’s important to just be yourself”(O:F:9:36). 
“You’ve got to be somebody who can talk through lengthy, obviously, times and come up with new things.  
Somebody they can trust…” (C:F:2:96). 
“And just being genuine… You know, you’ve kind of got to be true to yourself, and true to them, really… 
And try and say, you know, this is how I can help you” (H:F:5:50). 
“So those, those skills as well as communication, the non-verbal communication, if you like.  Um, the other 
skills.  I mean it’s difficult to put a label, but what I say instinct, just sort of intuitively… Um, it’s 
constantly searching for that, that common thread between of the two of you, the place where you might… 
different as anything, one might be, you know, you can be different genders, different ages, different life 
scenarios, different skills, different health, but there is usually a place where you can, uh hook and book 
with the person, and I think that’s important to get, uh… To get to influence…” (B:M:2:195).  
“Yeah, you’ve got to be intuitive to pick up on those hooks and levers” (C:F:2:96). 
“Well, the key one is obviously communication, but not so much talking.  It’s much more about listening… 
They must, first of all, be a good communicator.  They must be a… particularly a good listener, not so 
much a talker” (E:M:3:114). 
“But the common theme when you’re face-to-face or speaking to somebody is definitely enhanced 
listening… Listening with a real intent to try and understand and empathise with them; what is it that’s 
brought them to this place on this day?  So definitely that really enhanced, um… well it’s communication, 
isn’t it… But it, part… it’s the part of communication that involves you shutting down with the old mouth 
and just letting the ears do the work, sort of thing” (B:M:2:195). 
“I think the primary one is active listening, you’ve got to listen to what you’ve been told.  I guess it’s like 
what you said earlier, about having a strategy.  I think if I went there with my own agenda and my own 
strategies, I think that I could miss the boat.  So I try to really focus on what I’ve been told and feed off 
that.  So for example, I said about triggers, I might talk about football, girls, nights outs, whatever 
whatever, and if something is said to me, if I don’t pick up on it, you know, it could delay things or it could 
be quite a disaster really.  So you need to listen to what you’ve been told and take the book when it’s given 
to you” (L:M:7:54). 
“Um, probably listening is the biggest single one” (I:M:6:84).   
“I think listening is probably the key one, I really do” (J:F:6:110). 
“Listening skills.  Uh, without a doubt, I think, you know, more than what you say, it’s what you… the 
active listening” (F:M:4:111). 
“Well, communication, is, uh, is the trump card to any of it really” (O:F:9:36). 
“Um, what we’re looking for is someone who’s got the, some natural ability to communicate.  Negotiation, 
26. Enhanced listening skills/active 
listening skills/ability to listen/good 
listener (14) 
27. Communication skills (12) 
28. Team working ability/team 
player/”team fit” (9)  
29. Honesty/ability to be honest (4) 
30. Problem solving ability (4) 
14. Listening skills 
15. Communication 
skills 
16. Team working 
ability 
17. Problem solving 
18. Honesty 





of course, is two ways, listening as well as talking” (D:M:3:63). 
“It’s definitely got to be communication, that’s got to be the main bit because that’s what you are doing all 
the time” (N:F:8:34). 
“…what we are is we are very good communicators… Enhanced communicators, probably… Um, I think 
foremost it’s around your skills to communicate.  That’s definitely number one” (B:M:2:195). 
 “…at the end of the day, it’s all about teamwork” (A:M:1:156). 
“But we’re also looking for someone who has a team fit.  I think we do work very closely and very well as 
a negotiators team.  We’re looking for someone who’s going to fit in to that team…” (D:M:3:63). 
“And teamwork is crucial… Because this thing don’t work on, on that individual basis… There’s no such 
thing as a lone wolf, you know, absolutely it is the team” (G:M:4:123). 
“…part of the selection process is actually around your communication style, but also that team fit.  Um, 
and what we’re looking for very much is flexibility, support, help within that team, because we, we do deal 
with, um, complex, emotionally difficult incidents where, regularly, people are very focused on harming 
themselves or harming somebody else.  So, actually, the consequences of that can be somebody being 
seriously hurt or dying, um, and the support mechanisms we have in place; not only have we got the 
organisational ones, but actually that team response is a very big, big part of it.” (E:M:3:114). 
“But police officers, generally, have to relate to people, they have to communicate with people, they have 
to problem solve so, um, the majority of them should have the skills” (K:M:2:111). 
“So you look at effective communication, um, decision-making, um – what are the other areas?  Problem 
solving; um, there’s nothing in there about strategy; um, flexibility; um, and resilience” (B:M:2:195). 
“I think certain people are good negotiators in different ways, and by that I’ll go back to, you know, the 
fact that I feel that my strength is with people who are in crisis, because you know, I think, possibly, 
personally, whatever, I genuinely do feel some empathy there, and I think that comes across, um, whereas, 
other people are very good at the problem solving aspect of it” (J:F:6:110). 
“Listening… Um, personal communication… Some problem solving… Um, those I would, I would 
highlight as, as top [skills]” (G:M:4:123). 
“I think you’ve got to be very fair, very honest, not only to them, but about yourself as well” (C:F:2:96). 
“So it's being, decisions are, are based upon the principles of being totally open and honest, trying to 
understand the, what the individual’s going through, or empathise with their situation, certainly not lying 
to them, at all. Absolutely not…Being totally honest with the individual.  If he’s going to be arrested, he’s 
going to be arrested.  There isn’t going to be anything that’s going to change that… So if you then say no, 
you’re not, and they know that they are not being dealt with by someone who’s truthful, the chances are 
they’ll stay in there for a lot longer period of time” (A:M:1:156). 
“Um, prepared to say sorry, honesty with them.  Um, there are times when I’ve said I got that wrong; you 
told me not to mention family – I need to mention family because of, because they’re worried.  You’ve then 
gone mad at me, I clearly got that wrong, I’m sorry” (I:M:6:84). 
Total number of concepts and categories identified: 30 Concepts 18 Secondary 
Categories 
3 Primary Categories 





Appendix 25.  Contextual Scene-Setting Chapter and the Nature and 
Characteristics of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Model 
Contextual Scene Setting: Negotiator Bread and Butter 
Every situation that is encountered by a negotiator is likely to be unique (McMains and 
Mullins 1996 and Miller 2005, 2006), with no two deployments matching in terms of the 
characters, characteristics and context.  It became clear from the transcripts that negotiators 
were deployed to a breadth of crisis incidents and utilised their skills within a variety of 
contexts, but that there were a number of core categories/scenarios that negotiators consistently 
encountered, enabling a picture of the breadth of HCNn deployment in the UK to be developed.  
The twelve categories encountered by UK negotiators are described below and include: 
‘Provision of tactical operational support’, ‘Protest/demonstration liaison and management’, 
‘Suicide intervention (“Sad people on bridges”)’, ‘High-risk MISPERs’, ‘Criminals evading 
apprehension’, ‘Dwelling-based barricade (without victims)’, ‘Hostage-taking’, ‘Domestic siege 
(involving victims)’, ‘Kidnap and extortion’, ‘Pseudo-kidnapping’ and ‘Extortion’.   
The interview transcripts revealed a core underpinning characteristic of negotiation that 
dominated the deployment context. This involved negotiators responding to individuals who 
were in some form of personal/emotional or psychological crisis.  As such, negotiators reported 
that their “bread and butter” involved responding to “crisis”, as opposed to “hostage”, incidents.  
Although the official title for police negotiators in the UK is “Hostage and Crisis Negotiators” 
(A:M:1:156), negotiators have historically been referred to (particularly within the media) as 
“Hostage Negotiators”.  It became clear from the transcripts that the day-to-day work of 
negotiators typically reflected that of the latter term, as the majority of the deployments tended 
not to meet the criteria for true or genuine “hostage scenarios”90.  Domestic siege scenarios that 
were encountered typically involved a subject (or individual-in-crisis) preventing a “victim” 
from leaving the premises, as opposed to the subject specifically using the victim as a means to 
fulfil a substantive demand (such as a ransom).  Although negotiators were involved with 
situations that involved hostages, the frequency of this scenario was incredibly low in 
comparison to the frequency of deployments involving crisis incidents. Many negotiators 
specified that they had never dealt with a true hostage incident (i.e. M:F:8:24).  One negotiator 
reported that his force encountered true hostage-taking incidents approximately once a year 
(L:M:7:54) and two other negotiators described having only dealt with this type of situation 
once in five/ten years of service as a negotiator, respectively (H:F:5:50; G:M:4:123).  Hence, 
                                                          
90 According to Noesner (1999), a hostage situation refers to an incident whereby a subject holds another 
person or persons for the purpose of forcing the fulfilment of substantive demands upon a third party, 





there was limited reference to what would be perceived as “true” hostage incidents throughout 
the transcripts. 
The transcripts revealed that spontaneous deployments91 most frequently involved 
responding to individuals who were encountering some form of personal, emotional or 
psychological crisis.  The majority of deployments, according to negotiators, tended to involve 
suicidal individuals, or those who were attempting to harm themselves in some way.  One 
negotiator, for example, stated that all deployments involved “dealing with people in some sort 
of emotional crisis” (E:M:3:114)92 and another stated: “Yes, bread and butter, I’d say, would be 
that kind of desperate person on a roof or a bridge or something” (F:M:4:111).  As such, the 
majority of the negotiators’ experiences were contextualised by a backdrop of dealing with 
subjects who were encountering some form of crisis. 
   
The Nature and Characteristics of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Model 
As outlined in Figure 4.2, 2 primary, 4 secondary and 12 tertiary categories were 
identified as a means of depicting the key characteristics and categories of HCNn deployment 
within the UK.  Negotiators described two main categories of deployment, those that could be 
categorised as crisis negotiation scenarios and those that could be categorised as hostage 
negotiation scenarios.  This dichotomy aligns sympathetically with the FBI’s categorisation of 
critical events as either hostage or nonhostage situations (Noesner 1999) and these themes are 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
Categories of crisis negotiation.  Crisis negotiation scenarios constituted by far the 
majority of deployments and could be further subdivided into ‘Spontaneous negotiation 
deployments’ or ‘Pre-planned negotiation deployments’ as elucidated below. 
 
Spontaneous negotiation deployments formed a large proportion of the work that 
negotiators carried out and could be categorised into five sub-categories of reactive negotiator 
deployment: ‘Suicide intervention/“sad people on bridges”’, ‘Mental health or substance abuse 
precipitated crisis’, ‘High risk missing persons (MISPERs)’, ‘Criminals evading apprehension’ 
and ‘Dwelling-based barricades (without victims)’. 
 
                                                          
91 Spontaneous deployments refer to deployments that are not pre-planned and for which negotiators have 
no prior warning. 
92 Each interviewee is depicted by a code which represents their interview letter, gender, force number 






Figure 4.2.  Conceptual map depicting the primary, secondary and tertiary categories of HCNn 
deployment in the UK 
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Suicide intervention (“Sad people on bridges”) was the most frequently cited scenario 
encountered by negotiators.  Negotiators often described this situation colloquially as “sad 
people on bridges” (F:M:4:111), referring to “people who are suicidal, on a high rise, or 
bridges, or tops of buildings” (O:F:9:36).  They often got deployed to incidents involving 
subjects encountering some form of crisis that had precipitated suicidal ideation: “I got a call 
basically saying that it was a girl on a bridge, and, um, she would only speak to police women… 
She was going to throw herself off the bridge” (H:F:5:50). 
 
Mental health/substance abuse precipitated crisis.  Negotiators also described having to 
respond to incidents involving individuals experiencing some form of crisis that had either been 
precipitated (or exacerbated by) mental health problems and/or substance abuse.  Whilst there is 
limited published data in relation to the specific involvement of psychoactive substances within 
negotiation deployments, Scottish data from Alexander (2011) indicated that 64% of the 
deployments dealt with by negotiators within a three year period involved suspected use of 
alcohol and/or other substances, thereby highlighting the potential role of intoxication within 
hostage/crisis incidents.         
“…generally crisis intervention, really, people at height… some sort of personal… 
situation… in their lives… And/or aggravated by mental health and/or drugs… seen a 
fair bit of psychosis, brought about by cannabis.  Particularly skunk… that’s causing 
people to get things out of proportion, a fair bit” (G:M:4:123). 
One of the problems encountered with some of these incidents involved the accidental risk of 
harm to subjects as a result of the intoxication, as opposed to the suicidal intent per se.  Many 
scenarios involved subjects who were located at height and as such risked injury as a result of 
falling rather than jumping: “I was worried, because I was thinking, this is my first job, the 
guy’s under the influence of something, and he’s going to fall off this crane...” (H:F:5:50).   
 
High risk MISPERs involved attempting to engage with missing persons (MISPERs), 
particularly those who were considered to be high risk (in terms of harm to themselves) or 
particularly vulnerable: “I had one the week before last where it was not an enviable scenario 
where somebody is threatening… it was a high risk missing person threatening to kill 
themselves and very, um, you know, depressed…” (C:F:2:96).  This often involved negotiators 
trying to contact younger subjects who had run away from home or had potentially placed 
themselves in a risky situation: “We’ve got someone today who’s, um, a high risk, um, missing 
person… this 14 year old girl has gone off with a new boyfriend who they met on Facebook...” 





high risk suicidal MISPER” (B:M:2:195) and another agreed that “…suicide intervention, 
stroke, MISPERs is… the biggest… area of… work.” (D:M:3:63), further attesting to the 
frequency with which negotiators deal with missing persons who are at risk of self-harm or 
suicide.  Other scenarios involved negotiating with individuals who had experienced some form 
of domestic conflict or crisis situation that had resulted in them “disappearing off with the intent 
of self-harm” and “effectively becoming high-risk missing persons” (I:M:6:84). 
 
Criminals evading apprehension.  The fourth category of spontaneous crisis negotiation 
deployment related to a crisis situation that typically involved individuals who were wanted by 
the police (i.e. there was a warrant out for their arrest) and were evading apprehension, or 
individuals who had barricaded themselves in to a building/premises after the commission of an 
offence.   
“The typical incident that we deal with is someone refusing to come out of a premises, 
ah, after having committed some form of criminal offence… or they’re then to be 
questioned about an offence.  So that tends to be an individual in a house, perhaps we 
want to execute a filed warrant, and we need them out of the house, or they’ve 
committed a domestic violence incident” (A:M:1:156). 
The negotiator’s role in these types of scenario is to facilitate the execution of the warrant/arrest 
and to encourage the subject to come out of the premises without causing injury to themselves 
or any other party.  
  
Dwelling-based barricade (without victim(s)) is a scenario that involves negotiators 
being deployed to an individual who is experiencing some form of personal/emotional or 
psychological crisis and has barricaded him/herself into a premises.   
“The one that always sticks in my mind is a guy that was in a flat… He’d just smashed 
up the place but it was covered in blood and his girlfriend managed to leave the flat… 
And he was refusing to come out, and he’s cutting himself and there was, um, fuel all 
over the place… And he was threatening to set light, light to himself” (N:F:8:34).   
This category involves risk of potential harm to the barricaded subject, and does not involve any 
victims (i.e. individuals who are prevented from leaving the barricaded premises).  Negotiators 
described this type of barricade scenario as typically being precipitated by domestic disputes 
that had escalated into threats of, or, actual violence: “…that was a barricade situation where a 
lady had, um, domestic, she chased her husband out with a knife, and then was threatening to 





Pre-planned negotiation deployments.  In addition to spontaneous negotiator 
deployments, another secondary category emerged in terms of pre-planned or scheduled 
deployments that involved either supporting firearms operations to try and facilitate the peaceful 
arrest of a wanted individual with an outstanding warrant, or liaising with protest/demonstration 
organisers to agree terms of engagement and ensure that the event remains a peaceful one.  The 
two tertiary themes relating to this secondary category were entitled: ‘Provision of tactical 
operational support’ and ‘Protest/demonstration liaison and management’ and are discussed 
sequentially below. 
 
Provision of tactical operational support.  Negotiators are often utilised within pre-
planned firearms operations/deployments as a means of additional tactical support (i.e. “we 
always deploy a negotiator as well” (K:M:2:111)) with the intention of trying to avoid harm to 
the person of interest and any other parties who may be involved.  The national firearms manual 
mandates that negotiators are consulted in firearms operations (ACPO, ACPOS and NPIA 
2011), which refer to instances whereby the police have received some form of intelligence that 
indicates that a person poses a threat and/or possesses a firearm and the police execute a planned 
raid in order to remove the threat that this individual poses.  The role of the negotiator in this 
deployment is to try and convince the person of interest to vacate the premises without having 
to use tactical force (such as Taser and/or firearms).  Negotiators, in this sense, are there to 
“facilitate the arrest” (K:M:2:111). 
“…the next category is the firearms operation where very much it’s part of the tactics in 
the planning for how you can resolve it, whether it’s spontaneous or pre-planned… And 
a negotiator team will be put in there… as a part of a tactical option.  So you end up 
putting in an early call to try and persuade the person to, you know, look out the 
window, you’re surrounded, come out with your hands held high, type thing”  
(B:M:2:195). 
 
Protest/demonstration liaison and management.  The findings indicated that negotiators 
were increasingly being used within some forces as public order or “protest liaison officers” 
(N:F:8:34), whereby they were required to liaise with the organisers of protests, marches or 
demonstrations as a means of trying to ensure that the event remained peaceful and that rules of 
engagement were agreed and adhered to.  Normally, these events were pre-planned and as such, 
negotiators communicated with organisers prior to and during the event to establish where the 
demonstration was going to take place, where they could and could not march and any other 





not a perceived typical role for a negotiator, this role utilised many of the skills required within 
negotiation and was seen as more of a preventative/pro-active form of policing to avoid 
potential escalation of a peaceful protest or march into something that may result in violence or 
harm to the public.  
“…the role is changing… in as much as I think, ah, areas of use are increasing.  The 
actual job of negotiating, I think, is pretty similar to how it was when I started, ah, but, 
increasingly now, looking to be used in other situations, um, such as dealing with 
protesters.  If we’ve got, um, a group we know are going to come and protest in a 
particular area, and we fear there’s going to be an adverse reaction, one way or 
another, because of that protest, then, increasingly, we’re getting negotiators involved 
in that to try and facilitate, um, a better outcome for all parties” (D:M:3:63). 
Not all forces utilised negotiators in this format, and some utilised negotiators more in 
this remit than others, dependent on the frequency with which they experienced 
protests/demonstrations and marches.  One force lead HNC described disappointment that his 
cadre’s skills had not been utilised effectively in this way: 
“And sometimes, for pre-planned operations, we miss negotiators out.  So for example, 
recently we had a very large EDL93 march in [anonymised place], and there, I was a bit 
surprised that negotiators weren’t even consulted as part of the planning process…” 
(A:M:1:156). 
Another senior negotiator also felt that negotiators in his force were not being utilised enough 
for this type of scenario: “I’ve never been deployed to… negotiating in a protest situation.  But I 
think we should be used more in that area…” (B:M:2:195). 
 
Categories of hostage negotiation.  These infrequent deployments were further sub-
categorised into secondary categories of ‘Overt negotiation’ and ‘Covert negotiation’ as a means 
of depicting the contrasting nature of the hostage negotiation scenarios encountered.  
 
Overt negotiation.  Overt negotiation refers to a process of negotiation that was 
completed openly via visible processes of communication between the subject (i.e., the hostage-
taker) and the police negotiator(s).  Two tertiary sub-categories of overt negotiation emerged 
from the data, in the form of ‘Hostage-taking’ and ‘Domestic sieges (involving victim(s))’.   
 
Hostage-taking.  Some negotiators outlined incidents that involved individuals who had 
been taken hostage and were being held against their will: “Well, the specific one that’s most 
                                                          





memorable would be in [Month, Year], being called out to two police officers who, who’d been 
taken hostage in [Anonymised] by an armed man” (E:M:3:114).   
“…it was a fellow who was mentally ill, lived in… [Anonymised Place]… he had 
previously been in treatment for Schizophrenia and… had failed to maintain his regime 
and his contact with his physicians, to the point that, on, on a home visit, the CPN said, 
this guy is now dangerously unstable; we need to get control of him again... The 
psychiatrist decided that he knew better than the risk assessment and picked up one of 
his nurses and went to the house…where he was admitted by the man’s wife, shown into 
the lounge where the man said, excuse me a minute, disappeared and came back with a 
9mm… turned on the video camera and pointed the 9mm at the doctor… The CPN 
managed to get away and run away and raised the alarm.  And then there were a series 
of demands that went in, from him, via his solicitor and from them to, to the cops… and 
we ended up with a fairly major siege, that ran for 48 hours” (G:M:4:123). 
It is worth noting, however, that this type of deployment was reported by negotiators as being 
an infrequent occurrence within their typical deployment history. 
 
Domestic siege (involving victim(s)).  Negotiators more frequently described overt 
hostage negotiation scenarios that involved “victims” as opposed to “hostages”.  In this sense, 
victims refer to individuals who have been prevented from leaving a premises by the subject 
(i.e. there is no direct threat to the victims but they are being prevented from leaving the 
premises or are too frightened to leave because the person in control does not want them to 
leave).  Infrequently, threats may be made to the safety of the victims but this is not typically 
perceived as a hostage-taking scenario as the victims are not used as leverage to obtain some 
form of specific demand.  The most commonly described scenario involved: 
“…domestic, household family-based crises where they end up in some sort of siege.  
Where they might not be threatening to kill themselves, but they’re threatening to do all 
sorts of things to all sorts of people.  Often they don’t actually have a hostage but 
sometimes they do, you know.  It’ll be partner, girlfriend, wife, children, whoever” 
(B:M:2:195).   
Victims typically included the subject’s partner or children and the event tended to represent the 
culmination of either a domestic conflict or precipitated crisis event, whereby the presence of 
other parties was potentially incidental, as opposed to planned: 
“…the majority of times where there’s been a hostage/victim there, it’s tended to be… a 





it’s been… something like a mental health assessment where he’d grabbed hold of 
whoever… Or it could be a friend, who just happens to be in there” (K:M:2:111). 
 
Covert negotiation refers to negotiation that is carried out without the hostage-taker(s)’ 
knowledge of police involvement.  This type of deployment is typically referred to within the 
police as a “Red Centre” and is frequently utilised within “crime in action”94 cases.   
“There’s something called a Red Centre Course which specifically deals around a 
kidnap or a hostage environment… because effectively, in an overt-world, the subject in 
crisis knows that you’re there and knows that you’re working for the cops.  In a kidnap 
world where there’s a threat for life, very often they can’t know that the police are 
involved, so there’s different techniques in how you deal with them” (I:M:6:84). 
Covert negotiation is typically utilised when hostage-takers have contacted the family of the 
hostage(s) in order to obtain a ransom or other instrumental demand.  In this scenario, HCNs are 
required to negotiate using the family member/third party as an intermediary (i.e. a victim 
communicator).  The core principle will be to coach the third party intermediary (TPI) or victim 
communicator to communicate with the hostage-taker in a manner that does not convey the 
police’s involvement.  The data revealed three tertiary sub-categories of covert negotiation: 
‘Kidnap and Extortion’, ‘Pseudo-kidnapping’ and ‘Extortion’.   
 
Kidnap and extortion.  Negotiators described a number of scenarios that involved a 
form of kidnap and extortion, whereby an individual had been taken hostage and then used as 
leverage to obtain a ransom or some form of instrumental demand.  These types of incidents are 
infrequent, with some negotiators having never been deployed within a Red Centre scenario and 
others having limited experience of kidnap deployments.  One negotiator described having 
“dealt with two or three kidnappings… or alleged kidnappings, over the [five year] period” 
(D:M:3:63).  Kidnap and extortion scenarios were more frequently reported by negotiators from 
Metropolitan forces, a finding that was to be expected when considered in line with the type and 
frequency of crime experienced within cities as opposed to rural areas.       
“It was probably about, my first deployment was not for about four months actually, 
and it was a kidnap, and it was international.  Basically what had happened, we had a 
family in the north of the country, and demands were coming in from the hostage-takers 
in Indonesia, and the brother, who we had to negotiate through.  Quite often, on those 
                                                          






occasions, it turned out to be false previously, but that one was a genuine kidnap” 
(L:M:7:54). 
 
Pseudo-kidnapping.  Negotiators also described having responded to a number of 
pseudo-kidnappings that constituted “crime in action” situations and often involved what they 
referred to colloquially as “bad-on-bad kidnappings”.  These types of kidnappings tended to 
involve gang or criminal vendettas, organised crime or drug dealer conflict/disputes: “So it’s not 
one where someone’s threatening, or is required to hand over £1 million and they’ve got the 
bank manager’s wife.  It’s not that type of thing.  It’s a drug deal for £150 that’s gone wrong” 
(A:M:1:156).  Negotiators described this scenario as somewhat complicated as, although the 
situation was treated as a true Red Centre deployment, negotiators were conscious that the 
individuals (i.e. victims and victim communicators) that they were dealing with, could 
potentially be reversed in role (i.e. they could be the kidnappers in a future situation).  As such, 
they were cognisant not to give away strategy or tactics which could potentially benefit the 
victim in any way should they become the kidnapper in the future.  
“…that was a kidnap, about… A member of an organised crime group… who was of 
interest to us, in any case, had been snatched from outside his house, by… gangsters, 
bundled into a car, his mobile phone was thrown out of the car, before they sped off and 
he disappeared.  And the intelligence picture was such that this was likely to become a 
murder.  This was a significant incident of high risk and threat… it was without a 
doubt, a criminal vendetta.. a sum of money had exchanged hands somewhere, that had 
not gone through the family; it certainly hadn’t touched the police anywhere… more 
likely to be that your victim, your hostage has been encouraged to do some electronic 
bank transfer of money whilst he was held… and he turned up at about three o’clock in 
the morning, battered and bruised… in the local hospital” (G:M:4:123). 
 
Extortion.  Extortion is defined as “the practice of obtaining something, especially 
money, through force or threats” (Extortion n.d.).  Negotiators described dealing with situations 
that involved direct extortion/blackmail of individuals but no associated kidnapping: “…and 
what we’re finding is that we’re having more and more extortions rather than kidnaps” 
(K:M:2:111).  This particular category of incident was described by three negotiators (I:M:6:84; 
J:F:6:110; K:M:2:111) and the scenarios tended to involve product contamination threats or 





extortionist.  Many of these scenarios could be classed as “sextortion”95 as HCNs referred to an 
increasing number of deployments that involved individuals being blackmailed by somebody 
threatening to expose sexually-compromising material/information.   
   
“…the guy had received a letter that said… that they can make some threats towards his 
business; that they’d got some compromising photographs of him, which they had, 
which were going to destroy his family life... and this guy wanted a specific payment of 
£146,000” (I:M:6:84).   
IE: “Most of the time… it can be a product contamination but they’re more rare.  Most 
of the time, it tends to be they’re threatening to expose somebody.” 
IV: “Right, for something that could be potentially damaging, personally damaging to 
them perhaps?” 
IE: “Yes, we’re finding more of those internet related now where people are engaging 
in sexual activity, it’s being filmed on the internet and then... this film’s going to be 
released, it’s going to be sent to everyone on your Facebook account” (K:M:2:111).   
 
Model Synopsis 
This model provides the first systematic attempt to qualitatively describe the nature and 
characteristics of UK HCNn.  It exemplifies the diversity of the incidents to which negotiators 
are deployed by identifying 12 categories of incident that are typically encountered and serves 
to dispel some of the myths/preconceptions about ‘typical’ incidents, highlighting the 
inadequacy of the term ‘hostage negotiator’.  This model will serve as the backdrop to the 
remainder of the qualitative models that will be discussed in the following chapters. It can also 
be used to inform negotiator training and continuing professional development by highlighting 
the typical scenarios encountered and the contextual and situational characteristics of negotiator 
deployments in the UK. 
 
Model Implications and Recommendations 
This model has implications for the training of new negotiators and the CPD of 
established negotiators, as it provides a unique insight into the nature and characteristics of 
negotiation within the UK, an aspect which to date has not been subject to empirical research.  
Whilst the observations are based on the experiences of a specific sub-sample of negotiators 
(and therefore require further follow up/quantitative validation), the model can be used to 
                                                          
95 Sextortion is “also known as webcam blackmail.  It refers to criminals deceiving webcam users into 
unclothing and performing a sexual act.  This footage is recorded and then used to blackmail victims for 





inform the training of negotiators and other police staff that may be involved with the 
deployment of negotiators (i.e. call handlers, for example, could be provided with training in 
relation to the types of incident that may require negotiators and the most appropriate time to 
deploy negotiators).   
This model (and the contextual scene setting relating to negotiator “bread and butter”) 
provides an insight into the nature and situational context of negotiation deployments within the 
UK.  The findings indicate that the majority of scenarios to which negotiators are deployed, 
involve ‘crisis’, as opposed to, ‘hostage’ incidents.  Negotiators described their “bread and 
butter” as involving somebody who is in some form of crisis (whether that be personal, 
emotional or psychological), with the majority of these incidents involving suicide/self-harm 
intervention.  Negotiator training, whilst equipping negotiators to deal with both hostage and 
crisis scenarios would perhaps benefit from an emphasis on suicidal individuals, or those 
experiencing mental health or substance abuse precipitated crisis, due to the frequency with 
which these situations are encountered.     
The model also highlights that negotiators are utilised within pre-planned deployments 
involving firearms operations or protest liaison and there is perhaps scope for negotiators to be 
utilised to greater effect within pre-planned scenarios, such as protests/demonstrations/marches 
and the potential for negotiators to be used as in-force mediators for conflict resolution within 
the workplace.  The latter suggestion, for example, could be piloted within some forces initially 
to see whether there is scope for this type of work and whether it is effective.  The model 
demonstrates the diversity of negotiator deployments in the UK and as such, highlights the need 
for negotiators to be able to adapt their styles of negotiation in line with the scenarios 
encountered, an aspect that should be focused on within new and existing negotiator 
training/CPD.  This highlights the fact that whilst negotiator training could potentially be guided 
with an emphasis on crisis negotiation, negotiators need to be equipped to be able to respond to 





Appendix 26.  Table Synopsising Research Conducted to Identify the Personality and Socio-Psychological Characteristics of Police Hostage (Crisis) 
Negotiators 
Table 5.1.  Table Synopsising Research Conducted to Identify the Personality and Socio-Psychological Characteristics of Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiators 
Research Study Variables Measured Measures Findings Study Limitations* 
Gelbart (1979) Psychological & Personality 
Characteristics 
CPI (Taylor Manifest 
Anxiety Scale) &  
MMPI (Psychopathic 
Deviate Scale)  
Highly adequate social skills; communications ability; self-assurance; social 
presence; intelligence; ability to manipulate others; ambitious; active; forceful; 
insightful; resourceful; versatile. 
Lack of comparison/control group 
Small sample size (N = 44) 
Gettys and Elam (1988) Psychological & Personality 
Characteristics 
CPI & MMPI Good verbal skills/verbal fluency; positive self-image; good reasoning 
abilities; high sensitivity to others. 
Lack of matched pairs comparison/control 
group 
Small sample size (n = 39 HCNs; n = 30 
entry level police officers) 
Allen, Fraser and Inwald 
(1991) 
Psychological & Personality 
Characteristics 
CPI & MMPI Insightful; intelligent; rational; clear-thinking; logical; self-controlled; self-
confident; decisive; able to make concessions; assertive; determined; 
persistent; trustful; tolerant of ambiguity; values success; expresses frustration 
appropriately; has the ability to empathise and use insight to either help or hurt 
others. 
Lack of comparison/control group 
Small sample size (N = 12) 
Tatar (1982) Personality & Motivation Unknown Emotional stability; extraversion; instinctual gratification; liberal orientation. Exact method of data collection unknown 
Regini (2002) Desirable negotiator 
competencies/characteristics 
Self-report/qualitative 
data identified through 
discussions with crisis 
negotiation team members 
Adept criminal investigator; non-confrontational; non-judgemental; 
exceptional interview & interrogation skills; good self-control; ability to 
maintain voice control. 
Lack of empirically robust methodology 
Limitations associated with self-report data 
Slatkin (2010) Desirable negotiator 
competencies/characteristics 
Unknown Patience; sincerity; down-to-earth manner; non-judgemental/tolerant of others; 
flexibility; aplomb; verbal expressiveness. 
Lack of empirically robust methodology 




Unknown Ability to remain calm, cool and collected in the most stressful environments 
(primary negotiator); ability to control emotions; ability to control voice; 
ability to multi-task (secondary negotiator). 
Lack of empirically robust methodology 
San Jose State University 
Administration of Justice 
Bureau (1995, 2004 cited 




characteristics of effective 
negotiators (using a 
modified version of the 
300-item Adjective Check 
List) 
Demographic/occupational variables: Male/Female aged 35 – 50; Variety of 
law enforcement assignments; at least 5 years’ experience as an police officer; 
good ability to relate to people; training in suicide prevention; a good listener.  
Specific personality characteristics: Adaptable; alert; calm; capable; clear 
thinking; mature; patient; sociable; tactful (90% agreement); clever; confident; 
conscientious; intelligent; wide interests; logical; persistent; practical; 
reasonable; reliable; understanding (75-89% agreement) 
Limitations associated with self-report data 
(i.e. measured perceived as opposed to 
actual characteristics) 
Fuselier (1981a) Desirable negotiator 
competencies/characteristics 
Unknown Emotional maturity; credibility; good listening ability; good verbal ability; 
practical intelligence; ability to think clearly under stress. 
Lack of empirically robust methodology 
Birge, A. and Birge, R. 
(1994, 2011 cited in 
Strentz 2012) 
Behavioural responses likely 




Use of non-physical response (i.e. talking/listening) to resolve past incidents 
involving conflict as opposed to the use of force. 
Lack of empirically robust methodology 
Limitations associated with self-report data 
 
Note.  *All studies are subject to the limitation that they are specific to a USA context and cannot necessarily be applied to international law enforcement settings.  MMPI refers to the Minnesota 





Appendix 27.  Demographic Questionnaire (HCN Sample) 
Participant Reference Number …………… 
 
Demographic Questionnaire for Hostage Negotiator Sample 
 
Please can you answer the following questions: 
 
How old are you?                  ..…………………….. 
 
Are you male or female?                                  Male / Female 
 
Were you born in the UK?                                                                        Yes / No 
  
If no, in which country were you born?      …….………………………… 
 
What is your ethnicity? Please select from the following list:   
 
         White British 
          
        Other White 
          
        Indian 
          
        Pakistani 
          
        Bangladeshi 
          
        Other Asian 
          
        Black African 
          
        Other Black 
          
        Chinese 
          
        Other ethnicity 
  
Which police force do you currently work for?  ……………………….…………….…………………… 
 
Which OCU/Station are you currently based at?  ……………………….…………….…………………… 
 
Which department do you work in?   ……………………….…………….…………………… 
 
What is your current rank within the police?  Police Constable  
          
Sergeant 
          
Inspector 
          
Chief Inspector 
          
Superintendent 
          
Chief Superintendent                                                                                             








In years and months, how long have you been in the police?  ………………………………. 
           
In years and months, how long have you been a police hostage negotiator? ………………………. 
 
Approximately how many crisis/hostage incidents have you been involved with since 
becoming a negotiator? ...……………………………………….. 
 
Would you be willing to take part in an interview to discuss your role as a negotiator?  
 
Yes / No 
 
If yes, please provide a contact email address here……………………………………………………………… 
 
 






Appendix 28.  Demographic Questionnaire (Police Officer Sample) 
Participant Reference Number …………… 
 
Demographic Questionnaire for Police Officer (NON-NEGOTIATOR) Sample 
 
Please can you answer the following questions: 
 
How old are you?                     …………………….. 
 
Are you male or female?                    Male / Female 
 
Were you born in the UK?                               Yes / No 
  
If no, in which country were you born?        …..………………………… 
 
What is your ethnicity? Please select from the following list:   
 
         White British 
          
        Other White 
          
        Indian 
          
        Pakistani 
          
        Bangladeshi 
          
        Other Asian 
          
        Black African 
          
        Other Black 
          
        Chinese 
          
        Other ethnicity 
 
Which police force do you currently work for?  ……………………….…………….…………………… 
 
Which OCU/Station are you currently based at?  …………………….…………….…………………… 
 
Which department do you work in?  …………………….…………….……………………………………… 
 






                                                                                                            Other …………………………….. 
 
In years and months, how long have you been in the police? …………..………………………………… 
 





Appendix 29.  Demographic Questionnaire (Student Sample) 





Please can you answer the following questions: 
 
How old are you?                              …………………….. 
 
Are you male or female?                              Male / Female 
 
Were you born in the UK?                                         Yes / No 
  
 If no, in which country were you born?                    ………….…………………… 
 
What is your ethnicity? Please select from the following list:   
 
         White British 
          
        Other White 
          
        Indian 
          
        Pakistani 
          
        Bangladeshi 
          
        Other Asian 
          
        Black African 
          
        Other Black 
          
        Chinese 
          
        Other ethnicity 
  
 
What course are you currently studying at Coventry University?  ………..….........……………………… 
 
If you are a Psychology Student please provide details of your university email address 
below so that you can be awarded research credits in line with the research participation 
scheme: 
 
Coventry University Email address:   …..……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 





Appendix 30.  Table Depicting Framework Analysis and Cross-Referenced Self-Perceived Successful HCN Characteristics and Competencies 
Table 10.1.  Code Co-Occurrence Frequency Matrix Depicting Cross-Referenced Self-Perceived Successful HCN Characteristics and Competencies 
Interviewee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
A X X X X  X   X X X  X      X              
B X X X X  X    X    X X X X X X              
C X  X   X   X X    X      X X X X          
D  X  X X X X X  X   X                   X 
E X   X  X X   X       X       X         
F   X X         X X   X X      X  X X X     
G    X  X X   X     X X X X               
H   X X  X    X        X  X             
I  X X X     X X X X X    X   X          X X  
J X X X X X X          X         X     X   
K X X X X  X X X  X X  X   X X X X      X        
L  X  X       X X     X   X    X     X  X  
M    X  X   X  X  X           X        X 
N  X  X X X X    X X X X   X X       X       X 
O X X X X  X         X  X X      X         
Total 7 9 9 14 3 12 5 2 4 9 6 3 7 4 3 4 9 7 3 4 1 1 1 5 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 
 
1. Operational policing experience (B) 
2. Ability to empathise/empathic/empathy/compassion (C) 
3. Non-judgemental/respect for others (C) 
4. Listening skills (B) 
5. Ability to persuade/manipulate/exert influence over others (B) 
6. Communication skills (B) 
7. Mental agility (C) 
8. Likeable/personable/able to get on with people (C) 
9. Honesty (B) 
10. Team working ability/team fit/team player (B)  
11. Ability to work logically and methodically/common sense (B)  
12. Level headed (C) 
13. Perseverance/patience (C) 
14. Intuition (C) 
15. Knowledge of mental disorders/psychology of human behaviour (A)  
16. Problem solving ability (B) 
Note.  Competency key:  A = Knowledge; B = Skills; C = Characteristics/Attributes; Bold 
text represents the ten most highly corroborated/frequently cited competencies. 
 
 
17. Flexibility (C) 
18. Resilience/thick skin (C) 
19. Ability to make decisions/decisive (C)   
20. Genuine/trustworthy (C) 
21. Interest in people/human psychology (C)  
22. Investigation/interrogation skills (B) 
23. Ability to build rapport (B) 
24. Care about people/supportive/desire to help people/altruistic (C)  
25. Emotional intelligence/awareness (C) 
26. Ability to blend into the background/be invisible (C) 
27. Easy to talk to (C) 
28. Ability to think before you speak (C) 
29. Open minded (C) 
30. Prepared to say sorry/humility (C) 
31. Voice control/ability to control voice tone and pitch (B) 





Appendix 31.  Table Depicting the Most Frequently Cited Strategies/Stratagems Cited by Hostage and Crisis Negotiators96 
Table 11.1.  Table Depicting the Most Frequently Cited Strategies/Stratagems Cited by Hostage and Crisis Negotiators 
Strategy/Stratagem Interview Transcript Excerpt Pointers to Inform Use of Strategy 
1.  Establish why the subject 
is in the situation  
“You’re trying to find what’s made them where they are, and if 
you can find that, you can generally help them find a solution.”  
 Try to understand why the S is in crisis/conflict 
 Establish what the precipitating event was for the subject 
 What has been going on for the S in their life to get them to this point? 
2.  Honesty  “Being truthful – always be truthful….”   Always be truthful and honest 
 If asked a direct question, don’t lie! 
3.  Identification of hooks 
and triggers 
“…trying to establish what the big issues were for him, you 
know, um, and you’re looking for the hook, then, all the time, 
aren’t you?  The thing that he… he’s actually interested in, the 
thing that’s at the heart of his problem.” 
 Identify what is at the “heart of the problem” and focus on that aspect. 
 Identify the topics/subjects that are de-escalating/conciliatory (i.e. hooks) and focus on those. 
 Identify the topics/subjects that are escalating/aggravating (i.e. triggers) and veer away from 
those topics of conversation. 
4.  Matching of negotiator 
and subject 
“…if you get on better with that individual, then you end up 
being the number one.”  
 Think about matching of HCN and S in terms of: 1) Personality, 2) Gender, 3) 
Culture/Language, and 4) Background. 
 Try to match the HCN and S in a way that is likely to result in the greatest level of rapport 
between the two parties (i.e. if a S has had negative experiences with men in the past, she may 
engage better with a female HCN; if a S has a military history, it may be better to use a HCN 
who has knowledge/experience of the military).  
5.  Adapt strategy in line 
with situation /subject  
“I’ve known a friend of mine who was negotiating with someone 
who was ex-services.  He might come across as likeable, as well, 
but his eventual resolution was reached about because the, um, 
my colleague was a sergeant, he’d got stripes on and he actually 
ordered the guy to come down.  And that worked, in the end.  So, 
there are, there are times when other strategies work.  There’s 
no fixed rule.” 
 No fixed rule about which strategy to employ.  Try one and if it doesn’t work, try something 
else! 
 Adapt your style of language in line with the S (i.e. you are likely to communicate slightly 
differently/use different language when speaking to a young person, when compared to an 
adult). 
 Adapt strategy in line with situational context/S background (i.e. a more direct approach from 
an authority figure may be appropriate for a subject who is ex-services/military).    
6.  Use of concessions and 
positive police actions 
“…I’ve done this for you.  You do this for me.”   Quid Pro Quo concept (I.e. I’ll do something for you, if you do something for me). 
 Parallels with the Cialdini’s (1984) “Reciprocity” weapon of influence. 
 Sometimes provision of basic concessions (i.e. cigarettes, food, water etc.) can be used as a 
demonstration of “positive police action” (i.e. this is what we are doing for you, now you need 
to help us by doing x, y, z…)   
                                                          





Strategy/Stratagem Interview Transcript Excerpt Pointers to Inform Use of Strategy 
7. Perseverance/Persistence “…he didn’t want to engage first of all but, being persistent, 
perhaps sounds a bit pushy, but, persevering, perhaps a better 
word, persevering with him, I eventually got it so he was talking 
to me.” 
 Persevere with the S and don’t give up!  
 They may not want to talk initially but demonstrate that you are listening to them and that you 
want to help and eventually they will start to talk to you. 
 Ignore verbal abuse which may be directed at you and persevere with dialogue. 
8.  Use of time as a 
tactic/“Playing it long” 
“…you’re really, um, trying to buy time and let them diffuse the 
anger really, the emotion.” 
 Time is on the HCN’s side. 
 Play the long game (i.e. you have all the time in the world and aren’t going anywhere!). 
 Use time as a tactic to allow for: 1) de-escalation of arousal/emotion levels, 2) detoxification 
from drugs/alcohol, 3) S to become fatigued/bored and “run out of steam”. 
9.  Disassociation from the 
police  
“…introduce yourself just by name and then really, never say 
I’m a police officer.  And generally I turn up not in police 
uniform; I wouldn’t turn up in uniform ever actually.”  
 Try to dissociate yourself from the police as far as possible as association with the police can 
act as a barrier to developing a rapport with some Ss. 
 Never lie about not being a police officer but try to separate yourself from the police by 
wearing civilian clothing and introducing yourself by your first name (as opposed to rank/role). 
 State “my name is X and I am with the police”, as opposed to “I am a police officer”. 




“I’m not going away, and there are two choices…”  Make it clear to the S that there is more than one option available to them. 
 Emotion clouds/distorts rational thinking and it is difficult for someone in crisis/conflict to see 
that there is another way out to their situation (i.e. a more positive one). 
 Point out the potential options available to the S and try to encourage problem-solving (by the 
S).  I.e. “What do you think would help you to feel better about this situation?  “What could we 




“…trying to find that little thing that’s going to give you some 
kind of rapport, uh, with somebody who you otherwise might 
have nothing to… in common with at all” 
 Try to find the “common thread” between the HCN and S. 
 Identify things that you have in common with the S. 
 Use commonalities to build rapport/develop relationship with S. 
12.  Encourage 
dialogue/allow subject to 
vent 
[encourage the S to] “…talk as much as possible and offload it 
all.”  
 Encourage the S to offload and ventilate. 
 The more they engage in dialogue, the more likely you are to identify hooks to work 
with/understand why they are in the crisis/conflict state.  
 You want the S to feel that they are being listened to, heard and understood so utilise active 





Appendix 32.  Exemplar Crib Sheet that can be used to inform Training/CPD for 
Hostage and Crisis Negotiators97 
The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation 
 
The following document is designed to be used by negotiators as a crib sheet when responding to 
hostage/crisis incidents.  The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. acronym offers a quick and easy mnemonic 
mechanism for reminding negotiators to complete the key tasks involved in resolving hostage/crisis 
incidents successfully.  It is hoped that this document will be used to inform both the training of new 
negotiators and the continuing professional development of existing hostage and crisis negotiators 
internationally.   
 
STAGE 1 = INITIAL NEGOTIATOR DEPLOYMENT TASKS: 
 Deployment 
 Information/Intelligence gathering   
 Assessment of risk/threat 
 
STAGE 2 = THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS & INCIDENT RESOLUTION: 
 Methods of communication 
 Open dialogue with subject 
 Negotiator toolbox/repertoire to resolve incident 
 
STAGE 3 = POST INCIDENT PROTOCOL: 
 Debriefing procedures     
                                                          
97 Document prepared for use at CEPOL Crisis Hostage Negotiation Training Event held at the Swedish 





Appendix 33.  Table Depicting Potential Assessment Criteria Rubric to be used for Selection of Trainee Hostage and Crisis Negotiators 
Table 11.2.  Table Depicting Potential Assessment Criteria Rubric to be used for Selection of Trainee Hostage and Crisis Negotiators 
Competencies Specific Aspect Being Measured Method of Assessment Score/Rating Relative Importance 
1. Entry Requirements a. Sergeant/Inspector98 Rank Application Form Yes/No Essential 
 b. Committed to the Role Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 c. In it for the Right Reasons Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
2. Negotiator Skills a. Listening Skills Role-Play Assessment 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 b. Communication Skills Role-Play Assessment 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 c. Team-Working Ability Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 d. Honesty Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Desirable 
 e. Problem-Solving Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Desirable 
3. Negotiator Attributes a. Empathic Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 b. Non-Judgemental Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 c. Flexible Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 




1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 e. Patient Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 f. Resilient Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 g. Caring/Compassionate Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 h. Mentally Agile Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Essential 
 i. Genuine/Trustworthy Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Desirable 
 j. Intuitive Role-Play Assessment/Interview 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Desirable 
                                                          





Appendix 34.  Participant Information Sheet (HCN Sample) 
Participant Reference Number……………… 
 
Participant Information Sheet – Hostage Negotiator Sample (Stage 1 & 2) 
 
Study Title: Hostage / Crisis Negotiation from a UK Police Perspective 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is important that you 
understand the purpose and nature of the study and what it will involve.  Please take time to read this information 
sheet and discuss it with others if you wish.  Please feel free to ask me questions if there is anything which is not clear 
or you would like me to explain further or in more detail. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The aim of this study is to explore police hostage/crisis negotiation within the UK.  It is envisioned that this research 
will provide an insight into the role of the police hostage negotiator within the UK and to identify the characteristics, 
traits and skills that distinguish negotiators from others.  In order to identify these factors, negotiators will be 
compared with both police officers (non-negotiators) and the general public. 
  
Why have I been chosen? 
The study is utilising a sample of police hostage negotiators from a variety of forces within the UK.  Permission for this 
research to be conducted has been obtained from the lead hostage negotiation coordinator for each force.  You have 
been asked to take part in this research because you are a trained hostage negotiator working within one of these 
police forces. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, then you may keep this information sheet 
and you will be asked to sign a consent form.  If you do consent to take part in the research, you are free to withdraw 
at any time, without any consequences, if you decide you no longer want to be involved in the research.  There will be 
no negative consequences to you or your employment if you choose not to take part in the study.   
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The study consists of two sections. The first requires the completion of a psychometric test battery which should take 
no more than 60 minutes.  Some participants will only be required to complete this initial section of the research.  A 
smaller sample of participants will be randomly selected to take part in the second section of the research, which will 
require you, if you are selected, to take part in an interview lasting approximately 1 hour.  This interview will involve 
being asked questions relating to your role as a police hostage negotiator.  The interview will be digitally recorded 
using a dictaphone in order for the transcribed data to be analysed. Once the interview has been transcribed, you will 
be given the opportunity to check the transcript and verify that the information is accurate.  You will be informed by 
the researcher if you have been selected to take part in both parts of the research. 
 
What do I have to do? 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete the psychometric test battery initially and if you are 
selected to take part in the second section of the research, you will then be asked to arrange a convenient time for the 
interview to take place.  You will be asked to respond to the questions in the test battery and the interview as 
honestly and accurately as possible. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There is no physical risk from taking part in the study. It is important to note however that some of the questions in 
the interview may ask you to discuss crisis situations which may have resulted in negative consequences, however, 
please note that you are not obliged to discuss anything you do not wish to discuss.  You will be debriefed fully at the 
end of the interview and the researcher will provide an opportunity to discuss any issues that may have arisen during 
the interview.  Participants who feel they need further support will be referred on to counselling services provided by 
the Force.  Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity 
and the identity of all others who take part in the study. 
 





Your participation in this research will contribute to furthering our understanding of crisis/hostage negotiation in the 
UK and help to inform training procedures within police hostage negotiation programmes. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
When you have completed the psychometric test battery and the interview you will be debriefed regarding the 
purpose of the research and any questions or concerns you have can be addressed. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to continue with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and you will not be penalised in any way for doing so.  You will be 
allocated a unique participant reference code to provide a means of identifying your data should you wish to 
withdraw from the study.  Please contact the lead researcher to request that your data be withdrawn quoting your 
participant number at the time.  Any information collected about you will then be destroyed by the researcher and 
none of the information that you provide will be used in the research without your consent. You have the option to 
withdraw your data from the research up to 6 weeks after the completion of the psychometric test battery and 
interview, respectively.  All data will be kept in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed upon completion of my PhD.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
It is unlikely that there will be a problem during the course of your participation in this research study. However, in the 
unlikely event that something goes wrong or if at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect 
of this research, please feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan 
Berry Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB.  Professor Marshall is independent of the 
research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry University Ethics Committee. 
 
Harm 
There is no anticipated risk of harm involved with participation in this study. It is important to note however that 
some of the questions in the interview may ask you to discuss crisis situations which may have resulted in negative 
consequences, however, please note that you are not obliged to discuss anything you do not wish to discuss.  You will 
be debriefed fully at the end of the interview and the researcher will provide an opportunity to discuss any issues that 
may have arisen during the interview.  Participants who feel they need further support will be referred on to 
counselling services provided by the Force.  Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be 
anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in the study. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Your participation will be kept entirely confidential. You will be allocated a unique participant reference number at the 
point of starting the study ensuring that interview transcripts remain anonymous.  The interview will be digitally 
recorded using a dictaphone and then transcribed in order for qualitative analysis to be conducted.  You will be 
offered the opportunity to view and check the transcribed interviews once this process has been completed.  Once the 
transcript has been checked and you have verified the accuracy of the verbatim, the interview tape (digital file) will be 
erased and therefore any means of identifying individual interviewees will be removed.  Data obtained during the 
interviews will be reported at a group level with some extracts used to illustrate key points.  Names of individuals will 
not be given and care will be taken not to use extracts that may enable individuals to be identified.  All data resulting 
from the completion of the psychometric tests will also be analysed at a group level and no individual scores will be 
identified.  Completed psychometric tests will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and data from these tests will be 
stored in a password protected file accessible only to the lead researcher.  All anonymised data will be stored for five 
years after the completion of the PhD thesis, to allow time for publication.  All data will then be securely destroyed 
(i.e. paper data will be shredded and electronic data will be erased) once this time period has elapsed.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results will be typed up in the form of a formal PhD thesis and submitted for assessment at Coventry University.  
The research will also be written up in the form of academic papers and submitted for publication in academic, peer-
reviewed journals and presentation at conferences.  In these instances, data will be presented as a group rather than 
individual data and individual participants will remain anonymous.  The police forces involved will not be named 
unless approval is given by the ACC of the force and individual participants’ identities will remain protected.   
 
Contact details: 
Lead researcher’s name: Miss Amy Grubb (Lecturer in Forensic Psychology) 
Telephone number: 0247 688 8795; Email: amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk – preferred method of contact. 
Director of studies supervising PhD: Dr Sarah Brown (Reader in Forensic Psychology Development) Telephone number: 





Appendix 35.  Participant Information Sheet (Police Officer Sample) 
Participant Reference Number……………… 
 
Participant Information Sheet – Police Officer (Non-Negotiator Sample) 
 
Study Title: Hostage / Crisis Negotiation from a UK Police Perspective 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is important 
that you understand the purpose and nature of the study and what it will involve.  Please take time to 
read this information sheet and discuss it with others if you wish.  Please feel free to ask me questions if 
there is anything which is not clear or you would like me to explain further or in more detail. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The aim of this study is to explore police hostage/crisis negotiation within the UK.  It is envisioned that 
this research will provide an insight into the role of the police hostage negotiator within the UK and to 
identify the characteristics, traits and skills that distinguish negotiators from others.  In order to identify 
these factors, negotiators will be compared with both police officers (non-negotiators) and the general 
public. 
  
Why have I been chosen? 
The study is utilising a sample of police hostage negotiators from a variety of forces in the UK and a 
sample of police officers (non-negotiators) from these forces.  Permission for this research to be 
conducted has been obtained from the lead hostage negotiation coordinator for each force.  You have 
been asked to take part in this research because you are a police officer (non-negotiator) working within 
one of these police forces. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, then you may keep this 
information sheet and you will be asked to sign a consent form.  If you do consent to take part in the 
research, you are free to withdraw at any time, without any consequences, if you decide you no longer 
want to be involved in the research.  There will be no negative consequences to you or your 
employment if you choose not to take part in the study.   
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The study involves the completion of a psychometric test battery which should take no more than 60 
minutes.   
 
What do I have to do? 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete a number of psychometric tests.  You will be 
asked to respond to the questions in the test battery as honestly and accurately as possible.  You will 
then be asked to return the completed psychometric tests to the researcher within a sealed envelope. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There is no physical risk from taking part in the study.  Any information discussed will remain 
confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who 
take part in the study.   
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your participation in this research will contribute to furthering our understanding of crisis/hostage 









What happens when the research study stops? 
When you have completed the psychometric test battery you will be debriefed regarding the purpose of 
the research and any questions or concerns you have can be addressed by contacting the researcher 
directly via one of the methods detailed below. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to continue with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and you will not be penalised in any way for doing 
so.  You will be allocated a unique participant reference code to provide a means of identifying your 
data should you wish to withdraw from the study.  Please contact the lead researcher to request that 
your data be withdrawn quoting your participant number at the time.  Any information collected about 
you will then be destroyed by the researcher and none of the information that you provide will be used 
in the research without your consent. You have the option to withdraw your data from the research up 
to 6 weeks after the completion of the psychometric test battery and interview, respectively.  All data 
will be kept in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed upon completion of my PhD.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
It is unlikely that there will be a problem during the course of your participation in this research study. 
However, in the unlikely event that something goes wrong or if at any point you have any complaints 
about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in 
writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, 
Coventry, CV1 5FB.  Professor Marshall is independent of the research team and is responsible for 
overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry University Ethics Committee. 
 
Harm 
There is no anticipated risk of harm involved with participation in this study.   Any information discussed 
will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all 
others who take part in the study. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Your participation will be kept entirely confidential. Any information discussed will remain confidential 
and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in 
the study.  You will be allocated a unique participant reference number at the point of starting the study 
and this will be used to identify participants anonymously.  All data resulting from the completion of the 
psychometric tests will be analysed at a group level and no individual scores will be identified.  All data 
resulting from the completion of questionnaires will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and data from 
the psychometric test will be stored in a password protected file accessible only to the lead researcher.  
Completed psychometric tests will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and data from these tests will be 
stored in a password protected file accessible only to the lead researcher.  All anonymised data will be 
stored for five years after the completion of the PhD thesis, to allow time for publication.  All data will 
then be securely destroyed (i.e. paper data will be shredded and electronic data will be erased) once this 
time period has elapsed.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results will be typed up in the form of a formal PhD thesis and submitted for assessment at Coventry 
University.  The research will also be written up in the form of academic papers and submitted for 
publication in academic, peer-reviewed journals and presentation at conferences.  In these instances, 
data will be presented as a group rather than individual data and individual participants will remain 
anonymous.  The police forces involved will not be named unless approval is given by the ACC of the 
force and individual participants’ identities will remain protected.   
 
Contact details: 
Lead researcher’s name: Miss Amy Grubb (Lecturer in Forensic Psychology) 
Telephone number: 0247 688 8795; Email: amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk – preferred method of contact. 
Director of studies supervising PhD: Dr Sarah Brown (Reader in Forensic Psychology Development) 





Appendix 36.  Participant Information Sheet (Student Sample) 
Participant Reference Number …………… 
 
Participant Information Sheet  
(Student Sample) 
 
Project Title: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the UK" 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is important that 
you understand the purpose and nature of the study and what it will involve.  Please take time to read this 
information sheet and discuss it with others if you wish.  Please feel free to ask me questions if there is 
anything which is not clear or you would like me to explain further or in more detail. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The aim of this study is to explore police hostage/crisis negotiation within the UK.  It is envisioned that this 
research will provide an insight into the role of the police hostage negotiator within the UK and to identify 
the characteristics, traits and skills that distinguish negotiators from others.  In order to identify these 
factors, negotiators will be compared with both police officers (non-negotiators) and the general public. 
  
Why have I been chosen? 
The study is utilising a sample of police hostage negotiators and police officers from a number of UK Police 
forces.  You have been asked to take part in this research because you are a member of the general public.  
The data you provide will be compared with data obtained from police hostage negotiators and police 
officers (non-negotiators) in order to help identify characteristics, traits and skills that are specific to the role 
of hostage negotiation. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, then you may keep this 
information sheet and you will be asked to sign a consent form.  If you do consent to take part in the 
research, you are free to withdraw at any time, without any consequences, if you decide you no longer want 
to be involved in the research.  There will be no negative consequences to you or your studies if you choose 
not to take part in the study.   
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The study involves the completion of a number of psychometric tests which should take no more than 45 
minutes.   
 
What do I have to do? 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete a number of psychometric tests.  You will be 
asked to respond to the questions in the test battery as honestly and accurately as possible.  You will then 
be asked to return the completed psychometric tests to the researcher within a sealed envelope. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There is no physical risk from taking part in the study.  Any information discussed will remain confidential 
and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part. 
   
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your participation in this research will contribute to furthering our understanding of crisis/hostage 
negotiation in the UK and help to inform training procedures within police hostage negotiation programmes.  
If you are a Psychology student you can obtain 45 research credits in line with the Research Participation 









What happens when the research study stops? 
When you have completed the psychometric test battery you will be debriefed regarding the purpose of the 
research and any questions or concerns you have can be addressed by contacting the researcher directly via 
one of the methods detailed below. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to continue with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and you will not be penalised in any way for doing so.  
You will be allocated a unique participant reference code to provide a means of identifying your data should 
you wish to withdraw from the study.  Please contact the lead researcher to request that your data be 
withdrawn quoting your participant number at the time.  Any information collected about you will then be 
destroyed by the researcher and none of the information that you provide will be used in the research 
without your consent. You have the option to withdraw your data from the research up to 2 weeks after the 
completion of the psychometric test battery.  Please contact the researcher via email quoting your unique 
participant reference code if you would like to withdraw your data from the study.  All data will be kept in a 
locked cabinet or on a password protected computer and will be destroyed upon completion of my PhD.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
It is unlikely that there will be a problem during the course of your participation in this research study. 
However, in the unlikely event that something goes wrong or if at any point you have any complaints about 
the conduct of any aspect of this research, please feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the 
following address: AB124, Alan Berry Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB.  
Professor Marshall is independent of the research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed 
by the Coventry University Ethics Committee. 
 
Harm 
There is no anticipated risk of harm involved with participation in this study.   Any information discussed will 
remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others 
who take part in the study. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Your participation will be kept entirely confidential. Any information discussed will remain confidential and 
all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in the study. 
 
You will be allocated a unique participant reference number at the point of starting the study and this will be 
used to identify participants anonymously.  All data resulting from the completion of the psychometric tests 
will be analysed at a group level and no individual scores will be identified.  All data resulting from the 
completion of questionnaires will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and data from the psychometric test 
will be stored in a password protected file accessible only to the lead researcher.  All anonymised data will 
be stored for five years after the completion of the PhD thesis, to allow time for publication.  All data will 
then be securely destroyed (i.e. paper data will be shredded and electronic data will be erased) once this 
time period has elapsed.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results will be typed up in the form of a formal PhD thesis and submitted for assessment at Coventry 
University.  The research will also be written up in the form of academic papers and submitted for 
publication in academic, peer-reviewed journals and presentation at conferences.  In these instances, data 
will be presented as a group rather than individual data and individual participants will remain anonymous.  
The police forces involved will not be named unless approval is given by the ACC of the force and individual 




Lead researcher’s name: Miss Amy Grubb (Lecturer in Forensic Psychology) 
Telephone number: 0247 688 8795; Email: amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk – preferred method of contact. 
Director of studies supervising PhD: Dr Sarah Brown (Reader in Forensic Psychology Development) 





Appendix 37.  Consent Form (HCN Sample) 
Participant Reference Number……………………… 
 
Consent Form: Hostage Negotiator Sample 
 
Project Title: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within 
the UK" 
 
Please read the following statements and complete the form below to indicate that you 
consent to taking part in the research. 
 
Name of researcher: Amy Grubb 
Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant  
 information sheet for the above study.  
 
2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to consider the information,  
ask questions and have had these questions answered satisfactorily. 
 
1. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
 withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
2. I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential 
 and that my identity will be kept anonymous. 
 
3. I understand that the data will be treated according to the British 
 Psychological Society Code of Ethics and the study will be reviewed 
by Coventry University’s ethics committee. 
 
4. I understand that that the information I provide will be used and  
 analysed for research purposes, and the findings may be published 
 in an academic journal, presented at academic conferences and 
disseminated to police forces and the participants of the study. 
 
5. I understand that I may be asked to take part in an additional component 
 of the research project, an interview, and that I am under no obligation  
to take part. 
 
6. I understand that I can request that any information I provide will be  
 destroyed upon request. 
 
7. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
____________________            _____________                  ______________________ 







Appendix 38.  Consent Form (Police Officer Sample) 
Participant Reference Number……………………… 
 
Consent Form: Police Officer (NON-NEGOTIATOR) Sample 
 
Project: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the 
UK" 
 
Please read the following statements and complete the form below to indicate that you 
consent to taking part in the research. 
 
Name of researcher: Amy Grubb 
 
             Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant  
information sheet for the above study.  
 
2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to consider the information,  
ask questions and have had these questions answered satisfactorily. 
 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
4. I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential 
and that my identity will be kept anonymous. 
 
5. I understand that the data will be treated according to the British 
 Psychological Society Code of Ethics and the study will be reviewed 
by Coventry University’s ethics committee. 
 
6. I understand that that the information I provide will be used and  
 analysed for research purposes, and the findings may be published 
 in an academic journal, presented at academic conferences and 
disseminated to police forces and the participants of the study. 
 
7. I understand that I can request that any information I provide will be  
 destroyed upon request. 
 
8. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
____________________            ______________  ______________________ 






Appendix 39.  Consent Form (Student Sample) 
Participant Reference Number …………… 
 
Consent Form  
(Student Sample) 
 
Project Title: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within 
the UK" 
 
Name of researcher: Amy Grubb 
 
Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant  
information sheet for the above study.  
 
2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to consider the information,  
ask questions and have had these questions answered satisfactorily. 
 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
4. I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential 
and that my identity will be kept anonymous. 
 
5. I understand that the data will be treated according to the British 
 Psychological Society Code of Ethics and the study will be reviewed 
by Coventry University’s ethics committee. 
 
 
6. I understand that that the information I provide will be used and  
 analysed for research purposes, and the findings may be published 
 in an academic journal, presented at academic conferences and 
disseminated to police forces and the participants of the study. 
 
 
7. I understand that I can request that any information I provide will be  
 destroyed upon request. 
 
 
8. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
____________________            ______________  ______________________ 





Appendix 40.  Participant Debrief Sheet (Police Officer Sample) 
Participant Reference Number…………………… 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
(Police Officer Sample) 
 
Thank you for completing this research study. The aim of the study is to investigate crisis/hostage negotiation 
from a UK police perspective.  This stage of the research involves the investigation of a number of specific 
factors which may help to make an “effective negotiator”.  These factors include: personality, decision-making 
style, coping style, emotion regulation and emotional intelligence.  Previous research indicates that these factors 
may help individuals to cope more effectively within stressful situations.   
 
In line with previous research looking at coping and performance within stressful situations, it is hypothesised 
that hostage negotiators will be:  
 
a) more likely than police officers or the general public to possess certain personality traits,  
b) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain coping styles,  
c) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain cognitive coping strategies & methods of 
emotion regulation, 
d) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain decision-making styles,  
e) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise emotionally intelligent behaviours. 
 
Research shows that these constructs are all important elements within coping and performance in high stress 
occupations, such as hostage negotiation.  The data obtained from your questionnaires will be compared with 
data obtained from police hostage negotiators and a sample of the general public.  This will enable me to 
identify whether hostage negotiators display certain traits and characteristics more than others and as such will 
provide an insight into the skills, traits and characteristics that are required in order to be a competent police 
negotiator.  
 
The findings of this research will have implications in terms of police hostage negotiation recruitment, selection 
and training and will hopefully provide a basis for recommendations on the following aspects: 
 
 Psychometric tools that could be used in the selection of hostage negotiators  
 Psychometric tools that could be used to identify training needs of officers  
 Changes in policy in terms of selection, training and support of operationally active hostage negotiators. 
 
Should you want further information regarding any component of this study, please contact the researcher at 
the following address:   
 
Miss Amy Grubb, Lecturer in Forensic Psychology, Psychology Department, Coventry University, Priory Street, 
Coventry, CV1 5FB.  Tel: 02476 888 795, Fax: 02476 888 300, Email: amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk. 
 
Please note that you have the right to withdraw your data from the study up to two weeks following completion 
of the questionnaire.  If you would like to withdraw your data please contact me via email quoting your unique 
participant reference number (at the top right hand corner of this page). 
 
If at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please feel free to 
contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry Building, Coventry 
University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB.   Professor Marshall is independent of the research team and is 
responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry University Ethics Committee. 
 
I would like to thank you again for taking part in this study.  Your input is very much appreciated. 
  
Please return the completed questionnaire pack to the researcher at the address above using the prepaid 





Appendix 41.  Participant Debrief Sheet (Student Sample) 
Participant Reference Number …………… 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
(Student Sample) 
 
Project Title: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the UK" 
 
Thank you for completing this research study. The aim of the study is to investigate crisis/hostage negotiation 
from a UK police perspective.  This stage of the research involves the investigation of a number of specific 
factors which may help to make an “effective negotiator”.  These factors include: personality, decision-making 
style, coping style, emotion regulation and emotional intelligence.  Previous research indicates that these factors 
may help individuals to cope more effectively within stressful situations.   
 
In line with previous research looking at coping and performance within stressful situations, it is hypothesised 
that hostage negotiators will be:  
 
a) more likely than police officers or the general public to possess certain personality traits,  
b) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain coping styles,  
c) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain cognitive coping strategies & methods of 
emotion regulation, 
d) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain decision-making styles,  
e) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise emotionally intelligent behaviours. 
 
Research shows that these constructs are all important elements within coping and performance in high stress 
occupations, such as hostage negotiation.  The data obtained from your questionnaires will be compared with 
data obtained from police hostage negotiators and police officers (non-negotiators).  This will enable me to 
identify whether hostage negotiators display certain traits and characteristics more than others and as such will 
provide an insight into the skills, traits and characteristics that are required in order to be a competent police 
negotiator.  
 
The findings of this research will have implications in terms of police hostage negotiation recruitment, selection 
and training and will hopefully provide a basis for recommendations on the following aspects: 
 
 Psychometric tools that could be used in the selection of hostage negotiators  
 Psychometric tools that could be used to identify training needs of officers  
 Changes in policy in terms of selection, training and support of operationally active hostage negotiators. 
 





Miss Amy Grubb 







Tel: 02476 888 795 
Fax: 02476 888 300 
Email: Amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk – preferred method of contact 
 
I would like to thank you again for taking part in this study.  Your input is very much appreciated. 
